SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117652. April 27, 2000]
ROLANDO
APARENTE, SR. petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari[1] seeking to annul the Resolution dated September 19,
1994 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)[2] which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter
dated April 23, 1990 and found the dismissal of petitioner for violation of
company rules and regulations as valid. Sdaadsc
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Rolando Aparante, Sr. was first
employed by private respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (CCBPI), General
Santos City Plant as assistant mechanic in April 1970. He rose through the
ranks to eventually hold the position of advertising foreman until his
termination on May 12, 1988 for alleged violation of company rules and
regulations.[3] His monthly salary at the time of his termination
was P5,600.00.[4]
On November 9, 1987 at around 10:30 in the
morning, petitioner drove private respondent’s advertising truck with plate
number LBV-970 to install a panel sign. While traversing Zenia St. Ext.,
Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner sideswiped Marilyn Tejero, a ten-year old
girl. Petitioner brought Tejero to Heramil Clinic for first aid treatment. As
the girl suffered a 2 cm. fracture on her skull which was attributed to the
protruding bolt on the truck’s door, she was subsequently transferred to the
General Santos City Doctor’s Hospital where she underwent surgical operation.
She stayed in the hospital for about a month.[5]
On November 14, 1987 or five days after the
accident, petitioner reported the incident to private respondent. At about the
same time, petitioner submitted himself to the police authorities at Polomolok,
South Cotabato for investigation[6] where it was discovered that petitioner had no
driver’s license at the time of the accident. In view thereof, FGU Insurance
Corporation, an insurer of private respondent’s vehicles, did not reimburse the
latter for the expenses it incurred in connection with Tejero’s
hospitalization.[7] Private respondent spent a total amount of P19,534.45,
P17,988.48 of which was spent for hospitalization expenses while the
remaining amount served as Tejero’s living allowance during her confinement. Missdaa
On November 26, 1987, private respondent
conducted an investigation of the incident where petitioner was given the
opportunity to explain his side and to defend himself. Slxmis
On May 12, 1988, private respondent
dismissed petitioner from employment for having violated the company rules and
regulations particularly Sec. 12 of Rule 005-85[8] for blatant disregard of established control
procedures resulting in company damages amounting to P19,534.45.[9]
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a case for
illegal dismissal[10] against private respondent before the Labor Arbiter.
After the parties filed their respective position papers, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: Slxsc
ACCORDINGLY,
respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil. Inc. (CCBPI) is hereby directed to
reinstate complainant to his former or substantially equivalent position in
General Santos City without loss of seniority rights and other privileges.
Pursuant to RA 6715, the reinstatement of complainant is immediately executory
upon the promulgation of this Decision.
The claim for
backwages and damages is however DENIED for reasons aforecited.[11]
Dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the
NLRC which dismissed both appeals and affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter in a resolution dated June 27, 1994. Rtcspped
Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution which was granted by the NLRC on
September 19, 1994. In reversing its previous resolution, the NLRC ruled: Scslx
WHEREFORE, the
Resolution of this Commission dated June 27, 1994 is reconsidered. Accordingly,
the Resolution [affirming][12] the decision of Labor Arbiter below dated April 23,
1990 is vacated and set aside. In its stead, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the dismissal of complainant as one for just cause and effected after
observance of due process. His dismissal, is, thus, Sustained [as valid
and lawful. However, considering that complainant’s violation of company rule
is not reflective of his moral character plus his eighteen (18) long years of
loyal and efficient service to the company, respondent company is ordered to
pay complainant separation pay by way of financial assistance equivalent to
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service.
Complainant’s
appeal is ordered Dismissed for lack of merit.[13]
Hence, this petition. Slx
Petitioner contends that the NLRC erred in
holding that private respondent afforded him due process. He argues that when
he was investigated for his involvement in the vehicular accident, it was
simply for the offense of driving without a valid driver’s license. He further
asserts that had he been informed of the alleged damages incurred by private
respondent, he could have presented evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, he would
not have been terminated from service pursuant to Sec. 12 of Rule 005-85 of
CCBPI’s Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations which provides that: Mesm
A first, second
and third offense is punishable only by a suspension of 6 days, 15 days, and 30
days, respectively. The penalty of "discharge" is imposed only
after the fourth offense or when the damage caused upon private respondent
is more than P5,000.00. (Underscoring supplied).
Petitioner’s contention is baseless. He was
fully aware that he was being investigated for his involvement in the vehicular
accident that took place on November 9, 1987. The investigation was conducted
because he figured in an accident in which he sideswiped Marilyn Tejero, and
not for mere violation of traffic rules. It was also known to petitioner that
as a result of the accident, the victim suffered a 2 cm. fracture on her skull
which led to the latter’s surgical operation and confinement in the hospital
for which private respondent incurred expenses amounting to P19,534.45
which FGU Insurance Corporation refused to reimburse upon finding that
petitioner was driving without a valid driver’s license. Thus, being aware of
all these circumstances and the imposable sanctions under private respondent’s
Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations, petitioner should have taken it
upon himself to present evidence to lessen his culpability. Calrky
While the stenographic notes taken during
the investigation of petitioner do not state that the amount of P19,534.45
was paid for the hospitalization of the victim and that the insurance company
did not reimburse private respondent for its expenses, the Memorandum dated May
12, 1988 terminating petitioner’s employment clearly states that: Kycalr
xxx
xxx xxx
You, therefore,
have violated the Company Rules and Regulations, particularly Sec. 12 of Rule
005-85 for blatant disregard of established control procedures which resulted
in Company damages amounting to Nineteen Thousand Five Hundred Thirty Four and
45/100 (P19,534.45).
xxx
xxx xxx
If petitioner did not agree with the amount
purporting to be the loss suffered by the company, he should have refuted the
same before the labor arbiter. This omission creates an adverse inference that
such uncontroverted evidence speaks of the truth.[14] Not only did petitioner fail to contradict the same,
he even impliedly admitted the amount of such expenses when he alleged in his
position papers that: Kyle
xxx But for the
paltry and measly sum of P19,534.45 (yes, the sum is paltry and measly
considering the wealth of respondent), he got his walking papers![15]
Entrenched is the rule that the essence of
due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing but simply a
reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side.[16] In labor cases, the filing of position papers and
supporting documents fulfill the requirements of due process.[17]
Petitioner also contends that the NLRC erred
in ordering his dismissal despite its initial finding that the private
respondent had implicitly tolerated his driving without a license. Exsm
According to petitioner, he informed the
company that he had lost his license five months before the accident.
Notwithstanding such fact, the company allowed petitioner to continue
performing his job which necessarily included driving the vehicle assigned to
him. Thus, petitioner shifts the blame to the company, claiming that it should
have simply ordered him to desist from driving the vehicle once it was informed
of the loss of petitioner’s license. Private respondent’s failure to do so
amounted to a waiver of its own rules and regulations which it cannot now
invoke to justify petitioner’s dismissal from service. Msesm
Petitioner’s contention is belied by his
very own admission in his position papers filed before the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC that the company had in fact prohibited him from driving immediately
after he lost his license, and had requested him to secure a new license.[18] However, through misrepresentations, the petitioner
led the private respondent to believe that he had procured another driver’s
license. Thus, he was permitted to drive again.[19]
In fact, during the investigation conducted
by private respondent after the accident, petitioner attempted once more to
mislead the private respondent into believing that he had a driver’s license at
the time of the accident. He declared as follows: Esmso
Q11. Upon (sic) basing
on the Police report of Traffic Division Head, Cpl. George Valencia, he
disclosed further that you were not carrying a valid driver’s license during
the vehicular accident last November 9, 1987. What can you say about his
finding?
A11. That is only the
Police allegation that I was not carrying a valid driver’s license during the
vehicular accident. In fact I presented my driver’s license to him. My license
number is P-L04-65-011834, which will expire on October 28, 1988.
Q12. On (sic) this
investigation, can you present your Professional Driver’s license to me?
A12. Yes.
Q13. Upon further
analysis on (sic) your Professional Driver’s License which bears the number
P-L04-65-11834, which will expire on October 28, 1988, I noticed that it was
only issued to you by Gen. Santos LTC last November 16, 1987. What can you say
about this?
A13. It was only
on that very day that I was able to claim the original copy of the Driver’s
License for legal purposes.[20]
If it were true that the private respondent
had known all along that petitioner was driving without a license, then there
would have been no need for the latter to assert the contrary during the
investigation. Esmmis
Hence, the issue that arises now is whether
or not the infraction committed by petitioner warrants the penalty of dismissal
despite the fact that it was his first offense during his eighteen (18) long
years of satisfactory and unblemished service.
We answer in the affirmative.
First, the petitioner’s dismissal is
justified by Company rules and regulations. It is true that his violation of
company rules is his first offense. Nonetheless, the damage caused to private
respondent amounted to more than P5,000.00, thus, the penalty of
discharge is properly imposable as provided by Section 12 of Rule 005-85 of
CCBPI’s Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations. Esmsc
It is recognized that company policies and
regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are
generally valid and binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally
revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably through negotiation, by
competent authority.[21] The Court has upheld a company’s management
prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement of
the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements.[22]
Second, Article 282[23] (a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines sanctions
termination by the employer of the employee’s services for serious misconduct
or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work. In the instant case, petitioner
Aparente was terminated from service after having been found guilty of driving
without a valid driver’s license, which is a clear violation of the company’s
rules and regulations. Esm
In order that an employer may dismiss an
employee on the ground of willful disobedience, there must be concurrence of at
least two requisites: The employee’s assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude; and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.[24] We have found these requisites to be present in the
case at bar. The extant evidence on record clearly reveals the willful act of
petitioner Aparente in driving without a valid driver’s license, a fact that he
even tried to conceal during the investigation conducted by private respondent.
Such misconduct should not be rewarded with re-employment and backwages, for to
do so would wreak havoc on the disciplinary rules that employees are required
to observe. The law warrants the dismissal of an employee without making any
distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent where the
totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant his dismissal. In protecting
the rights of the laborer, the law authorizes neither oppression nor
self-destruction of the employer.[25]
An employee who is dismissed for cause is
generally not entitled to any financial assistance. Equity considerations,
however, provide an exception. Equity has been defined as justice outside law,
being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than of
law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of
positive law, for equity finds no room for application where there is law.[26] In the case of Camua v. NLRC,[27] the Court laid down the guidelines in the grant of
separation pay to a lawfully dismissed employee, thus: Chief
We hold that
henceforth separation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justice only
in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other
than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character. Where the
reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual intoxication or an
offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or illicit sexual relations with
a fellow worker, the employer may not be required to give the dismissed
employee separation pay, or financial assistance, or whatever other name it is
called, on the ground of social justice.
In the instant case, we find the award to
petitioner of separation pay by way of financial assistance equivalent to
one-half (1/2) month’s pay for every year of service equitable. Although
meriting termination of employment, petitioner’s infraction is not so
reprehensible nor unscrupulous as to warrant complete disregard for the fact
that this is his first offense in an employment that has spanned eighteen (18)
long years.
Jksm
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed
resolution of public respondent NLRC dated September 19, 1994 is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs. Â h Y
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza,
Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] Under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[2] NLRC Case No. RAB-11-07-50153-88.
[3] Rollo, p. 134.
[4] Rollo, p. 21.
[5] Rollo, pp. 5, 184.
[6] Rollo, p. 65.
[7] Rollo, p. 48.
[8] A first, second and third offense is punishable only
by a suspension of 6 days, 15 days and 30 days respectively. The penalty of
"discharge" is imposed only after the fourth offense or when the
damage caused upon private respondent is more than P5,000.00.
[9] Rollo, p. 69.
[10] Docketed as RAB-11-07-50153-88, Department of Labor
and Employment, Regional (DOLE) Sub-Arbitration Branch No. XI, General Santos
City.
[11] Rollo, p. 20.
[12] The dispositive portion of the NLRC Resolution dated
September 19, 1994 erroneously stated that it was reversing the decision of the
Labor Arbiter.
[13] Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[14] Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 249 SCRA 303, 305, 306 (1995) citing Starkie on Evidence, p. 846,
Moore on Facts, Vol. 1, p. 544; Somers v. McCready, 96 Md. 437, 53 Alt.
Rep. 1117, per Jones, C.J. Moore on Facts, Vol. 1, p. 559.
[15] Rollo, p. 16.
[16] National Semiconductor (HK) Distribution, Ltd. v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 291 SCRA 348, 354 (1998).
[17] Fernandez v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 285 SCRA 149, 168 (1998).
[18] Rollo, p. 29.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Rollo, p. 67.
[21] Tanala v. NLRC, 252 SCRA 315, 320 (1996).
[22] Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, 263 SCRA 531,
538 (1996).
[23] Art. 282. Termination by employee. –
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a)
Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
(b)
Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c)
Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;
(d)
Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and
(e) Other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
[24] Lagatic v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 285 SCRA 251, 257 (1998).
[25] Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Ople,
163 SCRA 323, 331 (1988).
[26] PLDT v. NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 681 (1988).
[27] 279 SCRA 45, 51 (1997).