FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111854. November 24, 1999]
BARANGAY BLUE RIDGE “A” OF QUEZON CITY, represented in this suit by its Punong Barangay and Sangguniang Barangay, who also are suing in their personal/individual capacities as Barangay residents/homeowners EDUARDO OCHOA, TERESITA OCHOA, PACITA ALMARIO, RAFAEL ESTRADA, SR., ALONSO ANCHETA, DELY LAGUMBAY, RAFAEL ESTRADA, JR., JAIME M. ALFONSO and FRANCIS NG, BABY LYN GODARZI, BLUE RIDGE “A” residents/homeowners suing in their behalf and in behalf of other residents/homeowners of Barangay Blue Ridge “A”, who are so numerous that bringing all of them in as parties-plaintiffs would be impractical/impossible, petitioner vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City, and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
On March 2, 1992,
petitioners filed a complaint for injunction plus damages against private
respondent,[1] Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[2] On March 20, 1992, private respondent filed
a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the complaint failed to
state a cause of action.[3] The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss on January 6, 1993[4] and denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration on June 3, 1993.[5]
Alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court judge, petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and prayed for the annulment of
the trial court orders of January 6, 1993 and June 3, 1993.[6] Petitioners also prayed for the inhibition
of respondent judge on the grounds of “unmistakable bias, prejudice and
hostility.”[7]
In a resolution dated
July 26, 1993, the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals denied the petition
on the ground that the proper remedy was appeal under Rule 41, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court and not a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65.[8]
Subsequently, the Court
of Appeals, in a Resolution dated September 13, 1993, denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.[9] The Court of Appeals went so far as to
describe the petition as a “patay na kabayo” (dead horse). As held by the Court of Appeals, “If we are
to give in to such argument (i.e. that under the facts, ordinary appeal
is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy), we might as well abolish appeal as
a remedy.”[10]
Aggrieved, petitioners
appealed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.[11] The sole question is whether or not the
Court of Appeals erred when it denied the petition. We find that it did not.
Accordingly, the petition must be denied.
A basic requisite for the
special civil action of certiorari to lie is that “there be no appeal
nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”[12] Certiorari is a remedy of last recourse
and is a limited form of review.[13] Its principal function is to keep inferior
tribunals within their jurisdiction.[14] It cannot be used as a substitute for a lost
appeal.[15] It is not intended to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings or conclusions.[16]
In resolving the motion
to dismiss, the trial court enumerated and discussed the elements of a cause of
action.[17] As regards the first cause of action, the
trial court held that while plaintiffs had a clear legal right created by law,
defendant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation was covered by the exception provided
for by MMA Ordinance No. 81-01.[18] Anent the second element, the trial court
ruled that defendant “was not remiss in its obligation to respect the right of
plaintiffs under MMA Ordinance No. 81-01” as the records showed that defendant
fell under the ordinance’s exception.[19] Having
discussed the first two elements and having decided that their concurrence in
this case was not established by plaintiffs, the trial court saw no need to
discuss the last element of a cause of action.[20]
In resolving petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, the trial court held that while it “recognized the
rules mentioned by plaintiff x x x the court doubts their absolute application
in the case at bar. Indeed, while
correct as general rules, they are not without exceptions.”[21]
Jurisprudence provides
that there is grave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law.[22] Not every error in proceeding, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or of fact, is abuse of discretion.[23]
In any case, if ever
there was any error committed, such was error of judgment and not of
jurisdiction.
Well settled is the rule
that “jurisdiction” is the authority to hear and determine a cause. It is the right to act in a particular
case. Its existence does not depend
upon the regularity of its exercise or upon the correctness or righteousness of
the decision or ruling made by the court.[24] Any error that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which should be
reviewed by ordinary appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 1993 and September 13, 1993 are
AFFIRMED.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
JJ., concur.
[1] Court of Appeals Records, p. 23.
[2] The complaint filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City pleaded that the construction by private respondent,
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, of a gasoline filling service station in
petitioners’ residential subdivision violated certain barangay ordinances and
resolutions.
[3] Court of Appeals Records, p. 33.
[4] Rollo, p. 86.
[5] Rollo, p. 113.
[6] Court of Appeals Records, p. 6.
[7] Court of Appeals Records, p. 15.
[8] Rollo, pp. 132-133.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 147-148.
[10] Rollo, p. 148.
[11] Rollo, p. 7.
[12] Cochingyan, Jr. v. Cloribel, 76 SCRA
361 (1977); Building Care Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,
268 SCRA 666 (1997).
[13] Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413
(1997).
[14] Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA 518 (1997).
[15] Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 380
(1997).
[16] Ilacad v. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA
301 (1977).
[17] To wit:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
(Court of Appeals Records, p. 451, citing ACCFA v. Alpha Insurance and Surety
Co., Inc., 24 SCRA 151).
[18] The Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, March 18,
1981.
[19] Court of Appeals Records, p. 70.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Court of Appeals Records, p. 105.
[22] People v. Marave, 11 SCRA 618 (1964);
Maritime Co. of the Phils. v. Paredes, 19 SCRA 569 (1967); Panaligan v.
Adolfo, 67 SCRA 176 (1975).
[23] Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Bello, 7
SCRA 735 (1963)
[24] Palma v. Q.S, Inc., 17 SCRA 97 (1966).