THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133145.
August 29, 2000]
LEY CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION and YU HE CHING, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An appeal and a
petition for certiorari are mutually exclusive. A petition for certiorari is
available only when there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Hence, a petition for certiorari is rendered moot by an appeal
challenging not only the trial court resolution dismissing the complaint, but
also the two interlocutory orders earlier assailed in the petition.
The
Case
Before us is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 24, 1997 and March 4,
1998 Resolutions[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 42512. The decretal portion of the first CA Resolution reads as follows:[2]
“WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE for
having become MOOT AND ACADEMIC.”
The second
assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.[3]
The Petition for
Certiorari, which was denied by the appellate court, assailed two Orders[4]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.[5]
In its September 17, 1996 Order, the RTC had ruled as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in order not to delay the early termination of this
case, all depositions set for hearing are hereby cancelled[;] set this case for
pre-trial on November 14, 1996 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.”[6]
In its October
14, 1996 Order, the RTC denied reconsideration in this wise:
“WHEREFORE, [petitioner’s] Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
the Order of this Court dated September 17, 1996 is DENIED.
“The pre-trial conference set on November 14, 1996 at 2:00 o’clock
in the afternoon shall proceed as scheduled.”[7]
The
Facts
The undisputed
facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:[8]
“On 1 April 1994, the petitioner filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against respondent Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation (Hyatt, for brevity), docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1429 of the
respondent court. The Complaint was
subsequently amended twice, to implead respondents Princeton Development
Corporation (Princeton, for brevity) and Yu He Ching (Yu, for brevity) as
defendants.
After some skirmishes over the
admission of the second amended complaint, culminating in the decision of this
Court in CA-G.R. SP No. 36206 dated 15 May 1995, the private respondents filed
their answers to the said second amended complaint.
On 2 April 1996, the petitioner
served notices to take the depositions of respondent Yu, Elena Sy and Pacita
Tan Go. On 17 July 1996, the respondent
court issued an Order allowing the petitioner to take the depositions of Elena
Sy on 17 September 1996, respondent Yu on 26 September 1996, and Pacita Tan Go
on 3 October 1996.
However, on 15 August 1996,
respondent Hyatt filed a manifestation stating that Elena Sy had resigned from
the company effective 1 July 1996. On
17 September 1996, Elena Sy failed to appear at her scheduled
deposition-taking. The respondent court
then issued its first questioned Order cancelling all depositions set for
hearing, in order not to delay the early termination of the case, and setting
the case for pre-trial on 14 November 1996, at 2:00 p.m.
On 24 September 1996, petitioner
filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said Order insofar as it
cancelled the scheduled taking of depositions.
On 14 October 1996, the respondent
court issued the second questioned order.
Hence, this petition for
certiorari, in which the petitioner accuses the respondent court of having
acted with grave abuse of discretion in depriving it of ‘the due process right
to discovery.’
The petition was raffled to Justice
Pacita Cañezares-Nye, who was then terminally ill. After her untimely death on February 28, 1997, the petition was
re-raffled to the undersigned ponente on April 3, 1997.
In the meantime, the respondent
court went ahead with the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 94-1429 on 14 November 1996.[9]
Petitioner moved for its suspension, and when (the) said motion was denied,
refused to enter into the pre-trial conference. On motion of the private respondents, petitioner was declared
non-suited and its complaint was dismissed.
On 23 December 1996, petitioner
filed a Conditional Notice of Appeal (conditioned on its failure to file a
motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period). Thereafter, it filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the respondent court denied. Hence, its appeal is now pending before this Court.”
Ruling
of the Court of Appeals
The Petition for
Certiorari was deemed moot and academic by the appellate court, which
ratiocinated as follows:
“We agree with the private respondents that the petition in this
case has already become moot and academic.
Any decision of ours will not produce any practical legal effect. According to the petitioner, if we annul the
questioned Orders, the dismissal of its Complaint by the trial [court] will
have to be set aside in its pending appeal.
That assumes that the division handling the appeal will agree with Our
decision. On the other hand, it may
not. Also other issues may be involved
therein than the validity of the herein questioned orders.
“We cannot pre-empt the decision that might be rendered in such
appeal. The division to [which] it has
been assigned should be left free to resolve the same. On the other hand, it is better that this
Court speak with one voice.”
Hence, this
Petition.[10]
The
Issues
In its Memorandum,
petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
“(a) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in dismissing the petition for certiorari in CA-GR SP No.
42512 below as being supposedly moot and academic; and
(b) Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in not nullifying the Orders dated 17 September and 14 October
1996 of the RTC, which arbitrarily deprived petitioner of the right to discovery.”[11]
In the main, the
Court will determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying due course
to the Petition for Certiorari on the ground of mootness.
The
Court’s Ruling
The Petition
before us has no merit.
Main
Issue: Mootness of the Petition for
Certiorari
Petitioner
contends that the appellate court erred in holding that the Petition for
Certiorari, which had assailed the two interlocutory RTC Orders, was moot,
academic and devoid of any practical legal effect. It insists that a ruling on the merits on the said Petition
“would have a practical legal effect since it would likely result in the
setting aside of the dismissal of petitioner’s amended complaint.”[12]
We
disagree. First, it should be
stressed that the said Petition sought to set aside only the two interlocutory
RTC Orders, not the December 3, 1996 Resolution[13]
dismissing the Complaint. Verily, the
Petition could not have assailed the Resolution, which was issued after the
filing of the former.
Under the
circumstances, granting the Petition for Certiorari and setting aside
the two Orders are manifestly pointless, considering that the Complaint itself
had already been dismissed. Indeed, the
reversal of the assailed Orders would have practical effect only if the dismissal
were also set aside and the Complaint reinstated. In other words, the dismissal of the Complaint rendered the
Petition for Certiorari devoid of any practical value.
Second, the Petition for Certiorari
was superseded by the filing, before the Court of Appeals, of a subsequent
appeal docketed as CA-GR CV No. 57119, questioning the Resolution and the
two Orders. In this light, there
was no more reason for the CA to resolve the Petition for Certiorari.
Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that a petition for certiorari
is available only when “there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[14]
A petition for certiorari cannot coexist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and the
availability of the right to appeal are antithetical to the availment of the
special civil action for certiorari.[15]
As the Court has held, these two remedies are “mutually exclusive.”[16]
In this case,
the subsequent appeal constitutes an adequate remedy. In fact it is the appropriate remedy because it assails not only
the Resolution but also the two Orders.
It has been held
that “what is determinative of the propriety of certiorari is the danger
of failure of justice without the writ, not the mere absence of all other legal
remedies.”[17]
The Court is satisfied that the denial of the Petition for Certiorari by
the Court of Appeals will not result in a failure of justice, for petitioner’s
rights are adequately and, in fact, more appropriately addressed in the appeal.
Third, petitioner’s submission that the
Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect is in fact an
admission that the two actions are one and the same. Thus, in arguing that the reversal of the two interlocutory
Orders “would likely result in the setting aside of the dismissal of
petitioner’s amended complaint,” petitioner effectively contends that its
Petition for Certiorari, like the appeal, seeks to set aside the
Resolution and the two Orders.
Such argument
unwittingly discloses a recourse to forum shopping, which has been held as “the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on
the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition.”[18]
Clearly, by its own submission, petitioner seeks to accomplish the same thing
in its Petition for Certiorari and in its appeal: both assail the two interlocutory Orders and
both seek to set aside the RTC Resolution.
Hence, even
assuming that the Petition for Certiorari has a practical legal effect
because it would lead to the reversal of the Resolution dismissing the
Complaint, it would still be denied on the ground of forum shopping.
Alleged
Distinction Between the Two Actions
Contending that
the two actions are different, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
should have resolved the Petition for Certiorari, notwithstanding the
pendency of the appeal. It alleges that
“the issue in the petition for certiorari – the due process right of
petitioner to avail of discovery procedures before pre-trial – is not directly
at issue in petitioner’s appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 94-1429.” It
distinguishes the two as follows:
“12.1 The petition for
certiorari assailed the orders of the RTC denying the petitioner its right to
discovery before pre-trial. It presented
an issue which is of great significance and should have been resolved by the
Honorable Court of Appeals in light of the rulings of the Honorable Supreme Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan x
x x and Fortune Corporation v. Court of Appeals x x x, which prove beyond any
doubt petitioner’s due process right to discovery before pre-trial.
“12.2. On the other hand,
the issue in petitioner’s appeal (CA GR CV No. 57119) is whether or not the
dismissal of the amended complaint was in conformity with justice and the
principle of liberality under the Rules of Court. This is quite a different issue.
Clearly, a resolution of this issue would not resolve the issue in the
petition for certiorari.”[19]
We are not
persuaded. The tortuous explanation of
petitioner cannot refute the clear fact that the relief sought in the Petition
for Certiorari is also prayed for in the appeal. In the latter, it questioned not only the
propriety of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint, but also the two
interlocutory Orders denying its recourse to discovery procedure. As Respondent Princeton points out,[20]
petitioner’s assignment of errors in its appeal included the following:
“I. The trial court committed reversible error in cancelling all
scheduled depositions that it had previously ordered in violation [of
petitioner’s] due process right to discovery.
“II. The trial court
committed reversible error in not granting plaintiff-appellant’s urgent Motion
to Suspend Proceedings x x x.”
As noted
earlier, a petition for certiorari is available only when there is no
appeal or any other adequate remedy.
Considering that the relief prayed for in the Petition for Certiorari
was already included in the subsequent appeal, we hold that the CA did not err
in ruling that the Petition for Certiorari had become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo,
(Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice Hector L. Hofileña, with the
concurrence of Justices Artemon D. Luna (Division chairman) and Artemio G.
Tuquero (member)
[2] CA Resolution dated July 24, 1997, p. 4; rollo,
p. 43.
[3] Rollo, p. 45.
[4] Written by Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
[5] See Petition for Review, p. 2; rollo, p. 10.
[6] Rollo, p. 108.
[7] Rollo, p. 123.
[8] CA Resolution dated July 24, 1997, pp. 1-3; rollo,
pp. 40-42.
[9] Although petitioner moved for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the trial court from proceeding with the
pretrial, the CA issued one, only on April 24, 1997, well after the scheduled
pretrial on November 14, 1996 and the dismissal of the Complaint on December 3,
1996. (Rollo, p. 142.)
[10] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on
January 14, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of Respondent Hyatt’s Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Allan A. Leynes. Filed
earlier were Respondent Princeton’s Memorandum signed by Atty. Bienvenido A.
Tan Jr. and petitioner’s Memorandum signed by Attys. Ramon J. Quisumbing,
Laurence B. Arroyo, and Ma. Carolina V. Fuentes of Quisumbing Torres.
[11] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 13; rollo, p. 310.
[12] Ibid., p. 14; rollo, p. 311.
[13] The Resolution disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, for failure of (petitioner) to
enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reason, its complaint is
dismissed. (Respondents’) counterclaims
are likewise dismissed.” (Resolution, p. 3; rollo, p. 135.)
[14] See Building Care v. NLRC, 268 SCRA
666, February 26, 1997; Bernardo v. CA, 275 SCRA 413, July 14, 1997.
[15] Province of Bulacan v. CA, 299
SCRA 442, November 27, 1998; Heirs of Placido Miranda v. CA, 255 SCRA
368, March 29, 1996.
[16] Ligon v. CA, 294 SCRA 73, August 7, 1998, per
Davide Jr., J. (Now CJ).
See also Oriental Media v. CA, 250 SCRA 647, December 6, 1995;
Malinao v. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616, March 29, 1996.
[17] Tan v. CA, 275 SCRA 568, July 17, 1997,
per Francisco, J. See also Seven
Brothers Shipping Corp. v. CA, 246 SCRA 33, July 13, 1995;
Lansang v. CA, 184 SCRA 230, April 6, 1990.
[18] Chemphil Export & Import v. CA, 251
SCRA 257, December 12, 1995, per Kapunan, J. See also Solid Homes v. CA, 271 SCRA 157, April 11,
1997; First Philippine International Bank v. CA, 252 SCRA 259,
January 24, 1996; Borromeo v. IAC, 255 SCRA 75, March 15, 1996.
[19] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 313.
[20] Respondent Princeton’s Memorandum, pp. 25-26; rollo,
pp. 259-260.