SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127195. August 25, 1999]
MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC. and DIAMANTIDES MARITIME, INC., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and WILFREDO T. CAJERAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC.
(MARSAMAN) and its foreign principal DIAMANTIDES MARITIME, INC. (DIAMANTIDES)
assail the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated 16 September 1996 as well as its Resolution dated 12 November 1996
affirming the Labor Arbiter's decision finding them guilty of illegal dismissal
and ordering them to pay respondent Wilfredo T. Cajeras salaries corresponding
to the unexpired portion of his employment contract, plus attorney's fees.
Private respondent Wilfredo T.
Cajeras was hired by petitioner MARSAMAN, the local manning agent of petitioner
DIAMANTIDES, as Chief Cook Steward on the MV Prigipos, owned and
operated by DIAMANTIDES, for a contract period of ten (10) months with a
monthly salary of US$600.00, evidenced by a contract between the parties dated
15 June 1995. Cajeras started work on 8
August 1995 but less than two (2) months later, or on 28 September 1995, he was
repatriated to the Philippines allegedly by “mutual consent.”
On 17 November 1995 private
respondent Cajeras filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners
with the NLRC National Capital Region Arbitration Branch alleging that he was
dismissed illegally, denying that his repatriation was by mutual consent, and
asking for his unpaid wages, overtime pay, damages, and attorney’s fees.[1] Cajeras alleged that he was
assigned not only as Chief Cook Steward but also as assistant cook and messman
in addition to performing various inventory and requisition jobs. Because of his additional assignments he
began to feel sick just a little over a month on the job constraining him to
request for medical attention. He was
refused at first by Capt. Kouvakas Alekos, master of the MV Prigipos,
who just ordered him to continue working.
However a day after the ship’s arrival at the port of Rotterdam,
Holland, on 26 September 1995 Capt. Alekos relented and had him examined at the
Medical Center for Seamen. However, the
examining physician, Dr. Wden Hoed, neither apprised private respondent about
the diagnosis nor issued the requested medical certificate allegedly because he
himself would forward the results to private respondent’s superiors. Upon returning to the vessel, private
respondent was unceremoniously ordered to prepare for immediate repatriation
the following day as he was said to be suffering from a disease of unknown
origin.
On 28 September 1995 he was handed
his Seaman's Service Record Book with the following entry: "Cause of discharge - Mutual
Consent."[2] Private respondent promptly
objected to the entry but was not able to do anything more as he was
immediately ushered to a waiting taxi which transported him to the Amsterdam
Airport for the return flight to Manila.
After his arrival in Manila on 29 September 1995 Cajeras complained to
MARSAMAN but to no avail.[3]
MARSAMAN and DIAMANTIDES, on the
other hand, denied the imputation of illegal dismissal. They alleged that Cajeras approached Capt.
Alekos on 26 September 1995 and informed the latter that he could not sleep at
night because he felt something crawling over his body. Furthermore, Cajeras reportedly declared
that he could no longer perform his duties and requested for repatriation. The following paragraph in the vessel's Deck
Log was allegedly entered by Capt. Alekos, to wit:
Cajeras approached me and he told me that he cannot sleep at night
and that he feels something crawling on his body and he declared that he can no
longer perform his duties and he must be repatriated.[4]
Private
respondent was then sent to the Medical Center for Seamen at Rotterdam where he
was examined by Dr. Wden Hoed whose diagnosis appeared in a Medical Report as
“paranoia” and “other mental problems.”[5] Consequently, upon Dr.
Hoed’s recommendation, Cajeras was repatriated to the Philippines on 28
September 1995.
On 29 January 1996 Labor Arbiter
Ernesto S. Dinopol resolved the dispute in favor of private respondent Cajeras
ruling that the latter's discharge from the MV Prigipos allegedly by
“mutual consent” was not proved by convincing evidence. The entry made by Capt. Alekos in the Deck
Log was dismissed as of little probative value because it was a mere unilateral
act unsupported by any document showing mutual consent of Capt. Alekos, as
master of the MV Prigipos, and Cajeras to the premature termination of
the overseas employment contract as required by Sec. H of the Standard
Employment Contract Governing the Employment of all Filipino Seamen on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels. Dr. Hoed’s
diagnosis that private respondent was suffering from “paranoia” and “other
mental problems” was likewise dismissed as being of little evidentiary value
because it was not supported by evidence on how the paranoia was contracted, in
what stage it was, and how it affected respondent's functions as Chief Cook
Steward which, on the contrary, was even rated “Very Good” in respondent's
Service Record Book. Thus, the Labor
Arbiter disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the repatriation and dismissal of complaint Wilfredo T. Cajeras as illegal and ordering respondents Marsaman Manning Agency, Inc. and Diamantides Maritime, Inc. to jointly and severally pay complainant the sum of USD 5,100.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment plus USD 510.00 as 10% attorney’s fees it appearing that complainant had to engage the service of counsel to protect his interest in the prosecution of this case.
The claims for nonpayment of wages and overtime pay are dismissed
for having been withdrawn (Minutes, December 18, 1995). The claims for damages are likewise
dismissed for lack of merit, since no evidence was presented to show that bad
faith characterized the dismissal.[6]
Petitioners appealed to the NLRC.[7] On 16 September 1996 the
NLRC affirmed the appealed findings and conclusions of the Labor Arbiter.[8] The NLRC subscribed to the
view that Cajeras’ repatriation by alleged mutual consent was not proved by
petitioners, especially after noting that private respondent did not actually
sign his Seaman’s Service Record Book to signify his assent to the repatriation
as alleged by petitioners. The entry
made by Capt. Alekos in the Deck Log was not considered reliable proof that
private respondent agreed to his repatriation because no opportunity was given
the latter to contest the entry which was against his interest. Similarly, the Medical Report issued by Dr.
Hoed of Holland was dismissed as being of dubious value since it contained only
a sweeping statement of the supposed ailment of Cajeras without any elaboration
on the factual basis thereof.
Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 12 November
1996.[9] Hence, this petition
contending that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion: (a) in not according full faith and credit to
the official entry by Capt. Alekos in the vessel’s Deck Log conformably with
the rulings in Haverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC[10] and Wallem Maritime
Services, Inc. v. NLRC;[11] (b) in not appreciating the
Medical Report issued by Dr. Wden Hoed as conclusive evidence that respondent
Cajeras was suffering from paranoia and other mental problems; (c) in affirming
the award of attorney’s fees despite the fact that Cajeras' claim for exemplary
damages was denied for lack of merit; and, (d) in ordering a monetary award
beyond the maximum of three (3) months’ salary for every year of service set by
RA 8042.
We deny the petition. In the Contract of Employment[12] entered into with private
respondent, petitioners convenanted strict and faithful compliance with the
terms and conditions of the Standard Employment Contract approved by the
POEA/DOLE[13] which provides:
1. The employment of the seaman shall cease upon expiration of the contract period indicated in the Crew Contract unless the Master and the Seaman, by mutual consent, in writing, agree to an early termination x x x x (underscoring ours).
Clearly,
under the foregoing, the employment of a Filipino seaman may be terminated
prior to the expiration of the stipulated period provided that the master and
the seaman (a) mutually consent thereto and (b) reduce their consent in
writing.
In the instant case, petitioners
do not deny the fact that they have fallen short of the requirement. No document exists whereby Capt. Alekos and
private respondent reduced to writing their alleged “mutual consent” to the
termination of their employment contract.
Instead, petitioners presented the vessel's Deck Log wherein an entry unilaterally
made by Capt. Alekos purported to show that private respondent himself
asked for his repatriation. However,
the NLRC correctly dismissed its evidentiary value. For one thing, it is a unilateral act which is vehemently denied
by private respondent. Secondly, the
entry in no way satisfies the requirement of a bilateral documentation to prove
early termination of an overseas employment contract by mutual consent required
by the Standard Employment Contract.
Hence, since the latter sets the minimum terms and conditions of
employment for the protection of Filipino seamen subject only to the adoption
of better terms and conditions over and above the minimum standards,[14] the NLRC could not be
accused of grave abuse of discretion in not accepting anything less.
However petitioners contend that
the entry should be considered prima facie evidence that respondent himself
requested his repatriation conformably with the rulings in Haverton Shipping
Ltd. v. NLRC[15] and Abacast Shipping and
Management Agency, Inc. v. NLRC.[16] Indeed, Haverton
says that a vessel’s log book is prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein as they are official entries made by a person in the performance
of a duty required by law. However,
this jurisprudential principle does not apply to win the case for
petitioners. In Wallem Maritime
Services, Inc. v. NLRC[17] the Haverton ruling
was not given unqualified application because the log book presented therein
was a mere typewritten collation of excerpts from what could be the log book.[18] The Court reasoned that since the log book was the
only piece of evidence presented to prove just cause for the termination of
respondent therein, the log book had to be duly identified and authenticated
lest an injustice would result from a blind adoption of its contents which were
but prima facie evidence of the incidents stated therein.
In the instant case, the disputed
entry in the Deck Log was neither authenticated nor supported by credible
evidence. Although petitioners claim
that Cajeras signed his Seaman’s Service Record Book to signify his conformity
to the repatriation, the NLRC found the allegation to be actually untrue since
no signature of private respondent appeared in the Record Book.
Neither could the “Medical Report”
prepared by Dr. Hoed be considered corroborative and conclusive evidence that
private respondent was suffering from “paranoia” and “other mental problems,”
supposedly just causes for his repatriation.
Firstly, absolutely no evidence, not even an allegation, was offered to
enlighten the NLRC or this Court as to Dr. Hoed's qualifications to diagnose
mental illnesses. It is a matter of judicial notice that there are various
specializations in medical science and that a general practitioner is not
competent to diagnose any and all kinds of illnesses and diseases. Hence, the findings of doctors who are not
proven experts are not binding on this Court.[19] Secondly, the Medical Report prepared by Dr. Hoed
contained only a general statement that private respondent was suffering from
“paranoia” and “other mental problems” without providing the details on how the
diagnosis was arrived at or in what stage the illness was. If Dr. Hoed indeed competently examined
private respondent then he would have been able to discuss at length the
circumstances and precedents of his diagnosis.
Petitioners cannot rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official duties to make the Medical Report acceptable because the
presumption applies only to public officers from the highest to the lowest in
the service of the Government, departments, bureaus, offices, and/or its
political subdivisions,[20] which Dr. Wden Hoed was not shown to be. Furthermore, neither did petitioners prove
that private respondent was incompetent or continuously incapacitated for the
duties for which he was employed by reason of his alleged mental state. On the contrary his ability as Chief Cook
Steward, up to the very moment of his repatriation, was rated “Very Good” in
his Seaman’s Service Record Book as correctly observed by public respondent.
Considering all the foregoing we
cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that
petitioners failed to prove just cause for the termination of private
respondent's overseas employment. Grave
abuse of discretion is committed only when the judgment is rendered in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner, which is not true in the present case.[21]
With respect to attorney’s fees,
suffice it to say that in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee
was forced to litigate and thus incurred expenses to protect his rights and
interests, a maximum award of ten percent (10%) of the monetary award by way of
attorney’s fees is legally and morally justifiable under Art. 111 of the Labor
Code,[22] Sec. 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its Implementing Rules,[23] and par. 7, Art. 2208[24] of the Civil Code.[25] The case of Albenson Enterprises Corporation v.
Court of Appeals[26] cited by petitioners in arguing against the award of
attorney’s fees is clearly not applicable, being a civil action for damages
which deals with only one of the eleven (11) instances when attorney’s fees
could be recovered under Art. 2208 of the Civil Code.
Lastly, on the amount of salaries
due private respondent, the rule has always been that an illegally dismissed
worker whose employment is for a fixed period is entitled to payment of his
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment.[27] However on 15 July 1995, RA 8042 otherwise known as
the “Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995” took effect, Sec. 10
of which provides:
Sec. 10. In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term whichever is less (underscoring ours).
The Labor
Arbiter, rationalizing that the aforesaid law did not apply since it became
effective only one (1) month after respondent's overseas employment contract
was entered into on 15 June 1995, simply awarded private respondent his
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment contract,
i.e., for 8.6 months. The NLRC affirmed
the award and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) fully agreed. But petitioners now insist that Sec. 10, RA
8042 is applicable because although private respondent’s contract of employment
was entered into before the law became effective his alleged cause of action,
i.e., his repatriation on 28 September 1995 without just, valid or authorized
cause, occurred when the law was already in effect. Petitioners' purpose in so arguing is to invoke the law in
justifying a lesser monetary award to private respondent, i.e., salaries for
three (3) months only pursuant to the last portion of Sec. 10 as opposed to the
salaries for 8.6 months awarded by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.
We agree with petitioners that
Sec. 10, RA 8042, applies in the case of private respondent and to all overseas
contract workers dismissed on or after its effectivity on 15 July 1995 in the
same way that Sec. 34,[28] RA 6715,[29] is made applicable to locally employed workers
dismissed on or after 21 March 1989.[30] However, we cannot subscribe to the view that private
respondent is entitled to three (3) months’ salary only. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals
that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed overseas
contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or three (3) months’ salary for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the employment contract
concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words “for every
year of the unexpired term” which follows the words “salaries x x x for three
months.” To follow petitioners’ thinking that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to
completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while giving
effect to some. This is contrary to the
well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute,
care should be taken that every part or word thereof be given effect[31] since the law-making body is presumed to know the
meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly.[32] Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.[33]
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution dated 16
September 1996 and 12 November 1996, respectively, of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission are AFFIRMED. Petitioners MARSAMAN MANNING AGENCY, INC., and DIAMANTIDES
MARITIME, INC., are ordered, jointly and severally, to pay private respondent
WILFREDO T. CAJERAS his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment
contract or USD$5,100.00, reimburse the latter's placement fee with twelve
percent (12%) interest per annum conformably with Sec. 10 of RA 8042, as well
as attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] Wilfredo T. Cajeras v. Marsaman
Manning Agency, Inc., and Diamantides Maritime Inc., NLRC NCR Case No.
00-11-00671-95.
[2] Id., p. 23.
[3] Complaint’s Position Paper, Original Records,
pp. 16-23.
[4] Id., p. 36.
[5] Id., p. 37.
[6] Id., pp. 57-64.
[7] Wilfredo
T. Cajeras v. Marsaman Manning Agency Inc., and Diamantides Maritime
Inc., NLRC NCR CA No. 010825-96.
[8] Rollo, pp. 58-67.
[9] Id., pp. 52-56.
[10] G.R.
No. 65442, 15 April 1985, 135 SCRA 685.
[11] G.R. Nos. 81124-26, 23 June 1988, 162 SCRA
541.
[12] Original Records, p. 22.
[13] Philippine Overseas Employment
Administation/Department of Labor and Employment.
[14] Sec. 3, Rule II, Book V, Rules and
Regulations Governing Overseas Employment (also known as the “POEA Rules and
Regulations).
[15] See Note 10.
[16] See Note 11.
[17] G.R. No. 108433, 15 October 1996, 263 SCRA
174.
[18] Id.,
p. 183.
[19] Librea v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No.
58879, 14 November 1991, 203 SCRA 545, 552; Nemaria v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, G. R. No. 57889, 28 October 1987, 155 SCRA 166, 173;
Medina v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 62406, 22 March
1984, 128 SCRA 349, 354-355.
[20] Ambrosio Padilla, Revised Rules on Evidence Annotated, Vol.
II, 6th Ed. (1994), p. 180.
[21] Singa
Ship Management Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119080, 14 April
1998, 288 SCRA 692, 698-699.
[22] (a)
In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the culpable party may be assessed
attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
(b)
It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or
administrative proceedings for the recovery of the wages, attorney’s fees,
which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
[23] Attorney’s fees in any judicial or administrative proceedings for
the recovery of wages shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded.
[24] In
the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other
than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: x x x x (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household
helpers, laborers and skilled workers x x x x
[25] Philippine National Construction Corporation v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 107307, 11 August 1997, 277 SCRA 91, 105; Sebuguero v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 115394, 27 September 1995, 248 SCRA 532, 548.
[26] G.R.
No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
[27] Vinta
Maritime Co., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113911, 23 January 1998, 284 SCRA
656, 659, citing Better Building, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109714, 15
December 1997; Anderson v. NLRC, G.R. No. 111212, 22 January 1996, 252
SCRA 116, 126; Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
100399, 4 August 1992, 212 SCRA 132, 140; Wallem Phil. Shipping, Inc. v.
Minister of Labor, G.R. Nos. 50734-37, 20 February 1981, 102 SCRA 835, 842-843;
Knust v. Morse, 41 Phil. 184 (1920); Logan v. Philippine
Acetylene Co., 33 Phil. 177 (1916).
[28] Amending Art. 279 of The Labor Code.
[29] “An
Act to Extend Protection to Labor, Strengthen the Constitutional Rights of
Workers to Self-Organization, Collective Bargaining and Peaceful Concerted
Activities, Foster Industrial Peace and Harmony, Promote the Preferential Use
of Voluntary Modes of Settling Labor Disputes and Reorganize the National Labor
Relations Commission, Amending Presidential Decree No. 441, as Amended,
Otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes.”
[30] See
Surima v. NLRC, G.R. No. 121147, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 260, 268.
[31] JMM
Promotion & Management, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109835, 22 November
1993, 228 SCRA 129, 134.
[32] Aparri v. Court of Appeals, No.
L-30057, 31 January 1984, 1`27 SCRA 231, 241.
[33] "That the thing may rather have effect than be
destroyed."