EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128045.
August 24, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ROMMEL DEANG, MELVIN ESPIRITU, and NICSON (or NIXON) CATLI, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
“Everything that happens in this
world happens at the time God chooses.
He sets the time for birth and the time for death, . . .” (Ecclesiastes
3:1-8).
Though God has
certainly set the time of Arthur Tanhueco's birth, the three men accused in
this case unblinkingly usurped God's power to set the time of his death. In one virtual motion, they deprived him of
his liberty; and demanded a considerable sum from his loved ones for his
freedom, and yet, took his life despite achieving their purpose. For their acts, they shall have to answer to
God and to society.
On 31 January
1997, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 95-320,
finding accused Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu, and Nicson (or Nixon) Catli (hereafter
DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide, and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of death. The case is now
before this Court on automatic review, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.[2]
The following
facts were established by the evidence for the prosecution:
In the morning
of 5 July 1995, Arthur “Jay-Jay” Tanhueco (hereafter JAY-JAY), a second-year
high school student of the Chevalier School in Angeles city, was walking on
campus when he was summoned by a man.
The latter talked to JAY-JAY for a short while then suddenly dragged him
inside a white Nissan Sentra aided by the driver. Two students, Arnel Mariano and Juliet Somera, who were defense
witnesses called to testify for DEANG, saw the abduction and identified the man
who forced JAY-JAY into the car as ESPIRITU.[3]
The car sped
away, narrowly missing pedestrian Ranulfo Quizon, but not before the latter had
a good look at the driver, whom he cursed in the Pampanga dialect: “Putanayda
mo, kalakalale ka!" He later identified the driver of the car as
DEANG.[4]
JAY-JAY was held
against his will as his captors negotiated with his parents, Arturo Tanhueco,
Sr. and Shirley Tanhueco (hereafter, Arturo and Shirley), for the payment of a P3-Million
ransom, which was reduced to P1.48 million.[5] The pay-off set on the evening of
12 July 1995 at the Game City Amusement Center in Balibago, Angeles City, did
not, however, push through. Instead,
Shirley was approached by a man in a polka dot shirt, who was earlier seen
talking to a certain Miller.[6]
The next day, 13
July, a man who went by the name of "Bian" (ESPIRITU's alias) rang
the Tanhuecos and told Shirley to bring the ransom money by herself to
Carmenville Subdivision that evening.
Once there, two men approached her.
One of them, whom she identified as ESPIRITU, quickly occupied the
driver's seat, while the other, whom she identified as CATLI, sat behind them
and examined the plastic bag containing the money. Shirley was made to sit beside ESPIRITU, and then
blindfolded. After driving for about an
hour, Shirley sensed a car passing by and stopping a short distance away. She was instructed to wait for her son, then
she heard ESPIRITU and CATLI board the other car. For about an hour, Shirley sat waiting in the car, until an old
man removed her blindfold. Her son
JAY-JAY, however, was nowhere in sight.[7]
On 27 July 1995,
after appropriate proceedings, Angeles City 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor Vicente
J. Pornillos filed with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City an information
for KIDNAPPING against Miller Capil and five (5) "Does" who remained
at large as of that time. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-320.[8]
In the course of
the investigation of JAY-JAY's kidnapping, his father Arturo observed that the
telephone calls made were traced to a house numbered 74-9 along Calachuchi St.,
Timog Park, Angeles City. Thus, on 20 July
1995, he visited said address, where he saw his nephew DEANG talking with a
young man, later identified as ESPIRITU, in front of the house owned by a
certain Reynaldo Cunanan.[9]
Once DEANG was
in police custody, the police recovered, P100,000 from him. He then implicated in his sworn statement
ESPIRITU, CATLI, and Benito Catli (hereafter Benito) in the kidnapping
for ransom of JAY-JAY.[10] Accordingly, on 25 August 1995, the
information was amended to specifically identify the "Does." Pursuant
to the Amended Information,[11] ESPIRITU, CATLI, and Benito were
charged as Miller's co-accused in the KIDNAPPING of JAY-JAY.
In the meantime,
on 17 July 1995, the dead body of an unidentified boy was found in Sitio
Kaynalawit, Barangay Dayap, Laurel, Batangas, along the Tagaytay ridge below a
ravine 15 to 30 meters from the road.
The post-mortem examination of the cadaver revealed the cause of death
as follows:
VICTIM DATA: An unidentified male
dead person, around 14 to 15 years old, wearing Giordano white shirt black
pants, Gamosa shoes.
PLACE OF INCIDENCE: Sitio
Kaynalawit, Barangay bayap, Itaas, Laurel, Batangas
NATURE OF INCIDENCE: Mauling
PLACE DATE AND TIME OF AUTOPSY:
Police Station, Laurel, Batangas at about 9:50 p.m., July 17, 1995
GENERAL FINDINGS
1. Skull
Fracture over left temporo parietal area.
2. Multiple
lacerated wds: 1-1 /2 inches (L) temporo parietal area.
3. Hematoma
2 inches over (R) eye.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Cerebral Hemorrhages.[12]
When the body
was identified to be that of JAY-JAY, and such fact was linked to the
kidnapping, the information was amended on 31 August 1995 to charge the accused
not for mere kidnapping, but for KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH HOMICIDE. This time, DEANG was included in the
indictment.[13]
Thereafter, 2nd
Asst. City Prosecutor Pornillos moved that accused Miller Capil be dropped as
co-accused after determining that he was erroneously charged on account of
mistaken identity and DEANG did not mention in his sworn statement Capil's
name.[14] Defense witness Arnel Mariano
clarified the mistake when he testified on 17 May 1996 regarding the physical
similarity of Miller and ESPIRITU.
Thus, on 1 September 1995, the Information was again accordingly
amended, and as so amended, it reads:
The undersigned Second Assistant
City Prosecutor accuses ROMMEL DEANG Y TANHUECO, MELVIN ESPIRITU, NIXON
CATLI, BENITO CATLI, of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM WITH HOMICIDE committed
as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of
July, 1995, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually aiding and abetting one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and for the purpose of extorting money
from the parents of ARTHUR TANHUECO, a minor, who was kidnap, carry away in an
automobile, detain and later taking him into undisclosed place, thereby
depriving him of his liberty; and accused herein despite having attained their
purpose of demanding and receiving money as ransom for the release of said
minor, the accused failed to release him to his parents, and instead the said
accused with abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation and treachery
killed said ARTHUR TANHUECO as a consequence.[15]
The trial court
granted the motion to drop Capil as co-accused. The remaining accused, DEANG, ESPIRITU, CATLI, and Benito Catli,
each entered a plea of not guilty on 29 September 1995, the scheduled
arraignment and pre-trial.[16]
On 19 October
1995, counsel for accused CATLI filed an omnibus motion to suspend proceedings,
to quash warrant of arrest, to hold preliminary investigation/examination, and
to immediately release accused CATLI.[17] The motion was opposed by the
prosecution and was denied by the court in its order of 7 November 1995.[18]
During the
trial, a motion to discharge Benito to become a state witness was filed,[19] which was opposed by DEANG,
ESPIRITU, and CATLI.[20] The trial court, however, granted
the motion in an order dated 29 February 1996.[21] It reasoned thus:
. . . First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of Benito Catli, for despite the presentation of witnesses by the prosecution,
none of them testified on the exact manner the crime was committed. The question as to who masterminded the
commission of the offense, the manner it was committed and the actual
participation of the four accused. The
existence of the alleged conspiracy can be gleaned from the sworn statement of
Benito Catli. Second, the crime charged
against the four accused is kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution was limited to the fact of kidnapping and
the fact of the victim's death. The
circumstances leading to the death of the victim and the manner he was killed
was not yet established. Without
accused Benito Catli's testimony, no other direct evidence is available for the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime charged against the four
accused. Third, his testimony was and
could be corroborated by the prosecution's witnesses .... Fourth, he does not appear to be the most
guilty. In his sworn statement, he was
merely asked by the three other accused to join them in their already perceived
plan of kidnapping a certain person .... Fifth, there is no evidence that he
has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
DEANG, ESPIRITU,
and CATLI had a common defense: denial and alibi. DEANG claimed that on the date in question, he was watching
television at his house on Jesus St., Angeles City. For his part, ESPIRITU maintained that he accompanied his niece,
Carmella Arcilla, to a Protestant school at Henson St., also in Angeles City.[22] Finally, CATLI, a cousin of state
witness Benito, said that between 5 and 17 July 1995, he never left their
family store located at the Panlilio Apartments, Jesus St., Angeles City.[23]
After trial on
the merits, the court found the evidence of the prosecution to be more
credible, disregarded the defense of alibi set up by DEANG, ESPIRITU, and
CATLI, and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
accused Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu and Nicson Catli are held civilly liable
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim Arthur "Jay-jay"
Tanhueco, Jr:
1. the
sum of P1,480,000.00 actually given as ransom money minus P100,000.00;
2. P30,000.00
for the wake and funeral expenses;
3. P10,000.00
for expenses in transporting the cadaver of the victim from Laurel, Batangas to
Angeles City;
4. the
sum of P3,000,000.00 pesos for and as moral damages; and
5. the
sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Finding all the accused GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping For Ransom With Homicide,
accused Rommel Deang, Melvin Espiritu and Nicson Catli are all sentenced to
suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.[24]
The capital
punishment having been imposed by the trial court, the assailed judgment is now
with this Court on automatic review.
DEANG insists
that the trial court erred in (a) convicting him on the basis of inadequate and
insufficient evidence; (b) basing his conviction on his alleged extrajudicial
confession which is inadmissible in evidence; (c) convicting him on the basis
of illegally obtained evidence; (d) not upholding his constitutional right to
counsel during his custodial investigation; and (e) not considering that he was
illegally arrested and detained.
ESPIRITU, aside
from asserting the lack of evidence to convict the three of them, assigns as
error the failure of the trial court to appreciate his alibi.
CATLI avers that
the trial court erred in: (a) proceeding with his arraignment without a
preliminary investigation; (b) admitting in evidence, giving weight and
credence to, and relying chiefly on the alleged extrajudicial confession of
accused DEANG in convicting them; (c) granting the discharge of Benito Catli
when he was the most guilty of the four accused and by giving weight to his
testimony; (d) ignoring his defense of alibi; and (e) convicting him despite a
clear lack of motive.
After a
meticulous review of the voluminous records and the evidence adduced by the
parties, this Court agrees with the findings of the trial court and,
consequently, affirms the conviction of accused-appellants DEANG, ESPIRITU and
CATLI.
Shirley's
narration of the events that followed the abduction of her son JAY-JAY is
convincingly clear. Her testimony
proved beyond any doubt that JAY-JAY was kidnapped, that she complied with the
ransom demands of the malefactors, and that she had sufficient knowledge of
their identities because she personally dealt with them. Her testimony may have had minor
inconsistencies, but these did not affect her credibility. It is settled that inconsistencies on minor
and trivial matters only serve, to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of a witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[25]
JAY-JAY's father
Arturo also had a hand in piecing together the evidence against
accused-appellants. He went to the
place from where the telephone calls made by the kidnappers were traced and
found his nephew, DEANG, conversing in front of the house with a man who was
later identified as ESPIRITU. This
eventually paved the way to the questioning of DEANG, who owned up the crime
and supplied the information that, in turn, led the police to CATLI, ESPIRITU
and Benito.
State witness
Benito Catli's testimony is crucial to the determination of the guilt or
innocence of accused-appellants. He
maintained that it was DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI who conceptualized, planned
and executed the abduction. Thereafter,
the three mapped out how to get the ransom from JAY-JAY's parents. Benito also declared that the boy was held
against his will.[26] As correctly observed by the trial
court:
The victim was
brought to the ancestral home of Nicson Catli's family at San Juan, San Luis,
Pampanga. Nicson Catli was the one who guarded the victim, while Melvin Espiritu
negotiated for the ransom money and Rommel Deang was the one who monitored the
movement of the Tanhueco family. Benito
Catli also testified that Nicson Catli and Melvin Espiritu were the ones who
met Shirley Tanhueco at Carmenville and that it was Nicson Catli who was
carrying the ransom money when he transferred from the car of Mrs. Tanhueco to
the car being driven by Benito Catli.
The three of them, Melvin, Nicson and Benito thereafter brought the
victim to Manila at the Longwood Hotel and the three of them also counted the
ransom money. When Benito and Melvin
returned to Angeles City in the early morning of July 13, 1995, Nicson Catli
was left in Manila to guard Jay-Jay, Tanhueco.
Then on July 17 or 18, 1995, it was Nicson Catli who gave Benito Catli
the amount of P50,000.00 and told him that Turo or Jay-Jay Tanhueco was
already dead. Nicson even told Benito that Nicson, Rommel and Melvin went to
Tagaytay. From there, Rommel shot Jay
Jay Tanhueco with a paltik revolver and thereafter Rommel and Melvin threw Turo
down the cliff.[27]
Recovered from
the possession of DEANG were peso bills in the amount of P100,000,[28] which was part of the ransom money.
The Nissan
Sentra car that was used in the forcible taking of JAY-JAY at the Chevalier
School campus on 5 July 1995 was properly identified by witnesses and was
traced to Bali Cars, which rented it out to ESPIRITU on several occasions in
July 1995, coinciding with the dates pertinent to the kidnapping of JAY-JAY,
the delivery of the ransom money, and the taking of JAY-JAY to Longwood Hotel
in Manila.[29] The trial court found ESPIRITU's
testimony on the circumstances surrounding said transactions incredible and
declared thus:
The explanations made by Melvin
Espiritu on why he rented a car on July 5, 1995 is unmeritorious. He alleged that he rented the car at 6:00
a.m. in favor of Benito Catli per the latter's request. Benito Catli's house is
nearer and more accessible to Bali Cars.
Benito Catli allegedly went to San Luis the night before and told him to
leave the car to Catli's sister.
Likewise, his explanation, on why he rented a car on July 14, 1995 does
not deserve consideration. It is
improbable for her mother not to call them considering that she will not be
going home on July 14, 1995 and the succeeding days thereafter. Melvin rented a car on July 14, 1995
allegedly to fetch his mother at the airport and who did not arrive on the said
date. He went on again on July 15 and
16, 1995 using the rented car hoping that his mother would come. They did not call their mother in Hong Kong
although they can call her up when there is an emergency. This Court believes that such narration was
used by the defense only to justify his renting a car on July 14, 1995. The car he rented on July 14, 1995 was
returned only on August 4, 1995 and he paid P26,400.00 for it.[30]
All the
foregoing, especially the pivotal testimony of state witness Benito Catli,
established beyond any shadow of a doubt that DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI
committed, and are guilty of, the crime for which they were charged, namely,
kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
There is no
merit to DEANG's claim that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible for
having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights under custodial
investigation.
Paragraph 1,
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution provides that:
Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If a person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
And Section 2(a)
of R.A. No. 7438 states that:
Any extrajudicial confession made
by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in
writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel or in the
latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of his
parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the
municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the
gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be
inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.[31]
DEANG asserts
that he was not advised of his constitutional rights and that his confession
was dictated by PO3 Primo Jamisolamin.
He adds that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Mariano Y. Navarro, was
not his counsel of choice and that the latter did not ascertain whether his
confession was freely given. Moreover,
he claims, Atty. Navarro did not see him write and sign the purported
confession. DEANG further states that
he was never asked any question at that time relating to the incident under
investigation.
PO3 Jamisolamin,
however, testified that DEANG was informed of his constitutional rights and,
when asked if he understood them, DEANG replied in the affirmative. When apprised of his right to counsel, DEANG
also said that he had a lawyer, Atty. Mariano Navarro. Jamisolamin further testified that Atty.
Navarro was right in front of DEANG when the latter was giving his confession.[32] DEANG’s confession was in written
form, signed by him, as well as by Atty. Navarro.[33]
SPO2 Mario
Nulud, who was present at the time DEANG was giving his confession,
corroborated PO3 Jamisolamin's testimony that DEANG was read his constitutional
rights; and that the latter's lawyer, Atty. Navarro, was present during the investigation.
Moreover, a
perusal of the extrajudicial confession of DEANG explicitly shows that he was,
indeed, informed of his constitutional custodial rights and that he was
represented by a counsel of his choice, Atty. Navarro, at the time said confession
was being executed, notwithstanding his disavowal of said counsel's services on
appeal. The pertinent portion of the
extrajudicial confession reads:
PASUBALI: Ginoong, Rommel Deang, ipinagbibigay alam ko sa iyo na ikaw
ngayon ay sumasailalim ng isang pagsisiyasat at inuusig tungkol sa isang
kasalanan na kung saan ikaw ay nasasangkot sa isang krimen (kidnapping). Bago ang lahat, pinaalala ko sa iyo na sa
ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas ikay ay may may sariling karapatan at ito ay ang
sumusunod:
a. Karapatan
mo ang magsawalang kibo sa anumang itatanong sa iyo.
b. Karapatan
mong magkaroon ng patnubay ng isang manananggol, ikaw ay bibigyan ng ating
gobierno na walang bayad o sa sarili mong pili o kagustuhan. Ito ba ay nauunawaan mo?
SAGOT: OPO (initialed)
TANONG: Pagkatapos na maipabatid sa
iyo ang inyong karapatan sa ilalim ng ating saligang batas na magsawalang kibo,
nais mo bang ipagpatuloy ang imbestigasyong ito?
SAGOT: OPO (initialed)
TANONG: Kailangan mo ba ng isang manananggol?
SAGOT: Opo, Si Atty. Mariano Y. Navarro po (initialed).
TANONG: Pinapaalala ka rin sa iyo na anumang salaysay ang ibibigay mo sa
imbestigasyong ito ay maaring gamitin laban sa iyo. Ito ba ay nauunawaan mo?
SAGOT: OPO (initialed)
TANONG: Handa ka na bang magbigay
ng isang kusang loob na salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo, sir.[34]
In light of the
positive assertions of PO3 Jamisolamin and SPO2 Nulud, police officers who have
not been shown to harbor any ill-motive in testifying against DEANG, and are
even presumed to have acted regularly, the self-serving and uncorroborated
claims of the latter must fail. The
Court finds no constitutional and legal infirmity in the signed extrajudicial
confession of DEANG and affirms its admissibility in evidence.
Neither is there
merit in DEANG'S claim that his arrest and the search of his house were
conducted in violation of his constitutional right against warrantless arrests
and searches. As he did not question
the legality of his arrest before he was arraigned, he is deemed to have waived
such defense. In any case, no proof of
the purported illegal arrest was ever presented by the defense. What is clear from the record is that, when
invited by the police, he willingly submitted himself to investigation.
With regard to
the alleged illegal search and seizure, SPO2 Mario Nulud testified that
DEANG conceded to accompany the police to his house in order to surrender his
share of the ransom money. He brought
them to his room upstairs. There DEANG
showed and gave to the police officer P100,000 in P500-peso
bills, some of which were marked.[35] It must be reiterated at this point
that a consented warrantless search is one of the exceptions to the
proscription under Section 2, Article III, of the Constitution.[36] The consent of the owner of the
house to the search effectively removed any badge of illegality.
Neither is the
Court impressed with DEANG's assertion that the students who witnessed the
kidnapping of JAY-JAY pointed to Miller Capil as the one who forced JAY-JAY
into the car. Arnel Mariano and Juliet
Somera actually identified ESPIRITU as the culprit. A closer scrutiny of the testimonies of the witnesses reveals
that Miller and ESPIRITU bear physical resemblance. On the other hand, DEANG was positively
identified by Ranulfo Quizon, who remembered him as the driver of the white
Nissan Sentra used in abducting JAY-JAY.[37] Moreover, he was tagged by Benito
Catli as one of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime charged.
CATLI, for his
part, contends that there was a violation of his right to a preliminary
investigation. He filed a separate
action before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 39287,
raising this issue. In its decision
promulgated on 15 March 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on
this ground:[38]
[T]he records show that only
accused Benito Catli filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The three (3) other accused did not invoke
their right to a preliminary investigation.
So much so that after entering into arraignment on September 30, 1995,
this right was deemed waived. At any
rate, it is settled that the absence of preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective
and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or
constitute a ground for quashing the information.[39]
Preliminary
investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering those who may be reasonably charged with a crime to enable the
prosecutor to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and serves no purpose
except to determine if a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It does not place in jeopardy the person against whom it is
taken.[40] It has been consistently held that
the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
criminal information or render it defective.[41] In this case, CATLI is deemed to
have waived his right to preliminary investigation when he entered his plea
during arraignment.[42]
CATLI also
repeats his objection to the utilization of Benito Catli as state witness. This issue is well within the discretion of
the trial judge. Assuming arguendo
that the trial court did err, this Court has held several times in the past
that any witting or unwitting error of the prosecution in asking for the
discharge of an accused, and of the trial court in granting the petition for
discharge, would not deprive the discharged accused of the acquittal specified
in Section 10 of Rule 119 and of the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, as long as no question of jurisdiction is involved. It is also relevant to note that the
improper or mistaken discharge of an accused would not affect his competence as
a witness or render inadmissible his testimony.[43]
CATLI'S argument
that he had no motive to kidnap anybody because his family was well-off is
irrelevant. In the fist place, the rich
and the poor can and do commit crimes.
Possession of wealth does not make one a saint, and poverty alone does
not make one a criminal. In the second
place, proof of motive, in general, is not necessary to pin a crime on the
accused if the commission of the crime has been proven and the evidence of
identification is convincing.[44] In the present case, CATLI was
identified by Benito Catli, his cousin, as one of the co-conspirators in the
planning and execution of the kidnapping for ransom and the killing of JAY-JAY.
The common
defense of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI is alibi. DEANG said he was in his house
in Jesus St., Pulong Bulo, Angeles City when the kidnapping was executed on 5
July 1995. He was, however, positively
identified by Quizon, who was almost hit by the white Nissan Sentra immediately
after JAY-JAY was kidnapped.
ESPIRITU, on the
other hand, claims that Benito Catli asked him to rent a car on 5 July
1995. He thus rented a car at Bali Cars
at approximately half past six in the morning, after which he deposited the car
at the residence of Benito Catli. He
got back home in Timog Park, Angeles City, at around 7:00 a.m. then brought his
niece to school at around 7:30. He left the school at around 8:00 o'clock and
reached home some thirty minutes later, where he stayed the rest of the day.
CATLI maintains
he was tending his sister's store at Jesus St., Angeles City, the entire two
months of July and August, including the 5th of July.
Alibi is the
weakest of all defenses for it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. For this reason, it cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused by witnesses.[45] For alibi to prosper, the
requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else
when the crime was committed. He must
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission.[46]
Chevalier
School, where the kidnapping occurred, is in Pampanga. The residences of DEANG and ESPIRITU, and
the store of CATLI's sister, are all located in Angeles City, Pampanga. Each of them miserably failed to show that
it was physically impossible for them to be at the Chevalier School at the time
JAY-JAY was kidnapped.
In light of the
overwhelming evidence for the prosecution, establishing their authorship of and
culpability for the crime charged, the alibis of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI
were rightfully disregarded by the trial court as obvious fabrications.
Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659,
provides that:
Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1) if
the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days
2) xxx
3) xxx
4) if
the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is
any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where
the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or
dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphasis
supplied)
The presence of
any of these two circumstances - the ransom demand or the death of the victim -
already calls for the imposition for the death penalty. Here, they are both present. The guilt of DEANG, ESPIRITU, and CATLI for
the kidnapping for ransom and death of JAY-JAY having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court has no other recourse but to agree with the penalty
imposed by the trial court.
Four Justices of
the Court have continued to maintain their view that Republic Act No. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of
the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In the matter of
damages, the Court notes that the trial court awarded actual damages in the
amount of P30,000 for wake and funeral expenses, and P10,000 as
expenses for transporting the victim's body from Batangas to Pampanga. These must be deleted for lack of supporting
evidence. The amount of the ransom
money, less P100,000, must, however, be returned to the Tanhuecos.
The award of
moral damages in the amount of P3 million must be reduced to P500,000.
The law also
allows exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability of
the malefactors when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating
circumstances.[47] As discussed above, this requisite
has already been met. Exemplary damages
are, however, imposed "not to enrich one party or impoverish another but
to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions."[48] In the case at bar, exemplary
damages in
the amount of P100,000
are awarded to the private complainants, by way of example or correction, in
addition to the other damages herein awarded.[49]
Finally, the
Court observes that no civil indemnity for the death of the victim was
decreed. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,[50] the amount of P50,000 is
hereby also awarded.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, in Criminal Case No. 95-320, sentencing
accused-appellants ROMMEL DEANG, MELVIN ESPIRITU, and NICSON CATLI to
suffer the penalty of death, is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following
modifications as to damages:
(1) the award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000 for
funeral and wake expenses, and P10,000 for transporting the victim's
body from Batangas to Pampanga, are hereby set aside;
(2) the award of P3 million in moral damages is reduced to P500,000;
and
(3) the amounts of P50,000 as indemnity for the death of Arthur
Tanhueco, and P100,000 as exemplary damages, are hereby also awarded.
The awards of
restitution of the ransom money in the amount of P1,480,000, less the P100,000
which was recovered, and attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000,
stand.
The aforesaid
awards shall be paid to the heirs of Arthur Tanhueco and accused-appellants are
solidarity liable for the payment thereof.
In accordance
with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning
power.
Costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Original
record (OR), vol. 3, 1006-1038; Rollo, 66-98. Per Judge Eliezer R. de los Santos.
[2] Entitled
“An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for
that Purpose the Revised Penal Code as Amended, Other Special Laws, and for
Other Purposes,” which took effect on 31 December 1993 (People v. Simon,
234 SCRA 555 [1994]).
[3] TSN,
17 May 1996, 17-19; 21 May 1996, 24-26.
[4] TSN,
20 October 1995, 35-36.
[5] TSN,
8 December 1995, 20-21; TSN, 7 November 1995, 19-20.
[6] TSN,
8 December 1995, 32.
[7] Id.,
32-33, 35-41.
[8] OR,
vol. 1, 1.
[9] TSN,
7 November 1995, 25-26.
[10] OR,
vol. 2, 528-530.
[11] OR,
vol. 1, 59-60.
[12] Exhibit
“AA.”
[13] OR,
vol. 1, 78.
[14] OR,
vol. 1, 82-83.
[15] Id.,
84.
[16] Id.,
124-125.
[17] Id.,
145-153.
[18] Id.,
166-170.
[19] OR,
vol. 1, 394-395.
[20] Id.,
414-419, 422-430, 432-438.
[21] OR,
vol. 2, 441-443.
[22] Rollo,
471.
[23] Id.,
345-346.
[24] OR,
vol. 3, 1038.
[25] People
v. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723, 732 [1996].
[26] TSN,
15 March 1996, 12, 35-36.
[27] OR,
vol. 3, 1031-1032.
[28] Exhibit
“N” to “N-28-a.”
[29] Exhibit
“E.”
[30] OR,
vol. 3, 1032-1033.
[31] Section
2(d), Republic Act No. 7438.
[32] TSN,
21 November 1995, 14.
[33] Exhibit
“S,” 525-527.
[34] OR,
vol. 2, 528.
[35] TSN,
28 November 1995, 12-14.
[36] See
Mustang v. CA, 257 SCRA 430, 449-450 [1996]; 1 JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1987 ED., 104-105.
[37] TSN,
20 October 1995, 35-36.
[38] OR,
vol. 2, 478-485; Per Romeo A. Brawner, J., Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes and
Buenaventura J. Guerrero, JJ., concurring.
[39] Id.,
482-483.
[40] Paderanga
v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86, 90 [1991].
[41] People
v. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478-483 [1961]; Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253
SCRA 773, 792 [1996].
[42] OR,
vol. 1, 124-125; See People v. Villanueva, 265 SCRA 318 [1996].
[43] People
v. Jamero, 133 PHIL. 127 [1968]; People v. Torrefranca, 151 SCRA
143 [1987]; Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. v. Son, 209 SCRA 329,
337-338 [1992]; See People v. Armada, 225 SCRA 644 [1993].
[44] People
v. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136, 160 [1974].
[45] People
v. De la Cruz, 217 SCRA 283 [1993]; People v. Kenysis, 221 SCRA
628 [1993]; People v. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 [1993].
[46] People
v. De la Cruz, 229 SCRA 755 [1994].
[47] Article
2230, Civil Code.
[48] Del
Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 158, 173, [1997], citing Mecenas v.
Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 83 [1989].
[49] Article
2229, Civil Code.
[50] People
v. Verde, 302 SCRA 690, 706 [1999].