FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129033. June 25, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HIPOLITO BERMUDEZ y VILLACORTA and RENARIO MANLAPAZ y OCAMPO, accused.
RENARIO
MANLAPAZ y OCAMPO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant RENARIO MANLAPAZ
(hereafter MANLAPAZ) appeals from the judgment[1] of conviction for murder and attempted murder in
Criminal Cases Nos. 263-92 and 265-92 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Olongapo City, Branch 75.
The challenged decision resolved
four criminal cases, to wit: (1)
Criminal Case No. 263-92 for murder; (2) Criminal Case No. 264-92 for illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition; (3) Criminal Case No. 265-92 for
frustrated murder; and (4) Criminal Case No. 266-92 for violation of Republic
Act No. 7166, an election offense.
MANLAPAZ and Hipolito Bermudez were the accused in the first and third
cases, while Bermudez was the lone accused in the second and fourth cases. The cases were filed with the different
branches of the RTC. Upon motion of
Bermudez, they were consolidated with Criminal Case No. 263-92 before Branch
75.
In the original informations[2] in Criminal Cases Nos. 263-92 and 265-92,
only Bermudez was accused of murder and frustrated murder, respectively. The informations were based upon the sworn
statements of several witnesses,[3] the autopsy report on Joseph Monteverde,[4] the medico-legal certificate of Roberto Bagalawis,[5] and two police reports.[6] Bermudez sought a reinvestigation of the case, since
the informations were filed without a preliminary investigation. Upon reinvestigation, MANLAPAZ was
implicated as a co-conspirator in both charges. As a result, amended informations[7] to include MANLAPAZ were filed.
During their arraignment Bermudez
and MANLAPAZ entered a plea of not guilty.
Bermudez jumped bail during the trial and has remained at large. The presentation of his evidence was waived
by his counsel.[8]
The evidence for the prosecution
was summarized in the Appellee’s Brief as follows:
It was about 4:00 o’clock in the morning of April 10, 1992, when Robert Bagalawis and Joseph Monteverde went to Richard’s Restaurant along Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City to drink beer. In a table in front of them sat Hipolito Bermudez together with three (3) companions. In a table behind Bagalawis and Monteverde sat appellant Renario Manlapaz, also with three (3) companions (pp. 7-10, TSN, April 27, 1993; p. 43, TSN, August 24, 1993).
Monteverde and Bermudez happened to stare at each other. This caused a quarrel to ensue between them, with Bermudez slapping Monteverde on the face. Appellant tried to join the fray but was prevented from doing so by a security guard (pp. 8-9, TSN, April 27, 1993; p. 45, TSN, August 24, 1993).
After the incident, appellant and
Bermudez left the restaurant together with their companions. Bagalawis and Monteverde left the restaurant
some time later. On the street,
Bagalawis noticed an “owner-type” jeep parked near Wimpy’s restaurant some 30
meters from Richard’s Restaurant.
Bagalawis and Monteverde start[ed] walking towards 18th Street
but noticed that the jeep was following them.
Hearing a gunshot, Bagalawis glanced back and saw appellant, Bermudez
and a group of women on board the jeep.
Bermudez was driving while appellant was on the front passenger side
(pp. 10, TSN, April 27, 1993). The shot
heard by Bagalawis hit Monteverde. The
latter was able to run away. Bagalawis
then saw appellant in a standing position.
He heard three (3) more shots, with appellant aiming a gun and firing at
him (Bagalawis), hitting him in his left hand and right foot. Bagalawis ran towards the jeep and punched
its driver, accused Bermudez.
Appellant, however, was able to get control of the jeep and drive away
(pp. 13-19, TSN, April 27, 1993).
Bagalawis was brought to the Olongapo City General Hospital by a police aide. While in the hospital, a policeman arrived with a man in handcuffs whom he recognized as Hipolito Bermudez. When asked by the policeman, he identified Bermudez as the one driving the jeep. He learned from a hospital attendant that Monteverde died on the same day, April 10, 1992 (pp. 8-10, 16-17, TSN, August 24, 1993).
Dr. Richard Patilano, a medico-legal officer of Olongapo City, determined the cause of death of Monteverde to be hypovolemic shock and neurogenic shock due to gunshot wound. The autopsy he conducted on the victim showed a point of entry of a gunshot at the lower right side of the neck. The bullet recovered from the body of the victim, which he said could have been fired from a .45 caliber firearm, went downwards, crossed the right clavicle and ended up in the left lobe of the lung. Powder burns on the point of entry indicate that the assailant was near the victim. The downward angle of the wound shows that the shot was fired from above (pp. 5-17, TSN, April 13, 1993; p. 5, TSN, August 10, 1993).
For his part, Dr. Rolando Ortiz II, a senior physician of the Olongapo City General Hospital, certified that Bagalawis sustained the following wounds: “Point of entry .5 x .5 cm. 2 ½ cm. below the lateral malleolus of the right foot; point of exit .7 x .7 cm. plantar aspect heel right. Point of entry .4 x .4 cm. dorsal aspect carpo phalangcal joint 5th digit left hand; point of exit .6 x .6 cm. lateral side carpo phalangcal joint of the 5th digit left.” (pp. 16-17, TSN, April 27, 1993; p. 3, TSN, September 27, 1994).
On the other hand, MANLAPAZ had
alibi for his defense. He testified
that in the evening of 10 April 1992, he, his wife, daughter and driver ate in
a restaurant. Bermudez was nowhere in
sight. They went home before
midnight. He failed to mention to his
driver, who had gone home, of his planned trip to Pampanga the following
morning; he thus commuted by bus. He
went to Pampanga to buy scrap materials.
He stayed there for two days.
Upon his return to Olongapo City in the evening of 13 April 1992, his
wife informed him that their vehicle was seized by the police. It was the same vehicle which they used in
the evening of 10 April 1992, when they ate in a restaurant. He merely instructed his wife to arrange for
the release of the vehicle. He was not
questioned or subpoenaed by the police in connection with the death of Joseph
Monteverde and the shooting of Robert Bagalawis. He denied knowing either man.
Neither was he aware that Bermudez implicated him in both crimes.[9]
MANLAPAZ claimed that he was
engaged in the scrap business. In 1992
he came to know Bermudez, from whom he bought scrap materials. In February of that year, Bermudez approached
him for a loan. His refusal to lend
offended Bermudez, who forewarned him that should he buy scrap materials from
other sources something would happen to him and his business would close
down. That was the last time he saw
Bermudez.[10]
Marites Manlapaz, appellant’s
wife, corroborated his testimony. On 10
April 1992, after closing their store at 9:00 p.m. she invited her husband for
a snack in a restaurant. Accompanied by
her daughter and the driver, they rode in the family’s Isuzu pick-up
vehicle. They left at midnight and
proceeded home and slept. She and
MANLAPAZ awoke at 6:00 a.m. MANLAPAZ
went by bus to Pampanga to buy scrap materials. That afternoon police authorities arrived and informed her that
their vehicle was involved in an incident, which occurred in the restaurant
where they ate. She was able to have
their vehicle released after the police officer claimed that it was probably a
mistake.[11]
Reynaldo Querubin testified that
he served as appellant’s driver from 1990 to 1995. In the evening of 10 April 1992, he drove for MANLAPAZ, his wife
and daughter. They went to a restaurant
to eat and stayed there until midnight.
After driving the family home, he proceeded home. He claimed that MANLAPAZ did not know how to
drive and did not have a driver’s license.[12]
Antonio Miclat was a traffic
aide. In the evening of 10 April 1992
he was on duty and assigned at the rotonda, Ulo ng Apo, Olongapo
City. At around 4:00 a.m. the following
day his assistance was sought, for a commotion was taking place inside a
restaurant. On his way he saw a
security guard leaving with the suspect, whom he later learned to be
Bermudez. The suspect boarded an
owner-type jeep parked outside. The
suspect had three female companions inside the jeep. Afterwards, two teenagers left the restaurant by foot. He noticed that the jeep tailed the
teenagers, keeping a safe distance. At
that time he was near the jeep, conducting the traffic. He then heard a laughter and a gunshot. The jeep swerved and was parallel to one of
the teenagers, who was midway crossing the street. This was followed by three more gunshots coming from the jeep,
which sped away towards Manila. A
wounded teenager approached him and eventually died. He immediately proceeded to the police station to report the
shooting and the plate number of the speeding jeep. He denied having seen MANLAPAZ at the scene of the crime.[13]
Benjamin Apaling testified that he
was a security guard of the restaurant where the altercation between the
accused and the victims occurred. At
about 4:00 a.m. of 4 April 1992, a man whom he later identified as Bermudez
arrived at the restaurant with three ladies.
A while later two male friends entered the restaurant. They passed by Bermudez and tapped the table
he occupied. The two friends seated
themselves nearby. An exchange of
glances transpired between the two groups.
Bermudez finally approached the other table and cursed one of the
friends, who just kept quiet. The other
friend instead cussed at Bermudez.
Bermudez then slapped and aimed a gun at the friend who remained
quiet. Apaling immediately tried to
pacify them and then left to seek help.
He chanced upon Antonio Miclat, who responded but failed to follow him. Upon his return he saw Bermudez and his
three female companions leaving the place.
In a few minutes, the two male friends paid their bill and also
left. He later learned of the shooting
incident involving the two groups. The
police came and questioned him. He
denied having seen MANLAPAZ in the restaurant during the commotion between
Bermudez and the two male friends.[14]
In its decision,[15] the trial court convicted MANLAPAZ and Bermudez for
the murder of Joseph Monteverde and for the attempted murder of Robert
Bagalawis. It acquitted Bermudez in the
cases for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, and for violation of
Republic Act No. 7166. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court renders judgment in the following manner:
1. In Criminal Case No. 263-92, the Court finds the accused Hipolito Bermudez y Villacorta and Renario Manlapaz y Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as principals by direct participation and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties attached thereto; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Joseph Monteverde, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. In Criminal Case No. 265-92, the Court finds the accused Hipolito Bermudez y Villacorta and Renario Manlapaz y Ocampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Attempted Murder and are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) month of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay the victim Roberto Bagalawis, jointly and severally, the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
3. In Criminal Case No. 264-92 for violation of Presidential Decree [No.] 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition), and Criminal Case No. 266-92 for violation of Section 32, Republic Act [No.] 7166 (Omnibus Election Code), the accused Hipolito Bermudez y Villacorta is acquitted.
Entry of judgment[16] was made against Bermudez.
MANLAPAZ appealed the
decision. He asserts that he was not at
the scene of the crime and his defense of alibi was corroborated by two
disinterested witnesses, a traffic aide and the restaurant’s security
guard. He also emphasizes that his last
encounter with Bermudez was marred by a disagreement over a loan proposal, with
the latter even threatening him as they parted. There could then be no conspiracy.
In his attempt to cast doubt on
the credibility of the eyewitness Roberto Bagalawis, MANLAPAZ points out
omissions in Bagalawis’ sworn statement and inconsistencies in his
testimony. According to him, Bagalawis’
sworn statement[17] failed to mention MANLAPAZ or state that MANLAPAZ held
a gun and fired at the victims. It also
omitted the exchange of words between Bermudez and Monteverde. As to Bagalawis’ testimony, the same was
fraught with inconsistencies. While
Bagalawis claimed that the place was well lit, he later declared that the site
where the jeep was parked was not lighted.
He even changed his statement that there were eight people who boarded
the jeep. He likewise denied in his
testimony the allegation in his sworn statement that the jeep bumped him and
Monteverde.
Additionally, MANLAPAZ claimed
that the sworn statement[18] of Antonio Miclat only identified Bermudez. The same holds true with the subsequent
sworn statements[19] of Elizabeth Puno and Wilmafe Miller, who recanted
their original affidavits and positively declared that MANLAPAZ was not in the
jeep during the alleged shooting.
As to the nature of the crimes,
MANLAPAZ contends that treachery was not established. The altercation in the restaurant was a forewarning to the
victims of an impending danger. The
suddenness of the attack is not synonymous with treachery. Moreover, the evidence show that the victims
suffered frontal wounds.
Lastly, MANLAPAZ asserts that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the
award of moral and exemplary damages are unfounded.
In the Brief for the Appellee, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that the inconsistencies cited by
MANLAPAZ were minor in character and did not affect the credibility of Roberto
Bagalawis. Anent the omissions in his
affidavit, the OSG asseverates that affidavits are generally incomplete and
lacking of details. In any event, the
trial court found Roberto’s testimony to be credible and straightforward.
The OSG asserts that conspiracy
was inferred from the acts of both MANLAPAZ and Bermudez, which showed a common
criminal design. MANLAPAZ was
positively identified to have held and fired the gun. Anent his defense of alibi the same must fail, since MANLAPAZ
failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime.
However, the OSG agrees with
MANLAPAZ that treachery cannot be appreciated because the prosecution failed to
prove how the attack began. Roberto
Bagalawis did not see MANLAPAZ fire the first shot. It was only after hearing the first shot did Bagalawis look
behind. Treachery cannot be based on
mere conjectures.
Lastly, the OSG observes a
clerical error in the trial court’s award of damages. It maintains that the award of P50,000 is actually the
civil indemnity for the death of Joseph Monteverde, while the P30,000 is
for moral damages. Also, while the OSG
agrees on the separate awards of moral damages to the heirs of Joseph
Monteverde and to Roberto Bagalawis, it contends that exemplary damages cannot
be granted in view of the absence of an aggravating circumstance.
We reject MANLAPAZ’s defense of
alibi. MANLAPAZ was positively
identified by the victim himself, Roberto Bagalawis. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused by the witness.[20]
On the credibility of Roberto
Bagalawis, it must be stressed that appellate courts do not generally disturb
the findings of the trial court on the matter.
This is so because the trial court is in a better position to determine
the issue, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner
of testifying. Thus, unless certain
facts of substance and value have been overlooked, which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case, we should not overturn the assessment of the
trial court on the credibility of the witnesses.[21] On this score, MANLAPAZ’s argument on the matter is
not well substantiated.
As to the inconsistencies in
Bagalawis’ testimony, we find them to be on minor and trivial matters. They even serve to strengthen rather than
weaken his credibility, for they remove any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[22]
The claimed omission of certain
events in Bagalawis’ affidavit[23] is understandable.
It is of judicial notice that an affidavit is almost always incomplete
and often inaccurate. Allegations are
sometimes suggested, or certain matters are even ignored for want of
inquiry. The infirmity of an affidavit
as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience. Thus, an affidavit taken ex parte is
generally considered inferior to a declaration made in open court.[24] Suffice it to say, in his testimony Bagalawis himself
pointed out and clarified the inaccuracies in his affidavit.
Moreover, contrary to MANLAPAZ’s
impression that he was never identified in Bagalawis’ affidavit, a scrutiny
thereof indicates that Bermudez was not alone in the commission of the crime;
there were two other men. We quote,
thus:
T: Anong nangyari sa iyo.
A: Binundol ako at ang kasama kong si Joseph Monteverde ng owner type jeep ng taong kasama ng driver na iyan (affiant was pointing and referring to a military I.D. card, AFP who’s [sic] picture appear thereon with name Hipolito V. Bermudez with the rank of FM1, PN, care of Subcom) [Emphasis supplied]
. . .
T: Ipagpatuloy mo?
A: Ito palang dalawang lalake na may kasama ding dalawang babae ay kasama pala ni Bermudez dahil umakmang susugod sa amin ngunit naawat ng security guard at sabay-sabay silang bumaba nila Bermudez at kami ni Joseph [ay] naiwan sa itaas at nagbayad pa kami ng chit. Pagbaba namin ni Joseph nakita ko na nakasakay na si Bermudez sa owner jeep at ang dalawang lalake at tatlo pang babae [sic]. Kami naman ni Joseph ay naglakad patungong St. Joseph, 18th St. upang sumakay ng tricycle pauwing E.T. Walang kaalamalam na kami ay kanilang susundan, bubundulin at pagbabarilin. [Emphasis supplied]
Neither are we persuaded by the
retraction of the two other affiants, Wilmafe Miller and Elizabeth Puno, who,
in their original affidavits, positively identified MANLAPAZ as the one who
shot the victims. Affidavits of
recantation are easily obtained for monetary consideration or through
intimidation. Thus, they are treated
with suspicion and reservation.[25] Besides, MANLAPAZ failed to present the recanting
affiants as his witnesses.
We now discuss the issue of
conspiracy. It exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it.[26] Direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a
crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode and manner in which the crime was perpetrated. It may also be inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a joint purpose and design, a concerted action, and
community of interest.[27] The simultaneous acts of leaving, waiting for their
victims to come out, tailing and firing at them continuously at close range,
and escaping from the crime scene clearly establish a conspiracy between
MANLAPAZ and Bermudez.[28] Since conspiracy was proved, the act of one became
the act of all.[29] It matters not who among the accused shot and killed
the victims, for the felonious act is attributable to all the accused.[30]
Nonetheless, we agree with the OSG
that the crimes committed by MANLAPAZ were not murder and attempted murder, but
only homicide and attempted homicide.
The informations alleged treachery as the qualifying circumstance. Treachery exists when the offender commits
any crime against the person, employing means, methods, or forms which tend
directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[31] Article Two elements are therefore necessary: (1) the employment of means of execution
that affords the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the said means of execution was deliberately or consciously
adopted.[32]
We find no treachery in both
cases. An altercation preceded the
shooting incident. The time between the
altercation and shooting was not significant as to create a break in the series
of events. In fact, when Monteverde and
Bagalawis were outside the restaurant, Bagalawis himself saw MANLAPAZ and
Bermudez inside the jeep, awaiting them. Sensing some danger, Bagalawis
suggested to Monteverde that they go home.[33] That
they were unarmed and defenseless does not by itself make the attack
treacherous. Treachery cannot be
presumed. It must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence.[34] Hence, MANLAPAZ and Bermudez can only be convicted of homicide for the
death of Monteverde. In the same
manner, they can only be convicted of attempted homicide for their crime
against Bagalawis. The evidence
indicates that the injury suffered by Bagalawis was not life-threatening.
The penalty for homicide under
Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal, while the
penalty for attempted homicide pursuant to Article 51 of the same Code is prision
correccional. There being no
modifying circumstances proved by the prosecution or the defense, the penalties
shall be imposed in the medium period.
Since MANLAPAZ is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he can, for the homicide charge, be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
whose minimum shall be within the range of prision mayor (the penalty
next lower in degree to that provided in Article 249) and whose maximum shall
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period. For the attempted homicide charge, he can be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty whose minimum shall be within the range
of arresto mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of prision
correccional in its medium period.
The reduction in penalty shall
benefit Hipolito Bermudez notwithstanding the entry of judgment of the decision
against him.
Finally, we rectify the error of
the trial court in designating the award of damages. In the homicide case, we affirm the awards of P50,000 as
civil indemnity for the death of Joseph Monteverde and P30,000 as moral
damages for his heirs. Contrary to
MANLAPAZ’s contention, the award of moral damages was supported by sufficient
evidence through the testimony of Joseph’s father. However, in both homicide and attempted homicide cases, we delete
the award of exemplary damages in the absence of any factual basis
therefor. The law is clear that
exemplary damages can only be recovered
in criminal cases when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[35] No aggravating circumstance was proved by the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE, except as modified above, the judgment appealed from
is AFFIRMED in all other respects. As
modified, accused-appellant RENARIO MANLAPAZ y OCAMPO is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principal by direct participation of homicide for the
death of Joseph Monteverde and of attempted homicide against the life of
Roberto Bagalawis. He is hereby
sentenced to the following indeterminate penalties: (a) in Criminal Case No. 263-92 for homicide, from eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum; and (b) in Criminal Case No. 265-92 for attempted homicide, from two
(2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum. He is ordered to indemnify (a) the heirs of
Joseph Monteverde in the sum of P50,000 as indemnity for his death and P30,000
for moral damages; and (b) Roberto Bagalawis in the sum of P30,000 for
moral damages.
In the service of his sentence,
accused-appellant RENARIO MANLAPAZ y OCAMPO shall be credited with the period
of his preventive imprisonment, subject to the provisions of Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Original Record (OR), 522-549; Rollo,
33-59. Per Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon,
Jr.
[2] OR, 30,
115.
[3] The sworn statements were executed by Marieto
Monteverde, Roberto Bagalawis, Wilmafe Miller, Elizabeth Puno, Andrea Peñaredondo,
Antonio Miclat, Myra Filipinas and SPO1 Rodel Sarmiento.
[4] OR, 125.
[5] Id., 126.
[6] Id., 127-128.
[7] Id.,
180-183.
[8]
See Order of 4 September 1996; OR, 513.
[9] TSN, 15 June 1995, 6-9, 16-24; TSN, 12
September 1998, 11-12.
[10] TSN, 15 June 1995, 10-15.
[11] TSN, 23 November 1995, 10, 12-17, 19-20,
24-28.
[12] TSN, 7 February 1996, 4-12.
[13] TSN, 6 August 1996, 6-34.
[14] TSN, 14 August 1996, 11-24, 28.
[15] Supra note 1.
[16] OR, 377.
[17] Exhibit “B”; OR, 118.
[18] Exhibit “2”; OR, 503.
[19] Exhibits “4” and “5,” respectively; OR,
507-508.
[20] People v. Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637, 646 [1996];
People v. Balamban, 264 SCRA 619, 631 [1995]; People v. De Guzman, 265 SCRA
228, 245 [1996].
[21] People v. Bantilan, 249 SCRA 367, 376 [1995];
People v. Gomez, 251 SCRA 455, 465 [1995]; People v. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA
471, 478 [1996].
[22] People v. Conde, 252 SCRA 681, 691 [1996];
People v. Villegas, 262 SCRA 314, 321 [1996]; People v. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723, 752
[1996].
[23] Exhibit “B.”
[24] People v. Bayani, 262 SCRA 660, 680 [1996];
People v. Conde, supra note 22 at 690 [1996]; People v. Diaz, supra
note 22 at 732.
[25] See People v. Saliling, 69 SCRA 427,
442 [1976]; Reano v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525, 530 [1988]; People
v. Soria, 262 SCRA 739, 749 [1996].
[26] Article 8, Revised Penal Code.
[27] People v. Hubilla, Jr., supra
note 21 at 480; People v. Laurente, 255 SCRA 545, 564 [1996]; People v.
Landicho, 258 SCRA 1, 31 [1996].
[28] See People v. Landicho, supra
note 27 at 31-32.
[29] People v.
Gomez, supra note 21 at 468; People v. Hubilla, Jr., supra
note 21 at 480-481; People v. Landicho, supra note 27.
[30] People v. Sequiño, 264 SCRA 79, 102
[1996].
[31]
14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code; People v. Ybeas, 213 SCRA 793, 805
[1992]; People v. Compendido, Jr., 258 SCRA 254, 264 [1996]; People v.
Tabag, 268 SCRA 115, 130-131 [1997].
[32] People v. Hubilla, supra note
21 at 481; People v. Landicho, supra note 27 at 27; People v.
Cabodoc, 283 SCRA 187, 203 [1996].
[33] TSN, 27 April 1993, 10-11.
[34] People. v Simon, 209 SCRA 148, 162
[1992]; People v. Estrellanes, Jr., 239 SCRA 235, 249-250 [1994]; People
v. Compendido, Jr., supra note 31 at 268 [1994].
[35] People v. Sequiño, supra note
30 at 108 [1996].