SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125298. February 11, 1999]
CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER CRESENCIANO R. INIEGO, and
FERNANDO CARANTO, RESTY REMITTERE, REYNALDO ROSALES, ANTONIO TAPAR, NARCISO CLARO, SIONY MANOS, BALDO VIODOR and DAWAY WAHAB, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY INC.
seeks in this petition for certiorari to annul, for having been rendered
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the
26 October 1995 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR
CA 007480-94, Fernando Caranto, et al. v. CMP Federal Security Agency, Inc.,
et al.,[1] affirming with
modifications the decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordering herein petitioner
to pay private respondents wage differentials, 13th month pay, holiday pay and
service incentive leave pay; and, its Resolution of 29 November 1995 denying
reconsideration.
CMP Federal Security Agency Inc.
(CMP hereon) is in the business of providing detective and security
services. Among its employees were
herein private respondent security guards Fernando Caranto, Resty Remittere,
Reynaldo Rosales, Antonio Tapar, Narciso Claro, Siony Manos, Baldo Viodor and
Daway Wahab,[2] all assigned at the
Maalikaya Health Complex in Quezon City.
On 10 March 1994 private
respondents filed complaints for illegal deduction, underpayment and/or
non-payment of wages, premium pay for holiday, rest day and night shift differential
pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, separation pay, allowance and
unfair labor practice against CMP,[3] Carolina Mabanta Piao and
Ponciano Mabanta Sr. Private respondent
Fernando Caranto later amended his complaint to include illegal dismissal[4] after he was relieved from
his post at the Maalikaya Health Complex by CMP, allegedly upon request of the
client.
The case was initially set for
mandatory conference or conciliation on 29 March 1994. It was reset to 11 April 1994 by agreement of
the parties to give them adequate time to explore the possibility of amicable
settlement. Thereafter the hearing was
reset several times with Labor Arbiter Cresencio R. Iniego directing the
parties each time to submit their respective position papers and other
documentary evidence. Efforts at
settlement failed.
When the case was finally called
for hearing on 23 May 1994 private respondents filed their position paper and
other documentary evidence in compliance with the Labor Arbiter’s orders. On the other hand, CMP moved for another
postponement which the Labor Arbiter denied.
Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision. It was only on 13 June 1994 that CMP
presented its position paper.
On 22 July 1994 the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of private respondents ordering CMP to reinstate
Fernando Caranto with full back wages,
pay salary differentials to all private respondents, plus attorney’s fees.
Both parties appealed to the
NLRC. Private respondents, in their Partial
Appeal, alleged that the Labor Arbiter erred in excluding the awards for
service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, overtime pay and illegal
deductions. CMP for its part argued
that the Labor Arbiter erred in holding that CMP did not submit any position
paper despite his repeated orders; in ruling that the non-filing of the
position paper amounted to an admission of liability by CMP; and, in deciding
the case solely on the basis of the position paper and evidence submitted by
complainants.
In its assailed Decision of 26
October 1995 the NLRC denied CMP’s appeal, granted private respondents’ Partial
Appeal and modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter by including in the
computation of monetary awards holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th
month pay, overtime pay and reimbursement for illegal deductions. The dispositive portion reads -
WHEREFORE xxx the appealed decision is xxx modified. Respondent CMP Federal Security Agency is xxx directed to pay complainants the following:
1. Pay all complainants wage differential(s) in the amount of One
Hundred Twenty Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Nine and 70/100 (P128,989.70)
as well as holiday pay, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay, as
follows:
FERNANDO CARANTO
13th Month Pay - P3,792.75
Holiday Pay - P1,760.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay
- P 590.00
P6,142.75
RESTY REMITTERE
13th Month Pay - P 9,195.49
Holiday Pay - P 3,318.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay -
P 1,770.00
P14,283.49
REYNALDO ROSALES
13th Month Pay -
P11,280.17
Holiday Pay - P 4,026.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay
- P 1,770.00
P17,076.17
ANTONIO TAPAR
13th Month Pay
- P10,253.91
Holiday Pay - P 3,355.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay
- P 1,770.00
P17,076.17
CLARO NARCISO
13th Month Pay -
P 6,186.50
Holiday Pay - P 2,138.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay
- P 1,180.00
P 9,504.50
SIONY MANOS
13th Month Pay -
P 4,101.83
Holiday Pay - P 1,666.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay
- P 1,770.00
P 7,537.83
BALDO VIODOR
13th Month Pay -
P11,280.16
Holiday Pay - P 4,026.00
Service Incentive Leave Pay
- P 1,770.00
P17,076.16
DAWAY WAHAB
13th Month Pay -
P 362.50
Holiday Pay - P
430.00
P 797.50
GRAND TOTAL - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
P87,797.31
2. The individual respondents Carolina Mabanta Piad and Ponciano Mabanta are held liable in their official capacity.
3. The other findings stand affirmed.
Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the NLRC through its Resolution of 29 November 1995,
petitioner CMP now comes to us through the present petition imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the NLRC: (a) in
holding that private respondent Caranto was illegally dismissed, basing its
findings solely on surmises and baseless conclusion that petitioner resorted to
retaliatory acts; and, (b) in granting
the money claims
of private respondents on the
unfounded presumption that since petitioner failed to submit its position paper
it is deemed to have admitted the charges in the complaint.
The issues are: (a) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that
private respondent Fernando Caranto was illegally dismissed by CMP; and, (b)
whether in granting all the money claims of private respondents CMP was denied
due process.
Well-settled is the rule that the
findings of the NLRC, except when there is grave abuse of discretion, are
practically conclusive on this Court.
It is only when the NLRC’s findings are bereft of any substantial
support from the records that the Court may step in and proceed to make its own
independent evaluation of the facts.[5] We see no cogent reason to
deviate from this rule.
On the legality of Caranto’s
dismissal, the NLRC held -
On the other hand, respondent’s [CMP] contention that complainant
Fernando Caranto abandoned his work is without sufficient basis. The plea of abandonment is inconsistent with
his immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement. It is illogical for an employee to abandon his work and then
immediately seek reinstatement. (Judric Canning Corp. v. Inciong, 115
SCRA 887). Moreover, respondents failed
to prove by evidence that Caranto was indeed absent without leave.[6]
CMP insists that Caranto was never
really dismissed but was merely relieved from his post at Maalikaya Health
Complex upon request of the Manager, and transferred by CMP to SM-Feati; that
two (2) special orders were
allegedly sent by
CMP to Caranto informing
him of his relief from guard duties at Maalikaya and his assignment at
SM-Feati but despite receipt of these
orders he failed to report at CMP office; that a
follow-up letter was likewise addressed to him requiring him to show cause why
he should not be dismissed, which he never answered; and, that his refusal to
accept a new assignment and his prolonged absence justify the presumption that
he voluntarily abandoned his job.
In termination cases like the one
before us, the burden of proving that the dismissal of the employee was for a
valid or authorized cause rests on the employer[7] and failure to discharge
that duty would mean that the dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal.[8] The same principle was
reiterated by this Court in Golden Donuts Inc. v. NLRC[9] when it ruled that the
employer carries the burden of proof in showing just cause for terminating the
services of an employee.
In the instant case, CMP failed to
present evidence to justify Caranto's dismissal. We have scoured the records but could not find any letter,
memorandum or correspondence between CMP and the management of Maalikaya Health
Complex dealing with the latter’s alleged request for Caranto’s relief from guard
duties at Maalikaya Health Complex, nor the two (2) special orders
supposedly sent by CMP to Caranto: the first order, informing him of his relief
from his post at Maalikaya Health Complex, and the other, reassigning him to
SM-Feati; neither the follow-up letter by CMP requiring Caranto to explain and
show cause why his services should
not be terminated. We could
not find any evidence, for that
matter, which would clearly and convincingly show that Caranto was absent
without any valid reason and with no intention of returning to work.
Apparently, CMP failed to
discharge its burden of proof. Its
allegation that Caranto was merely relieved and reassigned is empty and
self-serving, too insufficient to establish a just and valid cause for his
dismissal as employee. To allow an
employer to terminate the employment of his worker based merely on allegations
without proof places the latter in an uncertain situation. He is at the sole mercy of his employer
who, in this case, has emasculated his right to a security of tenure.
Contrariwise, when Caranto was
relieved from his post on 6 May 1994 he immediately pursued his claim against
CMP by amending his complaint six (6) days after to include illegal dismissal
among his charges. This can hardly be
expected from one who has voluntarily "abandoned" his job, as claimed
by CMP. The immediate filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal against the employer is a clear indication that
the employee has not given up on his
work.[10]
As already stated above, CMP failed
to justify Caranto’s dismissal thereby rendering it illegal. Consequently, no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the NLRC in upholding the decision of the Labor Arbiter
ordering Caranto’s reinstatement.
On the second issue, CMP maintains
that both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
gravely abused their
discretion in granting the money claims of private
respondents, alleging that a reading of the Labor Arbiter’s decision and that
of the NLRC clearly shows that only the pleadings and evidence submitted by
private respondents were taken into consideration while those presented by CMP
were completely ignored, in clear violation of its constitutional right to due
process.
Before resolving the merit of the
argument, it may be worth to mention the nature of the proceedings before labor
courts in relation to the requirements of due process. Under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, technical
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in
any proceeding before the NLRC or the Labor Arbiter. Both are mandated to use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.[11]
While administrative tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the NLRC and Labor Arbiters, are free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they are nonetheless
bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements
of due process. The standard of due
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of
latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.[12] Hence, it is not
legally objectionable, for being violative of due process, for the Labor
Arbiter to resolve a case based solely on the position papers, affidavits
or documentary evidence submitted by
the parties. The affidavits of
witnesses in such case may take the place of their direct testimony.[13]
Set against the records of this
case, CMP's claim that it was deprived of its right to be heard readily
collapses. The earlier narration of
facts clearly demonstrates that the parties were repeatedly ordered by the
Labor Arbiter to submit their position papers together with the affidavits of
their witnesses and other evidence in support thereof - first on 11 April 1994,
then on 22 April 1994, and finally on 6 May 1994. During the 23 May 1994 conference CMP, instead of complying with
the order requiring it to submit its position paper, moved for another
postponement which was denied. It was
only on 13 June 1994, after the case was submitted for resolution, that CMP
finally presented its position paper.
Having been given ample opportunity to put forth its case, CMP has only
itself to blame or, better still, its counsel who was then present, for its
failure to do so within the extended period.
A party before the Labor Arbiter
which had a chance to present its side during a period of more than one (1)
month, and despite repeated extensions of time given to enable it to present
its position paper still failed to meet its final deadline, cannot claim denial
of due process[14]if subsequently the Labor
Arbiter disregarded its position paper belatedly filed.
Moreover, CMP had all the chances
to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the NLRC where, in fact, it
submitted a memorandum, presented its
position paper and
supporting documents allegedly ignored by the Labor Arbiter, as well as
a motion for reconsideration - which documents were considered by that Labor Tribunal
in the course of resolving the case.[15] Consequently, the alleged
defect in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, if there be any, was deemed
cured.
The fact that the NLRC in its
decision made no reference to the position paper and evidence of petitioner
does not mean that they were not considered.
It is simply that the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter’s findings and
conclusions and found nothing substantial in petitioner’s position paper and
documentary evidence to warrant a reversal of those findings and conclusions.
The essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[16] Where, as in this case, the
party has had ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy
not only before the Labor Arbiter but also the NLRC on appeal, it cannot
thereafter interpose lack of due process for what the fundamental law abhors is
simply the absolute absence of opportunity to be heard.
Finally, while it may be true that
in labor cases stringent rules of procedure may be dispensed with in the
interest of justice, it does not mean that a party litigant is at liberty to
completely disregard or ignore the rules, particularly those relating to the
periods for filing of pleadings.
In this connection,
if we are to sustain
petitioner’s argument that it was denied due process when its position
paper and documentary evidence were not considered by the Labor Arbiter in
deciding the case, we will in effect put a premium on the undesirable practice
of filing position papers late and only after the case has already been
submitted for decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated 26
October 1995 affirming with modifications the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and
ordering petitioner CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC., to pay private
respondents FERNANDO CARANTO, RESTY REMITTERE, REYNALDO ROSALES, ANTONIO TAPAR,
NARCISO CLARO, SIONY MANOS, BALDO VIODOR and DAWAY WAHAB wage differentials,
13th month pay, holiday pay and service incentive leave pay as earlier quoted
in this Decision, and its Resolution of 29 November 1995 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ ., concur.
[1] Penned by Presiding Commissioner
Lourdes C. Javier, with Commissioners Ireneo B. Bernardo and Joaquin A. Tanodra,
concurring.
[2] The dates of employment and salary rates of respondents were as follows:
NAME DATES OF EMPLOYMENT SALARY
1.
Fernando Caranto Jan. - Jul.
1991 P 104.00
Aug. 1991 - Jan. 1992 106.00
March 1994 - May 1994 18.00
2. Resty Remittere Jun. 1989 64.00
Jul.1989 - Aug. 1990 89.00
Sept. 1990 - Sept. 1992 106.00
Aug. 1993 - Sept. 1993 118.00
Oct. 1993 up to present 118.00
3. Reynaldo Rosales May - Nov. 1989 89.00
Dec. 1988 - 1991 89.00
Jan. 1992 - 1994 106.00
Feb. 1994 118.00
4. Antonio Tapar Oct. 1989 - Sept. 1990 89.00
May 1991 - Sept. 1991 106.00
Sept. 1991 - May 1993 118.00
Jun. 1993 - Jan. 1994 106.00
5. Claro Narciso Sept. 1992 - Mar. 1994 106.00
Mar. 1994 up to present 118.00
6. Siony Manos Apr. 1989 - Aug. 1990 89.00
Aug. 1990 - Apr. 1991 106.00
May 1991 - Aug. 1991 118.00
Sept. 1993 up to present 106.00
7. Baldo Viodor May 1989 - Mar. 1991 104.00
Mar. 1991 - 1992 106.00
Aug. 1992 up to present 102.00
8. Daway Wahab Apr. 1989 - Nov. 1989 50.00
Dec. 1989 - May 1990 89.00
May 1990 - Dec. 1990 on forced leave
Apr.
1994 up to present 106.00
[3] Records,
pp. 2-11.
[4] Id., p. 15.
[5] Agoy
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 112096, 30 January 1996, 252 SCRA 588, 594-595.
[6] NLRC
Decision, p. 9; Rollo, p. 26.
[7] Art. 277, Labor Code as amended.
[8] See
Note 5.
[9] G.R.
Nos. 105758-59, 21 February 1994, 230 SCRA 153.
[10] Remerco Garments Manufacturing v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. Nos. 56176-77, 28 February 1985, 135 SCRA 167.
[11] See De Ysasi III v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 104599, 11 March 1994, 231 SCRA 173, 183.
[12] Adamson v. Adamson, Inc. v.
Amores, G.R. No. 58292, 23 July 1987, 152 SCRA 237, 250.
[13] Coca
Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 78787, 18 December 1989, 180 SCRA 195.
[14] Almoite
v. Pacific Architects & Engineers, Inc., G.R. No. 73680, 10 July 1986,
142 SCRA 623.
[15] Llora
Motors, Inc. v. Franklin Drilon, G.R. No. 82895, 7 November 1989, 179 SCRA 175.
[16] Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v.
Torres, G.R. No. 98050, 17 March 1994, 231 SCRA 335, citing PLDT v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 71499, 19 July 1989, 175 SCRA 437.