FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 121651-52. August 16, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FERNANDO WATIMAR, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Incestuous rape,
such as that committed by a father against his own daughter, is a dastardly and
repulsive crime[1] that has no place in our
society. Time and again the Court has
condemned in no unequivocal terms the bestial acts of rape perpetrated by
fathers against their daughters. The case before us now is no different.
On the basis of
two (2) sworn criminal complaints executed by the offended party, accused
Fernando Watimar was charged with the crime of Rape in two (2) Informations.
The Information in Criminal Case No. 5513-AF[2] alleges –
That on or about the 26th day of
March 1990, in Sitio Tingga, Brgy. Macapsing, Municipality of
Rizal, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused father of the victim, with lewd design
and at the point of a knife and threat to kill, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of her (sic) daughter MYRA WATIMAR.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other
Information in Criminal Case No. 5514-AF is a virtual reproduction of the
above–quoted information, the only difference being that the rape was committed
on November 28, 1992.[3]
Upon
arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.[4] Trial thereafter ensued, after
which the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, rendered judgment[5] against accused, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows, viz:
1. In
Crim. Case No. 5513-AF, the Court finding the accused Fernando Watimar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalty of the
law, to pay the complaining witness Myra Watimar P50,000.00 as moral damages,
and P20,000.00, as exemplary damages, without, however, subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs; and
2. In
Crim. Case No. 5514-AF, the Court finding the accused Fernando Watimar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalty of the law, to
pay the complaining witness Myra Watimar P50,000.00, as moral damages, without,
however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant
interposed this appeal alleging that –
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE
TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS MYRA WATIMAR WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY ANY MEDICAL FINDINGS WHICH WOULD BE MATERIALLY AND ESSENTIALLY RELEVANT TO
THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING ANY
CREDENCE WHATSOEVER TO THE DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTNG THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The facts as
found by the trial court are:
Myra Watimar, 20 years old when she
took the witness stand, single, farm helper and a resident of Macapsing, Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, testified that she is the complainant in the two (2) criminal
cases; that she stated that ‘in the evening of March 26, 1990, she slept
together with her brothers and sisters, namely: Bernardo, Marilou, Leonardo,
Ariel and Lea, without her mother who went to the hospital as her aunt was
about to give birth; that her father slept with them in the same room; that at
about 2:00 in the early dawn of March 26, 1990, she felt that somebody was on
top of her and [was] kissing her neck; that she recognized him to be her father
Fernando Watimar, but when she recognized him, her father talked and a knife
was pointed at her neck with an instruction that she should not resist, otherwise, she will be killed;
that despite the threat of her father, she resisted and told her father not to
molest her, because she is his daughter (the witness was crying); that despite
the resistance and plea of the daughter, her father went on top of her, removed
her panty and placed himself on top of the complaining witness; that he was
able to do the bestial act despite the resistance made by kicking him; that
after the father succeeded in sexually molesting her on March 26, 1990, she
just kept crying in the corner of their house.
That on November 28, 1992, at 10:00
o’clock in the evening while the complaining witness was cooking alone, she was
surprised when somebody was at her back who happened to be Fernando Watimar,
her father, who suddenly kissed her and pulled her bringing her to the place
where they used to sleep; that she resisted and wanted to extricate herself
from her father by kicking him, but the accused is stronger than she is; she
pleaded to her father not to molest her again but the father did not heed her
plea and he again succeeded in having his sexual desire, on this point, the
testimony of the victim is as follows:
Q- How
can he succeed with his desire to sexually abuse you?
A- He
forcibly opened my thigh[s] and I was appealing to him that I am his daughter,
yet he did not heed my plea, sir.
Q- Did
you offer any resistance when he was trying to separate your thigh[s]?
A- Yes,
sir.
Q- How
did you resist your father when he was trying to separate your thigh[s]?
Court Interpreter:
The witness is demonstrating that she is placing her
two (2) legs together, yet, the father started to hurt her.
Pros. R. Beltran:
Q- How
did he hurt you at that time?
A- He
pushed my thigh[s], sir.
Q- Did
he push your thigh[s] hardly (sic)?
A- Once,
only, sir.
Q- After
that what happened?
A- That
was the time he succeeded with his lust, sir.[6]
On the other
hand, the defense’s version of what transpired can be gleaned from the
testimony of accused-appellant as summarized thus in his brief, to wit:
Fernando Watimar testified that he
is 50 years old, married, a thresher by profession, and a resident of Sitio Tingga,
Macapsing, Rizal, Nueva Ecija xxx.
On direct examination, he testified
that during the month of March 1990, he was working as a thresher
operator. He testified that he arrived
at 1:00 o’clock a.m. on March 27, 1990 and found his family sleeping. His wife woke up and gave him something to
eat. Later that same day, his wife was
no longer at home when he woke up but his daughter Myra Watimar, the herein complainant
was still asleep. Nothing unusual
happened from the time he arrived home until the time he woke up and readied
himself to report for work. He reported
for work to Valentin Santiago at the latter’s residence in Vega, Bongabon,
Nueva Ecija, which was about 1 kilometer away from his house. When he inquired from his children as to the
whereabouts of his wife, he was told that the latter had brought the wife of
his brother-in-law to the hospital to give birth. His wife did not leave any messages for him nor did she ask his
permission before leaving the house.
Upon his arrival at the house of Valentin Santiago, the latter
instructed him to thresh the palay of a certain person whose name, due
to lapse of time, he could no longer recall.
That morning, he prepared breakfast for himself and did not order his
daughter Myra to serve him because she was a lazy person and did not even wash
clothes when told to do so.
In November 1992, particularly on
the date when she allegedly raped his daughter again, he testified that he was
working as a truck helper for Valentin Santiago in Angeles City. On that date, the truck was in Angeles City
before proceeding to Ilocos. There were
three of them on that truck, the accused-appellant, the truck driver and the
merchant or biyahero. In Angeles
City, they went to the Tibagan Market to load the truck with watermelons which
would be brought to Manila. They
arrived in Angeles City around 11:00 o’clock in the morning after departing
from Bongabon, Nueva Ecija at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening on Nov. 28, 1992. He left Angeles City at around 7:00 o’ clock
in the evening and proceeded to Ilocos where they again loaded the truck with
watermelons. According to him, he was
unable to go home for a period of one month due to his work as truck helper.
He also testified that he could
think of no reason why his daughter would charge him falsely but he knew that
the false accusations had been instigated by his father-in-law who had told him
that it was “better that the family name Watimar will sink rather than the
family name Benolias”. According to the
accused-appellant, this was because the one who caused the pregnancy of his
daughter was his brother-in-law Celestino Benolias, Jr., the youngest brother
of his wife. He learned all this when
he asked his daughter at one time why she no longer went to her grandmother’s
house and she had answered that she would not do so “as long as that man is
there”, supposedly referring to Celestino Benolias, Jr. He was never in good terms with his
brother-in-law to the extent that the latter had threatened him at gun point
and even mentioned “salvaging” him and throwing him in the river. He also characterized his brother-in-law as
a drug user who, when he was under the influence, had twice poked a gun at him. Accused-appellant could not remember when he
brought his daughter to the hospital but remembered that he was one of those
who had brought her to the hospital. He
no longer stayed at the hospital because he still had work to do. He also said that he gave a total of
P3,000.00 for his daughter’s hospitalization but that, as he had already been
apprehended, he no longer knew what happened to the money. He only learned about his daughter’s giving
birth the following afternoon. The
knowledge of his daughter’s condition affected him so much that, had he known
for certain who caused her pregnancy, he would have killed that person. He said he did not notice his daughter’s
pregnancy. He asked his daughter who
the father of her child was but the latter did not reply. When he asked his wife, the latter merely
insisted that his surname should be given to the child, a fact he disagreed
with. It was out his hands, however, as
his sister-in-law affixed the name Watimar on the birth certificate. He is convinced now that the father of the child is none other than his brother-in-law
Celestino Benolias, Jr.
In reviewing
rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: 1.] to accuse a man of rape is easy, but to
disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; 2.] considering
that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized with
great caution; and 3.] the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merit and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.[7] Corollary to the foregoing legal
yardsticks is the dictum that when a victim of rape says that she has
been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of
credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.[8]
The Court has
said time and again that in reviewing rape cases, it will be guided by the
settled realities that an accusation for rape can be made with facility. While the commission of the crime may not be
easy to prove, it becomes even more difficult for the person accused, although
innocent, to disprove that he did not commit the crime. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime
of rape where only two persons are normally involved, the testimony of the
complainant must always be scrutinized with great caution.[9] Thus, in a prosecution for rape,
the complainant’s credibility becomes the single most important issue.[10]
Guided by these principles, the Court has
meticulously scrutinized the testimony of complaining witness Myra Watimar and
ultimately reached the conclusion that the acts charged did in fact occur. Myra’s testimony on the acts of rape
perpetrated against her by her father is clear and could have only been
narrated by a victim subjected to those sexual assaults. Nowhere is accused-appellant’s bestiality
graphically detailed than in the following narration of the victim:
Q. At
about 2:00 in the early morning of that date, was there anything unusual that
happened to you?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. What
is that?
A. On
that night, sir, I was sleeping and there was somebody on top of me and kissing
my neck.
Q. Were
you able to recognize that somebody who was kissing your neck?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Who
was he?
A. Fernando
Watimar, sir.
Q. How
did you recognize him?
A. I
recognized him, sir, because he talked and a knife was pointed at my neck, and
he instructed me not to resist because, otherwise he will kill me, sir.
Q. What
did you do when he pointed that knife on your neck and threatened you?
A. I
resisted him, sir, and told him not to do it to me because I am his daughter.
PROSECUTOR R. BELTRAN:
At this point, Your Honor, may I place on record that
the witness is crying.
COURT:
Place that on record.
PROSECUTOR R. BELTRAN:
Q. What
happened to your plea to your father not to molest you because you are his
daughter?
A. He
continued his lust to me, sir.
Q. After
that what happened?
A. I
was appealing to him, sir, but because of his superior strength he continued
with his lust. I pleaded to him but he
continued by removing my panty, sir.
Q. Did
he succeed in removing your panty?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. What
happened when your panty was removed?
A. He
placed his body on top of me, sir.
Q. After
placing his body on top of you, what happened next?
A. I
continued pleading to him, sir, but he successfully inserted his penis.
Q. How
did he succeed in inserting his penis inside your private organ?
A. He
forcibly opened my thigh, sir.
Q. When
he forcibly opened your thigh, did you not make any resistance or whatsoever?
A. I
resisted, sir, I pulled him, sir, I was kicking but because he is stronger than
me he succeeded.
COURT
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR R. BELTRAN
Q. How
many times did you kick him?
A. Many
times, sir, I cannot remember anymore how many.
Q. Nobody
was awakened in your house at that time?
A. Nobody,
sir, because they were sleeping then.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. Was
that the only occasion when you were sexually abused by your own father?
A. It
was repeated for several times, sir.
Q. Can
you remember the dates when you were sexually abused by your father?
A. What
I remember, sir, is November 28, 1992 when I gave birth, sir.
Q. Where
were you on November 28, 1992 at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening?
A. I
was at home, sir.
Q. What
were you doing on that date and time?
A. I
was then cooking, sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q. While
you were cooking at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening on November 28, 1992,
was there anything unusual that transpired?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. What
was that unusual thing that happened to you?
A. I
was surprised, sir, when somebody was at my back.
Q. Who
was that somebody that was at your back?
A. Fernando
Watimar, sir.
Q. You
are referring to the accused in this case?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. What
happened when all of a sudden the accused Fernando Watimar appeared at your
back?
A. He
suddenly kissed me, sir, and he pulled me.
Q. Where
did he pull you?
A. He
pulled me and brought me to the place where we used to sleep, sir.
Q. Did
you offer any resistance when your father pulled you at that place where you
used to sleep?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. How
did you resist him?
A. I
resisted, sir, I wanted to extricate myself, sir.
Q. How
did you try to extricate yourself from the hold of your father?
A. I
was kicking him, sir, but he is stronger than me, sir.
Q. So,
what happened after that?
A. He
was able to let me down to the place where we used to sleep, sir.
Q. After
that what happened?
A. I
was then pleading to him not to do it again to me, sir.
Q. Did
he heed to your plea?
A. No,
sir.
Q. So
what happened after that?
A. He
again succeeded with his desire, sir.
Q. How
can he succeed with his desire to sexually abuse you?
A. He
forcibly opened my thigh and I was appealing to him that I am his daughter,
yet, he did not heed my plea, sir.
Q. Did
you offer any resistance when he was trying to separate your thigh?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. How
did you resist your father when he was trying to separate your thigh?
A. I
was struggling, sir.
Q. How
would you describe your struggling (pagkukumusot) with your father while
he was opening your thigh?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness is demonstrating that she is placing her
two (2) legs together, yet the father started to hurt her.
PROS. BELTRAN
Q. How
did he hurt you at that time?
A. He
pushed my thigh, sir.
Q. Did
he push your thigh hardly?
A. Yes,
Sir.
Q. How
many times did he push your thigh?
A. Once
only, sir.
Q. After
that what happened?
A. That
was the time he succeeded with his lust, sir.
Accused-appellant
insists that the foregoing narration of the victim “deserves scant
consideration as it is tainted with factual infirmities and contrary to human
experience and conduct.”[11] To buttress his claim of innocence,
accused-appellant first adverts to the supposed impossibility of consummating
the crime in a room measuring “a mere two meters in area” where the victim was
sleeping beside her five other brothers and sisters. According to him: “It boggles the mind and confounds reason to
accept the proposition that the accused-appellant was able to consummate the
act despite the fact that she attempted to resist and in fact caused some
commotion in her determined efforts to extricate herself from her father and
none of her brothers and sisters were alerted to the event then transpiring.”[12]
The argument is
tenuous.
The possibility
of rape is not negated by the presence of even the whole family of the accused
inside the same room with the likelihood of being discovered. Indeed, the Court pointed out only recently
in People v. Arteche Antonio y Payagan[13] that “for rape to be committed, it
is not necessary for the place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine, for
rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out their evil
deed.[14] Rape may be committed even when the
rapist and the victim are not alone, or while the rapist’s spouse was asleep, or
in a small room where other family members also slept, as in the instant
case. The presence of people nearby
does not deter rapists from committing their odious act.”[15] Verily –
…The court
has time and again held that ‘the evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no respect for time
and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere – even in places where people
congregate such as parks, along the road side, within school premises, and
inside a house where there are other occupants.’[16] ‘Rape does not necessarily have to
be committed in an isolated place and can in fact be committed in places which
to many would appear to be unlikely and high-risk venues for sexual advances.’[17] Indeed, no one would think that
rape would happen in a public place like the comfort room of a movie house and
in broad daylight.[18]
Suffice it to
state in this regard that the argument that rape cannot be committed in a house
where other members of the family reside or may be found is a contention that
has long been rejected by the Court, rape being no respecter of time and place.[19]
Accused-appellant
further contends that the victim did not do everything in her power to prevent
the assault on her virtue. He argues
that the complaining witness admitted that although accused-appellant initially
threatened her at knife point, both his hands were free when he finally
committed the act. Accused-appellant
states that it is inexplicable why she did not seize this opportunity to make
good her efforts.[20]
The contention
fails to persuade.
The law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance,[21] especially where there is
intimidation.[22] In fact, physical resistance need
not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and
she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for
her life or personal safety.[23] Indeed, it has been said that in
rape cases, it is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death[24] or sustained injuries in the hands
of the rapist.[25] It suffices that intercourse takes
place against her will or that she yields because of a genuine apprehension of
great harm.[26] In incestuous rape, actual force
and intimidation is not even necessary.[27] The reason for this is that in a
rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the moral ascendancy of
the former over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.[28]
Accused-appellant
next claims that the complete absence of any medical finding or examination
which would directly contribute to establish that rape was indeed committed is
a point too glaring to be ignored in the light of the fact that the complainant
allowed more than two (2) years to pass before filing the case.[29]
The argument is
likewise unpersuasive.
A medical
examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the
evidence on hand convinces the court that conviction for rape is proper.[30] As recently pointed out by the
Court in People v. Wilson Dreu @ “Adang Dreu”[31] -
…Although
the results of a medical examination may be considered strong evidence to prove
that the victim was raped, such evidence is not indispensable in establishing
accused-appellant’s guilt or innocence.
In People v. Docena we stated:[32]
That there was no medical
examination report presented, sign of resistance during the actual copulation,
or proof of violence committed against MARGIE does not detract from our
conclusion that she was raped. A medical
examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Medical findings or proof of injuries,
virginity, or an allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the
crime are not essential in a prosecution for rape…
… [The defense’s contention is not
bolstered by the victim’s] failure to put up a strong resistance or shout for
help, nor by the fact that there was no sign of force or intimidation, which
should be viewed in the context of the victim’s perception and judgment at the
time of the commission of the offense.
It is subjective, thus, lack of physical resistance cannot be considered
consent.
Accused-appellant
further points out that his characterization as being a good father and husband
by his wife, Isabelita Watimar, echoed by his employer, Valentin Santiago as well
as his father-in-law, Celestino Benolias, Sr., juxtaposed with complainant’s
characterization of him as being temperamental and unduly harsh, would at the
very least generate reasonable doubt as to his being the perpetrator of the
acts charged against him.[33]
This claim
deserves short shrift.
Suffice it to
state that no young and decent woman would publicly admit that she was ravished
and her virtue defiled unless such was true for it would be instinctive for her
to protect her honor.[34] A daughter would not concoct a
story of defloration against her father, accuse him of so grave a crime as
rape, allow an examination of her private parts, submit herself to public
humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if she were not truly aggrieved or
her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the
culprit apprehended and punished.[35] In short, a teenage unmarried lass
would not file a rape case against anybody, much less her own father, if it
were not true.[36]
Accused-appellant,
lastly, faults the complainant for tarrying for three (3) long years before
telling her mother about his nefarious conduct despite ‘countless’
opportunities to seek the aid of her mother and other relatives particularly
her grandfather who lived a mere ten (10) meters from her house. He insists that even assuming arguendo that
the initial shock was so great as to deprive her of the facility to report
these misdeeds to anyone, it is stretching the realm of logic and reason to
accept her belated claims at face-value three (3) years after the operative
fact giving rise to her trauma.[37]
The contention
deserves scant consideration.
As aptly stated
in People v. Arthur De Leon y Lagmay @ “Joel”:[38] “This Court has consistently held
that delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of physical violence cannot
be taken against the victim. A rape
victim’s action is oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than reason. It is fear, springing from the initial rape,
that the perpetrator hopes to build up a climate of extreme psychological terror,
which would, he hopes, numb his victim to silence and submissiveness.”[39] While indeed the complainant may
have tarried in reporting her defilement, the three-year hiatus in reporting
the crimes adverted to by accused-appellant will not extricate him from his
predicament. This is especially so
considering the Court’s recent pronouncement in People v. Conrado
Cabana @ Randy,[40] which states that –
... The
delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her
virtue is neither unknown or uncommon.[41] As held in the case of People
vs. Malagar:[42]
Vacillation in the filing of [a]
complaint by [a] rape victim is not an uncommon phenomenon. This crime is normally accompanied by the
rapist’s threat on the victim’s life, and the fear can last for quite a
while. There is also the natural
reluctance of a woman to admit her sullied chastity, accepting thereby all the
stigma it leaves, and then to expose herself to morbid curiosity of the public
whom she may likely perceive rightly or wrongly, to be more interested in the
prurient details of the ravishment than in her vindication and the punishment
of the rapist. In People vs. Coloma[43] we have even considered an 8-year delay in reporting
the long history of rape by the victim’s father as understandable and so not
enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year old daughter.
Zorayda was only sixteen years old
when she was subjected to the lustful desires of the accused; thus, she was
understandably cowed into silence as the accused-appellant warned her not to
tell her mother about the incident. No
woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter
expose herself to a public trial if she were not motivated solely by the desire
to have the culprit apprehended and punished[44] to avenge her honor[45] and to condemn a grave injustice to
her.[46]
Accused-appellant
merely raised denial and alibi as his defense.
The Court has consistently held in previous cases too numerous to cite
that for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during the commission of the
crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the locus criminis.
Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner,
convincingly identified accused-appellant as the defiler of her chastity. Succinctly stated, the positive assertions
of accused-appellant’s daughter that he raped her is entitled to greater
weight.[47] While denial and alibi are
legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.[48]
All told, we
find no reason to reverse the ruling of the trial court. The acts of rape are rendered all the more
heinous and reprehensible in this case inasmuch as the perpetrator is the
father of the victim. People v. Lao[49] scathingly condemned this kind of criminal thus:
Such a “father” deserves no place
in society, and more especially in a country like the Philippines whose
fundamental law considers the family as a basic autonomous social institution
and the foundation of the nation, recognizes the sanctity of family life and
mandates the State to defend the right of children to special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
The two acts
complained of in this case were committed in 1990 and 1992, respectively, at
which time Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provided:
ART. 335. When and how rape
committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:
1. By
using force and intimidation;
2. When
the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When
the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x x x x x x x
Considering that
a deadly weapon was employed in the commission of the offenses charged in this
case, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to
death. The use of the bladed weapon
already qualified the acts of rape.[50]
A circumspect
scrutiny of the record shows that none of the aggravating circumstances
enumerated in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by
the prosecution. Where there is no
aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser
penalty shall be applied.[51] While the employment of the knife
was sufficiently established by the prosecution, such clear showing can not
justify the imposition of the death penalty in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance. Furthermore, at the time
of commission of the crimes in this case, the imposition of the death penalty
was suspended.[52] Hence, the trial court correctly
sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[53]
The Court notes
that the court a quo, while awarding P50,000.00 as moral damages in each
count of rape, did not award any indemnity ex delicto which current
jurisprudence has fixed at P50,000.00.[54] It needs be stressed in this regard
that civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of moral damages
which is automatically granted in rape cases.[55] Pursuant to controlling case law,
the award of P50,000.00 ex delicto is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[56] Moral damages are additionally
awarded without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[57] This is because it is recognized
that the victim’s injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the
odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[58]
The anguish and
the pain a victim had to endure are evident.[59] The Court need not belabor the fact
that the offended party in a rape case is victim many times over. In our culture which puts a premium on the
virtue of purity or virginity, rape stigmatizes the victim more than the
perpetrator.[60]
Considering that
the offender is the father of the victim, we agree with the trial court that
accused-appellant should likewise pay the victim exemplary damages.[61] Accused-appellant should,
therefore, be liable for exemplary damages of P25,000.00 for each count
of rape.[62]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
Decision appealed from, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of rape and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for each crime, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS that the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim Myra
Watimar for each count of rape the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil
indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 by way
of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1]1 People
v. Amado Sandrias Javier, G.R. No. 126096, 26 July 1999, 311 SCRA 122.1
[2]2 Rollo,
p. 10.2
[3]3 Ibid.,
p. 12.3
[4]4 Record,
pp. 11, 29.4
[5]5 Ibid.,
p. 82; penned by Judge Johnson L. Ballutay.5
[6]6 TSN,
30 June 1994, pp. 10, 11.6
[7]7 People
v. Felipe Hofileña y Taala, G.R. No. 134772, 22 June 2000, p. 8, citing
People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 [1998]; People v. Ramirez, 266
SCRA 335 [1997]; People v. Teves, 246 SCRA 236 [1995]; People v. Guamos,
241 SCRA 528 [1995]; People v. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992].7
[8]8 People
v. Penaso, G.R. No. 121980, 23 February
2000, pp. 5-6; People v. Garces, Jr., G.R. No. 132368, 20 January 2000, pp.
9-10; People v. Borja, 267 SCRA 370, 379 [1997]; People v.
Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335, 348 [1997].8
[9]9 People
v. Jimmy Mijano y Tamora, G.R. No. 129112, 23 July 1999, 311 SCRA 81.9
[10]10 People
v. Emil Babera y Rabanera, G.R. No. 130609, 30 May 2000, p. 8, citing
People v. Dacoba, 289 SCRA 265 [1998] and People v. Gagto, 253
SCRA 455 [1996].10
[11]11 Appellant’s
Brief, p. 31.11
[12]12 Ibid.,
pp. 32-33.12
[13]13 G.R.
No. 122473, 8 June 2000, p. 8.13
[14]14 People
v. Ildefonso Bayona, G.R. Nos. 133343-44, 2 March 2000.14
[15]15 People
v. Joselito Baltazar, G.R. No. 115990, 31 March 2000; italics
supplied.15
[16]16 People
v. Agbayani, 284 SCRA 315 [1998].16
[17]17 People
v. Wilson Mitra, G.R. No. 130669, 27 March 2000; People v. David
Silvano y Hayag, supra.17
[18]18 People v.
Vicente Balora y Delantar, G.R. No. 124976, 31 May 2000, p. 8.18
[19]19 People
v. Reynaldo Ponado, G.R. No. 130334, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA 529, citing
People v. Alimon, 257 SCRA 658 [1996]; People v. Dones, 254 SCRA
696 [1996].19
[20]20 Appellant’s
Brief, p. 33.20
[21]21 People
v. Cresente Napiot, G.R. No. 119956, 5 August 1999, 311 SCRA 772, citing
People v. David Silvano y Hayag, supra.21
[22]22 People
v. Dominador Historillo, G.R. No. 130408, 16 June 2000, citing People v.
Penero, 276 SCRA 564 [1997].22
[23]23 People
v. Rabosa, 273 SCRA 142 [1997].23
[24]24 People
v. Monfero, G.R. No. 126367, 17 June 1999, 308 SCRA 396.24
[25]25 People
v. Napiot, supra.25
[26]26 Ibid.26
[27]27 People
v. Marcelo “Marlon” Nava, Jr., G.R. Nos. 130509-12, 19 June 2000, p. 14,
citing People v. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312 [1998].27
[28]28
People v. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251 [1998]; People v. Agbayani, 284 315
[1998]; People v. Bartolome, 296 SCRA 615 [1998].28
[29]29 Appellant’s
Brief, pp. 33-34.29
[30]30 People
v. Rizalino P. Rebose, G.R. No. 131104, 17 June 1999, 308 SCRA 499,
citing People v. Devilleres, 269 SCRA 716 [1997].30
[31]31 G.R.
No. 126282, 20 June 2000, pp. 7-8.31
[32]32
G.R. Nos. 131894-98, 20 January 2000.32
[33]33 Appellant’s
Brief, p. 34.33
[34]34 People
v. Alexander Tano y Caballero, G.R. No. 133872, 5 May 2000, p. 12,
citing People v. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75 [1998].34
[35]35 People
v. Alexander Tano y Caballero, supra, citing People v.
Escober, 281 SCRA 498 [1997]; People v. Antipona, 274 SCRA 328 [1997];
People v. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335 [1997]; People v. Marcelo
“Marlon” Nava, Jr., supra, citing People v. Escala, 292 SCRA 48
[1998].35
[36]36 People
v. Alfonso Pineda y Esmino, G.R Nos. 118312-13, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA
368, citing People v. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 [1999].36
[37]37 Appellant’s
Brief, p. 35.37
[38]38 G.R.
Nos. 124338-41, 12 May 2000, p. 13.38
[39]39 Citing
People v. Caballero, G.R. No. 129693, 24 January 2000, citing People v.
Melivo, 253 SCRA 347 [1996].39
[40]40 G.R.
No. 127124, 9 May 2000, pp. 14-15.40
[41]41 People
v. Montefalcon, 243 SCRA 617 [1995].41
[42]42 238
SCRA 512 [1994].42
[43]43 222
SCRA 255 [1993].43
[44]44 People
v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA 561 [1996]; People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64
[1993].44
[45]45 People
v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 [1995].45
[46]46 People
v. Base, 196 SCRA 688 [1991]; emphasis and italics supplied.46
[47]47 People
v. Romeo Arillas y Montoya, G.R. No. 130593, 19 June 2000, p. 7.47
[48]48 People
v. Elraine Martinez, G.R. No. 130606, 15 February 2000, citing People v.
Masalihit, 300 SCRA 147 [1998] and People v. Taneo, supra.48
[49]49 249
SCRA 137 [1995], citing Article II, Section 12; Article XV, Section 1 and 3,
Constitution.49
[50]50 People
v. de Leon, G.R. No. 128436, 10 December 1999, p. 11.50
[51]51 People
v. Jimmy Sabredo y Garbo, G.R. No. 126114, 11 May 2000, p. 7.51
[52]52 People
v. Romulo Carullo, 289 SCRA 481, 499 (1998).52
[53]53 People
v. Modesto Mamac y Caminero, G.R. No. 130332, 31 May 2000, p. 9, citing
People v. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 [1999].53
[54]54 People
v. Henry De Guzman y Pascual, 124368, 8 June 2000; People v.
Salazar, 258 SCRA 55 [1996]; People v. Caballero, 258 SCRA 541 [1996];
People v. Abordo, 258 SCRA 571 [1996]; People v. Emil Babera y
Rabanera, supra.54
[55]55 People
v. Edwin R. Decena, G.R. No. 131843, 31 May 2000, p. 7.55
[56]56 People
v. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546 [1999]; People v. Penaso, supra.56
[57]57 People
v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 [1998]; People v. Ludigario Candelario
and Gerry Legarda, G.R. No. 125550, 28 July 1999, 311 SCRA 475.57
[58]58 People
v. Rolando Tabanggay, G.R. 130504, 29 June 2000, p. 30.58
[59]59; People
v. Loriega, G.R. No. 116009-10, 29 February 2000, p. 13; People v.
Garces, Jr., G.R. No. 132368, 20 January 2000, p. 22; People v. Penaso, supra.59
[60]60 People
v. Felipe Hofileña y Taala, supra, citing People v.
Villamor, 297 SCRA 262 [1998].60
[61]61 People
v. Romeo Arillas y Montoya, G.R. No. 130593, 19 June 2000, p. 11.61
[62]62 Ibid.62