FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 122769. August 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENANTE
GONZALES @ "Oyong" and BLAS ROSARIO, accused.
BLAS ROSARIO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
Renante Gonzales
and Blas Rosario were charged with murder in an Information[1] that reads:
"That on or
about the 10th day of March, 1990, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RENANTE
GONZALES @ Oyong and BLAS ROSARIO, being then armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill one ANGELO DE GUZMAN, with treachery and evident premeditation,
confederating together, acting jointly and helping each other, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the latter by shooting and hitting him below his nose with the
said handgun, thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Cardio
Respiratory Arrest, Intracranial hemorrage, Traumatic? Gunshot wound?"
(sic) as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Asst. City Health
Officer, this City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said
deceased, ANGELO DE GUZMAN, in the amount of not less than THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00) Philippine Currency, and other consequential damages.
"Contrary to
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code."
On arraignment,
both accused pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Trial on the merits
thereafter ensued.
The prosecution
established that in the evening of March 10, 1990, the victim Angelo de Guzman
and his wife Violeta were inside their house in Bayanihan Village, Caranglaan,
Dagupan City. At around 7:00 o’clock that evening, Angelo de Guzman was seated
near the window of their sala when all of a sudden accused-appellant Blas
Rosario, from outside the window, shot de Guzman at close range with a shotgun.
The other accused, Renante Gonzales, supported the arm of Rosario that was
holding the shotgun. De Guzman was hit on the neck causing him to fall to the
ground. After shooting the victim, Rosario and Gonzales fled.
Violeta, wife of
the victim, witnessed everything that transpired inside their sala. She
positively identified the two accused as she was only a meter away from the
window through which they shot her husband. At the time of the shooting
incident, their sala was illuminated by a 50-watt bulb. Even before the
shooting incident, she was already personally acquainted with the two accused.
Gonzales denied the
accusation against him. He alleged that at the time of the incident, he was
with his mother at the house of a certain Nana Mely in Malued, Dagupan City.
They left Nana Mely’s house at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening but only his
mother proceeded to their house as he alighted in front of the Central Bank and
walked towards Lyguana Bazar. While on his way to Lyguana Bazar, he allegedly
met his co-accused Blas Rosario who invited him to attend a wedding party being
held that night in Malued. They arrived at Malued at around 12:00 midnight and
proceeded to the house of a certain Mama Juanito. An hour later, policemen came
and invited him and Blas Rosario to the police station for investigation.
Aurora Gonzales,
mother of accused Renante Gonzales, corroborated the testimony of her son. She
narrated that from 5:30 in the afternoon of March 10, 1990, she and her son
were at the house of Nana Mely in Malued, Dagupan City and left only at around
10:00 o’clock in the evening; that her son did not proceed home but alighted in
front of the Central Bank.
Juanito Rosario
testified for accused Blas Rosario. He narrated that on March 10, 1990 at
around 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, he and Blas Rosario were spraying mangoes
with chemicals in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. They ran out of chemicals, so he sent
Blas Rosario to Dagupan City at around 6:30 in the evening for more supplies.
But it was only at around 8:30 in the evening that Blas Rosario was able to get
a ride to Dagupan City.
The trial court set
aside the version of both accused and held that Gonzales failed to establish
that it was impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time it was
committed. As regards Rosario, the trial court held that Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, is only 29.9 kilometers away from Dagupan City and could be
traversed in 1 1/2 hours by motorized tricycle or 30 minutes by car. Hence, it
was likewise not impossible for him to be at the crime scene at the time of its
commission. The trial court further ruled that the alibis of the accused were
rendered more incredible because they were positively identified by the wife of
the victim.
In sum, the trial
court found the accused guilty of murder and correspondingly sentenced them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Angelo de Guzman P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P2,500.00 as actual damages and
to pay the costs of the suit.[2]
Accused Renante
Gonzales withdrew his appeal. Hence, the following discourse would only pertain
to the appeal of Blas Rosario.
Accused-appellant
Rosario claims that "the trial court gravely erred in finding
accused-appellant Blas Rosario guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder when the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Violeta de Guzman (victim’s
wife) is contradictory and highly improbable."
The appeal is
without merit.
Accused-appellant
basically attacks the credibility of Violeta de Guzman, the prosecution’s lone
eyewitness. He insists that Violeta’s testimony is contradictory and highly
improbable.
We do not agree.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial
courts. Said doctrine is based on the time-honored rule that the matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such
testimony in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate
between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the
credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of
witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or
disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the
case.[3] In the case at bar, the findings of the trial court
are supported by substantial evidence.
First, accused-appellant argues that if, indeed, Violeta
saw the two accused moving suspiciously at the back of their house moments before
the attack, she should have warned her husband about it.
This Court finds
nothing wrong or unusual with the demeanor of Violeta before the attack or with
her reaction thereto. As this Court has consistently held, different people
react differently to a given situation, and there is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or
frightful experience. As a matter of common observation and knowledge, the
reaction or behavior of persons when confronted with a shocking incident
varies. Persons do not necessarily react uniformly to a given situation, for
what is natural to one may be strange to another. Hence, placed under emotional
stress, some people may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility,
while others may openly welcome an intrusion.[4]
Besides, there is
nothing unusual in the way Violeta reacted to what she saw. She did not warn
her husband of the impending attack because she was afraid that the assailants
would also harm her. This is apparent in the following testimony:
"Fiscal
Resultan:
Q.....How many minutes or how long before the gun was
fired, according to you, when you saw both accused holding the gun at the neck
of your husband?
Violeta de Guzman:
A.....Before they actually killed my husband, I already saw
them but I cannot (make any) shout or move because they might turn on me, so I
was afraid, then the gun went off. I was about to shout but no voice came out
from me."[5]
Second, accused-appellant claims that if Violeta was
shocked with what she had witnessed, it follows that her perception or
identification of the accused is blurred or vague.
This argument is a non
sequitur and has no basis at all. Violeta categorically testified that she
clearly saw the accused moments before the attack. That the accused were
outside their house was undisputable. The windows were open at the time of the
incident and with a 4-5 inches distance between the window grills, Violeta
could clearly see the persons outside their house. Also, the place where her
husband was seated was illuminated by a 50-watt bulb.
Third, accused-appellant insists that while Violeta
testified during her direct examination that both the accused were holding only
one gun when they shot their victim, nevertheless, in her sworn statement
executed before the police officers, she testified that only Blas Rosario fired
the gun at the victim.
This Court finds no
contradiction in the aforecited testimony. As already explained above, only
Blas Rosario was actually holding the gun while his co-accused Gonzales simply
placed his hand over that of Rosario as if to support and steady it. Assuming
without admitting that the two testimonies contradict each other, the
contradiction is more apparent than real. The fact remains that the two accused
were positively identified as the assailants of Angelo de Guzman and that they
acted in concert in committing the crime.
Finally,
accused-appellant points out that it was highly improbable that the two accused
were only one foot away from their victim contending that since the gun
allegedly used by the accused in killing the victim was already one foot in
length or more, then the distance of the accused from their victim could not be
only one foot especially if the accused extended their arms.
This argument
deserves scant consideration. That the accused were farther than the one-foot
distance mentioned by Violeta when they shot their victim is immaterial. This
does not detract from the finding that both accused were positively identified
as the assailants of Angelo de Guzman.
Corollarily, this
Court agrees with the trial court that treachery qualified the killing to
murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.[6] Angelo de Guzman was totally unaware of the
impending attack on his life. In fact, at the time he was shot, he was merely
seated on a chair inside their sala while watching television. Both accused
surreptitiously positioned themselves outside the window and directly behind
the back of their victim. The victim was unarmed and they made sure that he
could not make any sort of defense or retaliation. Without doubt, the attack
was treacherous.
At the time of the
commission of the offense, the penalty for murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance which attended the
killing, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of Dagupan City finding accused-appellant Blas
Rosario guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Angelo de Guzman P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P2,500.00 as actual damages and to pay the cost, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and
Pardo, JJ., concur.