SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114740. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO GALAM,[1] accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the decision dated November 26,
1993, of the Regional Trial Court[2] of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, Branch 47, in
Criminal Case No. 8194, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder,
imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of the victim, Roberto Balasanos, the amount of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs. Slxsä c
The facts of the case on record are as
follows:
On June 10, 1989, at around 11:00 o’clock in
the evening, while Jose Medina was on his way to the store of a certain Hidalgo
in Malis, Brooke’s Point, Palawan, he chanced upon appellant Rogelio Galam and
another unidentified man, walking in the same direction. Medina noticed that
appellant appeared to be carrying a long gun wrapped inside a jacket, placed
under his right armpit. Upon reaching the store, Medina bought a cigarette.
When he was about to leave, appellant likewise entered the store. Suddenly,
five gun shots rang out in the night. Medina saw appellant pointing the gun at
the victim, Roberto Balasanos, who was hit on the chest and his sides. The
victim leaned weakly on a star-apple tree. Medina was about five (5) meters
from the victim, and about ten (10) meters from appellant during the incident.
While it was dark on the road, there was a lighted fluorescent lamp, which
illuminated the scene of the incident. Shocked at the incident, Medina and the
other persons milling around the store scampered away. Appellant merely walked
away, and nobody dared to stop him.[3]
On August 4, 1989, appellant was charged
with the crime of "Murder with the use of firearm" under the
following Information:[4]
"That on or
about the 10th day of June, 1989, in the evening, near the public market at
Barangay Malis, Municipality of Brooke’s Point, Province of Palawan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with a firearm, with evident premeditation and treachery, and
with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot with his firearm one ROBERTO BALASANOS hitting him on
the vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him physical injuries, to wit:
Gunshot wounds on
1. Mid-epigastric
area;
2. Left upper
Quadrant of abdomen;
3. Left anterior
axillary line, and
4. Left mid
axillary line
through and
through, hitting his lungs, anterior spleen and hear that caused hemorrhage and
cardiac tamponade which were the direct and immediate cause of his
instantaneous death. slxä mis
CONTRARY TO LAW
with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, the accused having employed
means which tend directly to insure its execution without risk to the accused,
by the use of a firearm, and under the cover of darkness (nighttime).
Puerto Princesa
City, Philippines, August 4, 1989."
On December 14, 1989, upon arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Pre-trial having been waived,[5] trial commenced. Missdaa
The prosecution presented four (4)
witnesses, namely (1) Jose Medina, a 20 year-old farmer who witnessed the
shooting incident; (2) Patricio Imperial, a 57 year-old farmer who testified
that he was present when the victim was shot, but he did not actually see the
gunman;[6] (3) Marciana Balasanos, the widow of the victim, who
testified as to the damages she sustained as a result of the death of her
husband;[7] and (4) Dra. Alma Feliciano Rivera, Medical Officer
III of the Palawan Provincial Hospital, who interpreted the Partial Autopsy
Report issued by Dr. Narciso B. Leoncio, M.D., since the prosecution and
defense agreed to dispense with the presentation of Dr. Leoncio. The defense
admitted the due execution and genuineness of the Partial Autopsy Report and
the Certificate of Death.[8] Dr. Rivera testified that the cause of death of the
victim was the four (4) gunshot wounds which were all fatal and could cause
instant death.[9]
For his part, appellant invoked the defense
of denial and alibi. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was at
his house in Samariniana, Brooke’s Point, Palawan, which is some eight (8)
kilometers from the locus criminis. He spent the entire night tending to
the sick two (2) year-old son of his friend, Nilda Maranan. His testimony was
corroborated by two witnesses, Primitivo Bahande, the faith healer (arbulario)
who treated the malaria-stricken child for two (2) days, and Nilda Maranan
herself, who testified that appellant and Bahande were with her throughout that
same night.[10]
After due trial, on November 26, 1993, the
trial court rendered a decision, disposing thus: SdaÓ adsc
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the prosecution having successfully proven its case, the
Court hereby finds the herein accused, ROGELIO GALAM guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder charged against him in the above-captioned case as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code without any
mitigating circumstance whatsoever, and it hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim,
ROBERTO BALASANOS the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as compensatory
damages; THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as moral damages; and TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as corrective or exemplary damages; and to pay the
costs."
Hence, the present appeal. Appellant assigns
the following errors:[11]
A. THE
IDENTIFICATION MADE ON APPELLANT GALAM WAS PURELY CONJECTURAL AND BY MERE
INFERENCE. JOSE MEDINA’S TESTIMONY IS FATALLY FLAWED ON TWO (2) PIVOTAL POINTS
NAMELY:
1. HE DID NOT
ACTUALLY AND DIRECTLY SEE APPELLANT GALAM IN THE POSSESSION OF A LONG FIREARM
AS HE ONLY PRESUMED THAT WHAT APPELLANT WAS CARRYING WAS A GUN CONCEALED INSIDE
A JACKET UNDER APPELLANT’S ARMPIT.
2. HE DID NOT
ACTUALLY AND DIRECTLY SEE APPELLANT GALAM SHOOT THE VICTIM AS (i) HIS VISION
WAS TURNED AWAY FROM APPELLANT AT THE PRECISE MOMENT THAT THE EXPLOSION OF
GUNFIRE OCCURRED; AND (ii) IT WAS THE SOUND OF GUNFIRE WHICH PROMPTED JOSE
MEDINA TO TURN IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOURCE OF THE GUNFIRE, WHICH HE SURMISED
CAME FROM APPELLANT SINCE HE SPECULATED THAT APPELLANT WAS BRINGING A FIREARM
HIDDEN UNDER A JACKET.
B. IT FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI BY DEFENDANT. RtcÓ spped
C. NOT AN IOTA OF
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO DISTINCTLY AND CONCLUSIVELY PROVE THE ELEMENT OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE CRIME TO MURDER.
Appellant anchors his appeal on the
credibility of Jose Medina’s testimony and his alleged failure as prosecution
witness to sufficiently identify appellant as the gunman in the shooting
incident. Appellant argues that in the face of this questionable
identification, the trial court erred in not giving due credence to appellant’s
defense of alibi, which was corroborated by his two witnesses. He further
contends that the prosecution failed to present evidence to prove the existence
of evident premeditation and treachery. Korteä
For the State, the Office of the Solicitor
General raises the issues as follows: (1) Was the eyewitness account of Jose
Medina sufficient to convict? (2) Was the crime committed murder? The OSG
points out that prosecution witness Medina actually saw appellant fire at the
victim as the events unfolded before his very eyes from a distance of mere ten
(10) meters in a well-lighted place. Hence, his positive identification should
prevail over appellant’s alibi. The OSG also contends that treachery qualified
the killing to murder because of the suddenness of the attack on the victim,
who was unarmed and had no chance at all to defend himself. Sclawä
On the issue of credibility of witnesses, we
abide by the well-entrenched rule that the "findings of the trial court as
to the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight, even finality, on
appeal, unless the trial court has failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result
of the case. Having had the opportunity to personally observe and analyze their
demeanor and manner of testifying, the trial judge is in a better position to
pass judgment on their credibility."[12] In his Brief, appellant emphasizes the following
portions of Medina’s testimony which he claims demonstrate the prosecution’s
failure to sufficiently identify him as the assailant:
(1) Medina said in his sworn statement -
"Noon po ay nasalubong ko si Giliong (appellant) at may kasamang isa
pero hindi ko makilala masyado, kasi madilim. Mayroong bitbit si Giliong na sa
aking palagay po ay baril kasi po itinatago po sa bandang kanan ng kanyang
katawan, x x x"[13]
(2) Further, on the witness stand, Medina
testified that "I did not really see the gun because it was wrapped in
a jacket. xxx It was placed under his right armpit ..."[14]
(3) As to the actual shooting incident,
Medina testified that "when he (Medina) was about to go away, and then
(sic) something exploded."[15]
Appellant contends that these excerpts prove
two things - that Medina did not actually see appellant carrying a firearm on
the night of June 10, 1989, and that he did not see appellant fire at the
victim. It is noteworthy, however, that appellant does not allege any inconsistencies
in Medina’s testimony, but merely hammers on his alleged lack of perception as
to the actual shooting incident. We have scrutinized the excerpts cited in the
context of Medina’s entire testimony, and find that Medina categorically
testified on two crucial points - first, Medina saw appellant at the locus
criminis that fateful night, and second, Medina actually saw
appellant fire at the victim. We have repeatedly held that "a witness’
testimony must be considered and calibrated in its entirety, and not by
truncated portions or isolated passages thereof."[16] For better appreciation, Medina’s answer in the
aforequoted Sinumpaang Salaysay is quoted hereunder in full:[17]
"05. - T -
Ano po ang pangyayari na naganap at iyong nasaksihan noon? ScÓ lex
- S - Noon po ay
nasalubong ko si Guiliong (appellant) at maykasamang isa pero hindi ko makilala
masyado, kasi madilim. Mayroong bitbit si Giliong pero na sa aking palagay ay
baril, kasi po itinatago po sa bandang kanan ng kanyang katawan, hindi naglipat
saglit ay nakarinig po ako ng putok ng baril, nakita kong nanggaling mula
kay Giliong ang putok ng baril na mahaba at nakita ko rin po ang nabaril.
Nakarinig ako ng limang putok ng baril at kitang kita ko na patumba ang tao na
tinamaan ng bala, kasi mayroong liwanag na nanggaling mula sa sayawan at sa
tindahan nina DUK, kaya saksi ako sa pagbaril na iyon." (underlining
supplied)[18]
From the transcripts of stenographic notes
covering witness Medina’s testimony[19] emerges a clear picture of the shooting incident, as
follows: xä
law
"PROSECUTOR
DELOVINO
Q: That night,
where did you see Giliong (appellant)?
A: On the road,
Ma’am.
COURT:
Q: What happened?
A: When I saw him
we walked together.
PROSECUTOR
DELOVINO
Q: What happened
after that?
A: He was carrying
a long gun, Ma’am.
Q: Could you
describe what kind of gun was that?
A: I did not
really see the gun because it was wrapped in a jacket.
Q: Where was that
gun?
A: It was placed
under his right armpit, Ma’am.
COURT:
Q: What happened
after that?
A: He entered a
house where there was a store, Your Honor.
Q: Who entered?
A: Guiliong (sic),
Your Honor.
Q: Then?
A: When he entered
I was about to go away and then something exploded, Your Honor. Scä
COURT: Proceed.
PROSECUTOR
DELOVINO:
Q: What was it
that exploded?
A: It was a gun,
Ma’am.
Q: Where did the
explosion come from?
COURT:
Q: Who fired
that gun?
A: It was fired
by Guiliong, Your Honor.
Q: You saw
this?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: To whom was
the gun directed?
A: It was
pointed to one of our companions, Your Honor.
Q: Who was that
companion of yours?
A: It was
pointed towards, Berto (Roberto Balasanos, the victim), Your Honor.
COURT: Proceed.
PROSECUTOR
DELOVINO:
Q: What is the
complete name of Berto? ScmisÓ
A: I don’t know,
Ma’am.
Q: What happened
to Berto after that?
A: He died." MisÓ sc
As correctly observed by the trial court,
Medina testified in clear, categorical manner as to the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the crime. His testimony in court was at all
fours with his previous sworn statement executed some four years prior. He was
acquainted with appellant, known to him as "Giliong," for almost a
year prior to the shooting incident. He was but a mere five (5) meters away
from the victim when he was shot, and a mere ten (10) meters from the appellant.
More importantly, his testimony as to the gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim was corroborated by the Partial Autopsy Report, whose due execution and
authenticity were duly admitted by the defense. Further, the defense could not
attribute any motive for him to falsely testify against appellant. Absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and his testimony is
thus worthy of full faith and credit.[20] Although Medina was the sole eyewitness to the crime,
we have long held that the testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to
support a conviction, so long as it is clear, straightforward and worthy of
credence by the trial court."[21]
As to the defense of alibi, the trial court
dismissed his version of the story as a "rehearsed scenario" and
"tailored to fit and suit the defense of alibi." The trial court did
not find it physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis
since there were vehicles plying the eight-kilometer road between Malis and
Samariniana. For alibi to be considered, it is not enough to prove that
appellant was somewhere else when the offense was committed. It must likewise
be shown that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.[22] Thus while appellant testified that he was at
Samariniana at the time of the commission of the offense, his testimony is
bereft of any explanation that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at the scene of the crime. Further, prosecution witness Medina
practically demolished appellant’s alibi when he testified that appellant was
at the locus criminis on the night of the incident. In view of
appellant’s positive identification as the assailant, his alibi holds no water.
The rule is that the positive and categorical assertions of witnesses generally
prevail over bare denials.[23]
Based on the foregoing testimonial and
documentary evidence, we agree with the trial court’s finding that appellant’s
identity as the killer of Roberto Balasanos has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. MisÓ
spped
We now come to the proper determination of
crime committed, in view of the attending circumstances. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery attended the killing as the two conditions for the
same are present, i.e., (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously
adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.[24] The attack was not only sudden, it was unexpected, as
the victim even cried out in surprise "Why are you firing at me, I have
not done anything wrong!"[25] Further, appellant deliberately or consciously
adopted the means of attack as shown by the fact that he even wrapped the gun
inside a jacket prior to shooting the victim. Sppedâ
However, evident premeditation cannot be
appreciated inasmuch as the following elements were not duly proven: (1) the
time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow the offender
to reflect on the consequences of his act.[26]
Nor can the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime be appreciated, for the prosecution failed to demonstrate (1) that
the malefactor particularly sought or took advantage of the darkness to commit
the offense, or (2) that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime.[27] Although the crime took place at around 11:00 in the
evening, the store/house where the incident occurred was sufficiently lighted
by a fluorescent lamp,[28] and there were still people milling around because
of the dance held at a nearby plaza. Joä spped
As to damages, the award of P50,000.00 as
compensatory or actual damages must be disallowed since it is not supported by
receipts.[29] However, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the
amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity under our current rulings.[30] The award of moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00, being supported by the testimony of the victim’s widow, is
sustained under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. Under Article 2230 of
the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed "when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances." There being no
aggravating circumstances, the award of P20,000.00 as corrective or exemplary
damages should be deleted. Sppedä jo
At the time of the commission of the crime
in 1989, the penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was
reclusion temporal maximum to death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for murder should be imposed in its medium period, which is reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding
appellant Rogelio Galam guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATIONS
as to the amount of damages. Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and the amount of
P30,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is deleted for lack
of legal basis. Costs against appellant. Miso
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] The Information and Decision do not indicate the
middle name of appellant.
[2] Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., presiding.
[3] TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 2-17; Sworn Statement
dated June 15, 1989, executed by Jose Medina y Honterial before TSG Jose T.
Auditor at the 264th PC/INP Company, Pangobilian, Brooke’s Point, Palawan.
[4] Records, pp. 1-2.
[5] Records, p. 54.
[6] TSN, November 15, 1991, pp. 4-5.
[7] Id. at 9-15.
[8] TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 20-21; Exhibits
"B" and "C," Records, pp. 145-146.
[9] TSN, July 8, 1993, pp. 12-22.
[10] TSN, October 19, 1993, pp. 4-6, 16-19; October 20,
1993, pp. 4-20.
[11] Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[12] People v. Batidor, G.R. No. 126027, February 18,
1999, p. 10.
[13] Rollo, p. 83.
[14] Id. at 84.
[15] Id. at 86.
[16] People v. Gaorana, 289 SCRA 652, 662 (1998); People
v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463, 477 (1997); People v. Butron, 272 SCRA 352, 363
(1997); People v. Sagaral, 267 SCRA 671, 679 (1997); People v. Natan, 193 SCRA
355, 362 (1991).
[17] Records, p. 143.
[18] "
0.5. – Q : What was the event which you witnessed then?
A: I met Guiliong at that
time and he was accompanied by somebody whom I couldn’t clearly recognize as it
was too dark. Guiliong was carrying an object, which seemed like a firearm. I
couldn’t clearly see it as he was keeping it hidden along the right side of his
body. After some seconds had elapsed, I heard a gunshot and saw the flash of
the firearm, a long firearm, coming from Guiliong. I saw the person who was
shot. I heard five gunshots and I saw the victim who was hit, fall. I saw all
these hence, there was some illumination coming from the dance party and from
the store of DUK, that’s why I was a witness to shooting."
[19] TSN, November 12, 1991, pp. 5-6.
[20] People v. Platilla, G.R. No. 126123, March 9, 1999,
p. 15.
[21] Id. at 14.
[22] People v. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999,
p. 16.
[23] People v. Atrejenio, G.R. No. 120160, July 13, 1999,
pp. 15-16.
[24] People v. Gutierrez, Jr., G.R. No. 116281, February
8, 1999, p. 23.
[25] TSN, November 15, 1991, p. 4.
[26] People v. Maldo, G.R. No. 131347, May 19, 1999, p.
19.
[27] People v. Pallarco, 288 SCRA 151, 170 (1998).
[28] Supra; People v. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658,
670-671 (1995).
[29] People v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 113787, January 28,
1999, p. 17.
[30] People v. Verde, G.R. No. 119077, February 10, 1999,
p. 17; People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, 716 (1997).