THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111027. February 3, 1999]
BERNARDINO RAMOS and ROSALIA OLI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO BAUTISTA and FELISA LOPEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
May the heir of the original
registrant of parcels of land under the Torrens System, be deprived of
ownership by alleged claimants thereof through acquisitive prescription?
Impugned in this petition for
review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto
that of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch VIII,[2] disposing of Civil Case No. VIII-7, an action for
reconveyance with damages, as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the instant case;
2. The defendants are hereby declared absolute owners of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint, Lot No. 572 and Lot No. 579 Gattaran Cadastre, Gattaran, Cagayan;
3. The affidavit of Self-Adjudication (Exhibit `6') and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-31699 and T-31698 (Exhibit `7’ & `8’) are hereby declared valid; and
4. Ordering the heirs of the late Bernardino Ramos and other persons acting in their behalf, to refrain from molesting or disturbing the possession and ownership of the defendants of the land described in paragraph 2 of the complaint, designated as Lot 572 and Lot 579 Gattaran Cadastre, Gattaran, Cagayan, covered by Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 17811 and 17812 which was (sic) cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-31699 and T-31698.
No pronouncement as to costs and damages.
SO ORDERED.”
as well as
the resolution of July I, 1993, denying reconsideration thereof.
The records disclose the following
antecedent facts:
On March 14, 1939, Pedro
Tolentino, claiming absolute ownership over Lot Nos. 572 and 579 of the
Gattaran cadastre in Lapogan, Gattaran, Cagayan, separately sold said
lots to petitioners, the spouses Bernardino Ramos and Rosalia Oli, in
consideration of the amount of eighty pesos (P80.00) for each sale. The aforesaid conveyances were allegedly
evidenced by two documents both entitled “Escritura de Compra Venta”[3] and acknowledged before a notary public.
Subsequently, however, petitioners
instituted on January 8, 1976 an action for reconveyance with damages[4] alleging that while they were ‘in open, public,
adverse, peaceful and continuous possession” of the subject lots “in good faith
and with just title, for not less than fifty (50) years, personally and through
their predecessors-in-interest,” they were surprised to discover in November
1975, that decrees of registration[5] covering Lot Nos. 572 and 579 were already issued on
January 7, 1940. They complained
further the subsequent issuance by the Register of Deeds of Cagayan on March
11, 1941, Original Certificates of Title Nos. 17811 and 17812 covering Lot Nos.
572 and 579, respectively, in favor of Lucia Bautista since the latter
allegedly neither laid claim of ownership nor took possession of them, either
personally or through another.
Petitioners claimed instead that they were the ones who acquired prior
ownership and possession over the lots to the exclusion of the whole
world. Thus, they concluded that the
original certificates of title as well as Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
T-31698 and T-31699 obtained by private respondent Rodolfo Bautista who adjudicated unto himself said lots on
September 20, 1975, as sole heir of Lucia Bautista[6] were null and void.
On the theory that they already acquired the subject lots by acquisitive
prescription, petitioners demanded their return but private respondents refused
to do so, hence, compelling them to file a complaint for reconveyance with
damages.
On the other hand, herein private
respondents, the spouses Rodolfo Bautista and Felisa Lopez, likewise claimed
absolute ownership of the lots covered by TCT Nos. T-31698 and T-31699. They alleged that while the records of the
Bureau of Lands showed that during the cadastral survey in Gattaran in 1932,
Pedro Tolentino was a claimant over lands in the cadastre, the
same was only with respect to Lot No. 1399 which was eventually titled under
his name as OCT No. 16110. It just
happened that Lot No. 1399 was adjacent to Lot No. 572, a portion of which was
occupied by petitioners upon the tolerance of the original registrant Lucia
Bautista.
By way of affirmative defense,
private respondents maintained that the action for reconveyance filed by
petitioners was tantamount to a reopening of the cadastral proceedings or a
collateral attack on the decrees of registration which cannot be done without
violating the rule on conclusiveness of the decree of registration. Moreover, they argued that since the lots
were already under the operation of the Torrens System, acquisitive
prescription would no longer be possible.
After due proceedings, the trial
court dismissed petitioners’ complaint underscoring the fact that during the
cadastral proceedings in 1940, Bernardino Ramos did not file an answer for the
two lots although he was allegedly the claimant and possessor thereof under the
deeds of sale executed by Pedro Tolentino in his favor on March 14, 1939. Since it was only Lucia Bautista who filed
an answer and who appeared to be the lawful claimant in the proceedings, she
was therefore issued original certificates of title for the subject lots. The trial court presumed that everyone was
notified about the proceedings inasmuch as cadastral proceedings are in
rem. More notably, within one year
from the issuance of the decree of registration on January 9, 1940, Bernardino
Ramos likewise failed to avail of a petition to reopen the proceedings on the
ground of fraud as he subsequently alleged in his belated action for
reconveyance. Consequently, when the action for reconveyance was finally filed,
more than thirty-six (36) years had already elapsed and laches had set in. The trial court ruled in this wise:
“The settled rule on the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of the title after the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration, now bars the plaintiffs from availing this action for reconveyance; the property in question not having been satisfactorily shown that same was wrongfully titled to in the name of Lucia Bautista. Accordingly, her titles thereto, Exhibit `4’ and Exhibit `5’, are therefore valid. By operation of law Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 31699 and 31698 in the name of Rodolfo Bautista (Exhibit `7’ & `8’) are also valid. The defendant Rodolfo Bautista is a possessor with a Torrens title who is not aware of any flaw of his title which invalidates it, is considered possessor in good faith and his possession does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment by final judgment of the Court (sic). Diaz vs. Rodriguez, L-20300-01 and Republic vs. Court of Appeals, L-20355-56, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 704.
In the same vein, it is a settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongfully registered in the name of another person, must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also a settled rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongfully registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. Defendant Rodolfo Bautista fittingly steps into the shoes of an innocent third person.” [Underscoring supplied].
Dissatisfied with the trial
court’s disposition of the case, petitioners seasonably appealed the same to
the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, however, found the conclusions reached by the trial court in accord with
law and the evidence presented, hence, it affirmed the same in toto on
October 23, 1992. Having been denied
reconsideration, petitioners interposed the instant petition for review on
certiorari alleging the following as grounds therefor:
1. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH FOUND BY MERE PRESUMPTION THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN SUIT WHEN THE FACTS ADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL CLEARLY PROVED THAT PETITIONERS HAVE BEEN IN POSSESSION THEREOF FOR MORE THAN 30 YEARS.
2. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE INSTANT ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE INSTITUTED BY PETITIONERS HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
3. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFORMING WITH THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION THAT RECONVEYANCE WILL NO LONGER PROSPER IF THE LANDS IN SUIT HAD ALREADY BEEN TRANSFERRED TO A THIRD PERSON IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE WHEN THE FACTS SHOW THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD ADMITTED THEY ALLEGEDLY INHERITED THE LANDS IN SUIT AND THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT THIRD PARTIES.
We sustain the appellate court’s
decision.
Inasmuch as petitioners anchor
their claim of ownership over the parcels of land on the alleged deeds of sale
executed by Pedro Tolentino in their favor, we believe that the issue of the authenticity
and binding effect of those documents should be addressed at the outset.
The two documents denominated as Escritura
de Compra Venta which were executed in 1939 would have well
qualified as ancient documents[7] since they were already in existence for more than
thirty years in 1976 when the case for reconveyance was initially filed. The original documents, however, were not
presented in evidence as these had been apparently lost in the fire that gutted
the office of petitioners’ counsel.
Under the circumstances, it should have been the duty of petitioners
therefore to prove the existence of the documents in accordance with Rule 130
of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
“SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or can not be produced in court, the offerror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.”
It appears that the loss of the
two documents of sale was shown by testimonial evidence of petitioners’
counsel, Atty. MacPaul B. Soriano, whose law office was burned. Upon realizing that the documents involved
here had been irretrievably lost because of the fire, Atty. Soriano suggested
to petitioners that they should see their other lawyer, Atty. Laggui, who could
provide them with certified true copies thereof.[8] Thus, the copies of the documents that petitioners
presented in court each contained the following certification:
“C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I, ANTONIO N. LAGGUI, Notary Public for and in the Province of Cagayan, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, correct and literal copy of the original copy of Doc. No. 1, Page No. 44, Book No. 1, Series of 1939 of the Notarial Register Luis Rosacia, shown to me by, and in possession of Bernardino Ramos.”
This certification, however, does
not imply that the documents certified to were authentic writings although it
proves the existence of the documents purportedly evidencing the sale. Rule 132 provides the manner by which the
due execution and authenticity of private writings like the deeds involved
here, should be established. Thus:
“SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
1. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or;
2. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwritng of the maker;
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.”
Unfortunately for petitioners, the
documents upon which they relied in establishing their claim of ownership, had
not been duly presented in evidence in accordance with the aforecited
Rule. They failed to present any person
who could have witnessed the execution of the documents, like the instrumental
witnesses thereof. Understandably, they
could not even demonstrate the genuineness of the signatures of the parties to
the sale because the copies they offered in evidence did not bear those
signatures. Consequently, under the
Rules of Court, the documents’ authenticity and due execution are suspect and
may not be given that much weight.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo
that the existence of the documents was properly established, still, the
supposed agreement embodied in the two documents bound only the parties
thereto, namely Pedro Tolentino and the petitioners, because the latter failed
to prove that these were later registered as to operate against the whole
world. They could not have bound third
persons like Lucia Bautista because of the basic civil law principle of
relativity of contracts which provides that contracts can only bind the parties
who had entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person.[9] This basic principle applies even if the sales were
supposedly concluded at a time prior to the operation of the Torrens system of
land registration over the properties involved. When the properties were eventually titled in favor of Lucia
Bautista, the sale between Pedro Tolentino and petitioners could not have
affected Lucia Bautista and her successor-in-interest because the pertinent law
in point, Act No. 496, as amended by P. D. No. 1529 unequivocably provides:
“SEC. 50. x x x. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument except a will, purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under this Act the registration shall be made in the office of the register of deeds for the province or provinces or city, where the land lies. [Underscoring supplied].
SEC. 51. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting registered land which would under existing laws, if recorded, filed, or entered in the office of the register of deeds, affect the real estate to which it relates shall, if registered, filed, or entered in the office of the register of deeds in the province or city where the real estate to which such instrument relates lies, be notice to all person from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.”
Hence,
petitioners’ failure to register the Escritura de Compra Venta resulted
in the sale being binding only between them and the vendor, Pedro
Tolentino. Lucia Bautista and her
successors-in-interest, being third parties to the sale, could not have been
bound thereby.
To give a semblance of ownership
over the properties, petitioners introduced in evidence documents showing that
their successors-in-interest mortgaged the properties. While only owners of properties have the
right to mortgage the same, the papers evidencing the alleged mortgages do not,
however, conform to the formal and substantive requirements therefor. One such document[10] dated May 24, 1987 and handwritten in the English
language described the property allegedly mortgaged to a certain Santos
Tolentino as “a certain parcel of land estimated at one hectare.” The other
alleged mortgage instrument dated August 12, 1985,[11] likewise handwritten but in the Ilocano dialect, did
not sufficiently describe the subject property of the mortgage. There is indeed no way that we can ever
determine if the lands referred to in the mortgage were the lots now in
controversy. At any rate, while
petitioners’ daughter, Erlinda Ramos, testified that the properties in
controversy were the ones she and her sisters mortgaged, that claim is now self-serving
since they are presently the claimants of the lands.[12] Interestingly, Erlinda herself admitted that her
father never declared the lots for taxation purposes and neither did they ever
pay real property taxes thereon. In
short, the alleged mortgage papers could very well refer to properties other
than Lot Nos. 572 and 579 and that the trial court correctly ruled that what
petitioners proved can not ripen into ownership “in derogation to that of the
registered owner.”[13]
Petitioners’ supposed possession
of the lots for more than forty (40) years, therefore, stands as a bare claim
with nothing whatsoever to prop it up.
Under the circumstances of the case, they would only succeed upon
sufficient evidence to support their allegation that fraud attended the
registration of the property in Lucia Bautista’s name. As it is, however, petitioners failed to
present evidence on the matter thereby leaving their claim barren.
In contrast, private respondent
Rodolfo Bautista’s claim to the properties registered under the Torrens system
which he traces to his aunt, Lucia Bautista, appears incontrovertible. Under the Cadastral Act, the original
certificates of title issued to the original registrant, shall have the same
effect as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land
under the Land Registration Act, because “no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.”[14] Pedro Tolentino and petitioners, as the former’s
alleged successors-in-interest, have therefore no valid claim of ownership over
the property, particularly since petitioners simply failed to substantiate the
nature and extent of Tolentino’s rights and interests over the lots. Such being the case, the conveyances in
their favor were void as the subject properties were lawfully owned by another
person.[15]
Neither may petitioners’ argument
that private respondent Rodolfo Bautista, being the son-in-law of Pedro
Tolentino, was bound by the sale and therefore he and his present wife hold the
properties in trust for petitioners’ successors-in-interest hold. On that basis, they aver that their right to
claim the property in trust is imprescriptible.
But petitioners’ argument would
only be tenable upon proof that the property was acquired through mistake or
fraud. As earlier observed, however,
petitioners’ claim of fraud was never substantiated and, hence, it has remained
a groundless charge. Consequently,
petitioners’ claim of imprescriptibility of the action for reconveyance is
baseless.
Section 38 of the Land
Registration Act provides that a decree of registration duly issued is subject
“to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent
Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court) a petition for review
within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for
value has acquired an interest.” The
same law provides that upon the expiration of the term of one year, “every
decree or certificate of title x x x shall be imprescriptible.”
Under the law, an action for
reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud prescribes in four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud.[16] Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken
place when Lucia Bautista was issued OCT Nos. 178111 and 17812 because
registration of real property is considered a “constructive notice to all
persons” and it shall be counted “from the time of such registering, filing or
entering.”[17] An action based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years. This
means that petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years
from the time of its creation[18] or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the
property. But as it is, petitioners
failed to avail of any of the aforementioned remedies within the prescribed
periods. With no remedy in view, their
claims should forever be foreclosed.
The Court, however, subscribes to
petitioners’ argument that the courts a quo incorrectly held that private
respondents are third persons to whom ownership of the properties had been
transmitted. But this error alone may
not save the day for petitioners. They
have, in a sense, slept on whatever rights they claimed to have over the
properties and by the time they were roused, the law had stepped in to bar
their claims. On the other hand,
private respondents’ inattention to the property from the time of Lucia
Bautista’s death until private respondent Rodolfo Bautista’s retirement from
the military should not be construed as an abandonment thereof. Private respondents have in their favor the
law that protects holders of title under the Torrens System of land
registration. As this Court so
eloquently pronounced in 1915:
“Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting in the `mirador
de su casa,’ to avoid the possibility of losing his land.”[19]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision and the resolution appealed from in CA-G.R. CV No. 30033
dated October 23, 1992 and July 1, 1993, respectively, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Segundino G. Chua; Cui and Rasul, JJ,
concurring.
[2]
Presided by Judge Felipe R. Tumacder.
[3]
Exhibits A and B.
[4]
The case was previously docketed as Civil Case No. II-226 but was later
re-docketed as Civil Case No. VIII-7.
[5]
Decree No. 736002 for Lot No. 572 and Decree No. 736003 for Lot No. 579.
[6]
Private respondents showed that Lucia Bautista died during the Second World War
without issue. Her brother, Felimon
Bautista, private respondent Rodolfo Bautista’s father, survived her. Rodolfo was previously married to Lucena
Tolentino, a daughter of Pedro Tolentino, who died less than a year after their
marriage. Private respondent Felisa
Lopez is Rodolfo’s second wife.
[7]
Sec. 21, Rule 132, Rules of Court; Dablo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93365,
September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 619, 627.
[8]
TSN, February 2, 1989, p. 9.
[9]
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1097, 1113 (1996).
[10] Exh. C or 2.
[11]
Exh. D.
[12]
Record, pp. 54-58.
[13]
RTC Decision, p. 24.
[14]
Sec. 46, Act No. 496 now Sec. 47 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. No.
1529); Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 106 (1985).
[15] Sagrado Labrador v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990, 184 SCRA 171, 175.
[16]
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, 211 Phil. 295, 305 (1983).
[17]
Sec. 51 of Act No. 496 as amended by Sec. 52 of P.D. No. 1529.
[18]
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[19]
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 593 (1915), cited in Umbay v.
Alecha, supra, at p. 106.