EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123543. August 23, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO
GABIANA y CARUBAS, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PURISIMA, J.:
For automatic
review is the Decision[1] of Branch 33, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in
Criminal Case No. S-1797, which imposed the supreme penalty of death on
appellant Pedro Gabiana y Carubas for the crime of rape; disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused PEDRO GABIANA
y CARUBAS Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 'RAPE' as charged, and
hereby sentences accused to suffer the extreme penalty of 'DEATH'. To pay the
offended party the sum of P50,000.00 for moral damages, and to pay the cost.
SO
ORDERED."[2]
Filed on October
18, 1994 by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rodrigo B. Zayenis, the information
indicting appellant, alleges:
"That on or
about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of September 12, 1994 at Sitio Quinale,
Barangay Burgos, Municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design
and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one Rosemarie C. Argosino a ten
(10) year old girl, against her will and consent and to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO
LAW."[3]
With the appellant
assisted by Atty. Benjamin G. Golla, pleading not guilty upon arraignment on
November 28, 1994,[4] trial ensued with the prosecution presenting Dra.
Eleanor V. Mane, Jocelyn R. Reformado, Isagani Argosina, Isabel Argosino and
the private complainant herself, as witnesses.
Roy Gabiana, Edger
Artula and the appellant testified for the defense.
Synthesized by the
Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the facts and circumstances
complained of are as follows:
"Appellant
Pedro Gabiana and Rosalia dela Cruz are live-in partners. Rosemarie Argosino is
the eldest of the three (3) children Rosalia dela Cruz has with her previous
live-in partner, Isagani Argosino.
On September
12, 1994, about 7 o'clock in the evening, in Sitio Quinale, Barangay Burgos ,
Siniloan, Laguna, appellant carried Rosemarie, then 10 years of age, up their
2-storey house and brought her to a corner. There, he undressed her, after
which, he removed his pants. He then forced her to lie on the floor, placed
himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt pain in
her vagina and wanted to cry for help but appellant covered her mouth with his
hand (TSN , April 19, 1995, pp. 3-5; 9 and 13).
After about 3
to 5 minutes, appellant stood up and warned Rosemarie not to report the
incident to her mother as he would kill her. He then left and went to sleep
(TSN, April 19, 1995, p. 5).
Rosemarie who
saw blood in her vagina went downstairs and washed herself, after which, she
too went to sleep (TSN, April 15, 1995, p. 6).
The following
day, September 13, 1994, Rosemarie went to school. However, after class,
instead of going home, she and her younger sister, Isabel Argosino, then 9
years old, proceeded to their aunt Jocelyn Reformado at the latter's house in
Barangay Taft, Pakil, Laguna. There, Isabel reported to their aunt Jocelyn
Reformado what appellant did to Rosemarie (TSN, April 19, 1995, pp. 6-7).
In the morning
of September 14, 1994, Jocelyn Reformado brought Rosemarie to the General
Cailles Memorial Hospital where Rosemarie was examined by Dra. Eleanor V. Mane
who found a sort of a swelling in the labia minora and complete
and incomplete laceration of the hymen (Exhibit 'A').[5]
In the
afternoon of the same day, Jocelyn Reformado accompanied Rosemarie to the
police station of Siniloan, Laguna and there reported the matter. The police
took the respective sworn statements of Jocelyn Reformado and Rosemarie
Agrosino (Exhibits 'B' and 'D'), after which, Rosemarie, assisted by Jocelyn
Reformado, affixed her signature on the complaint for rape against appellant.
The complaint was eventually filed in court on September 15, 1994 (TSN, December
19, 1994, pp. 23-28)."[6]
Appellant
interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He theorized that at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of September 12, 1994, his children, including the
complainant, his cousin Roy Gabiana, and himself had supper. Thereafter, he and
his cousin went outside the house and conversed with his (appellant's)
neighbor, Edgar Artula, until 10:00 p.m. when he (appellant) and Roy went home
to sleep.[7]
Appellant further
asseverated that the charge hurled against him is nothing but a malicious
fabrication of the complainant's aunt, Jocelyn R. Reformado, whose ulterior
motive is to take custody of the complainant and the latter’s sister Isabel.[8]
On November 7,
1995, after finding the version of the prosecution credible, the trial court of
origin handed down the judgment of conviction under review.
Appellant contends
that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE IRRECONCILABLE AND UNEXPLAINED CONTRADICTIONS
BETWEEN THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S STATEMENTS IN HER SWORN STATEMENT TO THE
POLICE AND THOSE MADE SUBSEQUENTLY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE IRRECONCILABLE AND UNEXPLAINED CONTRADICTIONS BETWEEN
THE SWORN STATEMENT TO THE POLICE AND THE SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT'S AUNT WHO CAUSED AND ASSISTED HER IN FILING THE COMPLAINT.
III.
THE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN IGNORING THE MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S AUNT IN CAUSING AND
ASSISTING THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO FILE THE RAPE CHARGE AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT IN GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND FOR DISREGARDING SOME CRUCIAL DETAILS.
VI.
THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF
THE ANTI-POOR, ANTI-UNINFLUENTIAL AND ANTI-SMALL FRY R.A. NO. 7659. THE PENALTY
SHOULD BE SUSPENDED PENDING FURTHER EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON WHETHER ONLY THE
WRETCHED AND THE POOR ARE SENT TO DEATH ROW IN AN IMPERMISSIBLE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL MANNER.[9]
It has been held
that:
"Countless of
times, this Court has said that it will be guided in reviewing rape cases by
the settled realities that an accusation for rape can be made with facility,
and while the commission of the crime may not be easy to prove, it becomes even
more difficult, however, for the person accused, although innocent, to
disprove; that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only
two persons normally are involved, the testimony of the complainant must always
be scrutinized with great caution; and that the evidence for the prosecution
must stand or fall on its own merits and should not be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. In an appeal from a judgment
of conviction in these rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to
the credibility and story of the victim and just as often the Court is
constrained to rely on the observations given by the trial court, with its
vantage, not equally enjoyed by the appellate court, in the reception of
testimony. It has thus since become doctrinal that the evaluation of
testimonial evidence by the trial court is accorded great respect precisely for
its chance to observe first hand the demeanor on the stand of the witness, a
matter which is important in determining whether what has been said should be
taken to be truth or falsehood."[10]
In the case under
consideration, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimony of
the private complainant, Rosemarie C. Argosino, ratiocinating thus:
"In the
witness stand, private complainant, when narrating what accused had done to
her, was in tears. Sometimes she could hardly answer questions asked on her. Seen
on her face and deportant (sic) while testifying, the impact on herself of what
accused had done to her. The trauma of rape still lingers in her mind. Her
narration of the incident was straight forward and clear. She was telling the
truth. Motive of private complainant in testifying against accused was not
established."[11]
Verily, a
meticulous scrutiny of the testimony of the private complainant indicates that
the same could only come from a person who truly suffered the ordeal sued upon.
It is simply improbable that private complainant, a girl of tender age,
innocent and guileless, would brazenly impute a crime too serious as rape to a
man she considered her father, if it was not really perpetrated.[12] Her disclosure that she has been raped, coupled with
her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo
public trial where she could be compelled to give out the details of the
assault against her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as mere concoction.[13]
The Court discerns
no tenability in supposed ulterior motive on the part of private complainant's
aunt. It is hard to believe that Jocelyn Reformado would accuse the appellant
of a crime so grave, and in the process, put their family, particularly her
niece, to a lifetime stigma and humiliation just because of a desire to gain
custody of the private complainant and the sister.[14]
So also, the
alleged inconsistency theorized upon by appellant is barren of any sustainable
basis. Whether it was the private complainant herself or her sister who first
divulged subject rape to Jocelyn C. Reformado, does not discount the
possibility that the other might have subsequently confided the same incident
to Reformado. In fact, it was established during the trial that both the
private complainant and her sister told the unfortunate happening to their
aunt. As convincingly put by the Solicitor General, the discrepancies alluded
to by appellant refer to minor and peripheral details; they strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses as they are badges of truth and indicia
that the witnesses are unrehearsed.[15]
Then too, the Court
agrees with the submission of the Solicitor General that the fact that private
complainant stated in her affidavit[16] that her sister Isabel saw appellant kissing her,
while on the witness stand she (complainant) declared that Isabel did not see
appellant raping her, does not necessarily discredit the credibility of private
complainant. Settled is the rule that affidavits are generally subordinated in
importance to open Court declarations because they are oftentimes executed when
an affiant's mental facilities are not in such a state as to afford her a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident which transpired.[17] "Moreover, errorless testimonies cannot be
expected, especially when a witness is recounting details of a harrowing
experience and as long as the agglomeration of testimonies concurs on material
points, the slight clashing statements dilute neither the witnesses'
credibility nor the veracity of their testimonies. The test is whether the
testimonies agree on essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent
and coherent whole."[18]
With respect to the
alibi relied upon by appellant, the Court believes, and so holds, that the same
cannot hold against the positive identification by the private complainant of
the appellant as the culprit. Basic is the rule that alibi which is easy to
concoct, cannot prevail over the positive identification by the witnesses. What
is more, appellant utterly failed to prove that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission. Consequently, his defense of alibi cannot prosper.[19]
Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659, amending Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, reads:
"SEC. 11.
Article 335 of the same Code (Revised Penal Code, as amended) is hereby amended
to read as follows:
"ART. 335.
When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force
or intimidation;
2. When the woman
is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman
is under twelve years of age or is demented.
x...........................x........................... x
"The death
penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim
is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x...........................x........................... x"
In this case,
although it was shown that the appellant is the common-law husband of the
complainant’s mother, the first special qualifying circumstance within the
contemplation of paragraph 1, above quoted, was not alleged in the Information
under which appellant was arraigned. In People vs. Ambray,[20] the Court held that the failure to allege the fact
of relationship between the appellant and the victim in the information for
rape is fatal and consequently, bars conviction of its qualified form which is
punishable by death. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to
be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Accordingly, the death penalty imposed below on appellant should be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
Following
prevailing jurisprudence, private complainant is entitled to civil indemnity
ex delicto of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, in addition to the
moral damages awarded by the trial court.[21]
WHEREFORE, the judgment rendered by Branch 33, Regional Trial
Court of Laguna in Criminal Case No. S-1797 is AFFIRMED but with the
modifications that appellant Pedro Gabiana y Carubas is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay private complainant
Rosemarie C. Argosino civil indemnity of P50,000.00, and the additional
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Judge Venancio M. Tarriela.
[2] Rollo, p. 149.
[3] Original Records (O.R.), p. 16.
[4] O.R. pp. 26-27.
[5] Exhibit
"A", O.R. p. 4:
"
xxx...xxx...xxx
- No external physical
injuries
- Labia Minora - Hypemeric, Edematous
- Hymen - Hyperemic Edematous, admits 1 finger with ease with laceration -
Incomplete at 3 o’ clock
- Complete at 6 o’clock
Positive - Tenderness on Internal Examination"
[6] Brief for the Appellee, Rollo, pp. 2-4.
[7] Direct examination of Pedro Gabiana, June 13, 1995,
TSN, pp. 3-6.
[8] Ibid., p. 6.
[9] Rollo, pp. 100-101.
[10] People vs. Lopez, 302 SCRA 669, 675 citing:
People vs. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663; People vs. Atuel, 261 SCRA 339.
[11] Rollo, p. 145.
[12] People vs. Molas, 286 SCRA 684, 691; citing:
People vs. Sagaral 267 SCRA 671(1997)
[13] Ibid., p. 690 citing: People vs. Cabillan
267 SCRA 258; People vs. Gaban, 262 SCRA 593; and People vs. Derpo,
168 SCRA 447.
[14] People vs. Bersabe, 289 SCRA 685, p. 697;
citing: People vs. Dela Cruz, 251 SCRA 77; People vs. Padre-e,
249 SCRA 422; People vs. Tabao, 240 SCRA 758; People vs. Ching,
240 SCRA 267.
[15] Brief for the Appellee, p. 7; citing: People vs. De
las Pinas, et. al., 141 SCRA 379; and People vs. Padilla, 242 SCRA 734.
[16] O.R. p. 6.
[17] Ibid., pp. 7-8; citing: People vs. Soan,
243 SCRA 627.
[18] People vs. Gaspar et al., G.R.
NO. 131479, November 19, 1999; citing: Antonio vs. Court of Appeals, 273
SCRA 328, 342-343; and People vs. Realin, G.R. No. 126051,
January 21, 1999.
[19] People vs. Enrique Cabingas and Reynaldo Dante
Ellevera, G.R. No. 79679, March 28, 2000; citing: People vs. Batulan,
253 SCRA 52, 64.
[20] 303 SCRA 697, p 707; citing: Sec. 14(2), Art. III,
Constitution; People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 129439, September 25, 1998;
People vs. de Guzman, 164 SCRA 215.
[21] People vs. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105, p.117.