THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104314. February 2, 2000]
HEIRS OF
NEPOMUCENA PAEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RAMON AM. TORRES, Presiding
Judge, N Branch 6, RTC, Cebu City and HEIRS OF EDILBERTO OSMEÑA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of
the Orders of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City, dated November
26, 1991 and January 22, 1992, respectively, dismissing the Complaint in Civil
Case No. CEB-10159, as against the herein private respondents, a set of
defendants below, and denying the latter’s motion for reconsideration.
The present controversy involves two (2)
parcels of land (Lots 5829 and 5830 of the Cebu Cadastre) in Punta Princesa,
Cebu, which were allegedly owned by petitioners’ predecessor, NEPOMUCENA PAEZ,
but were allegedly included fraudulently in the Petition for Reconstitution of
the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) of the late Don Sergio Osmeña.
Petitioners, heirs of Nepomucena Paez,
lodged a Complaint for Declaration of Nullities of Certificates of Title,
Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Reconveyance and Damages, docketed as
CEB-10159 below, against the heirs of Don Sergio Osmeña and the persons whose
certificates of title were derived from the reconstituted certificates of title
of Don Sergio Osmeña over subject parcels of land. Manikx
Private respondents are the children-heirs
of Edilberto Osmeña (a son of Don Sergio Osmeña), who are a set of defendants
in the case below, and who interposed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for
Failure to State a Cause of Action, which motion was granted by the court a
quo.
The facts of the case, as may be gleaned
from the complaint of petitioners (plaintiffs below) are as follows:
Nepomucena Paez was the owner of two (2)
parcels of land in Punta Princesa, Cebu, evidenced by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 8309 issued in her name on June 24, 1921.
Sometime in 1926, Nepomucena Paez-Cabansay
died. Unknown to her other children, her son, Victor Cabansay, who took care of
her in Cebu while she was still alive, brought with him the owner’s duplicate
copy of OCT No. 8309 when he migrated to Mindanao.
In 1947, elders of the Cabansay clan
(petitioners’ predecessors) were prevented by persons under the employ of Don
Sergio Osmeña from harvesting fruits from Lots 5829 and 5830. They
(petitioners’ predecessors) began their long search for any record or document
to prove the ownership of subject lots of their ancestor, Nepomucena
Paez-Cabansay, but they failed. Most if not all the pertinent records in the
Registry of Deeds were lost or destroyed during the last world war. The owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT. No. 8309 could not also be found.
In 1987, they found in Manila the owner’s
duplicate copy of OCT No. 8309 in the possession of Cirilo Cabansay, who,
because of his limited education, kept said document left by his deceased
uncle, Victor Cabansay, inside a "caban" without knowing its
significance. On May 18, 1990, on the basis of such owner’s duplicate copy
thereof, OCT No. 8309 covering Lots 5829 and 5830 was duly reconstituted in the
name of Nepomucena Paez.[1]
In 1991, the petitioners filed a Complaint,
docketed as CEB-10159, against the heirs of Don Sergio Osmeña and the latter’s
successors-in-interest, since they discovered for the first time in 1989 that
TCT No. RT-686 and TCT No. RT-687 covering Lots 5829 and 5830, respectively,
were reconstituted in the name of Don Sergio Osmeña.
As alleged in the said Complaint, on March
20, 1947 Esperanza Osmeña, spouse-attorney in fact of Don Sergio Osmeña, filed
a petition for the reconstitution of certificates of title of twenty seven (27)
parcels of land, fraudulently including Lots 5829 and 5830, as belonging to Don
Sergio Osmeña, even prior to the outbreak of the last world war. Relying on the
untruthful allegations in the petition that the certificates of title of Don
Sergio Osmeña covering said lots were lost or destroyed during the last world
war, the trial court of origin, in an Order, dated December 9, 1947, directed
the issuance of reconstituted certificates of title of all the twenty seven
(27) parcels of land in the name of Don Sergio Osmeña. Maniks
Upon the demise of Don Sergio Osmeña,
following the Project of Partition, dated December 31, 1963, executed by his
heirs, Lots 5829 and 5830 were adjudicated to Victor Osmeña and Edilberto
Osmeña (the immediate predecessor of the herein private respondents),
respectively.
TCT Nos. RT 686 and RT 687 covering Lots
5829 and 5830 in the name of Don Sergio Osmeña were cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT Nos. 28967 and 29068 were issued in the names of Victor Osmeña and
Edilberto Osmeña, respectively.
Subsequently, Victor Osmeña and Edilberto
Osmeña caused the subdivision of said lots. Except for some subdivision lots
still unsold, TCT Nos. 28967 and 29068 were cancelled and in lieu thereof, new
TCTs (TCT Nos. 39454 to 39691 and 29658 to 29666) covering the subdivision lots
were issued to the transferees, the other defendants in the case below.
Thus, the Complaint prayed, among others,
for the declaration of nullity of TCT No. RT-686 (for Lot 5829) and TCT No.
RT-687 (for Lot 5830) in the name of Don Sergio Osmeña and of the other TCTs
derived therefrom, and prayed for the restoration of their possession of
subject lots, and for an award of damages and attorneys fees in petitioners and
against the private respondents.[2]
On May 29, 1991, instead of sending in an
Answer, the herein private respondents (children-heirs of Edilberto Osmeña)
presented a Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that: (1) the complaint states no
cause of action as against them; and (2) the cause of action, if any, is barred
by the statute of limitations and by laches.[3]
More specifically, private respondents
contended that they cannot be faulted for the acts or omissions of their
predecessors with respect to the lots in question because they were either
minors or still unborn at the time of the commission or omission complained of;
and that petitioners cannot claim any title or rights over subject parcels of
land by right of subrogation, after having failed to assert such rights of
title for almost fifty (50) years.
On November 26, 1991, the trial court of
origin issued the Order of dismissal under attack on the ground that the
Complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action, as against the private
respondents.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial
court ratiocinated:
"xxx As to
them, the complaint states that notwithstanding the alleged fact that Lot No.
5830 was one of two lots covered by OCT No. 8309 in the name of the
predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs, the defendants-movants’
grandparents, fraudulently filed a petition for the reconstitution of TCT No.
6958 (par. 26 of complaint) which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. RT-687,
later on transferred to TCT No. 29068 in the name of Edilberto Osmeña, father
of the defendants-movants (pars. 28 and 30 of complaint); that Lot 5830 was
subdivided and TCT 29068 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCTs Nos. 29658 to
29666 were issued, still in the name of Edilberto Osmeña (par. 35 of
complaint); Edilberto Osmeña sold the subdivided lots to different vendees, who
are now the other co-defendants and new titles were issued in their respective
names.
x x x x x x x
x x Manikan
The allegations of
transfers of ownership of Lot 5830 referred only to Edilberto Osmeña and not to
any of the defendants-movants. x x x There are no allegations of any act or
omission on the part of any of the defendants-movants violative of the rights
of the plaintiffs or constituting a breach of any obligation of any of the
defendants-movants to the plaintiffs. Even in the allegations in pars. 40 and
41, none of the defendants-movants were informed of the existence of OCT No.
8309 when this matter was brought to the barangay captain for proceedings under
the Barangay Law.
xxx xxx xxx
There being no
cause of action as to the defendants-movants, the date of breach of the
plaintiff’s rights, cannot be determined by the court, hence there is no need
to discuss the second ground of the motion to dismiss."[4]
With the denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the assailed Order of dismissal, petitioners found their way
to this court via the instant petition; theorizing that the respondent court
seriously erred in dismissing the complaint, as against the herein private
respondents, thereby arbitrarily preventing petitioners from seeking a redress
of their grievances insofar as Lot 5830 was concerned.
Petitioners contend that since their
complaint states a sufficient cause of action against the deceased Edilberto
Osmeña, a legitimate son of the late Don Sergio Osmeña, it follows that there
is likewise a sufficient cause of action against the herein private
respondents, who are the children and forced heirs of the late Edilberto
Osmeña.
To buttress their submission, petitioners
invoked germane provisions of the Civil Code on general transmissibility of the
rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children and heirs, viz.:
1. Article 774 of
the Civil Code, by virtue of which private respondents succeeded to subject
parcels of land by operation of law, their lack of knowledge of the existence
of such properties, notwithstanding;
2. Article 1311 of
the Civil Code, which provides that hereditary assets are always liable in
their totality for the payment of debts of the estate;
3. Petitioners
further claim that subject parcels of land are registered under the Torrens
system. A Torrens title is not subject to prescription.[5]
Private respondents, on the other hand,
countered that there are no averments in the complaint showing that they were
privies to the subdividing and sale of subject lots to transferees nor are
there allegations therein that they received properties from their late father,
Edilberto Osmeña. Private respondents further argued that petitioners’ cause of
action, if any, is barred by prescription and laches.
The petition is impressed with merit. Oldmiso
As held in the case of Paredes vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court:
"‘In a motion
to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted
to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in
the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether those allegations
of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint.’
‘The test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint.’ (Garcon vs. Redemptorist Fathers,
17 SCRA 341)
If the allegations
of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but their veracity and
correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to deny the motion to
dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial to prove his
defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be ascertained at
the trial of the case on the merits. xxx"[6]
In the case under consideration,
petitioner’s cause of action sued upon is mainly for the declaration of nullity
of the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the late Don Sergio
Osmeña covering lots 5829 and 5830 of the Cebu Cadastre, allegedly procured
through fraud, and the subsequent certificates of title deriving their
existence from the said titles. Such being the scenario below, petitioners
should have been heard before the dismissal of their complaint, as against the
private respondents, who are the children and forced heirs of the late
Edilberto Osmeña, and who stand to succeed or inherit the properties or
proceeds from the sale of the properties sought to be recovered by the
petitioners.
Questions of fact raised by private
respondents, which petitioners dispute, viz.: that they (private respondents)
did not inherit a single centavo from their deceased father, Edilberto Osmeña,
that the petitioners remained silent or did nothing to assert their rights over
subject lots for the past fifty (50) years, barring therefore their claim by
reason of laches; and that petitioners’ title, which was reconstituted only in
1990, is based merely on a dubious machine copy of the owner’s duplicate copy,
can be ascertained at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the complaint.
Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
the rule in point, provides:
"Sec. 2. Hearing
of Motion. - At the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit
their arguments on the questions of law and their evidence on the
questions of fact involved except those not available at that time.
Should the case go to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall
automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the same."
(underscoring supplied) Ncm
The order of dismissal stated that the
complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action against the
defendants-movants as there was no allegation of any act or omission on the
part of the defendants-movants which violated the rights of the plaintiffs or
constituted a breach of any obligations to them. Defendants-movants claimed
that they were not privies to the alleged fraudulent procurement of the
reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the late Don Sergio Osmeña.
However, the complaint precisely impleaded the defendants-movants as the
successors-in-interest of Don Sergio Osmeña. Accordingly, the affirmative defense
raised by defendants-movants should have been heard before the dismissal of the
complaint. Otherwise petitioners would be barred from pursuing their action
without being accorded a hearing. Unlike a motion to dismiss based on the
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, which may be resolved
solely on the basis of the allegations of the complaint, the motion to dismiss
herein raised an affirmative defense that there is no cause of action as
against them. The motion thus posed a question of fact that should be resolved
after due hearing.
In a similar case where a complaint filed
below was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, this Court held:
"Without
hearing the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing her action. The plaintiff
should at least have been accorded a hearing. This is the least she is entitled
to. And this is true regardless of any strong opinion the court may have as to
the truthfulness of the document. No such hearing was held. Without hearing,
the plaintiff would be barred from pursuing her action and is to be deprived of
what she claims to be her property without being given an opportunity to affirm
or deny the validity of Exhibit B.
xxx xxx xxx
However,
petitioner should have been heard before dismissal of its complaint especially
because there is a stipulation in the Deed of Assignment which it executed in
favor of private respondent, that the nine (9) parcels of land subject of the
Deed were to be forfeited in favor of private respondent who could sell them to
any interested party if the loan of P100,000.00 remained unpaid on 1
October 1983, the very day petitioner allegedly tendered payment by check. Such
a precipitate deprivation of ownership should have been considered by the trial
court, at the very least, in requiring a hearing on the motion to dismiss, and
before actually dismissing the complaint, notwithstanding private respondent’s
attack on the validity of the tendered check and its character as legal
tender."[7]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the order of Branch 6 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, dismissing Civil Case CEB-10159, is SET
ASIDE; Civil Case CEB-10159 is REINSTATED and the respondent Regional Trial
Court is ordered to conduct a hearing on private respondents’ motion to dismiss
the Complaint.
Ncmmis
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.