EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130604. September 16, 1999]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
CELESTINO JUNTILLA y ALLARCOS, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is the decision
of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon[1] sentencing accused-appellant, Celestino Juntilla y
Allarcos to death for the horrible crime of raping his sixteen (16) year old
daughter, Nena Juntilla.[2]
In an information dated January
10, 1997, accused was charged as follows:
“That on or about the 14th
day of October, 1996, in the evening, at Purok 8 barangay Laligan, municipality
of Valencia, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd design did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally have sexual intercourse with his
daughter, NENA JUNTILLA, a 16 year old minor, against her will.”[3]
The relevant facts are undisputed.
Private complainant is the
daughter of the accused, being the youngest of six children. When she was only two years old, her mother
died. Thereafter, three of her siblings
lived with their relatives in Davao.
Private complainant however continued to live with her father, accused,
Celestino Juntilla, in his farm in Agusan del Sur.[4]
In December 1995, private
complainant and the accused transferred to Laligan, Valencia, Bukidnon.[5]
On the evening of October 14,
1996, while private complainant was sleeping in her room, she woke with a start
to find that her father was on top of her and had already taken off her
panties. She kicked him and tried to
resist him, but to no avail. Accused
was able to consummate the vile act of rape.[6]
The next day, private complainant
reported the incident to her uncle, Julie Juntilla. Her uncle then promptly brought her to the barrio kagawad who
accompanied her to the barangay captain.[7] Since she was a minor, her case was turned over to a
local social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.[8]
Nine (9) days after the rape, on
October 23, 1996, private complainant was examined by the municipal health
officer of Valencia, Dr. Marilyn Agbayani.[9] Dr. Agbayani issued a medical certificate[10] with the following findings:
“External Genitalia - no physical change in color, no contusion, no hematoma.
Internal Exam: admits two fingers without resistance xxx hymen not appreciated.”
On the same day, October 23, 1996,
private complainant, Nena Juntilla, filed a criminal complaint for rape against
the accused.
In convicting the accused, the
trial court held that it has “no reason to doubt that the crime of rape as charged
had been committed.” The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of
private complainant and relied on the “apparent sincerity” that private
complainant displayed during her testimony.
In its decision the trial court states:
“… It is most difficult to believe that she (i.e. the private complainant), at her young age and still immature mind, had lied on such a grievous crime against her own father. She has no motive to do it and the accused failed to adduce evidence of any.”
Regarding the results of the
medical examination, the trial court held:
“The fact that the doctor’s findings of Nena’s external genitals showed ‘no change of color, no contusion, no hematoma’ is of no consequence. Nena was only examined nine (9) days after she was sexually abused. Outward signs of inflicted physical force could have already healed.”
Citing Republic Act No. 7659 as
basis, the trial court imposed the maximum penalty of death on accused,
Celestino Juntilla, to wit:
“Being the daughter of the accused and only 16 years of age when she was raped, the crime committed is punishable by death as provided for under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed (under) any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age, and the offender is the parent, ascendant step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2. x x x x
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Celestino Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH as ordained under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7659. Accused is also ordered to indemnify private complainant Nena Juntilla the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos.”
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring ours.)
The judgment is now before this
Court for automatic review pursuant to Art. 47 of the Revised Renal Code as
amended by R.A. 7659.
Appellant denies the charge and
claims that “the reason why a case was filed against him is that she (private
complainant) wanted to live with other people.”[11] Insisting on his innocence, appellant raised the lone
assignment of error that:
“THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.”[12]
Appellant contends that during
private complainant’s cross-examination, she testified that she did not make an
effective resistance; rather, she only made a “token” resistance. Appellant also points out that it was only
during her cross examination that private complainant made the belated claim
that he had a bolo by his side at the time of the rape. Appellant claims that this is inconsistent
with her testimony on direct examination.[13]
Appellant also argues that private
complainant’s credibility is impaired by her failure or delay to report the
alleged acts of rape committed against her by the appellant since she was 10
years old. Appellant alleges that she
“had ample opportunity to report the incidents” but did not do so. He argues that such failure or delay to
report the rape incidents is an unnatural reaction on the part of private
complainant, and casts doubt on the credibility of her present accusation.[14]
We find appellant’s claim that the
charge was brought against him by private complainant because she “wanted to
live with other people”[15] to be flimsy and incredible. It is contrary to human experience to charge
one’s own flesh and blood with so grave an offense only because of such a whim
or a caprice.
In fact, we find that the alleged
reluctance of private complainant to live with her own father is, rather,
indicative of the veracity of her charges.
It is more consistent with normal human behavior for one who is sexually
abused by her own father to want to leave the family home, the place of her
disgrace. Truly, the fact that private
complainant wanted so badly to live away from her father bolsters her claim of
repeated sexual abuse by him.
Moreover, appellant’s denials are
not supported by clear and convincing evidence. His denials are self-serving statements which deserve no weight
in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of
private complainant, who testified on affirmative matters.[16]
We affirm the finding of the trial
court not only because of the settled rule that the trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect on appeal because it
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the
witness stand,[17] but more so because it is unnatural and highly
improbable that a young girl would come out with such serious an accusation,
risking not only her honor and reputation, but her family’s as well.
We have held time and time again
that no woman especially one who is of tender age would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit
herself to be subjected to public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[18] In a nutshell, “a rape victim will not come out in
the open if her motive is not to obtain justice.”[19]
Considering further that “youth
and immaturity are generally the badges of truth and sincerity,”[20] we find no reason to doubt the trial court’s finding
that private complainant’s testimony deserved more credence than that of
appellant’s.
Private complainant’s testimony
taken on November 22, 1996 was candid, straightforward and honest. She did not waver during the direct and
cross examinations conducted.
On November 22, 1996, she
testified before the Municipal Trial Court of Valencia, Bukidnon as follows:[21]
Q: Why did you file this complaint for “Rape” against your father?
A: Because he raped me and what he did to me sir, is not good.
Q: When was the first time when he raped you?
A: When I was yet ten (10) years old sir, I cannot remember what year was that sir.
Q: Where was your mother at that time when your father raped you?
A: When my father did the raping to me, my mother was at that time dead already sir.
x x x x x x x x x
Q: Did not your father ask forgiveness to you for what he did?
A: He did not, sir.
Q: Are you going to forgive him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Why?
A: I just not forgive him, sir.
Q: Did you suffer so much from the (hands) of your father since you were then 10 years old?
A: Yes, sir.
On April 23, 1997, before the
Regional Trial Court she remained steadfast.
During her direct examination she testified:[22]
Q: Now on October 14, 1996, in the evening, can you recall where you were?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Where were you?
A: There at our residence.
Q: Where is your residence located?
A: At Laligan, Valencia, Bukidnon.
Q: Now who were with you in your house during that time on October 14, 1996?
A: My father.
Q: Your father Celestino Juntilla?
A: Yes ma’m.
Q: Now what time did you go to sleep, Nena on October 14, 1996?
A: At 7:00 o’clock.
Q: Do you usually sleep in your house, you have a room?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: How about your father where does he sleep?
A: There at his room.
Q: While you were sleeping Nena, can you recall if you were awakened in that particular evening?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: Why were you awakened? You said he “removed my panty”, who removed your panty?
A: My father.
Q: Celestino Juntilla?
A: Yes ma’am.
Q: After he removed your panty, what did he do next if any?
A: He inserted his penis to my vagina.
x x x x x x x x x
Q: Was that the first time that you were raped by your father, Nena?
A: For several times already.
Q: How old were you when your father raped you for the first time?
A: I was ten (10) years old.
x x x x x x x x x
Q: Now, Nena, you have charged your own father for rape, are your really sincere and honest in charging of the rape against your father?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Now will you resent later on if your father will be convicted because of your charge?
A: No ma’am.
Q: Now what do you want from this court as far as your father is concerned of what he had done to you?
A: I want him to be imprisoned for life.
Q: Now, Nena, if your father will ask forgiveness from you do you think you can forgive him?
A: No ma’am.
x x x x x x x x x
Private complainant’s candid and
straightforward narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of a truthful
witness.[23] The
rule is that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says all
that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as
her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on
the basis thereof.[24]
Truly, a rape victim’s testimony
is entitled to greater weight when she accuses a close relative of having raped
her, as in the present case where the charge is brought by a daughter against
her own father.[25]
The alleged discrepancies which
appellant points to in the testimonies of private complainant during her direct
and cross examination are more apparent than real. This is readily observable upon a review of the transcript of
records.
During her direct examination,
private complainant testified:[26]
Q: Now after he inserted his penis to your vagina, what happened next?
A: I felt pain.
Q: Did you resist?
A: I resisted.
Q: How did you resist?
A: I kicked him.
Q: Did you shout for help?
A: I shouted.
Upon cross examination, the
private complainant’s story did not falter:[27]
Q: You said your father on October 14, 1996 at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening raped you, I hear you correct on that?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Since that is the last time for the several times that the rape have been done by your father, you did not anymore resist, correct?
A: I resisted.
Q: What did you do when he was about to remove your panty?
A: I kicked him.
Q: Where did you kick him?
A: At his thigh.
Q: How many times did you kick your father?
A: Only once.
Q: A token resistance?
A: Yes sir.
COURT:
Q: Why did you not fight back?
A: Because he had a bolo beside him.
x x x x x x x x x
The Solicitor General correctly
pointed out that there were no inconsistencies, considering that private
complainant, as a witness, “would naturally merely answer the questions
propounded to her and nothing more."[28]
We agree with the Solicitor General. Private complainant’s testimony that she
resisted and shouted for help does not contradict her testimony during the
cross examination that she put up only a token resistance because appellant had
a bolo beside him. The fact remains
that private complainant resisted. The
fact that private complainant did not describe the measure of resistance she
employed during her direct examination does not indicate prevarication but
merely a lack of facility to express herself.[29]
Given private complainant’s tender
age and the trauma of her experience, we cannot expect her to immediately
recall and give an exact and detailed description of the rape. In People vs. Rabosa,[30] we held that a rape victim cannot be expected to
mechanically keep and give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying
experience she had undergone.
Even assuming that a mere “token”
resistance was made, such cannot absolve appellant.
The case of People vs.
Manggasin[31] involved a
young girl who was sexually molested at age 12 and which abuse lasted until she
was 17. In that case, accused-appellant
was the common law spouse of the private complainant’s mother. We ruled that accused-appellant exercised
moral ascendancy over complainant which made the threats effective. Physical resistance need not be established
in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will to the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life
and personal safety.
The aforementioned ruling is
applicable to the case at bar considering that appellant is
private-complainant’s father whose moral ascendancy cannot be doubted. Also, the fact that appellant had a bolo by
his side at the time of the rape is enough to intimidate private complainant.
Private complainant’s delay in
instituting the complaint does not weaken the case for the prosecution. It is not uncommon for a young girl to
conceal assaults on her virtue, especially when the rapist is living with her.[32] In People vs. Caloma,[33] we ruled that even a delay of 8 years is not a sign
of fabrication.
We have consistently held that
delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily
adulterate the credibility of witnesses.[34] We are not about to change the rules in mid-stream.
We reiterate the rule that the
medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate are merely
corroborative in character and are not indispensable elements in rape. What is important is that the testimony of
private complainant be clear, unequivocal and credible.[35]
Besides, the fact that there were
no physical changes in color, no contusion, no hematoma in the external
genitalia, does not render the occurrence of rape improbable. The doctrine is well settled that the
absence of external injuries does not negate rape.[36] Even the absence of spermatozoa is not an essential
element of rape.[37] This is because in rape, the important consideration
is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the
male organ.[38]
Applying the foregoing rules,
we do not find any cogent reason to reverse or modify the trial court’s finding
that the accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged against him.
Under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. 7659, simple rape is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. However, the
attendance of certain qualifying circumstances in the commission thereof may
take the case out of the purview of simple rape where the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is increased one degree higher resulting in the imposition of the
death penalty. Among these
circumstances is where the offended party is under eighteen years of age and
the offender is a parent of the victim.
In such cases, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender should be alleged and proved.[39] In the instant case, it was specifically alleged in
the information that private complainant was the daughter of appellant and she
was only 16 years of age when she was raped.[40] Private complainant’s age and relationship to appellant
was established through her testimony.
Appellant did not belie such testimony.
We thus find that the minority of the victim was duly proved and affirm
the trial court’s imposition of the death penalty.
Four Justices of the Court have
continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless they submit to the ruling of
the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
Going to the matter of damages
that should be awarded to private complainant, the amount of P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity is proper. In People
vs. Victor[41] and People
vs. Delos Santos,[42] we ruled
that the award of civil indemnity should be P75,000 if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by present law.
In addition, the Court hereby
orders appellant to pay the amount of P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.[43]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 8262-97 finding
accused-appellant CELESTINO JUNTILLA y ALLARCOS guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the maximum penalty of death
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the
private complainant, NENE JUNTILLA, the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In accordance with Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic act 7659, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of the case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the power to pardon.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] In Criminal Case No. 8262-97.
[2] Rollo, p. 11.
[3] Rollo, p. 5.
[4] TSN, April 23, 1997, p. 6.
[5] TSN, April 23, 1997, p. 7.
[6] TSN, April 23, 1997, p. 8.
[7] TSN, April 23, 1997, p. 11.
[8] TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 4.
[9] TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 17.
[10] RTC Records, p. 3.
[11] TSN, May 20, 1997, pp. 9-12.
[12] Rollo,
p. 26.
[13] Rollo,
p. 31.
[14] Rollo, p. 33.
[15] TSN, May 20, 1997, p. 11.
[16] People vs. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 (1993).
[17] People vs. Ato, G.R. 123540, March 30, 1999;
People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335 (1997); People vs. Corea, 269
SCRA 76 (1997); People vs. Antipona, 274 SCRA 328 (1997); People vs.
Tadulan, 271 SCRA 233 (1997).
[18] People vs. Butron, 272 SCRA 352
(1997); People vs. Rabosa, 273 SCRA 142 (1997); People vs.
Esguerra, 256 SCRA 657 (1996).
[19] People
vs. Castromero, 280 SCRA 421 (1997).
[20] People vs. Lusa, 288 SCRA 296 (1998).
[21] RTC Records, p. 9; TSN, November 22, 1996,
pp. 1-2.
[22] TSN,
April 23, 1997, pp. 8-17.
[23] People vs. Calayca, G.R. No. 121212, January
20, 1999.
[24] People vs. Ambay, G.R. No. 127177, February
25, 1999.
[25] People
vs. Carullo, G.R. No. 129289, July 29, 1999; People vs. Tabugoca, 285
SCRA 312 (1998).
[26] TSN,
April 23,1997, p. 9.
[27] TSN,
April 23, 1997, pp. 27-28.
[28] Rollo,
p. 71.
[29] People
vs. Villanueva, 253 SCRA 155 (1995).
[30] 273 SCRA 142 (1997).
[31] G.R. No. 130599-600, April 21, 1999.
[32] People
vs. Vitor, 245 SCRA 392 (1995).
[33] 222 SCRA 255 (1993).
[34] People vs. Plasencia, 249 SCRA 674
(1995).
[35] People vs. Brandares. G.R. No. 130092, July
26, 1999.
[36] People vs. Managaytay. G.R. No. 126916, March
25, 1999; People vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647 (1994); People vs.
Querido, 229 SCRA 745 (1994); People vs. Casipit, 232 SCRA 638 (1994);
People vs. Bautista, 236 SCRA 102 (1994); People vs. Alimon, 257
SCRA 658 (1996).
[37] People vs. Caballes, 274 SCRA 83
(1997).
[38] People vs. Dones, 254 SCRA 696 (1996).
[39] People vs. Cantos, G.R. No. 129298, 14 April
1999; People vs. Mangasin, G.R. Nos. 130599-600, April 21, 1999.
[40] Rollo,
p. 5.
[41] 292 SCRA 186, 200 (1998).
[42] G.R. No. 121906, September 17, 1998.
[43] People vs. Prades, G.R. No. 127569, July 30,
1998.