SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 100801-02. August 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES
DOE, PAUL DOE and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused, DONATO B.
CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us on
appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 27, 1991 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843
and 89-4844 finding herein appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of murder and frustrated murder, respectively for the killing of U.S.
Col. James N. Rowe and for seriously wounding Joaquin Vinuya.
It appears that
appellant Donato Continente and several other John Does were initially charged
with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in two (2) separate
Informations dated June 20, 1989 in connection with the shooting incident on
April 21, 1989 at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon
City which caused the death of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe while seriously wounding
his driver, Joaquin Vinuya. After the
arrest of another suspect, Juanito Itaas, on August 27, 1989 in Davao City, the
prosecution, with prior leave of court, filed two (2) separate amended
Informations for murder and frustrated murder to include Juanito T. Itaas,
among the other accused. The amended
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 89-4843 and 89-4844 read:
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4843 for
Murder:
"That on or about the 21st day
of April, 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite rifles and
motor vehicles, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, and employ personal violence upon the person of COL. JAMES N. ROWE, a
U.S. Army Officer, by then and there firing at him while then on board a Toyota
car, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal gunshot wounds, which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Col. James
N. Rowe in such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Criminal Case No. Q-89-4844 for
Frustrated Murder:
"That on or about the 21st day
of April 1989, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and treachery and with the use of armalite rifles and motor
vehicles, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of JOAQUIN BINUYA, by then
and there firing at him while then on board a Toyota car, hitting him on the
scalp and body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal gunshot wounds,
thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of murder, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes independent
of their own will, that is the timely intervention of medical assistance, to
the damage and prejudice of said Joaquin Binuya in such amount as may be
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
Upon being
arraigned on August 31, 1989, appellant Donato B. Continente, assisted by his
counsel of choice, pleaded "Not guilty" to each of the amended
Informations in both criminal cases. On
the scheduled arraignment of appellant Juanito Itaas on October 31, 1989,
appellant Itaas, upon the advice of his counsel, refused to enter any
plea. Hence, the trial court ordered
that a plea of "Not guilty" be entered in each of the amended
Informations in both criminal cases for the said appellant.
From the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that on April 21, 1989 at
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, the car of U.S. Col. James N. Rowe, Deputy
Commander, Joint U. S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG for brevity), was
ambushed at the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon
City. Initial investigation by the
Central Intelligence Service (CIS for brevity), National Capital District
Command, Camp Crame, Quezon City which was led by Capt. Gil Meneses, Assistant
Chief of the Special Investigation Branch, CIS, shows that on the date and time
of the ambush, Col. James Rowe, was on board his gray Mitsubishi Galant car
which was being driven by Joaquin Vinuya; and that they were at the corner of
Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City on their way to the JUSMAG
Compound along Tomas Morato Street when gunmen who were on board an old model
Toyota Corolla car suddenly fired at his car, thereby killing Col. Rowe and
seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya.
The car that was used by the gunmen was followed by a Mitsubishi Lancer
car when it sped away from the site of the ambush.[2] The same Toyota Corolla car was
later recovered on the same day by a team from the Philippine Constabulary
(PC), North Sector Command, led by PC/Sgt. Fermin Garma, at No. 4 Windsor
Street, San Francisco Del Monte in Quezon City.[3]
Upon further
investigation of the case, the CIS agents established through a confidential
intelligence information the involvement of appellant Donato Continente, an
employee of the U.P. Collegian in U.P. Diliman, Quezon City, in the ambush of
Col. James Rowe and his driver. Accordingly,
on June 16, 1989, the CIS investigation team proceeded to the U.P. campus in
Diliman, Quezon City to conduct a surveillance on appellant Donato
Continente. After accosting appellant
Continente inside the said U.P. campus, the CIS team took him to Camp Crame in
Quezon City for questioning.[4] During the interrogation which was
conducted by CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico in the presence of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala in Camp Crame on June 17, 1989, appellant Continente
admitted to his participation in the ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver
as a member of the surveillance unit under the Political Assassination Team of
the CPP-NPA.[5] Among the documents confiscated
from appellant Continente by the CIS agents, and for which a receipt dated June
16, 1989 was prepared and issued by Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz, was a letter
addressed to "Sa Kinauukulan".
At the dorsal right hand side of the letter appear the acronyms
"STR PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng
Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team, Regional
Command".[6]
Another
confidential intelligence information established the participation of
appellant Juanito Itaas in the said ambush of Col. James Rowe and his driver on
April 21, 1989. Appellant Itaas, who
was a known member of the Sparrow Unit of the NPA based in Davao City was
arrested in Davao City and was brought to Manila by Capt. Gil Meneses for
investigation.[7] CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico
investigated and took down the statements of appellant Itaas who disclosed
during the investigation that he was an active member of the Sparrow Unit of
the NPA based in Davao City and confessed, in the presence of Atty. Filemon
Corpuz who apprised and explained to him his constitutional rights, that he was
one of those who fired at the gray Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. James Rowe at
the corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue on April 21, 1989.[8] The said appellant identified the
Toyota Corolla car that the assailants rode on April 21, 1989 and the gray
Mitsubishi Galant car of Col. Rowe.[9]
Meanwhile, it
appears that the ambush on Col. James Rowe and his driver was witnessed by a
certain Meriam Zulueta. The testimony
of prosecution eyewitness Meriam R. Zulueta reveals that at around 7:00 o'clock
in the morning of April 21, 1989, she was about to cross the Tomas Morato
Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to attend a practicum
in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several gunshots. Upon looking at the direction where the
gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a gray car
at a distance of more or less one (1) meter at the corner of Tomas Morato
Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City.
Zulueta returned to the side of the street to seek for cover but could
not find any so she docked and covered her head with her bag while continuously
looking at the persons who were firing at the gray car.[10] She recognized appellant Juanito
Itaas when the latter was presented for identification in Camp Crame as the
person, directly behind the driver of the maroon car, whose body was half
exposed while he was firing at the gray car with the use of along firearm.[11] The shooting incident lasted for
about five (5) seconds only after which the maroon car made a U-turn to Timog
Avenue toward the direction of Quezon Boulevard while being followed by a white
Mitsubishi Lancer car.[12]
Prosecution
eyewitness Zulueta likewise recognized the driver of the white Mitsubishi
Lancer car as the same person whom she had encountered on two occasions. Zulueta disclosed that in the morning of
April 19, 1989, the white Mitsubishi Lancer car was parked along the side of
Tomas Morato Street which was near the corner of Scout Madrinas Street. Her attention was caught by the driver of
the car, who was then reading a newspaper, when the latter remarked "Hoy
pare, ang sexy. She-boom!" as she
was walking along the street toward the JUSMAG Compound. On April 20, 1989, she saw the same person
inside the white Mitsubishi Lancer car which was then parked along the side of
Tomas Morato Street while she was again on her way to attend practicum in the
JUSMAG Compound. She learned of the
identity of the driver as a certain Raymond Navarro, who is allegedly a member
of the NPA, from the pictures shown her by the CIS investigators in Camp Crame.[13]
Prosecution
witness Zulueta also recognized appellant Donato Continente whom she had
encountered on at least three (3) occasions at a carinderia outside the JUSMAG
Compound. Her first encounter with
appellant Continente was at around three o'clock in the afternoon on April 17,
1989 when she went out of the JUSMAG Compound to a carinderia nearby. She mistook the said appellant for a
tricycle driver who was simply walking around the premises. She saw appellant Continente in the same
carinderia again on the following day, April 18, 1989, and she was even
teased by her companions that he was her escort. On April 19, 1989, Zulueta saw appellant Continente for the third
time inside the same carinderia while the latter was merely standing. She came to know the identity of appellant
Continente when Continente was presented to her in Camp Crame for
identification. She thought that he was
the tricycle driver whom she had seen in the carinderia near the JUSMAG
Compound.[14]
Joaquin Vinuya
testified that he was employed by the JUSMAG, as driver, and assigned to Col.
James Rowe. On April 21, 1989, he
fetched Col. Rowe from his house in Potsdam Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong to
report for work in JUSMAG, Quezon City.
He drove along EDSA and turned left upon reaching Timog Avenue in Quezon
City. While he was making a right turn
at the intersection of Timog Avenue toward Tomas Morato Street, he noticed four
(4) people on board a red car, two (2) of whom suddenly opened fire at the car
that he was driving hitting him in the process. The shooting incident happened very fast and that he had no
opportunity to recognize the persons inside the red car. Despite the incident, Vinuya managed to
drive the car to the JUSMAG Compound.
Upon arrival at the JUSMAG Compound, he found out that Col. James Rowe,
who was sitting at the back seat of the car, was also hit during the shooting
incident.[15]
Col. James Rowe
and Joaquin Vinuya were initially brought to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon
City for treatment. Subsequently, they
were transferred to the Clark Air Base Hospital in Pampanga. It was only then that Vinuya learned of Col.
James Rowe's death whose body was already wrapped in a blanket. Vinuya was treated in the Clark Air Base
Hospital in Pampanga for four (4) days for the injuries he sustained on his
head, shoulder, and on the back portion of his left hand. Thereafter, he was taken back to JUSMAG
Compound in Quezon City to recuperate.[16]
Prosecution
witnesses Dr. Walter Divers and Dr. Jose Santiago testified on their respective
medical findings[17] on the victims. Dr. Divers confirmed in court the contents
of his medical report dated April 21, 1989 which shows that Col. Rowe sustained
a gunshot wound on the left side of his head and abrasions on other parts of
his body and that he was pronounced dead upon arrival at the V. Luna Hospital
in Quezon City.[18] On the other hand, Dr. Santiago
identified the medical report dated April 25, 1989 that he prepared relative to
the treatment that he administered on Joaquin Vinuya. The report shows that Vinuya sustained three (3) superficial
injuries on the scalp, on the left shoulder, and on the back of the left hand
which could have been caused by bullets that came from a gun; and that the
wounds could have caused the death of Vinuya without the medical treatment that
lasted for four (4) days.[19]
For the defense,
appellant Juanito Itaas testified and denied the truth of the contents of his
sworn statements which are respectively dated August 29, 1989 and August 30,
1989, insofar as the same establish his participation in the ambush of Col.
James Rowe and his driver on April 21, 1989.
Appellant Itaas testified that he was allegedly tortured by his captors
on August 27 and 28, 1989 in Davao City; that he was blindfolded and a masking
tape was placed on his mouth; and that subsequently, he was hit and mauled
while a cellophane was placed on his head thus, causing him to loss
consciousness.[20]
Appellant Itaas
further testified that he affixed his signatures on his sworn statements dated
August 29 and 30, 1989 in the presence of the CIS officers and that Atty.
Filemon Corpus was not present during those two occasions. The said appellant admitted having sworn to
the truth of the contents of his said sworn statements before the administering
fiscal, but he disclosed that the CIS officers previously threatened him to
admit the contents of the two sworn statements.[21]
Appellant Donato
Continente testified that he was working as messenger with the U.P. Collegian,
an official monthly publication of the University of the Philippines. He was walking on his way home inside the
U.P. campus in Diliman, Quezon City from his workplace in Vinzon's Hall in the
late afternoon of June 16, 1989 when four (4) persons blocked his way and
simultaneously held his body and covered his mouth. He asked if they had any warrant of arrest but the persons simply
boarded him inside a waiting car where he was handcuffed and blindfolded. Thereafter, they took his wallet that
contained his NBI clearance, SSS, tax account number (TAN), identification
card, two (2) pictures, and a typewritten certification from "SINAG"
where he used to work.[22]
Appellant
Continente learned that he was taken to Camp Crame in Quezon City only in the
following morning when his blindfold was removed so that he could give his
statement in connection with the killing of Col. James Rowe before a CIS
Investigator whom he later identified during the trial as Virgilio
Pablico. Appellant Continente affirmed
the truth of his personal circumstances only which appear on his sworn
statement dated June 17, 1989 but denied having made the rest of the statements
embodied therein. The said appellant
claimed that he initially denied any knowledge in the killing of Col. James
Rowe but CIS Investigator Pablico maintained that he (Continente) knew
something about it; that appellant Continente was alone with Investigator
Pablico during the investigation; that he signed his sworn statement in the
presence of Pablico and swore to the truth thereof before the administering
fiscal for fear that something might happen to him while he was alone; that he
signed the last page of his sworn statement first before signing the waiver of
his constitutional rights upon arrival of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala whose legal
services was engaged by the CIS Investigators; and that he had no opportunity
to talk with Atty. Manansala who left after he (Atty. Manansala) signed, merely
as witness, the first page of his sworn statement, which is the waiver of his
constitutional rights.[23]
On rebuttal,
prosecution witness Sgt. Reynaldo dela Cruz testified that he prepared and
issued the receipt for the documents which he confiscated from appellant
Continente on June 16, 1989; and that it is the standard operating procedure in
the CIS to put a blindfold on an arrested suspected NPA member in order to
withhold from him the view and location of the entrance, the exit and the
terrain in the camp.[24]
The testimony of
CIS Investigator Virgilio Pablico on rebuttal reveals that during the investigation
of appellants Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas, their respective lawyers
namely, Atty. Bonifacio Manansala and Atty. Filemon Corpuz, were present; that
appellants Continente and Itaas conferred with their lawyers before they gave
their statements to the CIS investigator; that the CIS investigator typed only
the statements that the appellants had given him in response to his questions
during the investigation; that both appellants were accompanied by their
respective lawyers when they were brought to the fiscal for inquest; and that
said appellants were never tortured nor threatened during the
investigations of these cases.[25]
The trial court
rendered its decision[26] in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 to
44 on February 28, 1991 finding both appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato
Continente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and
frustrated murder. It ruled, thus:
"In assessing the evidence
against co-accused Continente, it is undeniable that the yardstick of his
culpability hangs in the validity of the extra-judicial confession he had
executed. A close scrutiny of the
document would reveal that the confession is free from any taint of illegality
and thus serves as a basis for his conviction.
The presumption of law that
official duty has been regularly performed has not been satisfactorily
controverted by the accused.
Circumstances show that
Continente's waiver was done with the assistance of a counsel of his
choice. The records indicate that Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala was accused's counsel during his custodial investigation
and his arraignment and that his counsel during the trial was a relative of the
aforementioned lawyer. These factors
are undeniable evidence of trust reposed upon Atty. Bonifacio Manansala by the
accused.
Continente also admitted on
cross-examination that he had read his statement which included the
PAGPAPATUNAY containing his waiver of constitutional rights (TSN 29 August 1990
p. 29). Accused was raised in Metro Manila
and spoke Tagalog, thus would not have any difficulty in comprehending the
questions addressed to him and the information relayed to him with respect to
his rights. The court can not equate
that whenever a suspect is taken into custody and is fearful of his safety, the
police authorities had exercised pressure or had threatened if not subjected
them to physical abuse. Moreover, the
fact that the accused admitted that his answers were typed as he spoke them
(TSN August 30 1990 p.4) leaves no room for Pablico to fabricate an answer.
xxx xxx xxx.
The prosecution evidence gathered
against accused Itaas cradles on two incriminating points. The Zulueta testimony and his extra judicial
confession working independently, one without the other, have the force capable
of convicting the accused. The
interplay of these two valuable evidence solidifies a ruling of guilt against
accused Itaas.
The defense raised by the accused
is not sufficient to overrule this Court's determination of guilt against
Itaas.
The testimony of Zulueta has been
candid and straightforward, devoid of any material contradiction. No motive has been imputed to assail the
credibility of her testimony. xxx
xxx xxx xxx.
With respect to the extra-judicial
confession executed by accused Itaas, the Court finds that such was made
pursuant to the Constitution. Although
it may be argued that accused resides in Davao, the fact that he could
understand Tagalog as admitted by him in his testimony and proven by the
proceedings in court where he was answering questions addressed to him in
Tagalog militates against his inability to comprehend his right and its
subsequent waiver. Counsel for accused
contests the independence and competence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz on the ground
that said lawyer was a military lawyer.
Although the military background of Atty. Corpuz is admitted, this does
not automatically disqualify him to act as lawyer for the accused. Proof of the fact that he failed to render
his duty to safeguard the rights of the accused must be shown before this court
nullifies the weight of Itaas' extra-judicial confession. The allegation of torture similarly rings
hollow. No medical certificate had been
shown by the accused that he had indeed suffered brutal treatment from his
jailers specially since he had alleged to have been treated by a doctor for his
injuries."
Thereafter, the
trial court meted out the following penalties on the appellants:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, this Court finds accused DONATO CONTINENTE y BUENVENIDA and JUANITO
ITAAS y TURA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER and
FRUSTRATED MURDER, and each is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA for the killing of Col. James Rowe, to pay P30,000.00 to the
heirs; and an imprisonment from Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of PRISION MAYOR
as MINIMUM to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of
RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM for the crime committed against Joaquin Vinuya,
and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED."
From the
foregoing judgment of the trial court, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito
Itaas separately instituted the instant appeal.
On March 15,
1993, appellant Donato Continente filed his Appellant's Brief[27] while appellant Juanito Itaas filed
his Appellant's Brief[28] on March 5, 1993. The Office of the Solicitor General filed
the Appellee's Brief[29] for the People on October 4,
1993. Appellant Itaas filed a Reply
Brief[30] on December 3, 1993.
Appellant
Continente raised the following assignments of error by the trial court:
I
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND
GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
CONTINENTE.
II
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE BY THE PROSECUTION'S LONE WITNESS.
III
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONTINENTE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.
On the other
hand, appellant Itaas interposed the following assignments of error:
I
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING AND APPRECIATING THE EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY OF MERIAM ZULUETA.
II
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING AND APPRECIATING THE ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ITAAS.
III
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
ADMITTING TESTIMONIAL AND PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
POSING BESIDE THE AMBUSHER'S AND THE VICTIM'S ALLEGED CARS.
IV
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.
V
THE EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY BY THE AUTHORITIES DEPICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ITAAS AS "THE ROWE KILLER", A "COMMUNIST"
AND A MEMBER OF THE CPP/NPA/NDF/ABB INFLUENCED MERIAM ZULUETA'S IDENTIFICATION
OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE LOWER COURT'S JUDGMENT.
The principal
issues are:
1. Whether
or not the waivers of the constitutional rights during custodial investigation
by the appellants were valid; and
2. Whether
or not the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta was credible.
The rights of
the accused during custodial investigation are enshrined in Article III,
Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel."
The rights to
remain silent and to counsel may be waived by the accused provided that the
constitutional requirements are complied with.
It must appear clear that the accused was initially accorded his right
to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. In addition, the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of
counsel. If the waiver complies with
the constitutional requirements, then the extrajudicial confession will be
tested for voluntariness,[31] i. e., if it was given
freely-without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility,[32] i.e., if it was consistent with the
normal experience of mankind.
In assailing the
validity of their written statements, appellants Donato Continente and Juanito
Itaas contend that they were not properly informed of their custodial rights
under the constitution as to enable them to make a valid waiver. The pertinent portion of appellant Donato
Continente's written statement dated June 17, 1989 is quoted hereunder, to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Donato Continente, ang pagsisiyasat na
ito ay may kinalaman sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S. Army Colonel James
Rowe ng JUSMAG.
Bago kita simulang tanungin ay nais ko munang
ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating umiiral na Saligang
Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o huwag
magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw ay
magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sasabihin mo sa
salaysay mong ito ay maaaring gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa
anumang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng abogado ayon sa
iyong sariling pili habang ikaw ay aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay walang kakayanang umupa ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan
namin ng isang abogado ng gobyerno bilang tumayo na iyong tagapayo at ng sa
gayon ay maprotektahan ang iyong mga karapatan.
Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng
mga karapatan mong ito.
TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo. Nauunawaan ko po.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang siya mong
maging tagapayo?
SAGOT: Wala po pero nakapagdesisyon na po ako na ako ay magbibigay ng
salaysay kahit na wala akong nakaharap na abogado.
TANONG: G. Continente, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan, ayon narin sa
batas, ay kinakailangang gawin sa harap ng isang abogado. Payag ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan
sa harap ng isang abogado ng gobyerno?
SAGOT: Pumapayag po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay
napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan, at nauunawaan mo ang mga karapatan
mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.[33]
On the other
hand, the pertinent portion of appellant Itaas' written statement dated August
29, 1989 is quoted, to wit:
01. PALIWANAG: G.
Juanito Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman sa pagkakaambush
at pagpatay kay Colonel James Rowe ng JUSMAG at pagkasugat ng kanyang
driver. Bago kita simulang tanungin ay
nais ko munang ipabatid sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan alinsunod sa ating
Bagong Saligang Batas. Ito ay mga sumusunod. Una, ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik o
huwag magbigay ng salaysay. Kung ikaw
ay magbibigay ng salaysay, ipinaalala ko sa iyo na anumang sabihin mo sa
salaysay mong ito ay maaaring gamiting ebidensiya pabor o laban sa iyo sa
anumang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas.
Ikalawa, karapatan mong magkaroon ng pili at sarili mong abogado habang
ikaw ay aking tinatanong. Kung ikaw ay
walang pambayad ng abogado, ikaw ay bibigyan ng gobyerno ng abogado na wala
kang aalalahaning anumang kabayaran.
Ikatlo, karapatan mong malaman at mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong
ito.
TANONG: Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Mayroon ka bang abogado na naririto sa ngayon upang ikaw ay
patnubayan?
SAGOT: Wala po pero ako ay nakahandang magbigay ng salaysay kahit na
wala akong nakaharap na abogado.
TANONG: G. Itaas, ayon din sa
batas, ang pagsusuko ng mga karapatan ay kailangan ding pagtibayin sa harap ng
isang abogado, nakahanda ka bang magsuko ng iyong mga karapatan sa harap ng
isang abogado na bigay sa iyo ng gobyerno?
SAGOT: Opo. Nakahanda po ako.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka rin bang lumagda sa isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay
napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan at nauunawaan mo naman ang mga
karapatan mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.[34]
Also, the
pertinent portion of his (Itaas) supplemental written statement dated August
30, 1989 is quoted hereunder, to wit:
PALIWANAG: G. Itaas, ang pagsisiyasat na ito ay may kinalaman pa rin
sa pagkaka-ambush at pagpatay kay U.S. Colonel James Rowe. Tulad sa nauna mong pagbibigay ng salaysay,
ipinaalala ko sa iyo na muli ang iyong mga karapatang manahimik, magkaroon ng
pili at sariling abogado at karapatang mapagpaliwanagan ng mga karapatan mong
ito. Nauunawaan mo ba ang mga karapatan
mong ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka pa rin bang magbigay ng salaysay at ipapatuloy ang
pagbibigay mo ng salaysay?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nakahanda ka bang lumagdang muli ng isang pagpapatunay na ikaw ay
napagpaliwanagan ng iyong mga karapatan at handa ka ring isuko ang mga
karapatan mo?
SAGOT: Opo.[35]
We have
consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or Paliwanag found
at the beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the
accused his custodial rights do not meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that
do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the
appellant his constitutional rights.[36] We emphasized that when the
constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed"
of his rights to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel
preferably of his own choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle.[37] In other words, the right of a
person under investigation "to be informed" implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates
an effective communication that results in understanding of what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a
denial of the right.[38]
In the case of
People vs. Jara,[39] we declared that:
"This stereotyped
"advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which
are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or
model. Police investigators either automatically
type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused
to sign it or even copy it in their own handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style
does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part
of the accused. The showing of a
spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing."
It must be noted
however, that far from being a mere enumeration of the custodial rights of an
accused, the aforequoted portions ("Paliwanag") of the written
statements contain an explanation as to the nature of the investigation that
is, regarding the respective participations of the appellants in the ambush on
April 21, 1989 that resulted in the killing of U.S. Col. James Rowe while
seriously wounding his driver, Joaquin Vinuya.
They also include an advice that the appellants may choose not to give
any statement to the investigator and a warning that any statement obtained
from the appellants may be used in favor or against them in court. In addition, they contain an advice that the
appellants may engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. If they cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, they will be provided with one by the government for free. Thereafter, both appellants manifested to CIS
Investigator Virgilio Pablico their intentions to give their statements even in
the absence of counsel.
Despite the
manifestations of the appellants, Investigator Pablico requested for the legal
services of Atty. Bonifacio Manansala to act as counsel for appellant
Continente and Atty. Felimon Corpuz for appellant Itaas. Significantly, Investigator Pablico
disclosed that appellant Continente conferred with Atty. Manansala in his
presence for about half an hour before the investigation started.[40] Nevertheless, the appellant
(Continente) maintained his decision to give a statement even in the absence of
counsel. As proof thereof, the
appellant signed[41] the "Pagpapatunay" that
contains an express waiver of his constitutional rights in the presence of
Atty. Manansala who also signed the same as counsel of the appellant.
With respect to
appellant Itaas, Atty. Felimon Corpuz testified that his legal services were
requested on two (2) occasions to act as counsel for appellant Itaas after the
latter purportedly manifested his intention to waive his rights to remain
silent and to counsel during the investigation. Atty. Corpuz stated that he conferred with the appellant before
the investigations and explained to him his rights under the constitution and
the consequences of waiving said rights.
After the explanation, appellant Itaas decided to sign the
"Pagpapatunay", which are entirely written in Tagalog, a dialect
which he understands, in his written confessions respectively dated August 29,
1989 and August 30, 1989 stating that his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel were explained to him; that he fully understood the same;
and that he was willing to give a written confession even without the
assistance of counsel.[42]
Appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas likewise impugn their respective written
statements. They allege that the
statements appearing therein were supplied by the CIS investigator. CIS Investigator Pablico however,
categorically denied on rebuttal the allegations of the appellants. Pablico disclosed that during his
investigations of the appellants on separate occasions he simultaneously
typewrote his questions to the appellants including their answers thereto which
are done entirely in Tagalog, thus leaving no room for Pablico to fabricate an
answer. After the investigation,
he allowed the appellants to read their respective confessions,[43] a fact that was admitted by
appellant Continente.[44] Thereafter, the appellants
voluntarily affixed their signatures on every page of their written
confessions.
On July 18, 1989
appellant Continente appeared before City Prosecutor Galicano of Quezon City
and affirmed under oath the truth of his statements by affixing his signature
on the left hand portion of every page of his written confession.[45] Likewise, appellant Itaas,
accompanied by Atty. Corpuz, affirmed under oath the truth of his statements in
his written confessions by affixing his signature on every page thereof before
the administering officer.[46]
In a desperate
attempt to cast doubt on the voluntariness of his confessions, appellant
Continente claims that he was under pressure to read entirely his written
confession before he affixed his signature thereon. The unsubstantiated claim of the appellant is belied by his own
admission that he was treated fairly during the investigation, thus:
Court: Proceed.
Q: Now,
Mr. Witness, since the time you were arrested on June 16, 1989 until this time,
you said you were staying in Camp Crame, am I correct?
A: Yes,
sir.
Q: And
from the time you were arrested up to this time, you were never harmed by
anybody in Camp Crame, that is also correct?
A: No,
sir.
Q: In
fact, from the time you were arrested when that blindfold was removed, you were
treated fairly, am I correct?
A: Yes,
sir.[47]
There is also no
basis to support the claim of appellant Itaas that he was tortured into giving
a confession and was threatened by the CIS agents to admit the truth of the
same before the administering officer.
This Court held that where the appellants did not present
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons; where they
failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged
intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence
on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness of confessions.[48]
It has been
established by the evidence that Atty. Filemon Corpuz was present during both
occasions that appellant Itaas was being investigated by Investigator Virgilio
Pablico in Camp Crame and even accompanied the said appellant before the
administering officer. Appellant Itaas
did not present any evidence in court to buttress his bare claim despite the
fact that a doctor was summoned for his check up immediately upon his arrival
in Manila after he was previously arrested in Davao City.[49] He did not complain to the
administering officer about the threats and torture he allegedly suffered in
the hands of the CIS agents. Neither
did he file any criminal nor administrative complaint against said agents for
maltreatment. The failure of the appellant
to complain to the swearing officer or to file charges against the persons who
allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of his confessions.[50] To hold otherwise is to facilitate
the retraction of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegation of
torture, without any proof whatsoever.[51]
The Court also
notes that the respective written confessions of appellants are replete with
details which could be supplied only by someone in the know so to speak.[52] They reflect spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which
violence and torture have been applied.[53]
In particular,
appellant Juanito Itaas admitted in his written confession[54] dated August 29, 1989 that he was
an active member of the New People's Army (NPA) and performed different
functions mainly in the province of Davao; that he was one of the two other
members of the NPA who were sent to Manila sometime in March 1989; that
appellant stayed in Merville, Paranaque before moving to an apartment in
Santolan, Pasig together with certain Vicky and her husband Ronnie, Onie, Bosyo
and Bernie; that one day before the ambush on Col. Rowe he (Itaas) was told by
Ronnie to take part in a major operation by the NPA; that he (Itaas) was not
informed by Ronnie about the identity of their supposed target; that on the
following day, Ronnie and the appellant boarded a dark brown Toyota car
together with certain Edgar and James; that he (Itaas) was seated directly behind
the driver beside Edgar and James while Ronnie sat beside the driver; that they
were armed with M-16 rifles while Ronnie was armed with an ultimax; that after
several minutes their car reached a junction (circle) and was running alongside
a dark gray car; that he fired automatic shots toward the dark gray car only
after his companions started firing at the said car; and that after the ambush
they drove back to their apartment in Santolan, Pasig while they were being
followed by a back up car allegedly being occupied by certain Liway, Fred and
Eddie. Appellant Itaas also identified
in his written confession[55] dated August 30, 1989 the gray
Mitsubishi car that they ambushed on April 21, 1989 and the car that they used
on the same date of ambush.
On the other
hand, the written statement[56] dated June 17, 1989 of appellant
Donato Continente reveals that he had been a member of several revolutionary
groups before becoming a full fledged member of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) under the Political Assassination Team (PAT) headed by a
certain Kit; that the objective of their team was primarily to conduct
surveillance on foreigners and diplomats; that he did not know Col. James Rowe
prior to the shooting incident on April 21, 1989; that his participation in the
ambush was merely for having conducted a surveillance of the vicinity of the
JUSMAG in Tomas Morato Avenue in Quezon City; that he gathered certain data,
specifically: the number of people and volume of vehicles around the area, the
measurement of the streets, as well as the distance of the JUSMAG Compound from
Tomas Morato Avenue; that his surveillance activity was continued by certain
Freddie Abella and Taddy who are also members of the PAT; and that he came to
know the identity of the victim of the ambush on April 21, 1989, through
Freddie Abella who informed him two days after the incident.
Appellants
Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them
legal assistance during their respective investigations as biased and
incompetent. It must be emphasized that
both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own
choice. In any case, it has been ruled
that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under
custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as
he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the
former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing
officer.[57]
If Atty.
Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against advising the appellants not to
give their statements involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely
complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The counsel should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.[58] Whether it is an extrajudicial
statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the ascertainment
of truth.[59] What is sought to be protected with
the constitutional right to counsel is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts. The right is
guaranteed merely to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused
to admit something false, not to provide him with the best defense.[60]
We agree with
the trial court's observation that the retention by appellant Continente of Atty.
Bonifacio Manansala as his counsel until the early stages of his case in the
lower court and his subsequent decision to engage the legal services of Atty.
Manansala's relative, Atty. Ceferino Manansala, who represented the said
appellant throughout the proceedings in the absence of the former bespeaks of
the trust he had for the said lawyer.
On the other hand, while it is admitted that Atty. Felimon Corpuz served
in the military as prosecutor in the Efficiency and Separation Board of the
armed forces, such fact is not sufficient to adjudge the said lawyer as biased
against the appellant (Itaas) in the absence of any concrete evidence to that
effect. The defense also failed to
adduce substantial evidence to support a finding that Atty. Corpuz was short of
being a vigilant and effective counsel for the said appellant.
Moreover, the
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam Zulueta confirms to a large extent
the statements made by the appellants in their written confessions. Zulueta positively identified appellant
Juanito Itaas as among the persons on board a car, directly behind the driver,
whose body was half exposed, while firing at the car of Col. James Rowe at the
corner of Tomas Morato Street and Timog Avenue in Quezon City. She also testified that she had seen
appellant Donato Continente on at least three (3) occasions at the carinderia
outside the JUSMAG compound. She
mistook appellant Continente for a tricycle driver on April 17, 1989 while the
latter was simply walking around the premises.
The second and third encounters with the appellant (Continente) took
place on April 18 and 19, 1989 while the said appellant was standing inside the
same carinderia.
The defense
assails the propriety of the pre-trial identification by Meriam Zulueta of appellants
Donato Continente and Juanito Itaas as pointedly suggestive. However, there is no sufficient evidence on
record to show that the appellants were previously indicated by the CIS
investigators to Zulueta that they were the perpetrators of the crime.[61] Besides, a police line-up is not
essential to a proper identification of the appellants.[62]
The defense for
appellant Itaas further argues that the so-called "positive
identification" of appellant Itaas by Meriam Zulueta cannot be considered
reliable inasmuch as the same was based on a fleeting glimpse of a
stranger. To support its argument, the
defense cited cases[63] where the Court rejected the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses for not being credible, such as: where
the identification of a stranger is based upon a single brief observation made
during a startling occurrence; where the testimony of the witness defies human
nature and reason; where there are serious inconsistencies and glaring
omissions in the testimony of the eyewitness; and where the witness only
identified the suspect after he was arrested and the witness was informed by
the police that the suspect was one of the killers.
It should be
pointed out that the above rulings of the Court are based on the circumstances
peculiar to each of the abovecited cases that do not exactly obtain in the
cases at bench. It is accepted legal
precept that persons react differently to a given situation.[64] In the same way, certain witnesses
to an unfolding crime may run or scamper to safety while others would remain
transfixed and strive to identify the perpetrators thereof. As found by the trial court, Zulueta
testified in an honest and straightforward manner that she was about to cross
the Tomas Morato Street on her way to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City to
attend a practicum in the JUSMAG Mess Hall when she heard several
gunshots. Upon looking at the direction
where the gunshots emanated, she saw persons on board a maroon car firing at a
gray car. Zulueta returned to the
sidewalk to seek for cover but could not find any so she docked and covered her
head with her bag while continuously looking at the persons who were firing at
the gray car. In acting the way she
did, Meriam Zulueta was merely reacting naturally to the crime that was
unfolding before her. And while the
shooting incident lasted for only about five (5) seconds, that was all that
Zulueta needed under the situation to recognize appellant Itaas whose body was
incidentally half exposed.
The testimony of
Meriam Zulueta does not suffer from any serious and material contradictions
that can detract from her credibility.
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to her said
testimony. The defense failed to adduce
any evidence to establish any improper motive that may have impelled the same witness
to falsely testify against the appellants.
It is well-settled rule that the evaluation of the testimonies of
witnesses by the trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect
because such court has the direct opportunity to observe the witnesses on the
stand and determine if they are telling the truth or not.[65]
Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
ART. 248. Murder.-- Any person
who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall
be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or
employing means to weaken the defense or means or persons to insure or afford
impunity.
2. In
consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By
means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel,
derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On
occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of
an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other
public calamity.
5. With
evident premeditation.
6. With
cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim,
or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse."
The trial court
erroneously found that the appellants allegedly conspired in the commission of
the crimes charged in the instant criminal cases. While it is clear that the appellants did not even know each
other, the lower court opined that the Alex Boncayao Brigade is such a large
organization that there is great likelihood that the participants of the
various stages of the crime are unknown to each other. To justify its position, it cited the ruling
in the case of People vs. Geronimo[66], thus:
When the defendants by their acts
aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another part as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same
object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted
and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal associations, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments, the Court will be justified in concluding
that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy.
We
disagree. Article 8 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. To prove conspiracy, the
prosecution must establish the following three (3) requisites: (1) that two or more persons come to an
agreement; (2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime; and (3)
that the execution of the felony was decided upon.[67] While conspiracy must be proven
just like any criminal accusation, that is, independently and beyond reasonable
doubt,[68] the same need not be proved by direct
evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during,
and after the commission of the crime.[69]
The case against
appellant Donato Continente is primarily anchored on the written statement[70] that he gave during the
investigation of these cases. The
pertinent portions of his written statements are quoted hereunder, to wit:
T: Ikaw
ba'y naging full fledged member ng Partido?
S: Nito
pong Oktubre 1988.
T: Sino
naman ang iyong kinikilalang puno sa inyong Partido?
S: Ganito
po iyon. Mayroon kaming sariling grupo na kung tawagin ay PAT. Ang ibig sabihin nito ay POLITICAL
ASSASSINATION TEAM. Ang aming puno ay
tinatawag naming PO o Political Officer.
Ang susunod sa kanya ay ang TL o Team Leader; tapos po ay ang Vice Team
Leader; at mga miembro na nagsasagawa ng activities tulad ng gawaing edukasyon,
surveillance at intelligence.
x x x
T: Ano
ang mga alam mong objectives ng inyong team?
S: , Ang mga objectives po namin ay magsagawa ng surveillance sa mga
foreigner o diplomat. Kinukuha namin ang plate number ng kanilang mga sasakyan,
make, model at kulay nito at ito ay aming tinitipon.
x x x
T: Nakikilala
mo ba itong si Col. James Rowe ng U.S. Army na nagtrabaho sa JUSMAG?
S: Nakilala
ko po lamang siya ng mapabalitang patay siya sa ambush sa may malapit sa JUSMAG
noong buwan ng Abril 1989.
x x x
T: Ano
ang iyong naging partisipasyon sa pagkakapatay nitong si Col. Rowe?
S: Surveillance
po lamang ang aking naging papel dito.
T: Paano
mo naman isinagawa itong pag-surveillance kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Nagpunta
po ako sa area ng JUSMAG doon sa Tomas Morato Avenue, Q. C. at nagmanman doon
tungkol sa dami ng tao at sasakyang dumadaan tuwing tanghali. Inalaman ko din
ang lawak ng kalsada at layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG. Sa report ko ay sinabi ko na mga anim (6) na
hakbang ang luwag ng Tomas Morato Avenue, madalang ang daan ng tao at sasakyan
at ang layo ng Timog Avenue sa gate ng JUSMAG ay may tatlong poste o apat na
poste lamang.
T: Ang
pagrereport mo bang ito ay ginawa mo ng verbal lamang?
S: Verbal
lamang po.
T: Kanino
ka naman nagreport?
S: Kay
Ka Freddie Abella po.
x x x
T: Bakit
mo natiyak na ang ABB ang nagsagawa ng pag-ambush kay Colonel Rowe?
S: Dalawang
(2) araw po matapos ang pag-ambush kay Col. Rowe ay nagkita kaming dalawa ni Freddie
sa aming bahay. Sa pagkikita naming
iyon ay ikinuwento niya sa akin ang mga pangyayari. xxx
It should be
emphasized that conspirators are the authors of the crime, being the ones who
decide that a crime should be committed.
Strictly speaking, a person may not be considered a conspirator by his
mere subsequent assent or cooperation in the commission of a crime absent a
clear showing, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that he
participated in the decision to commit the same;[71] in which case, his culpability will
be judged based on the extent of his participation in the commission of the
crime.
In the case at
bench, appellant Donato Continente is liable for the crimes charged in these
criminal cases only as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal
Code. In order that a person may be
considered an accomplice in the commission of a criminal offense, the following
requisites must concur: (a) community
of design, i.e., knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in
the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and (c) there
must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed
to the person charged as accomplice.[72]
The prosecution
failed to establish, either directly or by circumstantial evidence, that
appellant Donato Continente was privy to any conspiracy to carry out the ambush
on Col. James Rowe and his driver on that fateful morning of April 21, 1989. The evidence adduced disclose that the
participation of appellant Continente was made only after the plan or decision
to ambush Col. Rowe was already a fait accompli. Continente was merely assigned to the
vicinity of the JUSMAG Compound in Tomas Morato Street, Quezon City, before the
shooting incident to gather certain data, specifically the number of people and
volume of vehicles in the area, the measurement of the streets, and the
distance of the JUSMAG Compound from Tomas Morato Street. Subsequently, Continente reported his
findings to Freddie Abella and that thereafter the latter had taken over the
activity. Significantly, appellant
Continente was not even present at the scene of the crime on April 21, 1989.
The error of the
trial court in its appreciation of appellant Continente's participation in the
crimes charged lies in its apparent confusion regarding the distinction between
a conspirator and an accomplice. In
view of its effect on the liability of appellant Continente, the distinction
between the two concepts as laid down by this Court in the case of People vs.
de Vera, et al.[73] needs to be reiterated, thus:
Conspirators and accomplices have
one thing in common: they know and
agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they
themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have
reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be
committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they
merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of the crime;
accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
With respect to
appellant Juanito Itaas, however, the trial court correctly found that the
evidence against him which consist of his written confession and the
straightforward and credible testimony of prosecution eyewitness Meriam
Zulueta, even if taken independently, are sufficient to convict him. Appellant Itaas categorically admitted in
his written confession that he and his companions fired at the gray Mitsubishi
car of Col. James Rowe at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in
Quezon City. Moreover, prosecution
witness Meriam Zulueta positively identified appellant Itaas as one of the
persons she saw on board a car who fired at a gray car at the same time and
place where Col. Rowe and his driver were ambushed.
The shooting of
Col. James Rowe and his driver, Joaquin Vinuya, was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against person, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might
make.[74] The evidence clearly shows that the
mode of execution was deliberately adopted by the perpetrators to ensure the
commission of the crime without the least danger unto themselves arising from
the possible resistance of their victims.
Appellant Itaas and his companions, who were all armed with powerful
firearms, waited for the car of Col. Rowe which was being driven by Joaquin
Vinuya at the corner of Timog Avenue and Tomas Morato Street in Quezon
City. Without any warning, appellant
Itaas and his companions suddenly fired at the said car upon reaching the said
place. Hence, the crime committed for
the killing of Col. James Rowe during the said ambush is murder.
With respect to
the liability of appellant Itaas for the wounding of Joaquin Vinuya, it appears
that the said victim sustained injuries on his scalp, on the left shoulder and on
the back portion of the left hand from the ambush. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, a felony
is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the opinion of Dr. Jose Santiago in his testimony, is not
sufficient to establish the crime of frustrated murder. This Court notes that the wounds sustained
by the victim are not fatal wounds but merely superficial wounds.[75] The records disclose that Joaquin
Vinuya managed to drive the car of Col. Rowe toward the JUSMAG Compound which
is 200 meters away from the site of the ambush.[76] It also appears that Vinuya was
treated for his wounds for only four (4) days at the Clark Air Base Hospital in
Pampanga after which he was brought back to the JUSMAG Compound in Quezon City
to recuperate. Hence, the crime
committed as against him is only attempted murder.
In view of the
foregoing, appellant Juanito Itaas should be held liable for the crimes of
murder and attempted murder for his direct participation in the killing of Col.
James Rowe and in the wounding of his driver Joaquin Vinuya, respectively. Due to the absence of any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance in both cases, the penalty to be imposed on appellant
Itaas is reclusion perpetua for the murder of Col. James Rowe and the
medium period of prision mayor for the attempt on the life of Joaquin
Vinuya. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law in the latter case, the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on
appellant Itaas is the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the offense, that is, prision correccional.
On the other
hand, being an accomplice to the crimes of murder and attempted murder, the
penalty to be imposed on appellant Donato Continente shall be the medium
periods of reclusion temporal and prision correccional,
respectively. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in both cases, the maximum of the penalty to be
imposed on appellant Continente as an accomplice to the crime of murder is the
medium period of reclusion temporal and the minimum shall be prision
mayor, while the maximum of the penalty to be imposed on the said appellant
as an accomplice to the crime of attempted murder is the medium period of prision
correccional and the minimum shall be arresto mayor.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-89-4843 and Q-89-4844
is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
In Criminal Case
No. Q-89-4843, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, as principal and as
accomplice, respectively. Appellant
Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant Continente as
accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Both appellants Itaas and Continente are ORDERED to pay jointly
and severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim, Col. James
Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.
In Criminal Case
No. Q-89-4844, appellants Juanito Itaas and Donato Continente are found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted murder, as principal and
as accomplice, respectively. Appellant
Itaas, as principal, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for six (6)
years of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and six (6)
months of prision mayor, as maximum.
Appellant Continente, as accomplice, is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo,
(Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned
by Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco, Rollo, pp. 11-18.
[2] TSN,
dated May 14, 1990, pp. 4-5.
[3] TSN,
dated June 6, 1990, p. 4.
[4] TSN,
dated May 14, 1990, pp. 6-7.
[5] Exhibit
A.
[6] TSN
dated September 4, 1990, pp. 4-5.
[7] TSN,
dated May 14, 1990, pp. 8-9.
[8] Exhibits
B and B-7.
[9] Exhibits
C and C-9.
[10] TSN,
dated May 16, 1990, pp.4-5.
[11] Exhibit
M.
[12] TSN,
dated May 16, 1990, pp. 7-8.
[13] TSN,
dated May 16, 1990, pp. 8-9.
[14] TSN,
dated May 16, 1990, pp. 12-13.
[15] TSN,
dated May 9, 1990, p. 7.
[16] TSN,
dated May 9, 1990, pp. 7-10.
[17] Exhibits
N and P.
[18] TSN,
dated June 1, 1990, p. 4.
[19] TSN,
dated June 1, 1990, pp. 9-10.
[20] TSN,
dated September 3, 1990, p. 4.
[21] TSN,
dated September 3, 1990, pp. 4-5.
[22] TSN,
dated August 29, 1990, p. 21.
[23] TSN,
dated August 29, 1990, pp. 21-29.
[24] TSN,
dated September 4, 1990, pp. 4-5.
[25] TSN,
dated September 4, 1990, pp. 11-13.25
[26] Rollo,
pp. 11-18.
[27] Rollo,
pp. 201-303.
[28] Rollo,
pp. 93-173.
[29] Rollo,
pp. 383-496.
[30] Rollo,
pp. 512-548.
[31] People
vs. Fabro, G.R. No. 95089, August 11, 1997, p. 14; People vs. Santos,
283 SCRA 443, 454 (1997).
[32] People
vs. Pascual, 80 SCRA 1, 16 (1977); People vs. Santos, 283 SCRA
443, 454 (1997).
[33] Exhibit
A.
[34] Exhibit
B.
[35] Exhibit
C.
[36] People
vs. Santos, 283 SCRA 443, 455 (1997).
[37] People
vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312, 322 (1983).
[38] People
vs. Nicandro, G.R. No. 59378, February 11, 1986; People vs.
Duhan, et al., G.R. No. 65189, May 28, 1986.
[39] 144
SCRA 517, 530-31 (1986).
[40] TSN,
dated September 4, 1990, p. 11.
[41] Exhibit
A-1.
[42] TSN,
dated June 4, 1990, pp. 5-7.
[43] TSN,
dated September 4, 1990, pp. 11-12.
[44] TSN,
dated August 29, 1990, pp. 27 and 29.
[45] TSN,
dated August 29, 1990, p. 27.
[46] TSN,
dated September 3, 1990, p. 16.
[47] TSN,
dated August 29, 1990, pp. 32-33.
[48] People
vs. Pia, 145 SCRA 581, 586 (1986) citing People vs. Villanueva,
128 SCRA 488 (1984); People vs. Urgel, 134 SCRA 483 (1985); and People vs.
Toledo, 140 SCRA 259 (1985).
[49] TSN,
dated September 3, 1990, p. 11.
[50] People
vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119, 136 (1997).
[51] People
vs. de Vera, et al., G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999.
[52] People
vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364, 376 (1991).
[53] People
vs. Villanueva, 266 SCRA 356, 362 (1997).
[54] Exhibit
B.
[55] Exhibit
C.
[56] Exhibit
A.
[57] People
vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119, 136 (1997) citing people vs. Parojinog,
203 SCRA 673 (1991).
[58] People
vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119, 137 (1997).
[59] People
vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47, 52-53 (1989).
[60] People
vs. Alvarez, 201 SCRA 364, 375-376 (1991).
[61] People
vs. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620, 625 (1988).
[62] People
vs. Padua, 215 SCRA 266, 275-276 (1992); People vs. Herbias, 265
SCRA 571, 577 (1996); People vs. Timon, 281 SCRA 577, 592 (1997).
[63] People
vs. Acosta, 187 SCRA 39 (1990): People vs. Pampaluna, 96 SCRA
787, 810 (1980); People vs. Baquiran, 20 SCRA 451; People vs.
Peruelo, 105 SCRA 226, 236-37 (1981); People vs. Domingo, 165 SCRA 620,
624 (1988).
[64] People
vs. Damiar, 127 SCRA 499, 507 (1984).
[65] People
vs. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296, 304 (1998).
[66] 53
SCRA 246, 254 (1973).
[67] People
vs. de Vera, et al., G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999.
[68]
Dans, Jr. vs. People, 285 SCRA 504, 533 (1998).
[69] People
vs. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384, 394 (1996).
[70] Exhibit
A.
[71] People
vs. de Vera, et al., G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999.
[72] People
vs. Elijorde, et al., G.R. No. 126531, April 21, 1999.
[73] Supra,
at p. 30.
[74] People
vs. Elijorde, 306 SCRA 188, 198 (1999).
[75] Exhibit
P-1.
[76] TSN,
dated May 9, 1990, pp. 7 and 10.