SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131977. February 4, 1999]
PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and
GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Before us, petitioner prays for
the execution of the decision of the trial court[1] granting his petition for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III,
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back
salaries and benefits.
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined
the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held
the positions of Port Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy
Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to September 1975, Acting Commissioner
of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs Operations Chief I
from October 1987 to February 1988.[2] On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service
Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service
Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in
accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No.
50. Petitioner's position was thus
categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function
and duties of said office.
On April 22, 1993, petitioner was
temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City. In his place,
respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the
CIIS. Despite petitioner's new
assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the
salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner
received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing
him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas'
appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
"Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for all government benefits due [him]."
Attached
to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director
III, CIIS, Bureau of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."
Petitioner wrote the Customs
Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss
of seniority rights. No reply was made.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner
filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the
Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.[3] The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a
decision was rendered granting the petition.
The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office
without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that
as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent
Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent
Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the
reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back
salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto.
Respondent Allas appealed to the
Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996,
while the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by
President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for
Assessment and Operations. As a
consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal
as having been rendered moot and academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case
accordingly. The order of dismissal
became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.[4]
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed
with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the
motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas
was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to
the quo warranto petition.[5]
Petitioner filed a special civil
action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals
questioning the order of the trial court.[6] On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition.[7] Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner claims that:
"The Court of Appeals grossly
erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering
that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject
position."[8]
The instant petition arose from a
special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Quo warranto is a
demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what
right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state
which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally
exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state.[9] In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to
the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right
to enjoy the privilege.[10] The action may be commenced for the Government by the
Solicitor General or the fiscal[11] against individuals who usurp a public office,
against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of
his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without
being legally incorporated.[12] The action may also be instituted by an individual in
his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped
or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[13]
Where the action is filed by a
private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.[14] If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment
should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office.[15] If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and
declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires."
If it is
found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the
office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office,
position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as
justice requires.[16]
The character of the judgment to
be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of
the court and on the relief sought.[17] In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the
following relief:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled thereto.
Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise
prayed for."[18]
In
granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:
"WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this petition for quo warranto by:
1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and
2. Reinstating petitioner
Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other
monetary benefits appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until
reinstated."[19]
The trial court found that
respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted
from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his
stead. Although petitioner did not
specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his
"full back wages and other monetary benefits" appurtenant to the
contested position "from the time they were withheld until
reinstated."
The decision of the trial court
had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should
have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment because the subject
position was never vacant to begin with.
Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated
his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and
void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his
successor-in-interest.[20]
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public
officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo
warranto cases.[21] A judgment in quo warranto does not bind
the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title
to the same source. This follows from
the nature of the writ of quo
warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such,
but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and
legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the
office to which he lays claim.[22] In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely
against respondent Allas. What was
threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner
to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against
Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals
did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision.
Petitioner has apprised this Court
that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on
November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not
being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his back salaries and
other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the
trial court's decision.[23]
Respondent Allas cannot be held
personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the
subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
constitutional power as Chief Executive.
Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back
salaries and benefits of petitioner.
The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo
warranto.[24]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41801 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza,
Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1]
Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258, presided by Judge Raul E. de Leon.
[2]
Petition, p. 3, Rollo, p. 23.
[3]
Civil Case No. 94-3078.
[4]
CA Rollo, p. 83.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 42-45.
[6]
CA-G.R. SP No. 41801.
[7]
Quirino Abad Santos, Jr., J., ponente with Ruben Reyes and
Hilarion Aquino, JJ., concurring.
[8]
Petition, p. 7, Rollo, p. 27.
[9]
Francisco, V., The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. IV-B, Part
I, p. 281 [1972] citing 44 Am Jur 88-89; see also Sections 1 to 5, Rule 66,
Revised Rules of Court.
[10]
Castro v. del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196, 200 [1967].
[11]
Referred to as public prosecutor under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[12]
Sections 1 to 4, Rule 66, Revised Rules of Court; see also Sections 1 to 3,
Rule 66, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[13]
Section 6, Rule 66, Revised Rules of Court; see also Section 5, Rule 66, 1997
Rules.
[14]
Castro v. del Rosario, 19 SCRA 196, 201 [1967]; Caraan-Medina v.
Quizon, 18 SCRA 562, 569 [1966]; Austria v. Amante, 79 Phil. 780, 783
[1948].
[15]
Francisco, supra, at 334.
[16]
Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. III, p. 268 [1986].
[17]
Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, vol. III, p. 268 [1986].
[18]
Petition, p. 4, Annex "C" to the CA Petition, CA Rollo, p. 43.
[19]
Decision, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 66-67.
[20]
Petition, pp. 10-14, Rollo, pp. 29-33.
[21]
Francisco, supra, at 339-340, citing 44 Am. Jur 181-182.
[22]
Id.
[23]
Petition, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[24]
Angara v. Gorospe, 101 Phil. 79, 92 [1957].