SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127064. August 31, 1999]
FIVE STAR BUS COMPANY INC., and IGNACIO TORRES, petitioners,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE JAIME F. BAUTISTA, RTC-Br. 75, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila and SAMUEL KING SAGARAL II, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The threshold issue in this
petition for review on certiorari is whether the Court of Appeals can
summarily dismiss a petition on the ground that the certification on non-forum
shopping required by Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 was signed by counsel and
not by petitioners themselves.
On 9 November 1991, at around
11:00 o’clock in the evening, along the MacArthur Highway in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, the Suzuki Supercarry Mini-Van driven by private respondent Samuel King
Sagaral II collided with a passenger bus owned and operated by petitioner Five
Star Bus Company and driven by co-petitioner Ignacio Torres.[1]
On 1 April 1992 private respondent
Sagaral filed a civil action for damages against petitioners and the case was
assigned to Branch 171 of the Valenzuela Regional Trial Court and docketed as
Civil Case No. 3812-V-92.
When amicable settlement failed,
trial ensued with private respondent Sagaral (plaintiff in the court a quo)
initially presenting his evidence.
Several years passed and on 26 December 1996 Sagaral finally rested his
case.[2] On 12 March 1996 the trial court ordered petitioners
herein (defendants in the court a quo) to present their evidence on 25
April 1996 and 9 May 1996.[3]
The presentation of evidence by
petitioners was snagged by several postponements. The first was when Presiding Judge Adriano R. Osorio reset the 25
April 1996 hearing to 9 May 1996 as he had to go on forced vacation leave from
23 April 1996 to 25 April 1996.[4] But during the 9 May 1996 hearing, petitioner Ignacio
Torres failed to appear prompting the lower court to cancel the hearing. According to petitioners, Torres was then
detained in jail due to a separate pending criminal case filed against him by
Sagaral before Br. 172 of the RTC of Valenzuela. Petitioners further explained that Torres could not post bail
earlier for his provisional liberty since no notice was sent to him regarding
the criminal complaint.[5]
On 4 June 1996 Judge Osorio
ordered the civil case to be unloaded in view of his court’s designation as a
permanent special court to exclusively try heinous crimes under RA 7659.[6] On 17 June 1996 the case was re-raffled to Br. 75 of
the same RTC, this time under Judge Jaime F. Bautista who immediately scheduled
a hearing for the initial presentation of petitioners' evidence on 8 August
1996.[7] Nonetheless on 9 July 1996 petitioners filed a motion
to reset the hearing scheduled on 8 August 1996 to 15 August 1996 citing as
reason their counsel’s conflict of schedule.[8]
It seemed however that even prior
to the scheduled hearing of 8 August 1996, former Presiding Judge Osorio had
already set a hearing for 2 July 1996 and 16 July 1996. But instead of conducting a hearing on said
dates, Judge Bautista issued an order on 2 July 1996, thus -
It appearing from the records that this case had been previously
set by Branch 171 today and July 16, 1996 and considering the Urgent Motion to
Reset filed by the defendants thru counsel, the hearing set for today is hereby
cancelled and is reset to July 16, 1996 as previously scheduled and August 8,
1996 both at 8:30 a.m. x x x x[9]
When the case was called for
hearing on 16 July 1996, counsel for petitioners was not present. In fact he arrived twenty (20) minutes
late. Thus, upon motion of respondent
Sagaral, the trial court issued the disputed Order-
There being no certainty as to what time defendants’ counsel would
be in court, and upon manifestation of plaintiff’s counsel that lawyer should
be aware of his time x x x as prayed for, the defendants’ right to present
their evidence is deemed waived and the case is now submitted for decision
x x x x (underscoring supplied).[10]
Petitioners forthwith filed a
motion for reconsideration of the above-mentioned Order arguing that the right
to be heard was a basic tenet guaranteed by the Constitution which the courts
could not impinge upon in the absence of any justifying reason to do so. They also blamed the heavy traffic for their
lawyer's tardiness.
To simplify the proceedings due to
the various motions filed by petitioners, Judge Bautista cancelled the 8 August
1996 hearing and reset it to 20 August 1996.
He also set for hearing petitioner's motion for reconsideration on 20
August 1996.[11]
However, as if trying to test the
patience of the trial court, petitioners once again filed on 5 August 1996 an Urgent
Motion to Reset the 20 August 1996 hearing. Their counsel pleaded that he could not make it on such date
because he had previously committed himself to appear before the Antipolo
Regional Trial Court. He prayed that
the hearing be moved to 2 September 1996.[12]
The hearing set for 20 August 1996
was cancelled[13] and the trial court on that day issued instead its
Order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its Order dated 16
July 1996 which considered the case submitted for resolution. The lower court noted that the case had been
pending for more than four (4) years and it had always been at the
"mercy" of petitioners when it acted favorably on their motions. There would be no end to this litigation if
the court would give due course to this motion.[14]
Undeterred, petitioners sought
recourse in the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari. But in the assailed Resolution dated 23
September 1996 the appellate court summarily dismissed their petition on the
ground that the affidavit of non-forum shopping was signed and executed by
counsel for petitioners and not by petitioners themselves, or one of them, as
required by Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.[15]
Petitioners moved for
reconsideration which the Court of Appeals rejected in its Resolution of 31
October 1996.[16] Petitioners are now before us contending that the
appellate court erred in affirming the Order of the trial court dated 16 July
1996 and in dismissing their petition for non-compliance with the requirement
of Circular No. 28-91. They pray that
the appellate court remand the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
Circular No. 28-91, which took
effect on 1 April 1994, provides inter alia:
(1) (I)n every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, the petitioner, aside from complying with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing circulars, must certify under oath all of the following facts or undertakings x x x x;
(2) Any violation of this revised Circular will entail the following sanctions: (a) it shall be a cause for the summary dismissal of the multiple petitions or complaints; x x x x (underscoring supplied).
Circular No. 28-91 has its roots
in the rule that a party-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous
remedies in two (2) different fora, for such practice works havoc upon orderly
judicial procedure. Forum shopping has
been characterized as an act of malpractice that is prohibited and condemned as
trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It constitutes improper conduct which tends to degrade the
administration of justice. It has also
been aptly described as deplorable because it adds to the congestion of the
already heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[17]
Nonetheless, we are not unmindful
of this Court’s ruling in Gabionza v. Court of Appeals,[18] Loyola v. Court of Appeals,[19] and Kavinta v. Castillo, Jr.[20] that substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91
is sufficient:
It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied to achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that circular. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
The fact that the Circular requires that it be strictly complied with merely underscores its mandatory nature in that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.
In the instant case, we cannot
apply the "substantial compliance" rule to petitioners and be as
liberal minded. For one thing, counsel
for petitioners gave a rather frail excuse for his non-compliance, i.e.,
oversight and haste in ensuring that the petition would be filed at the
earliest possible time for the protection of his clients’ interests thereby
overlooking the aforesaid circular.[21]
In Ortiz
v. Court of Appeals[22] which involves a similar set of facts, we ruled -
(I)t should be recalled that Revised Circular No. 28-91 provides that the party must certify under oath that he has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court x x x x
Petitioners admit that their lawyer x x x signed the Certification on Non-Forum Shopping. Allegedly, Atty. Paulite has personal knowledge that the Ortizes had not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same parties and causes of action. Petitioners now assert that their lawyer’s signature must be accepted as substantial compliance with the requirements of the Circular.
Regrettably, we find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance as provided for in Circular No. 28-91. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. However, the petitioners did not give any explanation to warrant their exemption from the strict application of the rule utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction x x x x
Finally, petitioners argue that
the delay in the proceedings in the court below was not entirely their fault
"as various circumstances and incidents beyond (their) control contributed
to the delay."[23]
Contrary to petitioners’s
assertions, their failure to present their evidence was their own undoing. A review of the records shows that the trial
court had scheduled a total of six (6) hearing dates for the presentation of
their evidence. These were 25 April
1996, 9 May 1996, 2 July 1996, 16 July 1996, 8 August 1996 and 20 August
1996. Five (5) of these trial dates
were cancelled at the instance of petitioners.
They themselves admitted that the 9 May 1996 hearing was postponed when
Isagani Torres failed to appear in court because he was then incarcerated. Likewise, through a motion petitioners were
able to have the hearing on 2 July 1996 moved to 16 July 1996. However on said date petitioners’ counsel
failed to appear on time, thus prompting the trial court to declare
petitioners’ right to present evidence as waived. As to the 8 August 1996 hearing, they moved to have the same
reset, citing as reason the conflict of schedule of their counsel. And when the trial court granted the motion
and transferred the hearing to 20 August 1996, petitioners once again submitted
a motion praying that the hearing be reset to 2 September 1996. From these repeated resettings, it can be
gleaned that the delay in the proceedings was largely, if not mainly, due to
petitioners.
We also do not miss the fact that
petitioners were represented by a law firm which meant that any of its members
could lawfully act as their counsel during the trial. As such petitioners’ frequent motions to reset hearings by reason
of their counsel’s unavailability should be cautiously considered to make sure
that these were not mere dilatory tactics.
As observed by the lower court, a perusal of the records shows that the
case has been pending for a long period of time, with the court often
accommodating petitioners. Thus there
could be no grave abuse of discretion when the trial court finally ordered
petitioners’ right to present evidence as waived to put an end to their foot
dragging. Indeed, it is never too often
to say that justice delayed is justice denied.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the
Court of Appeals, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and
the assailed Resolution of 23 September 1996 summarily dismissing the petition
for certiorari and the Resolution of 31 October 1996 denying
reconsideration are AFFIRMED.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, is
DIRECTED forthwith to render its decision in Civil Case No. 3812-V-92 without
delay. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.
[1] CA Records, p. 18.
[2] Rollo, pp. 41-43.
[3] Id., p. 71.
[4] Id., p. 72.
[5] Id., p. 13.
[6] Id., p. 73.
[7] Id., p. 74.
[8] Id., p. 75.
[9] Id., p. 77.
[10] Id., p. 78.
[11] Id., p. 83.
[12] Id., p. 84.
[13] Id., p. 86.
[14] Id., p. 87.
[15] Fifth Division, CA-G.R. SP No. 41880, with
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. as ponente and Justices Pedro A.
Ramirez and Pacita Cañizares-Nye concurring; Rollo, p. 104.
[16] Rollo, p. 111.
[17] Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No.
112547, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 192.
[18]
Ibid.
[19] G.R. No. 117186, 29 June 1995, 245 SCRA 477.
[20] G.R. No. 117083, 27 October 1995, 249 SCRA
604.
[21] Rollo, p. 105-106.
[22]
G.R. No. 127393, 4 December 1998, p. 3.
[23] Rollo, p. 106.