SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122876. February 17, 2000]
CHENIVER DECO
PRINT TECHNICS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION (SECOND DIVISION), CFW-MAGKAKAISANG LAKAS NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA CHENIVER DECO PRINT TECHNIC CORPORATION, EDGARDO VIGUESILLA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari
seeks to annul the resolution of public respondent promulgated on May 31, 1995,
in NLRC NCR CA 007946-94, and its resolution dated August 14, 1995, which
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner is a duly organized corporation
operating its printing business in Visita St., Barangay Sta. Cruz, Makati.
Private respondent CFW-Magkakaisang Lakas ng mga Manggagawa sa Cheniver Deco
Print Technic Corporation is a registered labor union affiliated with the
Confederation of Free Workers (CFW). Private respondent Edgardo Viguesilla and
twenty-two (22) others are members of aforesaid union and former employees of
petitioner.
The records disclose that on June 5, 1992,
petitioner informed its workers about the transfer of the company from its site
in Makati to Sto. Tomas, Batangas. Petitioner decided to relocate its business
in view of the expiration of the lease contract on the premises it occupied in
Makati and the refusal of the lessor to renew the same. Earlier, the local
authorities also took action to force out petitioner from Makati because of the
alleged hazards petitioner’s plant posed to the residents nearby.
In view of the impending transfer,
petitioner gave its employees up to the end of June 1992 to inform management
of their willingness to go with petitioner, otherwise, it would hire
replacements. On June 27, 1992, petitioner reminded its workers of the following
schedule to be followed:
June 29, 1992 - last
day of operation in Makati
July 1-31, 1992 - temporary
shutdown to give way to transfer of operation
August 1, 1992 - start
of operation at new site in Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On August 4, 1992, petitioner wrote its
employees to report to the new location within seven days, otherwise, they
would be considered to have lost interest in their work and would be replaced.
Five days later, the union advised petitioner that its members are not willing
to go along with the transfer to the new site. Nonetheless, petitioner gave its
workers additional time within which to report to the new work place. Later on,
the labor federation informed petitioner that the employees decided to continue
working for petitioner. However, not one reported for work at petitioner’s new
site. It appears that several employees namely, Edgar Paquit, Dexter Mitschek,
Nicanor Quebec, Maricris Polvorosa, Vicente Solis, Eugene De la Cruz, Rodel
Gomez, Marylin Macaraig, Diomedis Poblio, Albert Pimentel, Marieta Ramos,
Gilbert Saquibal, Marlon Tafalla, Eduardo Jolbitado, Solitario Andres, Maria
Cecilia Perez and Wilfredo Flores, decided not to work at the new site but just
opted to be paid financial assistance offered by petitioner.
On the other hand, the remaining workers
(private respondents herein) filed a complaint against petitioner for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of legal
holiday pay, 13th month pay, incentive leave pay and separation pay. On October
27, 1994, the labor arbiter rendered a decision declaring the transfer of
petitioner’s operation valid and absolving petitioner of the charges of unfair
labor practice and illegal dismissal. However, the labor arbiter directed
petitioner to pay private respondents their separation pay and other money
claims as well as attorney’s fees, decreeing as follows:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring
respondent company not guilty of unfair labor practice. (ULP);
2. Declaring respondent
company not guilty of illegal dismissal and illegal lay-off but directing it to
pay the individual complaints their separation pay, to wit:
a) Adeser,
Tarcisio ----------- P 20,280.00
b) Albino,
Silveria ----------- 36,816.00
c) Arizala, Imelda ----------- 18,408.00
d) Canares, Danilo ----------- 36,816.00
e) Carin, Elena ---------- 12,272.00
f) Cabanatan,
Lourdes ----------- 9,204.00
g) Dizon, Juanito ----------- 12,272.00
h) Domingo, Salome -------- 24,544.00
i) Esguerra,
Bonifacio ---------- 21,476.00
j) Famillaran,
Benjamin ----------- 27,612.00
k) Gabucan, Amelia ------------ 15,340.00
l) Ibardolaza,
Hadjie ------------- 21,476.00
m) Jores, Nelita ------------- 18,408.00
n) Largadas, Mario ------------- 9,204.00
o) Mitschek,
Dexter ------------- 33,748.00
p) Paquit, Edgar ------------- 15,340.00
q) Panotes, Roel ------------- 12,272.00
r) Pedrigosa,
Lerma ------------- 18,408.00
s) Pedrigosa, Liza ------------- 18,408.00
t) Ulzoron,
Yolanda ------------- 9,204.00
u) Viguesilla,
Edgardo ------------ 21,476.00
v) Viray, Ruel ---------------- 9,204.00
_____________
P 422,188.00
3. Directing
respondent company to pay complainants the sum of P280,010.00 as to their other
money claims aforestated, distributed as follows:
a) Adeser,
Tarcisio ---------------- P
5,330.00
b) Albino,
Silveria -------------- 13,080.00
c) Arizala, Imelda -------------- 13,080.00
d) Canares, Danilo -------------- 13,080.00
e) Carin, Elena -------------- 13,080.00
f) Cabanatan,
Lourdes ------------- 13,080.00
g) Dizon, Juanito -------------- 13,080.00
h) Domingo, Salome -------------- 13,080.00
i) Esguerra,
Bonifacio ------------- 13,080.00
j) Famillaran,
Benjamin ----------- 13,080.00
k) Gabucan, Amelia -------------- 13,080.00
l) Ibardolaza,
Hadjie -------------- 13,080.00
m) Jores, Nelita -------------- 13,080.00
n) Largadas, Mario -------------- 13,080.00
o) Mitschek,
Dexter -------------- 13,080.00
p) Paquit, Edgar -------------- 13,080.00
q) Panotes, Roel -------------- 13,080.00
r) Pedrigosa,
Lerma -------------- 13,080.00
s) Pedrigosa, Liza -------------- 13,080.00
t) Ulzoron,
Yolanda -------------- 13,080.00
u) Viguesilla,
Edgardo ------------ 13,080.00
v) Viray, Ruel -------------- 13,080.00
______________
P 280,010.00
4. Directing
respondent company to pay complainants attorney’s fees of ten (10%) percent
based on the totality of the monetary award.
Other claims are
hereby dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED."[1]
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed with
modification the decision of the labor arbiter by deleting the award of
attorney’s fees, thus:
"For all of
the foregoing the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with modification
that the award of attorney’s fees be deleted for lack of legal and factual
basis.
SO ORDERED."[2]
Its motion for reconsideration having been
denied, petitioner filed the instant petition alleging that public respondent
committed grave abuse of discretion in:
"I
AFFIRMING THE
LABOR ARBITER’S AWARD OF SEPARATION PAY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS;
II
AFFIRMING THE
AWARD OF OTHER MONEY CLAIMS TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WITHOUT BASIS IN FACT AND
[IN] LAW AS SHOWN BY LACK OF COMPUTATION OF THE SAME."[3]
Petitioner contends that the transfer of its
business is neither a closure nor retrenchment, hence, separation pay should
not be awarded to the private respondents. It also avers that private
respondents were not terminated from the service but they resigned from their
job because they find the new work site too far from their residences.
The foregoing contention lacks factual and
legal basis, hence, bereft of merit.
Broadly speaking, there appears no complete
dissolution of petitioner’s business undertaking but the relocation of
petitioner’s plant to Batangas, in our view, amounts to cessation of
petitioner’s business operations in Makati. It must be stressed that the phrase
"closure or cessation of operation of an establishment or undertaking not
due to serious business losses or reverses" under Article 283 of the Labor
Code includes both the complete cessation of all business operations and the
cessation of only part of a company’s business.[4] In Philippine
Tobacco Flue-Curing & Redrying Corp. vs. NLRC,[5] a company transferred its tobacco processing plant
in Balintawak, Quezon City to Candon, Ilocos Sur. The company therein did not
actually close its entire business but merely relocated its tobacco processing
and redrying operations to another place. Yet, this Court considered the
transfer as closure not due to serious business losses for which the workers
are entitled to separation pay.
There is no doubt that petitioner has
legitimate reason to relocate its plant because of the expiration of the lease
contract on the premises it occupied. That is its prerogative. But even though
the transfer was due to a reason beyond its control, petitioner has to accord
its employees some relief in the form of severance pay. Thus, in E. Razon,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,[6] petitioner therein provides arrastre services in all
piers in South Harbor, Manila, under a management contract with the Philippine
Ports Authority. Before the expiration of the term of the contract, the PPA
cancelled the said contract resulting in the termination of employment of
workers engaged by petitioner. Obviously, the cancellation was not sought, much
less desired by petitioner. Nevertheless, this Court required petitioner
therein to pay its workers separation pay in view of the cessation of its arrastre
operations.
Now, let it be noted that the termination of
employment by reason of closure or cessation of business is authorized under
Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides:
"ART. 283.
Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. -- The employer may
terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing
is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a
written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least
one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to
the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected
thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one
(1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures
or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1) whole year."
Consequently, petitioner herein must pay his
employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of
service. Since the closure of petitioner’s business is not on account of
serious business losses, petitioner shall give private respondents separation
pay equivalent to at least one (1) month or one-half (1/2) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher.
Petitioner’s contention that private
respondents resigned from their jobs, does not appear convincing. As public
respondent observed, the subsequent transfer of petitioner to another place
hardly accessible to its workers resulted in the latter’s untimely separation
from the service not to their own liking, hence, not construable as
resignation.[7] Resignation must be voluntary and made with the
intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied with an act of
relinquishment.[8] Indeed, it would have been illogical for private
respondents herein to resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Resignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint.[9]
As to petitioner’s assertion that private
respondents resorted to forum shopping, the same deserves scant consideration.
As noted by the Solicitor General, private respondents’ claims in this case are
based on underpayment of wages, legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay
and 13th month pay. On the other hand, the other cases
separately filed in different fora by Danilo Canares, Aurelia Gabucan, Dexter
Mitschek and Ruel Viray involved different issues which are distinct and have
no bearing on the case at bar.[10] The case pursued by Canares is for diminution of
salary on account of his demotion which was decided in his favor with finality
by this Court;[11] Gabucan’s case involves reinstatement to her job;
Mitschek’s case pertains to diminution of his salary; and Viray’s complaint was
dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Thus, there is no basis
for petitioner’s forum shopping charge as the instant case and the others do
not raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.[12]
Lastly, petitioner alleges that claims of
other private respondents have already been paid upon the enforcement of the
order dated February 26, 1992 in case number NRC-00-9112-CI-001. This is not
correct. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the aforesaid order
refers to the enforcement of Wage Order No. NCR-02 mandating P2.00 wage
increase.[13] Certainly, the wage differential received by private
respondents by virtue of the mandated wage increase is different from the
monetary benefits herein being claimed by private respondents. Hence, public
respondent cannot be faulted for grave abuse of discretion on this score.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed
RESOLUTIONS of public respondent are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., on official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp. 23-25.
[2] Id. at 29.
[3] Id. at 9.
[4] Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.) Inc. vs. NLRC, 194 SCRA 592, 599 (1991).
[5] 300 SCRA 37 (1998).
[6] 222 SCRA 1, 7 (1993).
[7] Rollo, p. 28.
[8] Pascua vs. NLRC, 287 SCRA 554, 567 (1998).
[9] Valdez vs. NLRC, 286 SCRA 87, 94 (1998).
[10] Rollo, p. 141.
[11] Cheniver Deco Print Technics Corp. vs. NLRC, GR-119841, June 5, 1995.
[12] International Container Terminal Services Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 389, 394-395 (1995).
[13] Rollo, p. 142.