EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131618. July 6, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DOMINADOR MANGAT Y PALOMATA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Accused Dominador Mangat y
Palomata was charged with rape with homicide in an Information that reads as
follows:
“That on or about the 10th
day of July 1995, at around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, in barangay Lusong,
municipality of San Agustin, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one Kristal F.
Manasan, against her will, and on the occasion thereof, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and strangle the said victim, inflicting upon
the latter mortal injuries in different parts of her body which were the direct and immediate cause of her death.”[1]
Upon arraignment, the accused
pleaded “not guilty.” Whereupon, trial
on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented SPO1 Ronnie M. Fajutag of PNP San Agustin, Romblon; Pacifico Magramo,
a farmer; Dr. Cynthia Baradon-Mayor, Medical Officer IV of Tablas Island
District Hospital; Jaime Magramo, a farmer; and Herminio Manasan, father of the
victim. The defense, on the other hand,
presented the accused himself, his wife Alice Mangat and SPO1 Ronnie M.
Fajutag.
The facts, as borne by the
records, are as follows:
Thirteen-year-old Kristal F.
Manasan lived with her family in Barangay Lusong, San Agustin, Tablas Island,
Romblon.[2] On July 10, 1995, Kristal went out of their house to
go to the shore, about 2 1/2 kilometers away.
To reach it, she has to pass by Saguilpit creek. Kristal failed to return home and could not
be found for three days. Alarmed,
Herminio Manasan, father of Kristal, reported the matter to their barangay
council.[3]
At four in the afternoon of July
13, 1995, SPO1 Fajutag received information from Brgy. Kagawad Ronnie Manao of
Brgy. Lusong that a decomposing body was found along Lusong River. SPO1 Fajutag proceeded to Brgy. Lusong to
verify the report. Upon reaching the
place, he saw the dead body of a girl lying on her belly. The victim was nude and the upper part of
her body was placed inside an opening of a stone hole. The panties and shorts of the victim were
also found on the riverside, along with a plastic bag containing a pitcher and
a headband. The place where the body
was found was a cave-like structure on top of which was a foot-trail used by
local residents, and underneath water flowed to the lowlands.[4]
The body was later identified to
be that of Kristal F. Manasan. Dr.
Cynthia Baradon-Mayor examined the cadaver and certified that Kristal died of
multiple hemorrhage due to multiple fracture on the head. The victim also suffered multiple hymenal
and anal lacerations. Her bladder went
out of the vaginal canal and her intestines went out of the rectal vault. From all indications, Dr. Mayor concluded
that the victim was brutally raped and murdered.[5] In particular, the medical findings showed the
following injuries:
1) Head – Multiple hematoma with multiple fracture of skull; with severe cerebral hemorrhage; both eyes reddish to blackish in color and protruding; tongue severely protruding (about 95% of tongue is protruding).
2) Neck – Hematoma contused, around the neck.
3) Chest – Hematoma contused blood vessels blackish all over chest and back.
4) Arms – Multiple Hematoma of both arms.
5) Abdomen – distended, swollen, with multiple hematoma, contused.
6) Vagina - with multiple laceration of hymen at 12:00, 9:00, 6:00 and 8:00 respectively; examining fingers were able to penetrate with ease, vaginal canal much relaxed; with cervical and bladder prolapse.
7) Rectum – with intestinal herniation with lacerated rectal vault on 9:00 and 3:00 o’clock.
8) Legs – with multiple
hematoma and blackish blood vessels.[6]
Pacifico Magramo, a farmer and
resident of Brgy. Lusong, was presented as prosecution witness. He testified that at 2:30 p.m. of July 10,
1995, he was walking downhill along Saguilpit creek in Brgy. Lusong, carrying a
sack of copra which he was bringing to the shore. He chanced upon accused Dominador Mangat pushing the naked and
lifeless body of thirteen-year-old Kristal into a rock hole. Seeing him too, accused warned him not to
divulge to anyone what he saw or he would be next.[7] Scared, Magramo continued downhill while accused
walked away followed by his dog.[8] He also testified that the accused was wearing a gray
sando and white pair of shorts, and was carrying a bolo in a sheath hanging on
his left shoulder by a string.[9]
Jaime Magramo and his wife
traversed the same pathway at two o’clock in the afternoon of July 10,
1995. They were going downhill with
Jaime carrying a sack of copra on his shoulder. While passing along Saguilpit creek, Jaime saw the accused
conversing with his father Benedicto Mangat.
Jaime though could not hear what they were talking about.[10] On July 14, 1995, Jaime was informed by his son who
was in Grade V that the dead body of Kristal was found along Lusong River. It was found exactly in the same spot where
the accused was seen talking with his father in the afternoon of July 10, 1995.[11]
With the recovery of the body of
Kristal on July 14, 1995, there was widespread speculation that the accused was
the culprit. On July 15, 1995, the
police authorities arrested the accused.[12] Bothered by his conscience, Pacifico Magramo
eventually came out in the open and reported to the police what he had
witnessed in the afternoon of July 10, 1995.[13]
While at the police station, the
accused and his father offered to settle the case amicably. SPO1 Fajutag executed an affidavit in this
wise:
“That on or about the 15th day of July 1995, at around 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, while I was in the police station together with SPO1 Rodolfo Espinosa Jovillo, suspect in Rape with Murder case Dominador Mangat and Benedicto Mangat orally manifest (sic) to me that they are willing and wanted (sic) to talk with the complainant for the possible amicable settlement of their case. Benedicto asked me further, how much the amount he will give to the complainant as payment for the early death of Kristal Manasan; and that Dominador Mangat who was just listening inside the cell interrupted and asked his father how much is his share and likewise concurred with his father’s idea for the settlement of their case. Indeed, he told me that he is willing to give the amount no matter how big provided that their case will be settled amicably; I asked them the reason why they wanted to settle their case, Dominador answered, I only want that this case be settled amicably;
“That when said persons were about to be released from jail after
thirty six (36) hours detention, they refused to be released and they
voluntarily executed an affidavit of waiver for safekeeping on the ground that
they are afraid for any retaliation from the relatives of the victim; xxx.”[14]
The accused offered an alibi. He claimed that on July 10, 1995, he was
working with his wife at a farm located in the mountain of Lusong from morning
until lunchtime, after which they went home to their house, located just 50
meters away, to eat lunch and rest. At
1:00 p.m., they returned to the farm and continued their weeding until 4:30
p.m.[15] This was corroborated by his wife, Alice Mangat.[16] The accused admitted, though, that he had a dog which
fit the description given by prosecution witness Pacifico Magramo.[17] Corollarily, the accused asserted that the
prosecution witnesses have an ill-motive in testifying against him as he did
not vote for their candidate in the last May 8, 1995 elections.[18]
The trial court gave credence to
the evidence presented by the prosecution.
Thus, finding the accused guilty of the complex crime of rape with
homicide, it sentenced him to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to pay
the heirs of Kristal F. Manasan the amount of P50,000.00 and costs. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused DOMINADOR MANGAT Y PALOMATA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Rape with Homicide and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, KRISTAL F. MANASAN, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to Section 10, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.
SO ORDERED.”[19]
This case is now before Us on
automatic review.
Accused-appellant assails the
judgment of conviction, contending that:
THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE TESTIMONY OF PACIFICO MAGRAMO FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDENCE TO CONCLUDE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DOMINADOR
MANGAT (SIC) GUILTY OF THE HEINOUS CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE.[20]
In support of his contention,
accused-appellant argues that:[21]
(1) If Pacifico Magramo saw accused pushing the body of the victim at 2:30 p.m. of July 10, 1995, it follows that Jaime Magramo should have witnessed the commission of the heinous act when he passed by the same spot earlier.
(2) If in fact he committed the crime, his white short pants should have been “dirtied and messed” and his behavior or appearance should have been “disturbed.”
(3) If Pacifico Magramo saw what happened, then he should not have waited for a month before reporting the matter to the police authorities.
(4) If the accused had his dog with him when he committed the crime, then it would not have been as quiet because despite their loyalty to their master, dogs “bark if they sensed something bad is happening around them.”
In short, the accused contends
that with the above circumstances, he could not have committed the crime. Thus, the evidence proffered by the
prosecution is “improbable, incredible and inconsistent with normal human
experience.”[22] Consequently, the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court is unconvinced. The accused-appellant’s conviction must
stand.
It is true, as contended by the
defense, that there is no direct evidence linking the accused to the crime charged. There is to Our mind, however, ample
circumstantial evidence which tend to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused was the author of the offense.
Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[23] No greater degree of certainty is required when the
evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed
the crime.[24]
In this case, not only was the
accused-appellant’s presence at the crime scene established, there is also
clear an convincing testimony that he was seen pushing the body of the victim
into a cave-like hole in the rock. We
have examined the transcripts and found that the respective testimonies of
Pacifico Magramo and Jaime Magramo in this regard withstood rigorous
cross-examination and questioning by the trial court. Accused-appellant, however, attempts to impeach the credibility
of Pacifico Magramo by seemingly inconsistent statements. In the face of the damaging testimony
against him given by Pacifico, accused-appellant can only make capital of the
latter’s earlier statement in his affidavit that when he saw him, he thought he
saw a person gathering shells and shrimps.
Upon closer scrutiny of Pacifico’s affidavit, however, We find that the
inconsistency is more imagined than it is real. For in the same breath, Pacifico corrected himself by confirming
that as he got nearer he realized that it was indeed the accused-appellant whom
he saw pushing a half-naked person into a hole in the rock. Pacifico’s exact words were:
“That on or about the 10th
day of July 1995, at around 2:30 o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, I left
the kiln of Panfilo Manalon at the interior of Barangay Lusong, carrying on my
shoulder one sack of copras proceeding to the low land (barangay proper) thus,
when I was along Sagilpit Lusong River I noticed that there was a person
standing on the river which I thought gathering shells and shrimps then when
I am getting nearer to said person I recognized that it was my compare “Enggoy”
but I was shocked upon seeing him pushing a half naked person towards the hole
of stone which I believed already dead.”[25]
It is not unnatural for a person
to mistake people, objects and even events from afar. Pacifico merely thought that what he saw was a person gathering
shells and shrimps when he was yet at a distance. When he got nearer, the vision became clearer and he realized
that it was accused-appellant pushing a half-naked dead body into the hole.
Even if there was an inconsistency
between Pacifico’s affidavit and his testimony in open court, it can still be
easily reconciled by affording greater weight to his open court
declaration. In People v. Mayor
Antonio L. Sanchez, et al.,[26] this Court held that discrepancies between sworn
statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit the witness. Sworn
statements/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant’s mental
faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of
narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies given during trials are much more exact and
elaborate. Thus testimonial evidence
carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits.
Insofar as prosecution witness
Jaime Magramo is concerned, accused-appellant argues that he should have seen
the commission of the crime when he passed by Saguilpit creek earlier because
when Pacifico Magramo passed by thirty minutes later he saw accused-appellant
stuffing the body of the victim into the stone hole. We do not agree. Jaime
himself testified that from his vantage point as he was passing the spot where
accused-appellant and his father were standing, a rock obstructs his view. This is described by the trial court in more
detail:
“xxx That spot where he [Jaime Magramo] saw the two (2) [the
accused and his father] talking to each other was just right there about
two (2) to three (3) feet from the hole.
In the photograph (Exhibit A), he pointed to the spot where he saw them
standing (marked with two (2) “x” “x” on Exhibit A), very near the cadaver of
the victim. He was about 4-1/2 meters
from this spot when he passed by but there was a rock (Exhibit AA) which
obstructed his view and if any person was lying there he could not see it
unless he climbed that rock. There
was a small opening wherein if you look through intently at that opening you
would see the two (2) persons without climbing that rock."[27]
Furthermore, accused-appellant’s
argument that Jaime should have seen him committing the crime is based on the
assumption that the crime occurred exactly thirty minutes before Pacifico
Magramo passed by the crime scene. But
the incident may not have happened the way it was presumed. It may be possible that the crime was not
yet committed at the time Jaime Magramo saw accused-appellant and his father
talking along Saguilpit creek. Or it
may have even been committed before but Jaime did not see the victim’s body
because of the obstruction. Besides,
there never was any pretension on the part of the prosecution that Jaime
Magramo also saw accused-appellant commit the crime. Jaime Magramo’s testimony that he saw accused-appellant and his
father along Saguilpit creek in the afternoon of July 10, 1995 was only
intended to corroborate the testimony of Pacifico Magramo to the effect that
accused-appellant was in the vicinity of Saguilpit creek at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant next argues that
had he committed the crime, his white shorts should have been dirty and messy
and his behavior strange. We are not
persuaded.
A careful scrutiny of the
testimony of Pacifico Magramo would reveal that he only testified on the kind
of clothing accused-appellant had on when he committed the crime. Pacifico did not testify on the condition
of accused-appellant’s clothing. At any
rate, it does not follow that if the accused-appellant raped and tortured the
victim his clothing would be soiled, especially since he was then only wearing
a sando and a pair of shorts. As to his
demeanor, suffice it to say that it is not uncommon for a criminal to act
coolly after committing a crime, especially when the criminal is as
cold-blooded as the accused-appellant in this case.
The one-month delay in Pacifico’s
report of what he saw does not necessarily destroy his credibility. As held by this Court, the delay of
witnesses in revealing to the authorities the identities of the accused may be
attributable to trauma, confusion and grief.
It is quite understandable that the witnesses do not immediately report
the identity of the offender after a startling occurrence more specifically
when they are related to the victim as they had just a traumatic experience.[28] In this case, it was fear that prevented Pacifico
from immediately coming out in the open.
This Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that:
“xxx. Delay or vacillation
in divulging the commission of a crime does not necessarily impair the
credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. It is not uncommon for a witness to a crime
to show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case, as in fact
the natural tendency of most people not to get involved is of judicial
notice. Thus, it is understandable when
a witness fears for his safety especially when townmates are involved in the
commission of the crime (People v. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493). Pacifico’s failure to immediately report the
incident to the police did not detract from his credibility, his hesitance
being attributable to appellant’s death threat and the fact that appellant’s
father was an ex-convict.”[29]
Accused-appellant’s argument that
if indeed he committed the crime then his dog would have barked is a rather
puerile argument on which this Court finds no necessity to elaborate.
Coming to the appellant’s claim
that he was at the farm that day and only took his lunch at home, the same
cannot be given much weight in view of the positive identification made by
Pacifico and Jaime Magramo. Already a
weak defense, it is essential that credible and tangible proof of physical
impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime be presented to
establish an acceptable alibi. Time and
time again, this Court has ruled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive testimony of prosecution witnesses and their clear identification
of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.[30]
Appellant failed to show that it
was physically impossible for him to be at Saguilpit creek on that fateful day
of July 10, 1995. His house was only
two kilometers away from Saguilpit creek.[31] In fact, appellant admitted that he often passes by
Saguilpit creek whenever he goes from his house to the seashore. He also has to pass by this creek when he hauls
copra from Celso Magramo’s house to the seashore.[32]
Appellant’s alibi was corroborated
only by his wife despite the supposed availability of another person who could
have corroborated his presence at the farm.
Appellant himself stated that aside from him and his wife, there was
another person, by the name of Dioneve Galang, who was tilling on the adjacent
farm on July 10, 1995. This person
could have been presented to corroborate appellant’s alibi. However, neither appellant nor his wife
bothered to secure the attendance of Dioneve Galang, notwithstanding the
gravity of the crime charged, for the reason simply that Mr. Galang had
transferred to a farther place.[33] The non-production of a named corroborative witness
due to lack of effort on the part of the accused to find and present him in
court weakens the defense.
As already stated, there is clear
and categorical evidence that he was at the place where the victim’s body was
found in the afternoon of July 10, 1995.
Worse, one of the witnesses, Pacifico Magramo, testified that he saw the
appellant pushing the half-naked body of the victim into the hole in the
rock. That being the case, it baffles
Us why the appellant had to be untruthful about his whereabouts on July 10,
1995, if it were not to conceal an unlawful act that he had committed. This circumstance, to be sure, renders the
appellant’s testimony highly unreliable.
At this juncture, it may be well
to emphasize that the trial court, in no uncertain words, declared that it
“found the testimony of Pacifico Magramo most credible and sufficient to
establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.”[34] It characterized Pacifico’s identification of the
appellant as “determined and unshakable”, and at the same time ruled that the
appellant’s alibi must fail.[35]
It is precisely this giving of
full weight and credence by the trial court to Pacifico Magramo’s testimony
that is the subject of the appellant’s sole assignment of error. However, well settled is the rule that the
findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best
left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand
while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.[36] Only the trial judge can observe the “furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness,
sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath” --all of which are useful
aids for an accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity.[37] The trial court’s findings are accorded finality,
unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which
the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated and which,
if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.[38] In the instant case, We see no compelling reason to
disturb the findings of fact of the trial court.
It has not been convincingly shown
that Pacifico had an ill-motive to testify falsely against the appellant. The insistence of appellant that it was his
refusal to side with their candidate for mayor and congressman that irked Pacifico,
Jaime and the victim’s father, and caused the latter to conspire in accusing
him of the crime charged, is “incredible and unworthy of merit.”[39] This, to Our mind, is not sufficient cause for the
prosecution witnesses to testify falsely against the appellant in a case in
which the death penalty is involved.
On the other hand, the victim’s
father, Herminio Manasan, provided the appellant’s motive for raping and
killing Kristal Manasan. He testified
that the appellant had threatened to kill his children because the appellant
became angry when he kept demanding payment of his monetary debt. We note from the transcripts that Herminio
maintained this story despite badgering by and misleading questions from the
trial judge.[40] While motive should not be a sole basis to convict an
accused,[41] the motive of the accused in this case may be
considered to provide the whole picture and explain the commission of this
gruesome crime.
All told, the foregoing
circumstances provide the required quantum of proof to find the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of raping and killing Kristal Manasan. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is
required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind.[42] This moral certainty is met by the testimonies and
evidence presented by the prosecution.
But perhaps the most damaging
piece of evidence which points to the appellant’s culpability is the affidavit
executed by SPO1 Fajutag to he effect that the appellant and his father,
Benedicto Mangat, offered to settle the case amicably. It is most telling for the defense not to
have made any effort whatsoever to dispute this. Said gesture can only be taken to mean an admission of
guilt. In criminal cases, except those
involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
amicably settled or compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[43]
In view of the foregoing, this
Court has no other recourse but to affirm the death penalty imposed by the
trial court. Under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 7659, “when by reason or on occasion of
the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." At this juncture, it should be stated that
four justices of the Court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality
of Republic Act 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless
they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is
constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case
at bar.
However, the award of P50,000.00
as indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P75,000.00 in line with
the ruling in the case of People v. Mahinay.[44] The additional award of P50,000.00 as moral damages
is appropriate under the circumstances.
The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided in
Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is “recognized that
the victim’s injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting
from the odious crime of rape to warrant per se the award of moral
damages.”[45]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon,
Romblon finding accused Dominador Mangat y Palomata guilty of the complex crime of rape with homicide and imposing
upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the award of civil indemnity is INCREASED to P75,000.00, and the amount of
P50,000.00 is awarded as moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., on leave.
[1] Rollo, p. 9.
[2] TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 2.
[3] TSN,
March 27, 1996, pp. 3-4.
[4] TSN, November 20, 1995, pp. 3-5.
[5] TSN, January 16, 1996, pp. 5-11.
[6] Exhibit “E”.
[7] TSN,
January 15, 1996, pp. 2-8; Exhibit “D”.
[8] TSN, January 5, 1996, p. 13.
[9] Ibid., pp. 11-13.
[10] TSN, March 19, 1996, pp. 3-5.
[11] Ibid., pp. 7-9.
[12] TSN, November 20, 1995, p. 11.
[13] Exhibit “D”.
[14] Exhibit “I”.
[15] TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-3.15 TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-3.15 TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-3.15 TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-3.15 TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-3.15 TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 2-3.
[16] TSN, November 20, 1996, pp. 7-9-.
[17] TSN, April 14, 1997, pp. 18-19.
[18] Ibid., p. 14.
[19] Decision penned by Judge Placido C. Marquez;
Rollo, pp. 20-23.
[20] Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, p. 32.
[21] Ibid., pp. 39-40.
[22] Ibid., p. 41.
[23] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 4.
[24] People v. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94, 103-4 [1988].
[25] Exhibit “D”, 1st par.; italics provided.
[26] G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999.
[27] Rollo, p. 21; italics provided.
[28] People v. Nang, 289 SCRA 16, 32-33 [1998].
[29] Appellee’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 71-72.
[30] People v. Fuertes, G.R. No. 126285, September
29, 1998.
[31] TSN, April 14, 1997, p. 16.
[32] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
[33] Ibid., p. 4.
[34] Decisions; Rollo, pp. 21-22.
[35] Ibid.
[36] People v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 122485, February
1, 1999.
[37] People v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05, February
10, 1998.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Rollo, p. 22.
[40] TSN, May 27, 1996, pp. 10-17.
[41] People v. Obzunar, G.R. No. 92153, December
16, 1996.
[42] Rules of Court, Rule 133, Section 2.
[43] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Section 27.
[44] G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999, supra.
[45] Ibid.