SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265. April 6,
2000]
VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant, vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and
Tudela, Misamis Occidental, respondent.
francis
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint filed against Judge
Priscilla T. Hernandez of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and
Tudela, Misamis Occidental, charging her with grave abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which complainant Valencides
Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros for recovery of
possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela,
Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality,
while complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because of this
fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong
Tagapamayapa.
However, this matter was raised by defendant
in her answer as an affirmative defense, and respondent, in her order of July
15, 1997, ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to the
prosecution of the counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in her answer. In
support of her order, respondent cited P.D. No. 1508, §3 of which provides:
Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually
residing in the same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before
the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay
where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the
election of the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added)
Complainant and his wife moved for a
reconsideration, citing the following provisions of R.A. 7160, "The Local
Government Code of 1991":
SEC. 408. Subject
matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing
in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
except:
(a) Where one
party is the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one
party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses
punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where
there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the
dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes
involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes
of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. marie
The court in which
the non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this
Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the
case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
SEC. 409. Venue.
- (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city of
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving
real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising
at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to
venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay;
otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred
to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated
representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.
They argued that under §408(f), in relation
to §409(c), where the parties to a dispute involving real property or any
interest therein are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or
of adjoining barangays, prior resort to barangay conciliation is not required.
However, respondent denied the motion. In
her order dated September 9, 1997, respondent stated:
The Court after
taking into consideration the Motion for Reconsideration and the ground relied
upon by the counsel finds that counsel for the plaintiffs failed to correlate
Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 and to consider Rule VIII,
paragraph (a) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, the rules and
regulations [of] which were promulgated to implement Sections 399 to 422,
Chapter 7, Title One Book III and Section 515, Book IV of R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, to wit:
"RULE VIII -
PRE-CONDITION FOR FORMAL ADJUDICATION
Conciliation,
pre-condition for filing of complaint in court or government office. novero
(a) No individual
may go directly to court or to any government office for adjudication of his
dispute with another individual upon any matter falling within the authority of
the Punong Barangay or Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo to settle under these Rules, unless,
after personal confrontation of the parties before them earnest efforts to
conciliate have failed to result in a settlement or such settlement has been
effectively repudiated."
and also Rule VI,
Section 3 paragraph (c) of the same Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which
provides:
"Rule VI -
Amicable Settlement of Disputes
Section 3. Venue.
The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:
. . . .
(c) Dispute
involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay where
the real property or larger portion thereof is situated.
From the
provisions of the above-cited Rules it was very clear that parties whose
disputes involved real property should first br[ing] the said dispute before
the barangay where the property was located, and that [because of] failure to
bring the dispute before the Barangay for conciliation no action may be filed
in court for final adjudication of the said dispute.
That parties
should first comply with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
before the Court can acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. That
non-compliance of the plaintiff to the requirement of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law was admitted by her in paragraph 3 of the complaint. Her
allegation of non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Lupon
Conciliation before the filing of the complaint, in a way divest[s] the Court
of its jurisdiction over the case. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
16, Section 1, paragraph (j) provides:
"That a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with"
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.
Complainant alleges that in dismissing Civil
Case No. 295, respondent judge committed "(a) Grave abuse of authority by
knowingly rendering an unjust and unlawful order; (b) Ignorance of the law in
its highest order, she being a judge; (c) Grave disobedience to the
jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the matter
of exemption of lupon conciliation of contending parties who are not
residen[ts] of the same city or municipality." He states that respondent
"practically threw several decisions of the Supreme Court on the matter
out of the window and obviously followed hook, line and sinker the arguments of
the [defendant] Daria Galleros."
In answer, respondent judge claims that she
merely followed the law in dismissing the case. She prays that the complaint
against her be dismissed and that complainant be ordered to stop harassing her
just because he had not been able to obtain the relief he wanted in Civil Case
No. 295.
nigel
In its memorandum dated February 29, 2000,
the Office of the Court Administrator recommends the dismissal of this case on
the ground that the "issue [raised] is purely judicial and is best resolved
by a court of competent jurisdiction" and that, even if respondent had
erred, she should not be held administratively liable since there is no
allegation that she acted in bad faith or knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment.
In Tavora v. Veloso,[1] this Court already ruled that where parties do not
reside in the same city or municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no
requirement for them to submit their dispute involving real property to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa. As explained in that case:
The sole issue raised is one of law: Under
the given facts, is the respondent judge barred from taking cognizance of the
ejectment case pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of amicably
settling disputes at the barangay level? The section reads:
"SECTION. 6.
Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. - No complaint, petition,
action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as
provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement
has been repudiated. . . ." (Italics supplied)
For the above
provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the jurisdiction of
the Lupong Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the relevant
provisions of PD 1508 are:
"SECTION 2.
Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(1) Where one
party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(2) Where one
party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(3) Offenses
punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;
(4) Offenses were
there is no private offended party;
(5) Such other
classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice
determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
Local Government. ella
"SECTION 3. Venue.
— Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay
shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay.
Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city
or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or
any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall
be brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is
situated.
"The Lupon
shall have no authority over disputes:
(1) involving parties
who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangays adjoin each other; and
(2) involving real
property located in different municipalities." (Italics supplied)
The foregoing
provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the
Lupon of a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the
disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute: The parties must be
"actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the
same time, Section 3 — while reiterating that the disputants must be
"actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different
barangays within the same city or municipality" — unequivocably
declares that the Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes
"involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities
or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.
Thus, by express
statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over
disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or
municipality, except where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin
each other.
It is true that
immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of
a given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:
"However, all
disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought
in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."
Actually, however,
this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as
such.
marinella
The operation of a
proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to
restrict or vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its
scope, in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.[2]
To be sure, the
Court was interpreting in that case the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 which,
except for some modifications, are applicable to the case before respondent
judge because they are now found in §§408-409 of R.A. No. 7160 which took
effect on January 1, 1992. The ruling in Tavora v. Veloso, reiterated in
other cases,[3] should be familiar to the bench and the bar. As we
have held in Espiritu v. Jovellanos,[4] the phrase "Ignorance of the law excuses no
one" has a special application to judges who, under the injunction of
Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity, and independence." In Bacar v. De Guzman,[5] it was held that when the law violated is basic, the
failure to observe it constitutes gross ignorance. Reiterating this ruling, it
was emphasized in Almeron v. Sardido[6] that the disregard of an established rule of law
amounts to gross ignorance of the law and makes the judge subject to
disciplinary action.
In the case at bar, respondent showed patent
ignorance ¾ if not disregard ¾ of this Court’s rulings on the jurisdiction of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa by her erroneous quotations of the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing R.A. No. 7160. While a judge may not
be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he
renders, his error may be so gross or patent that he should be administratively
disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.
In this case, respondent at first cited P.D.
No. 1508, §3 as basis of her action. When her attention was called to the fact
that this had been repealed by §409(c) of R.A. No. 7160, respondent, who
obviously was more intent in justifying her previous order than correcting her
error, quoted out of context the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of R.A. No. 7160. She
thus violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that
"In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts
and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear of
criticism."
Contrary to respondent’s interpretation, it
is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that recourse to barangay
conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in
the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. Rule VI of the same
states in pertinent part:
SECTION 2. Subject
matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of proceedings
for amicable settlement under these rules except the following enumerated
cases:
(a) Where one
party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; alonzo
(b) Where one
party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses for
which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where
there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the
dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable
settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes
involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the
parties thereto to agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other
classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The foregoing
exceptions notwithstanding, the court in which non-criminal cases not falling
within the authority of the lupon under these Katarungang Pambarangay Law and
Rules are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to
the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.
SECTION 3. Venue.
The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:
(a) Where the
parties reside in the same barangay, the dispute shall be brought for
settlement in said barangay;
(b) Where the
parties reside in different barangays in the same city or municipality, the
dispute shall be settled in the barangay where the respondent or any one of the
respondents actually resides, at the choice of the complainant;
(c) Dispute
involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the barangay where
the real property or larger portion thereof is situated;
(d) Disputes
arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the
barangay where such workplace or institution is located;
(e) Any objection
relating to venue shall be raised before the Punong Barangay during the
mediation proceedings before him. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver of
such objection;
(f) Any legal
question which may confront the Punong Barangay in resolving objections to
venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his
duly designated representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. brando
(Emphasis added)
Indeed, these provisions, which are also
found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been authoritatively interpreted by this
Court, and the duty of respondent judge was to follow the rulings of this
Court. Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due
either to an ignorance of this Court’s ruling or to an utter disregard thereof.
We choose to believe that her failure to apply our rulings to the case before
her was simply due to gross ignorance which, nevertheless, is inexcusable. In
accordance with the ruling in Ting v. Atal,[7] in which a judge who was similarly found guilty of
gross ignorance of the law was fined P2,000.00, respondent judge should
likewise be fined the same amount.
WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND
(P2,000.00) PESOS with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. micks