SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 123853. August 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN
AGPAWAN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
AGUSTIN AGPAWAN and
BONIFACIO CHUMACOG together with three (3) John Does were charged with murder
for the violent death of Christopher Batan. Only Agpawan was apprehended and
tried, while the rest have remained at large.
On 23 February 1993
Christopher Batan, Mila Fana-ang and Fr. Eduardo Solang were taking a rest at a
dried creek on their way to Betwagan, Sadanga, Mountain Province. The group of
accused Agpawan passed by. After some thirty (30) minutes, Batan, Fana-ang and
Solang proceeded on their way to Betwagan. There they met the group of accused Chumacog
who ordered them to stop. Batan, Fana-ang and Solang obliged but after a short
while they were greeted by a volley of gunfire which hit Batan on the left leg.
The gunshots according to Fana-ang came from the other side of the creek about
thirty (30) meters away where Agpawan was seen in a squatting position aiming
his rifle at them.
Even before the
incident Fana-ang was already acquainted with Agpawan. Upon being attacked,
Fana-ang summoned enough courage and stood up. She somehow identified herself to
Agpawan but the latter only waved his hand and then joined the group of
Chumacog who approached the fallen Batan and shot him at close range on the
chest. Agpawan, Chumacog and their companions then left towards the direction
of Betwagan.
On the witness
stand Agpawan did not deny shooting Batan. He claimed instead that he fired
twice at the group of Batan to warn them of the impending attack by the group
of Chumacog. He insisted that he never intended to kill or harm them nor did he
conspire with the group of Chumacog to ambush them.
But the trial court
did not believe the story of Agpawan. On the other hand, appreciating the
qualifying circumstance of treachery the court below found him guilty of murder
and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Batan P50,000.00.[1]
The defense submits
in this appeal that the lower court erred in finding that (a) there was
conspiracy between accused-appellant and the group of Chumacog; (b) treachery
qualified the killing to murder; and (c) accused-appellant was guilty of murder
instead of a much lower offense.
In arguing for his
acquittal accused-appellant claims that no single evidence of conspiracy was
presented against him before the lower court.
We are not
persuaded. Conspirary exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.[2] Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct
evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating
a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and
entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or how an illegal objective was to be carried out. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from
the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.[3] In order to hold an accused liable as a co-principal
by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime, or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or
implement the conspiracy.[4]
Conspiracy was
established in the instant case by the concerted and synchronized actions of
accused-appellant and his companions in carrying out the ambush. That they were
prompted by a common criminal agenda was shown by the fact that even after
Batan was shot and hit by accused-appellant, Chumacog also approached Batan and
finished him off by shooting him on the chest. After making sure that their
victim was already dead, accused-appellant signalled to Chumacog and his
companions and together they left the place and proceeded towards Betwagan.
This Court cannot
lend credence to the testimony of accused-appellant that he waved his right
hand at Fana-ang only as a warning signal for them to leave the place because
of the imminent attack from the group of Chumacog. In the first place, there
was no convincing evidence as to how accused-appellant knew of the plan of
Chumacog and his cohorts to ambush Batan, Fana-ang and Solang. Second, had
accused-appellant only wanted to warn Batan, Fana-ang and Solang, he could have
done so without causing harm, particularly to Batan. Accused-appellant could
have just fired his gun into the air if his purpose was merely to drive them
away from danger. Third, he could have simply forewarned Batan, Fana-ang and
Solang of the impending assault without waiting for them to actually meet the
group of Chumacog face to face. If his sole objective was only to alert Batan,
Fana-ang and Solang, he could have done so with the least risk not only to
himself but also to the trio. As correctly observed and well reasoned out by
the court a quo -
x x x (A)fter the
accused fired the second volley of shots he waved his right hand from right to
left and then turned his back and moved towards the direction of Betwagan. Upon
seeing the signal from the accused, the group of four (4) to five (5) civilian
volunteers referring to the group of Chumacog also moved out and headed
towards Betwagan. The Court does not buy the proposition advanced by the
accused that his purpose in waving his hand was to make Mila Fana-ang and her
group leave the place. As the Court sees it, the accused’s waving of his hand
was meant as a signal for the civilian volunteers to already leave the area. Note
that the accused waved his right hand from right to left indicating the
direction towards Betwagan and immediately thereafter he and the civilian
volunteers in unison turned and headed towards Betwagan.
The Court also
notes the almost simultaneous assault staged by the accused and the four [4] or
five [5] civilian volunteers on the person of the deceased Christopher Batan.
Just a few seconds after the accused fired his rifle, Bonifacio Chumacog
approached the victim and shot him on the chest. This indicates a concerted
design on the part of the accused and Bonifacio Chumacog to kill Christopher
Batan.[5]
Accused-appellant
next claims that the court below erred in finding that treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
We disagree. There
is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.[6] In the instant case, Chumacog and his companions
tried to waylay Batan, Fana-ang and Solang before the attack. They ordered them
to stop supposedly to talk when in fact accused-appellant was already waiting
in ambush for them. Batan, Fana-ang and Solang were unarmed and completely
unaware of the danger that lurked ahead. They were so unsuspecting that when
they stopped, they were surprised that instead of a talk they were met by a
volley of shots instead, and accused-appellant had already positioned himself
on the other side of the creek to have a good shot at their intended victims.
Batan, Fana-ang and Solang were thus placed in a situation where they were
utterly defenseless and at the complete mercy of their attackers. The method
employed in the execution of the crime insured no risk to the assailants
arising from the defense which their victims might put up. Plainly, this is
treachery.
Finally,
accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of
murder instead of a much lower offense.
His argument is
utterly without merit. Conspiracy having been established, the act of one is
the act of all. Assuming that it was Chumacog who fired the fatal shot, Agpawan
could still be held liable for murder because the prosecution has
satisfactorily established the existence of conspiracy among the assailants and
that conformably with their common design he fired the first shot which hit
their intended victim.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court - Br. 59,
Baguio City, finding accused-appellant AGUSTIN AGPAWAN guilty of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering
him to indemnify the heirs of Christopher Batan the amount of P50,000.00
is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza,
Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Decision penned by Judge Abraham B. Borreta, RTC-Br.
59, Baguio City; Rollo, p. 44.
[2] Art. 8, The Revised Penal Code.
[3] People v. Francisco, G.R. Nos. 118573-74, 31 May
2000, citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 118423, 16 June 1999 and People
v. Andales, G.R. No. 130637, 19 August 1999.
[4] Id., citing People v. Berroya, G.R. No.
122487, 12 December 1997, 283 SCRA 129-130.
[5] Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[6] Art. 15, par. (16), The Revised Penal Code.