EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133927. November 29, 1999]
MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, and ATTY. DAN RESTOR, respondents.
RICARDO
QUINTOS, necessary respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA_REYES,
J.:
For the Court’s
resolution is the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
assailing Resolution dated May 11, 1998 of the Commission on Elections (hereafter, “COMELEC” or “the
Commission”)[1] on Election Matter No. 98-044, disallowing
the use by petitioner of the nickname “JTV” for the purpose of her candidacy in
the May 11, 1998 elections, and the COMELEC Resolution, dated May 13, 1998,[2] denying reconsideration of the earlier
Resolution.
Petitioner was a
candidate for Representative of the lone district of Occidental Mindoro in the
May 11, 1998 elections and was proclaimed duly elected thereto on May 27,
1998. On March 27, 1998, she filed her
certificate of candidacy in which she stated, among others, that her nickname
is “JTV”. On April 20, 1998, private
respondent Restor filed a letter-petition[3] addressed to COMELEC Chairman Bernardo Pardo
through Atty. Jose Balbuena, Director of the COMELEC Law Department, asking for
the invalidation or cancellation of “JTV” as the official nickname of
petitioner as declared in her certificate of candidacy, and the nullification
of all votes cast in the said nickname, on the ground that petitioner is not
publicly known by that name. The
letter-petition further averred that petitioner is publicly known in Occidental
Mindoro as “Girlie” and that the appellation “JTV” actually pertains to the
initials of her husband and former Congressman of Occidental Mindoro, Jose
Tapales Villarosa.
On election day, May 11,
1998, the Commission, sitting en banc, issued a Resolution granting
private respondent Restor’s letter-petition on the ground that the nickname
“JTV” is not one by which petitioner is popularly known.[4] Petitioner received a fax copy of this
Resolution at 5:32 in the afternoon of May 11, 1998, at which time voting has
ceased and canvassing of votes in some precincts has already gone underway.
On May 12, 1998,
petitioner filed with the Commission an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to reconsider
the aforesaid Resolution. Finding that
no new matter has been raised therein, the Commission en banc issued
another Resolution the next day, May 13, 1998, denying the above motion.
Thus, this petition
raises the question of whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion
in: (1) ruling on private respondent
Restor’s letter-petition without according notice and hearing to petitioner;
(2) taking cognizance of the letter-petition which was not filed by a real
party in interest; (3) resolving the letter-petition en banc, instead of
first referring it to one of its Divisions; and finally, (4) disallowing
petitioner’s use of the nickname “JTV” and ordering the election officers of
Occidental Mindoro to consider invalid all votes cast in that appellation.
The petition also
impleads as a necessary respondent Ricardo Quintos, who ran opposite petitioner
for the lone congressional post of Occidental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998
elections, in view of “confirmed reports” that he will file an election protest
before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (“HRET”) invoking the
questioned resolutions. Private
respondents validated this allegation when they declared that private
respondent Quintos has in fact filed such an election protest case, docketed as
HRET Case No. 98-030.[5]
In its Manifestation In
Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General observed that even if the
letter-petition was treated as an “election matter” which may be properly heard
firsthand by the Commission en banc, the Commission should have given
notice to petitioner before resolving the issue therein, especially since the
petitioner stands to be adversely affected should the petition be granted. On the issue of the validity of the use of
“JTV” as petitioner’s nickname, it opined that petitioner may validly use the
same as she is in fact Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa, and hence, there is no
misrepresentation. Moreover, no one
among the other candidates had the same initials as to be prejudiced by her use
of the same.
The petition is impressed
with merit.
It stands uncontested
that petitioner came to know of the letter-petition lodged against her by
private respondent Restor only upon receipt of a copy of the COMELEC Resolution
issued on May 11, 1998, which she received by fax at 5:32 in the afternoon of
the same day. Under these
circumstances, it is clear that the Commission passed upon the letter-petition
without affording petitioner the opportunity to explain her side and to counter
the allegations of private respondent Restor’s letter-petition. Due process dictates that before any
decision can be validly rendered in a case, the twin requirements of notice and
hearing must be observed.[6] Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission
in the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 1998, that “JTV” is not a nickname by
which petitioner is generally or popularly known, was drawn purely from the
allegations of the letter-petition and for this reason, the Commission acted in
excess of its jurisdiction.
Interminably, we have
declared that deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.[7] However, we find the foregoing rule
inapplicable to the circumstances of the case at bench.
As earlier narrated,
petitioner filed an “Urgent Manifestation and Motion” with the Commission on
May 12, 1998, which the Commission promptly denied the following day. By its own designation, the two-page
pleading filed by petitioner is one part manifestation and one part motion. On the main, it enters appearance of petitioner,
who was not impleaded in private respondent Restor’s letter-petition, and
communicates receipt of the May 11, 1998 Resolution. Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said resolution by
invoking due process, it does not purport to embody petitioner’s grounds and
arguments for reconsideration. Rather,
it states that “(petitioner) reserve(s) all rights and waive(s) none, including
filing a supplemental motion for reconsideration, pending retaining additional
counsel” as the lawyer representing petitioner at the time was saddled with
other commitments.[8] In filing this “Urgent Manifestation and
Motion” on the second day of canvassing of votes, and immediately after receipt
of the contested resolution, it is obvious that petitioner’s immediate concern
for doing so was not mainly to exercise her right to be heard, but to have the
Commission seasonably reconsider the May 11, 1998 Resolution while canvassing
was still at the precinct or municipal level.
While the filing of a
supplemental motion for reconsideration is not a matter of right, it is
believed that the judicious thing for the Commission to have done, considering
the obvious due process issues brought about by the May 11, 1998 Resolution,
was to afford petitioner a chance to explain why she should be allowed to use
the nickname “JTV”, such as by requiring her to submit a supplemental motion
for reconsideration. We consider this
more in consonance with our rulings in Salonga and Rodriguez on
opportunity to be heard on reconsideration.
Thus, we find that respondent COMELEC acted imprudently and in excess of
its jurisdiction in treating the “Urgent Manifestation and Motion” as
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the May 11, 1998 Resolution, and in
summarily dismissing the same.
Anent the second issue,
petitioner contends that the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of the petition below, there being no showing that it was filed
in the name of a real party in interest.
The argument is
tenable. The COMELEC Rules of Procedure
require that all actions filed with the Commission be prosecuted and defended
in the name of the real party in interest.[9] The letter-petition does not allege that the
protestant, herein private respondent Restor, is a candidate for any position
in the May 11, 1998 elections, or a representative of a registered political
party or coalition, or at the very least, a registered voter in the lone
district of Occidental Mindoro --- as to stand to sustain any form of injury by
petitioner’s use of the nickname “JTV”.
Absent such essential allegation, the letter-petition stood defective
and should have been dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.
The question of whether
the Commission may decide cases en banc without first referring them to
any of its divisions has been consistently answered in the negative since
Sarmiento vs. COMELEC[10], which interpreted Section 3, Article IX(C)
of the Constitution[11] as requiring all election cases to be first
heard and decided by a division of the Commission, before being brought to the
Commission en banc on reconsideration.
Conformably, we hold that the Commission exceeded the bounds of its
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of private respondent Restor’s
letter-petition at the first instance, thus rendering its May 11, 1998
Resolution void.
To the above rule,
private respondents take exception by stating that the subject letter-petition
posed issues which were administrative in character, and, thus, not subject to
the requirement of referral to division which applies only in the Commission’s
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions.
In the concurring opinion
of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez, 56 SCRA
148, he noted that
(t)he term “administrative” connotes, or pertains, to “administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things.” It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon.
While
a “quasi-judicial function” is
a term which applies to the action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required
to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[12]
Thus, in Vigan
Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 10 SCRA 46,[13] we held that where the fixing of power
rates, which are to apply exclusively to a particular party, is based upon a
report of the General Auditing Office, and which fact is denied by the affected
party, the making of such finding of fact by respondent administrative agency
is a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character.
A directive by the
Commission to disallow petitioner’s use of the nickname “JTV” for purposes of
her candidacy, on the basis of Resolution No. 2977[14], clearly necessitates a determination of
whether petitioner is in fact not generally or popularly known as such in the
locality of Occidental Mindoro.
Indubitably, since it involved the application of law or rules to an ascertained
set of facts, it called for the Commission’s exercise of its adjudicatory
powers and falls within the concept of an “election contest” in the sense
contemplated by Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution.
We cannot agree with the
view advanced by private respondents that because the petition below cannot be
classified as a case falling under Rules 20 to 33 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure[15], it is not a quasi-judicial matter and may
thus be dealt with firsthand by the Commission en banc. Private respondent Restor’s letter-petition
clearly asks, not only for the invalidation of “JTV” as petitioner’s authorized
nickname, but also the nullification of all votes cast in that name.[16] We are hard put to treat the issue as
administrative when petitioner stands to be so adversely affected by the relief
asked for. That the petition below was
in the form of a letter does not make the issues posed therein less
substantial. As opined by the Office of
the Solicitor General in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, “(t)o sustain
the ruling of the COMELEC is to open venues for commission of fraud, as one
simply needs to write a letter to the COMELEC asking that votes for a candidate
be nullified on the ground that the nickname used is inappropriate or not
valid.”
The remaining issue
pertains to the validity of votes cast in the name “JTV”. In view of the fact that the election
protest of private respondent Quintos is presently pending in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, we resolve to leave this matter to the
resolution of the said body as the sole judge of all contests respecting the
election, returns and qualifications of its members.[17]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the COMELEC
Resolutions dated May 11, 1998 and May 13, 1998, respectively, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part; was Comelec
Chairman in the case below.
[1] Issued
by the COMELEC en banc, signed by Commissioners Bernardo P. Pardo
(Chairman), Julio F. Desamito, Evalyn I. Fetalino and Amado M. Calderon.
Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores dissented. Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Japal M. Guiani were away on
official business.
[2] Issued
by the COMELEC en banc and signed by all the Commissioners. Commissioner Dy-Liacco Flores maintained her
dissent.
[3] Annex
“G” of Petition.
[4] Citing Section 2 (Contents of Certificate of Candidacy) of COMELEC Resolution No. 2977, which, in turn, is a reiteration of Rule 13, Section 211 of the Omnibus Election Code. Said Section 2, Resolution No. 2977 reads:
“ x x x The person filing the certificate of candidacy
may include one nickname or stage name by which he is generally or popularly
known in the locality. x x x”
[5] Private
Respondents’ Motion to Resolve Case, 3-4.
[6] Salafranca
vs. Philamlife Village Homeowners Association, G.R. No. 121791, December 23,
1998; Pascual vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120575, December 16, 1998; Autobus
Workers Union vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 117453, June
26, 1998.
[7] Salonga
vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 534; Rodriguez vs. Project 6 Market Service, 247
SCRA 528; Mendiola vs. Civil Service Commission, 221 SCRA 295.
[8] Urgent
Manifestation and Motion, Annex “H” of Petition.
[9] Sec.
3, Rule 5, COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
[10] 212
SCRA 307. Reiterated in Ong vs. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 806; Ong vs. COMELEC, 221
SCRA 475; Reyes vs. Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, 244 SCRA 41;
Borja vs. COMELEC, 260 SCRA 604; Ramirez vs. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 590; Garvida vs.
COMELEC, 271 SCRA 767; Acosta vs. COMELEC, 293 SCRA 578.
[11] Section
3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution reads: “The Commission on Elections may
sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies. All
such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that
motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.”
[12] Midland
Insurance Corporation, 143 SCRA 458.
[13] Also
cited in Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Education Secretary, 153
SCRA 622.
[14] See
note 4.
[15] These
Rules refer to particular actions or proceedings, i.e., ordinary actions
– election protest and quo warranto; special actions – petition to deny
due course or cancel certificate of candidacy, proceedings against nuisance
candidates, postponement or suspension of elections; special cases –
pre-proclamation controversies; special reliefs – certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus in aid of the Commission’s limited appellate
jurisdiction over courts of general jurisdiction, contempt; provisional
remedies – injunction; special proceedings – annulment of permanent list of
voters, registration of political parties or organizations, which the
Commission, sitting in Divisions, is required to hear and decide.
[16] Letter-Petition
to COMELEC, Annex “G” of Petition.
[17] Sec.
17, Art. VI, Constitution.