EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4748.
August 4, 2000]
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant,
vs. ATTY. JOSE O. ALOVERA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Atty. Jose O.
Alovera, former Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City,
Branch 17, faces disbarment for having penned a Decision[1] dated January 30, 1995 long after
his retirement from the Judiciary on January 31, 1995 which ultimately divested
complainant Victoria V. Radjaie of her property in Panay, Capiz.
In an Affidavit-Complaint[2] filed before the Office of the Bar
Confidant on April 21, 1997,[3] complainant sought the disbarment
of respondent enumerating the following particulars to support her contention
that the questioned January 30, 1995 decision was prepared after the retirement
of respondent:
a) Almost
all orders issued by then Judge Alovera prior to his retirement bear the stamp
"RECEIVED" by Branch 17 of RTC-Roxas City, with the initial of the
one who received it for filing with the court-record except the Order of
January 25, 1995 (p. 87 records) admitting, and the Decision dated January 30,
1995 (pp. 88-93, ibid.).
b) It
can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the retirement were all
type-written in the same type-[writer] except the January 25, 1995 Order (p.
87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93) and these two (2) documents appear to have
been type-written on the same type-[writer].
c) It
is also a source of wonder why plaintiffs formally offered their evidence one
year after the last witness was presented last December 10, 1993.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiffs had until January 20,
1994 to formally offer their evidence but it took them one (1) year and five
(5) days to file such a simple pleading.
It goes against the normal human experience when plaintiffs who are
allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually very quick in having
things done because there is no opposition but in this case it took plaintiffs
a while to formally rest which was only fifteen (15) days prior to the
retirement of Mr. Alovera. This timing
is highly suspect.
d) Even
plaintiffs' formal offer of evidence showed badges of fraud. It was not received by the trial court. Page 67 shows this clearly. It would not be surprising if the same was
also inserted into the records on a much later date and Atty. Alberto Villaruz
must be made to explain this too.
It was dated January 20, 1995 but
the date of the Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz,
counsel for the plaintiffs, was issued only on January 31, 1995. This is shown
on Page 71 of the records.
e) There
is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) admitting the formal
offer was even received by a Court staff for filing with the records.
f) The
same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 88-93) which was
allegedly decided five (5) days after the Order admitting the evidence (p. 87)
was allegedly issued. What a swift
action from a retiring judge.
g) A
copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs but is
shown to have been received by one of the plaintiffs only on August 1, 1995 (p.
93).
h) Again,
it is beyond the normal experience for a lawyer such as Atty. Villaruz who is a
practitioner in the locality and who is in Court almost everyday that he will
not follow up if there is already a decision rendered in a case where he was
allowed to present evidence ex-parte or even be told about it.
i) The
records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr. Alovera bear the stamp
"RECEIVED" by the Court staff who received them for filing in the
court records.
Traversing the
allegations of the Affidavit-Complaint as purely speculative and not based on
personal knowledge, the respondent, in his Comment[4] dated August 20, 1997, further
assailed as simply self-serving complainant's Affidavit-Complaint alleging that
a careful scrutiny of the expediente of Civil Case No. V-6186 would reveal that
respondent observed due process when he resolved the said case against
complainant.[5] It was only when Judge Julius
Abela, who succeeded him in RTC, Br. 17, Roxas City, annulled, through a
resolution, the questioned January 30, 1995 decision, which ostensibly having
become final was also executed, did the matter get out of hand.[6] His said decision, respondent
argued, may only be impeached, annulled or otherwise set aside under three (3)
modes,[7] all of which were either not
availed of by complainant for lapse of time, or like an action to annul the
judgment, though still available, should not have been filed in the same court,
which rendered the questioned decision, but should have been filed, instead, in
the Court of Appeals.[8] As to the absence of stamp
"RECEIVED" on the questioned decision, respondent shifted the blame
to the then OIC Clerk of Court of the said court, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, contending
that after the decision was rendered on January 30, 1995, he lost control of it
and he surmised that Mrs. Aluad, who had the duty to receive and record the
decision, might have lost it "momentarily."[9]
In a Resolution[10] dated October 22, 1997, this Court
referred the instant case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation,
report and recommendation. While in the
process of investigation, three (3) incidents occurred, namely:
1. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Capiz Chapter, approved Resolution No.
9, Series of 1997 on December 17, 1997, questioning the order, dated November
28, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, which ordered the
suspension from the practice of law of herein respondent and Atty. Alberto
Villaruz;
2. The
Court En Banc, in its Resolution of December 22, 1997, resolved to issue
a temporary restraining order (TRO) in G.R. No. 131505, entitled "Atty.
Alberto A. Villaruz vs. Honorable Julius L. Abela," ordering the
respondent judge therein to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing
his questioned order dated November 28, 1997 in Civil Case No. V-6186, which
ordered the suspension of Atty. Villaruz; and,
3. Respondent
Alovera filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, entitled
"Jose Alovera vs. Victoria Villariez-Radjaie and Judge Julius L.
Abela," under G.R. No. 131768, which, at the time was still pending,
questioning the Order of November 28, 1997 which ordered respondent's
suspension from the practice of law.
Thus, necessitated the filing of the Manifestation[11] by the Office of the Bar Confidant
on January 27, 1998, inquiring from the Court whether to proceed with the
investigation of the case in view of the aforementioned incidents.
On February 18,
1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar Confidant to proceed with the
investigation of the instant case.[12]
Judge Julius
Abela, Nenita M. Aluad, legal researcher, Teresita V. Bauzon, court
stenographer, Concepcion Alcazar, clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special
proceedings, all of Regional Trial Court, Br. 17, Roxas City, Rosa Dapat, court
stenographer of Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City and the complainant
herself testified as witnesses for the complainant.
The respondent
presented as his lone witness, Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who merely testified on the
January 10, 1993 proceedings inside his chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither did any other
witness testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum on
Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed to appear at the
investigation. In lieu of their oral testimonies, respondent offered and
presented their respective affidavits.[13] Complainant chose not to object
thereto and even waived her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine them.
The established
facts, as quoted from the Report dated November 17, 1999 of the Office of the
Bar Confidant, are as follows:
On July 2, 1992, the heirs of the
late Faustina Borres, Segundina Borres, Felisa Borres, Micaela Borres, Maria
Bores, and Sixto Borres (hereinafter "Borres heirs") through their
counsel, Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, filed an action for Partition and
Accounting, docketed as Civil Case No. V-6186, with the Regional Trial Court,
Br. 15, Roxas City, against herein complainant, Victoria V. Radjaie, who was
presumably an heir of the late Faustina Borres. The action sought, among
others, the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-24150 in the
name of herein complainant covering a parcel of land with an area of 215,777
square meters situated in Panay, Capiz, and the declaration of the said parcel
of land as property commonly owned by the Borres heirs.
On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which
Civil Case No. V-6186 was re-raffled, declared herein complainant in default
and ordered the Borres heirs to present their evidence on July 30, 1993.[14]
It was only after three (3)
postponements that the Borres heirs were able to start presenting their
evidence ex-parte on October 8, 1993.
For lack of material time, however, the presentation of evidence was again
reset to November 22, 1993, which again was postponed and reset to December 10,
1993.[15]
On December 10, 1993, there were
several criminal and civil actions scheduled for trial, which commenced at
about 10:00 in the morning, before Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186,
which was listed number four in the court calendar. Judge Alovera presided over the hearing and Teresita V. Bauzon,
court stenographer of Br. 17, took down notes of the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for the accused in a
criminal case[16] before Br. 17 at the
time. The court had a recess at 11:10
and resumed at 11:35 in the morning.
After the hearing of criminal cases was through, Civil Case No. V-6186
was called at about 11:55 in the morning, but the plaintiffs as well as their
counsel, Atty. Villaruz, were no longer inside the courtroom. The session thus adjourned at 11:57 in the
morning without Civil Case No. V-6186 being heard.[17]
At about 11:30 in the morning of
the same date, Atty. Villaruz approached Rosa Dapat, who was the court
stenographer at the time of RTC, Br. 15, Roxas City, while she was in her
office. Atty. Villaruz told her that Judge Alovera was requesting her to assist
in the proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. At first she was hesitant to
accede to the request as Br. 17 had also its own court stenographer. She
relented though when told that Br. 17 as well as the other branches had no
available court stenographer. She then went to Br. 17 and saw Atty. Villaruz
standing by the door of the chambers of Judge Alovera. Atty. Villaruz motioned
her to enter the chambers, which is separate from the courtroom. While inside
the chambers, she saw Judge Alovera behind his desk and other people whom she
did not know. Upon being told that Mrs. Dapat would be the stenographer, Judge
Alovera told Atty. Villaruz to start the proceedings. Following the manifestation made by Atty. Villaruz, a witness,
whom she later recognized to be Atty. Arturo Agudo, was called. At that instant Judge Alovera stood up and
said, "All right, you just continue," and then went out of the
chambers.[18] Judge Alovera would occasionally return to the
chambers in the course of the proceedings, but he would just sit down and
listen while Atty. Villaruz was conducting his direct examination of the
witness and presenting documentary evidence.[19] The proceedings lasted up to 12:10 in the afternoon,
with Judge Alovera making only two rulings in the course thereof, including the
one he made at the end when he ordered the plaintiffs to file their written
offer of evidence on January 20, 1994.[20]
From this point on, complainant would establish how the January
30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came about.
Prior to his retirement from the
judiciary on January 31, 1995, or on January 5, 1995, Judge Alovera designated
his legal researcher, Mrs. Nenita Aluad, to be the OIC Branch Clerk of Court.[21] As part of her functions as such OIC, all decisions,
orders and resolutions of Br. 17 would first be received by her from the judge,
and would stamp them "RECEIVED" and put thereon the date of receipt
as well as her initial or signature.[22] This is in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 36 of the
Rules of Court.[23]
Sometime in February of 1995, Mrs.
Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br. 17 since 1993, was asked to type
the draft decision in Civil Case No. V-6186 in Judge Alovera's house. When she
inquired if he can still do it, Judge Alovera told her that he had one (1) year more to decide cases. With this
assurance, she typed the draft decision on a single bond paper without a
duplicate as Judge Alovera was dictating it.[24]
On August 1, 1995 at about 9:30 in
the morning, retired Judge Alovera came to Br. 17, with a man and a woman,
later identified as the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. V-6186, behind him. While
he was approaching Nenita Aluad, he uttered to the latter, "Receive
this, receive this, " referring to the questioned January 30, 1995
decision, which he was holding. As he spread the decision on her table, he
continued, "Because I will defend you even up to the Plaza Miranda. And
give copies to these two, pointing to the plaintiffs who were at his back.[25] Almost instantaneously, Mrs. Aluad replied, " I
would not receive it because it is already August 1, 1995," and she
did not argue with him anymore so as not to embarrass him for being her former
superior.[26] She then went out of the office while retired Judge
Alovera, as well as the two plaintiffs were still inside.[27] At about the same time, Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar,
another employee of Br. 17 and the clerk-in-charge of civil cases and special
proceedings therein, saw Judge Alovera inside the office of Br. 17 while trying
to have her co-employees receive the questioned decision. Nobody, however, received the same because
it was already seven (7) months after his retirement.[28] A little later, she found
the questioned decision, together with the formal offer of exhibits of January
20, 1995 and the order of January 25, 1995, on the top of her table. Although
she noticed that these records were not stamped "RECEIVED" as a
matter of procedure, she went on to attach the said records to the expediente
of Civil Case No. V-6186.[29] She even gave a copy of
the questioned decision to one of the plaintiffs, Ireneo Borres, and to Atty.
Villaruz, which was received for him by Ireneo Borres.[30] After keeping the expediente,
she then entered the questioned decision in her logbook.[31]
The Borres heirs succeeded in
having the questioned decision executed when, on January 31, 1996, the lessee
of the property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. V-6186,
surrendered possession of the said property in favor of the Borres heirs,[32] Said transfer of possession was made pursuant to the
writ of execution issued on January 19, 1996 by the Acting Presiding Judge of
Br. 17, Hon. Delano F. Villaruz, through Clerk of Court Susan Mendoza Arce.[33]
Meanwhile, complainant, who had
been working in Japan together with his husband who is employed at the Turkish
Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, learned of what happened to her property in Panay,
Capiz.[34] She was thus prompted to
come back to the Philippines, which resulted in losing her job in Japan.
Back home, complainant, on March 5,
1996, filed a Petition for Relief from Order, questioning the January 30, 1995
decision and the January 19, 1996 Writ of Execution.[35] She also prayed "that
disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the
perfidious anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice."[36]
Judge Julius L. Abela took
cognizance of Civil Case No. V-6186 as he was the acting presiding judge of Br.
17 at the time of the filing of said petition for relief from order.[37] In the course of the
proceedings thereof, he noticed that the Formal Offer of Exhibits purportedly
filed by the plaintiffs, i.e., Borres heirs, was dated January 20, 1995, while
the PTR of their counsel, Atty. Alberto Villaruz, was issued on January 31,
1995. He concluded then that the said offer could not have been filed on
January 20, 1995. When he asked Atty. Villaruz about it, the latter refused to
answer and just kept quiet.[38] He likewise observed that there was no order in Civil
Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for decision, except for the order made by
Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the "simulated proceedings"
inside his chambers, where he directed the counsel for the plaintiffs to file
his offer of exhibits.[39] Mrs. Rosa Dapat, who took
down notes during the said proceedings and who was not a member of the staff of
Br. 17, was not even acknowledged on the records as the official stenographer
in the course thereof.[40] Thus, in his resolution of
September 25, 1997, Judge Abela granted the petition for relief filed by
complainant and the latter was ordered reinstated to the possession of the
property in question. In the same resolution, Judge Abela declared the January
30, 1995 decision null and void, the same not being filed with the clerk of
court and not properly rendered in accordance with Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of
Court.[41]
Prompted by what he considered to
be anomalous proceedings, coupled with the prayer of complainant in her
petition for relief "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken
against those involved in the perfidious anomaly to tamper with the
administration of justice," Judge Abela conducted an investigation into
the said anomaly.[42] After considering the
testimonies of Misses Aluad, Dapat, Bauzon and Alcazar during the
investigation, together with the documentary evidence presented, he concluded,
thus:
From the foregoing facts and
circumstances the following facts are established that:
1) Civil
Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What transpired was a mock
or simulated trial inside the chamber of Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto
Villaruz, the plaintiffs and Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another
court, were present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present as
there was actual court session in open court going on at that time.
2) The
records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O. Alovera and remained
with him even after his retirement on January 31, 1995. He did not return the
record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar, Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
3) The
record of Civil Case No. V-6186 turned up on the table of Mrs. Alcazar together
with the "Offer of Exhibits" of Atty. Villaruz dated January 20, 1995
and the "Order" dated January 25, 1995, after the retirement of Judge
Alovera. Both the Offer and the Order admitting the exhibits were not properly
filed and do not bear markings of having been received by the court.
4) The
"decision" of Judge Jose O. Alovera, though dated January 30, 1995,
was filed with the court on August 1, 1995 by former Judge Alovera himself and
because he was no longer a judge his submission was refused.
- CONCLUSIONS -
The "Offer of Exhibits"
of Atty. Alberto Villaruz though dated January 20, 1995 bears signature and PTR
No. issued on January 31, 1995. This simply means that the pleadings (were)
ante dated. It is impossible for Atty. Villaruz to affix his PTR No. dated
January 31, 1995 or any date prior to its issuance. The Offer of Exhibits could
have been made only on January 31, 1995 or later. Because this is so, the Order
of Judge Alovera dated January 25, 1995 is also ante dated and could have been
made only on a date beyond the filing of the Offer of Exhibits. So also with
the decision of former Judge Alovera dated January 30, 1995.
xxx xxx xxx
The Order admitting the exhibits
and the decision were made after the retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no
longer a judge.
The acts of Attys. Alberto Villaruz
and Jose O. Alovera constitute deceit, malpractice, serious and grave
misconduct as lawyer justifying their suspension from the practice of law and
ultimately their disbarment.[43]
Based on the foregoing findings, the Bar
Confidant recommended the disbarment of respondent, declaring that it found
more than sufficient evidence to sustain complainant's charge against
respondent that, indeed, the January 30, 1995 decision in Civil Case No.
V-6186, which divested complainant of her property in Panay, Capiz, was penned
by respondent after his retirement from the judiciary on January 31, 1995.
This Court finds
the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant to be well-taken.
Respondent has thus sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally
unfit to remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal
profession.
In his long
years as a lawyer, respondent has forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is
time once again that the Court inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that
pledge; thus -
LAWYER'S OATH
" I, x x x, do solemnly swear
that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor
consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
not delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this
obligation voluntary, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to
which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to
the pursuit of justice, is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law[44] to be forgotten afterwards nor is
it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that every lawyer must
uphold and keep inviolable at all times.[45] This oath is firmly echoed and
reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, the particular provisions
of which are applicable to the case at bar, provide, to wit:
CANON 1 - A
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 - A
lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public
or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. When respondent took the oath as a member of the legal
profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his pledge.[46] In this covenant, respondent
miserably failed.
The testimonies
of Nenita M. Aluad, Teresita V. Bauzon and Concepcion Alcazar were all quite
telling on how respondent acted in a grossly reprehensible manner in having the
questioned decision dated January 30, 1995 come to fore, leading ultimately to
its execution divesting the complainant of her property. Respondent gravely abused his relationship
with his former staff, pompously flaunting his erstwhile standing as a
judge. Respondent disregarded his
primary duty as an officer of the court, who is sworn to assist the courts and
not to impede or pervert the administration of justice to all and sundry.[47] In so doing, he made a mockery of
the judiciary and eroded public confidence in courts and lawyers.
This Court has
been nothing short of exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral
character from members of the Bar. By
swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the
rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice - a vital function of democracy a failure of which is
disastrous to society. Any departure
from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his
profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the disciplining authority[48] for there is perhaps no profession
after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.[49]
Despite the
opportunities accorded to respondent to present substantial defense to refute
the charges against him, he failed neither to do so nor to offer a valid
explanation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains
that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.[50]
Given the
peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, the Court finds as
appropriate the recommended penalty of the Office of the Bar Confidant in its
Report. Such gross misconduct of the
respondent brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession and calls for
the severance of respondent’s privilege to practice law for life.
WHEREFORE, respondent JOSE O. ALOVERA is
hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the
Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys
and to inform all courts of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo,
J., on
leave.
Vitug, and
Kapunan, JJ., took no part due to close relation to a party.
[1] In
Civil Case No. V-6186 entitled “the Heirs of the Late Faustina Borres (except
Victoria Villariez Radjaie) represented by Arturo V. Agudo, et al. v.
Victoria Villariez Radjaie” for Partition and Accounting.
[2] Complainant
initially filed a Letter-Complaint dated February 27, 1996 with the Office of the
Court Administrator but subsequently withdrew her complaint. Nonetheless, the Court Administrator still
conducted an investigation thereon.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court referred the administrative complaint to
the Office of the Bar confidant for appropriate action, pursuant to the
recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator, Justice Zenaida Elepaño, in a
memorandum dated October 9, 1996; Rollo, p. 130.
[3] Subscribed
and sworn to before Notary Public Ferdinand D. Tolentino on September 17, 1996;
Exhibit “A”, Folder of Exhibits.
[4] Rollo,
at p. 224-227.
[5] Id.,
p. 226.
[6] Ibid.
[7] These
are (a) direct action, i.e., by special civil action for certiorari,
if the judgment was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (b) petition for relief
from judgement; and (c) independent civil action to annul a judgment, where the
alleged defect is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained in
the judgment.
[8] Supra.
at p. 226.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Id.,
p. 229.
[11] Id.
at p. 235.
[12] Id.
at p. 234.
[13] Exhibits
“3” and “4”.
[14] Exhibit
“3” and “44”.
[15] Id.
at pp. 46, 48, 54, 62 and 66.
[16] People
v. Donanito Hijosa.
[17] TSN,
Hearing of November 10[PM], 1998, pp. 55-57.
[18] Id.,
pp. 17-23.
[19] Id.,
pp. 32-35.
[20] Id.,
pp. 29, 35-39.
[21] TSN
Hearing of November 9 [PM], 1998, pp. 33-34.
[22] Id.,
pp. 25-26.
[23] Rendition
of judgments and final orders. – A judgment or final order determining the
merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the
judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court. (underscoring
supplied)
[24] TSN,
Hearing of November 10 [PM], 1998, pp. 48, 58-61.
[25] TSN,
Hearing of November 9 [PM], 1998, p. 38.
[26] Id.,
39-46.
[27] Id.,
p. 45.
[28] TSN,
Hearing of November 13 [PM], 1998, pp. 45-49.
[29] Id.,
pp. 30-32, 51-52.
[30] Id.,
pp. 34-36.
[31] Id.,
pp. 52-53.
[32] Exhibit
“C” at p. 116.
[33] Id.,
at p. 22.
[34] TSN,
Hearing of November 12 [PM], 1998, pp. 20-21.
[35] Exhibit
“C” at p. 129.
[36] Id.,
at p. 132.
[37] TSN,
Hearing of November 12 [AM], 1998, pp. 4-5.
[38] Id.,
pp. 10-14.
[39] Id.,
pp. 25, 68.
[40] Id.,
p. 25.
[41] Id.,
pp. 8-9; Exhibit “C” at p. 337.
[42] TSN,
Hearing of November 12 [AM], 1998, pp. 31-32.
[43] Exhibit
“P”.
[44] In
Re: Al Argosino, 270 SCRA 26, 30-31 [1997].
[45] Masinsin
v. Albano, 232 SCRA 631, 636-637 [1994].
[46] Investment
and Management services Corporation v. Roxas, 256 SCRA 229, 234 [1996].
[47] Pepsi
Cola Products Phils. Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 518, 527 [1998];
Cordova v. Labayen, 249 SCRA 172, 184 [1995]; Sanchez v. Brion,
249 SCRA 1, 4 [1995]; Libit v. Oliva, 237 SCRA 375, 378 [1994]; Likong v.
Lim, 235 SCRA 414, 419 [1994]; see Co v. Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102, 107
[1998]; Choa v. Chiongson, 260 SCRA 477, 483 [1996].
[48] Busiños
v. Ricafort, 283 SCRA 407, 414-415 [1997].
[49] Tapucar
v. Tapucar, 293 SCRA 331, 337 [1998].
[50] Reyes
v. Gaa, 246 SCRA 64, 67 [1995].