SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102648. November 24, 1999]
DRS. ALENDRY P. CAVILES, JR. and FLORA P. CAVILES, petitioners, vs. EVELYN T. BAUTISTA and RAMON T. BAUTISTA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
Petitioners assail the
Decision[1] dated September 20, 1991, as well as the
Resolution[2] dated November 4, 1991, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27758, which reversed the judgment dated June 2,
1990, of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, in LRC Case No.
M-1586.[3] The trial court’s judgment disposed as
follows:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered (1)
ordering herein respondents or any person witholding the owner’s copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57006 to surrender the same to the Register
of Deeds of Las Pinas, Metro Manila within 15 days from the finality of this
decision; thereafter, said official shall annotate on said title the
certificate of sale issued by the Manila sheriff and thereafter cancel the
original and duplicate copy of the same torrens title and issue a new one in
favor of herein petitioners; and (2) in the event the respondents or other
persons fail or refuse to deliver/surrender said owner’s copy, authority is
hereby granted to the same official to annul TCT No. 57006 after annotating
thereon the said certificate of sale, and to issue a new transfer certificate
of title in lieu thereof in the name of herein petitioners, which new
certificate and all duplicate thereof shall contain a memorandum of the
annulment of the outstanding duplicate.”[4]
The
Court of Appeals in turn ruled:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed. The petition is dismissed and respondents-appellants’ transfer certificate of title upheld.
SO ORDERED.”[5]
The antecedent facts
culled by the Court of Appeals from the findings of the trial court, are as
follows:
“1. On September 22, 1982, petitioners-appellees, the spouses Alendry and Flora Caviles, Jr. filed with the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 82-12668 against Renato C. Plata for recovery of a sum of money. The complaint contained an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. On September 24, 1982, the CFI issued the writ prayed for and on October 4, 1982 Deputy Sheriff Jaime L. de Leon issued a Notice of Attachment over a piece of real estate owned by Plata covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-33634 of the Pasay City (now Las Piñas) Registry.
2. The Notice of Attachment was entered in the Primary Entry Book (also known as Day Book) on October 6, 1982, but was not annotated on TCT No. S-33634 by the Register of Deeds, nor did the deputy sheriff or the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 82-12668, now herein petitioners-appellees, take any step to annotate the attachment on the TCT No. S-33634.
3. On October 18, 1982, Plata sold the property covered by TCT No. S-33634 to herein respondents-appellants, the spouses Evelyn and Ramon Bautista, free, of course, from the attachment or any encumbrance, and on the same date Plata’s TCT No. S-33634 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. 57006 was issued in the name of respondents-appellants. From then on, respondents-appellants appear to have taken over and resided in the property.
4. No action was taken by petitioners-appellees to annotate the attachment – as indeed they remained ignorant that the property had been sold and a new title issued until very much later when, after obtaining a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 82-12668 on September 30, 1983, they attempted execution. Thus, even as petitioners-appellees were able to obtain a writ of execution on February 3, 1984, the levy effected on February 21, 1984, was in (sic) still in regard to the by-then-cancelled TCT No. S-3364. The Notice of Levy was entered in the Day Book on February 22, 1984.
5. On March 30, 1987, close to 4 ½ years after the property was bought by respondents-appellants, and 3 years after levy on execution was effected, the property was sold on execution to petitioners-appellees.
6. The Certificate of Sale was entered in the Day Book on April 2, 1987, but when its inscription was sought to be made - the first time such idea entered petitioners-appellees’ mind, apparently - it was found out that Plata’s certificate had been cancelled and a new one issued to respondents-appellants. The entry was made nonetheless on the title of respondents-appellants which annotation the Register of Deeds, however, refused to sign. Upon the matter being elevated on consulta to the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration, the Administrator thereof, the Honorable Teodoro G. Bonifacio, opined on February 23, 1988, that the certificate of sale may be annotated on respondents-appellants’ TCT No. 57006.
7. Due to the refusal of
respondents-appellants to surrender their owner’s copy of TCT No. 57006, the
proceedings below were initiated on January 30, 1989, with
petitioners-appellees invoking Section 107 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
which insofar as herein pertinent speaks of an action to compel surrender of
the owner’s duplicate of title for annotation of a “voluntary instrument”. In any event, on June 2, 1990, a decision
was handed down by Branch 145 of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region stationed in Makati and presided over by the Honorable
Job B. Madayag, ordering, inter alia, respondents-appellants to
surrender their owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 57006 for inscription or
annotation of the certificate of sale, and for the subsequent cancellation of
said certificate of title and the issuance of a new certificate of title in
favor of petitioners-appellees.”[6]
On September 20, 1991,
the Court of Appeals, Second Division,
promulgated a decision reversing the June 2, 1990 decision of Branch 145
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition before the trial court and upheld the transfer certificate of title of
respondent-appellants Evelyn T. Bautista and Ramon T. Bautista.[7]
Petitioners now assign
the following errors:
“1. The court below (Court of Appeals) erred in holding that a person who in good faith acquires any right to registered land need not go beyond the certificate of title, citing in support thereof the case of Director of Lands vs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, (Decision, Annex “A”, p. 3, pars. 3 & 4, and p. 9).
2. The court below erred in holding that the ruling laid down in Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil. 419, is OBITER DICTUM for the reason that allegedly the facts of the case in Levin are not the same, or do not involve, the issue in the case at bar – which is preferred, an encumbrance which is entered in the day book but not annotated on the title or one which is annotated on the title (Decision, Annex “A”, p. 4, last par.).
3. The court below erred in holding that the facts in the case of Potenciano vs. Dineros, et. al., 97 Phil. 196, are far from being identical or similar to those obtaining in the case at bar (Decision, Annex “A”, p. 5, last par.).
4. The court below erred in holding
that what is controlling in the case at bar is the case of Bass vs. De la Rama,
73 Phil. 682, (Decision, Annex “A”, pp. 6, 6th par., to p. 9, 1st par.).” [8]
In Part VIII of the
petition, petitioners identify the “ultimate” issue at bar to be:
“Which interest will prevail, that
of petitioners (which consists of a notice of attachment duly entered in the
Day Book or Primary Entry Book on October 6, 1982, with corresponding
fees paid for, levy or execution, execution sale, and final deed of sale but
without the corresponding annotation thereof on the certificate of title of
subject property) or that of respondents (which consists of a deed of sale
executed on October 18, 1982, entered in the Day Book on the same date
and a new certificate of title in their
favor issued free from the petitioners’ attachment)?”[9]
This Court is thus asked
by petitioners to resolve two conflicting rights, to determine who should
acquire title to the subject property.
These are: the right of one
party to acquire title to registered land from the moment of inscription of an
attachment on the day book (or entry book) on one hand; and on the other, the
right of the other party to rely on what appears on the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title for purposes of voluntary dealings with the same parcel of
land.
It was established by
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals that respondents Evelyn and Ramon
Bautista purchased the subject property on October 18, 1982, from Renato C.
Plata, the petitioners’ judgment debtor in Civil Case No. 82-12668. On said date, Plata’s Transfer Certificate
of Title No. S-33634 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57006
was issued in the name of respondents.
They relied on Plata’s duplicate certificate of title, free from the
notice of attachment. However, the
notice of attachment was entered on the primary entry book of the Register of
Deeds of Pasay City. When respondents
verified the original title with the Office of the Register of Deeds, they
found the same unblemished by any liens or encumbrances. It appears that the then Register of Deeds
had failed to annotate the notice of attachment on the original copy of the
title.
From the facts,
respondent spouses clearly had no notice of any defect, irregularity or
encumbrance in the title of the property they purchased. Neither did they have any knowledge of facts
or circumstances which should have put them on inquiry, requiring them to go
behind the certificate of title.
Respondent spouses were clearly innocent purchasers for value and in
good faith at the time they acquired the subject property. Petitioners themselves admitted in their
petition, “Neither can negligence be ascribed to respondents for their failure
to go beyond their certificate of title…”[10] In Sandoval vs. Court of Appeals,[11] we reiterated a long line of decisions and
ruled “that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system
need not go beyond the same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.”[12]
Likewise, negligence
cannot be imputed to petitioners in this case.
The records show that petitioners successfully obtained a writ of
preliminary attachment of the subject property in Civil Case No. 82-12668, and
the notice of attachment was then entered in the primary entry book of the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City on October 6, 1982. But as earlier stated, the notice of attachment was not annotated
on the original copy of the transfer certificate of title TCT No. S-33634. Petitioners later obtained a favorable
judgment and purchased the subject property at the execution sale. When they sought to inscribe the certificate
of sale on Plata’s title covering the subject property, they discovered that
the latter had been sold to respondent spouses, the new title thereto - TCT No.
57006 - now in their name. The notice
of attachment was later inscribed on the cancelled certificate of title on
November 22, 1983, but it was made to appear that it had been annotated on
October 6, 1982.[13] This belated inscription is reflected since
said inscription followed the earlier entry on October 18, 1982, of the sale of
the subject property to respondent spouses.[14] The notice of attachment dated October 6,
1982, was also later annotated on TCT No. 57006.[15]
In its Decision, the
Court of Appeals stated that the petitioners did not “take any step to annotate
the attachment on TCT No. S-33634” and that “No action was taken by
petitioners-appellees to annotate the attachment.”[16] The respondents likewise contend that “the
problem in this case would not have arisen were it not for the negligence and
very long delay on the part of petitioners in annotating their attachment in
the original certificate of title in the possession of the Register of Deeds.”[17]
We disagree. Petitioners paid the corresponding fees for
the annotation of the notice of attachment and they had every right to presume
that the register of deeds would inscribe said notice on the original title
covering the subject property. The
register of deeds had the duty to inscribe the notice on the original
title. This was not a duty of
petitioners. This Court has held that a
party which delivers its notice of attachment to the register of deeds and pays
the corresponding fees therefor has a right to presume that the official would
perform his duty properly.[18] In involuntary registration, such as an
attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and the like, it has been
held that entry thereof in the day book is a sufficient notice to all persons
of such adverse claim.[19] The notice should, of course, be annotated
on the back of the corresponding original certificate of title, but this Court
has said that this is an official duty of the register of deeds which may be
presumed to have been regularly performed.[20] As we have held in DBP vs. Acting
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, “current doctrine thus seems to be that
entry alone produces the effect of registration, whether the transaction
entered is a voluntary or involuntary one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and annotation,
and nothing more remains to be done but a duty incumbent solely on the register
of deeds.”[21]
Given this parity of good
faith and the absence of negligence on the part of both parties, who between
them has a better right to the property in question?
Article 1544 of the New
Civil Code, provides:
“If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property,
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.” (Italics supplied.)
In the case at bar, the
notice of attachment covering the subject property was annotated in the entry
book of the Register of Deeds of Pasay City on October 6, 1982, while the new
transfer certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses was issued on
October 18, 1982, the date when Plata sold the property to said
respondents. Petitioners’ levy on
preliminary attachment was put into effect when the property was sold on
execution to petitioners, after the latter obtained a writ of execution by
virtue of a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 82-12668.
This Court has repeatedly
held that in involuntary registration, such as an attachment, levy on
execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day book or
entry book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim.[22] Petitioners’ lien of attachment was properly
recorded when it was entered in the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds
on October 6, 1982.
We have also consistently
ruled that an auction or execution sale retroacts to the date of levy of the
lien of attachment.[23] When the subject property was sold on
execution to the petitioners, this sale retroacted to the date of inscription
of petitioners’ notice of attachment on October 6, 1982. The earlier registration of the petitioners’
levy on preliminary attachment gave them superiority and preference in rights
over the attached property as against respondents.
Accordingly, we rule that
the execution sale in favor of the petitioner Caviles spouses was anterior and
superior to the sale of the same property to the respondent Bautista spouses on
October 18, 1982. The right of
petitioners to the surrender of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 57006
covering the subject property for inscription of the certificate of sale, and
for the cancellation of said certificate of title and the issuance of a new title
in favor of petitioners cannot be gainsaid.
Anent the matter of the
existence of another case involving the same issue as raised in Part IX of the
petition,[24] suffice it to state that our present
disposition of this case is not inconsistent with the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 16359, promulgated on September 28, 1990.[25] This ruling was elevated to this Court as
G.R. No. 98343 by way of a petition for certiorari, but it was denied
for failure to comply with the Rules governing the filing of petitions with
this Court.[26]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 27758 dated September 20, 1991, and its Resolution
dated November 4, 1991, are hereby SET ASIDE, and the Decision of Branch 145 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati dated June 2, 1990, is hereby AFFIRMED and
REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 18-27.
[2]Id. at 29.
[3] CA
Records, pp. 7-11.
[4] Id.
at 11.
[5] Supra,
note 1 at 26.
[6] Id.
at 19-20.
[7] Id.
at 26.
[8] Id.
at 6, (denominated by petitioners as “questions of law”).
[9] Id.
at 12-13.
[10] Id.
at 14.
[11] 260
SCRA 283, 295 (1996).
[12] Legarda
vs. C.A., 280 SCRA 642, 655 (1997).
[13] Rollo,
p. 61.
[14] Records,
p. 56, 64.
[15] Id.
at 58.
[16] Supra,
note 13 at 19.
[17] Id.
at 45.
[18] Director
of Lands vs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, 486 (1935).
[19] Levin
vs. Bass, et al., 91 Phil. 419, 437 (1952), citing Villasor vs.
Camon, et al., 89 Phil. 404 (1951).
[20] Yu
vs. C.A., 251 SCRA 509, 513 (1995), citing Rivera vs. Tirona, 109
Phil. 505 (1960).
[21] 162
SCRA 450, 459 (1988).
[22] Yu
vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Sumaya vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 201 SCRA 178, 185 (1991); DBP vs. Acting Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, 162 SCRA 450, 458 (1988); Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals, 95 SCRA 380, 388 (1980); all citing Levin vs. Bass, 91 Phil.
419 (1952).
[23] Oliva
vs. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA 632, 637 (1988); Campillo vs. Philippine
National Bank, 28 SCRA 220, 228 (1969); Philippine Executive Commission vs.
Abadilla, 74 Phil. 68, 69 (1942) [citing Hernandez vs. Katigbak, 69
Phil. 744, 749 (1940); Vargas vs. Tancioco, 67 Phil. 308, 311 (1939).
[24] Rollo, p. 14.
[25] Id.
at 60-63.
[26] Id.
at 67.