THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124140. November 25, 1999]
BERNARDO B. RESOSO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES,
J.:
In this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction, Bernardo Resoso seeks to
set aside respondent’s Resolution dated February 2, 1996 denying his Demurrer
to Evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 19773-19779 entitled “People vs. Bernardo B.
Resoso”, and Resolution dated March 12, 1996, denying his Motion for
Reconsideration of the earlier Resolution.
Under date of September
29, 1993, seven (7) informations for falsification of public document under
Article 171, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code were filed with respondent
court against the petitioner, for allegedly making alterations/changes in the
quality, quantity and country of origin of the items sought and approved to be
imported under certain Veterinary Quarantine Clearances to Import, taking
advantage of his public position as Executive Officer, National Meat Inspection
Commission (NMIC), which alterations or intercalations in the documents changed
their meaning and/or made the documents speak something false, to the damage
and prejudice of public interest.
Petitioner entered a plea
of not guilty upon arraignment. During
the trial, the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, (1) Rosario
Agustin, the Records Officer of the NMIC; (2) Dr. Romeo N. Alcasid, Director,
Bureau of Animal Industry, Department of Agriculture; (3) Delia Ang, Public
Relations Officer and Clerk, NMIC and (4) Senen C. Bacani, former Secretary,
Department of Agriculture. The Special
Prosecutor made a written offer of exhibits, which were admitted by the
court. With leave of court, petitioner
filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that by the evidence presented by the
prosecution itself the guilt of the accused has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt, and he is entitled to an acquittal.
The Demurrer to Evidence
was denied in the assailed order of February 2, 1996, as follows:
“The ‘DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE’ dated November 20, 1995 of the accused is Denied.
At this stage, the issue raised by the accused in his defense, i. e. good faith, is not yet apparent. There is no question of making the documents speak of the truth since this is not a narration of facts where errors are corrected or altered because they are incorrect. Rather the cases herein refer to alterations which authorize acts which were not theretofore authorized, i.e., importation of one quantity of meat instead of another, from countries of origin not originally authorized therein.
Among the other issues in falsification such as those charged
herein is the integrity of public documents and the need for purposes of public
order not to alter their tenor. In this
case the documents appear to have been altered to authorize something distinct
from what the person charged therewith had authorized and for which the officer
who altered the same does not appear to have been authorized.”[1]
Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration submitting that the evidence of the prosecution showed that
(1) the alterations or changes in the Veterinary Quarantine Clearances in
question were authorized and the good faith of the accused is already clear at
this stage of the case in light of the testimony of Adelia P. Ang. Dr. Romeo Alcasid and former Secretary of
Agriculture Senen C. Bacani.
Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. The
respondent court stated in its Resolution of March 5, 1996, as follows:
“The ‘MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION’ dated February 12, 1996, of the accused, is Denied.
What are apparent from the testimony of prosecution’s evidence on record are that:
1. while the changes as to the meat that could be imported were not of concern to then Secretary Senen C. Bacani, Sec. Bacani categorically denied that he authorized the alterations;
2. while he stated how the changes could be made, Sec. Bacani was merely establishing a procedure, he was not saying that this had actually happened.
The basis for the Motion for Reconsideration does not exist in the
record to justify an acquittal of the accused at this time.”[2]
The instant petition
raises the following grounds for the issuance of the writs prayed for:
"Respondent court gravely abused its discretion, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, when it denied petitioner’s ‘DEMURRER to EVIDENCE’ on the
ground that ‘good faith, is not yet apparent’ and ‘the officer who altered the
same does not appear to have been authorized’.[3]
Petitioner claims that
the prosecution evidence clearly shows the good faith of the petitioner, as the
alterations/changes in the VOC’s in question were duly authorized by then
Undersecretary Conrado Gozon, who had direct supervision over the National Meat
Inspection Commission (NMIC) at that time, and were made in accordance with the
then prevailing practice in the NMIC.
The prosecution having failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
Respondent People filed
Comment. It disagreed with petitioner’s
argument that the alterations and changes in the VOC’s were authorized and/or
cleared through the Office of the Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture. While respondent agrees that good faith is a
valid defense to a charge of falsification of a public or official document,
the fact that petitioner admitted that there were alterations/changes made in
the VOCs and that he authorized the same (without authority to do so) is a
clear indication of bad faith. Good
faith must be clearly proven, and it is premature at this stage to conclude
that petitioners acted in good faith.
Petitioner filed Reply to
Comment, controverting the assertion that he acted in bad faith. He claims that he should be spared the
ordeal and expense of going through the presentation of evidence on his part in
the face of the prosecution’s failure to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner’s urgent
motion reiterating his prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order was denied by this Court in the
Resolution of June 17, 1998. Motion for
reconsideration of said denial was likewise denied for lack of merit.
We find no merit in the
instant petition.
Petitioner is charged
with falsification of Veterinary Quarantine Clearances by allegedly making
alterations/changes in the quality, quantity, and country of origin of the
items sought and approved to be imported, taking advantage of his public
position as Executive Officer, National Meat Inspection Commission (NMIC) which
alterations or intercalations in the documents changed their meaning and/or
made the documents speak something false, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest.
The petitioner’s defense
is good faith, i.e. that the alterations were made in good faith as they were
duly authorized by the then Undersecretary of Agriculture who had direct
supervision over the NMIC at that time.
Moreover, no injury/prejudice was caused to the public.
It is petitioner’s thesis
that in view of (1) the testimony of former Secretary of Agriculture Senen
Bacani, who concurrently acted as Chairman of the National Meat inspection
Commission, that the alterations made in the VOCs regarding importation of
sheep casings, beef briskets, etc. would not be a cause for concern on the part
of the government and would have probably been authorized anyway if originally
incorporated in the VOCs, (2) the testimony of Director Romeo Alcasid, Bureau
of Animal Industry, that the Executive Director was allowed to make alterations
in the VOCs on condition that a monthly summary report is made on the said
alterations; (3) the testimony of Delia Ang that the alterations were made
after clearing the matter with the Office of the Undersecretary Gozon who was
then the department undersecretary supervising the NMIC, the good faith of the
accused was clearly established and that it was therefore an error for the
respondent to conclude that the allegation of good faith has no factual basis.[4]
For his part, respondent
argues that it is premature at this time to conclude that petitioner acted in
good faith in making the alterations considering the testimony of Secretary Bacani that he did not authorize the
alterations, and the testimony of Delia Ang that the alleged authority given by
Undersecretary Gozon was unwritten, and was not contained in any office
Memorandum, and that the go-signal to make the changes came from
the secretary of Undersecretary Gozon.
Moreover, the alleged prevailing practice in the NMIC regarding the
introduction of alterations in the VOCs was not proven.[5] It is argued that
good faith must be clearly proven considering that the prosecution witnesses
testified that the alterations or changes in the VOCs were not authorized by
either Secretary Bacani or Undersecretary Gozon.[6]
Petitioner would have
this Court review the assessment made by the respondent Sandiganbayan on the
sufficiency of the evidence against him at this time of the trial. Such a review cannot be secured in a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus which is not available to
correct mistakes in the judge’s findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous
conclusions of law and fact. Although
there may be an error of judgment in denying the demurrer to evidence, this
cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari,[7] as certiorari
does not include the correction of evaluation of evidence.[8] When such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort to
certiorari or prohibition but to continue with the case in due course and when
an unfavorable verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner
authorized by law.[9] Factual findings
of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon the Supreme Court except where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; (2) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment
is based on misapprehension of facts and the findings of fact of the
Sandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by
evidence on record.[10]
From an examination of
the pleadings and the annexes, we are not convinced that any of the above
exceptions are in point. There is no
showing that the conclusions made by the respondent on the sufficiency of the
evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is
manifestly mistaken. Assuming that
there is an error of judgment on the factual issue whether the petitioner had
acted in good faith in altering the VOCs in question, considering the testimonial
evidence adduced by the prosecution, there is to our mind, no capricious
exercise of judgment that would warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writs
of certiorari and prohibition. It is
clear that the denial of the demurrer was made by respondent in the due
exercise of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug,
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 1.
[2] Rollo, p. 106.
[3] Rollo, p. 116.
[4] Demurrer to Evidence; Reply to Comment.
[5] Rejoinder to petitioner’s Reply to Comment.
[6] Comment of respondent People of the
Philippines.
[7] Santiago Land Dev. Co. vs. CA 258 SCRA 535.
[8] Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. vs. NLRC 261 SCRA 757.
[9] Quiñon vs. Sandiganbayan, 271 SCRA 575.
[10] Pareño vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242.