EN BANC
[A.M. No. P-98-1276. September 25, 1998]
EDGAR P. REMOLLO, complainant, vs. ATTY. THELMA A.
GARCIA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Dumaguete City, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EDGAR P. REMOLLO, in a sworn
letter-complaint dated 4 March 1997,[1] charged respondent
Atty. Thelma A. Garcia, Clerk of Court
and Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental,
with misfeasance, bias, ignorance of the law and usurpation of judicial
functions. The complainant alleged that
respondent persistently refused to perform her ministerial duty to execute a
Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale over forty-three (43) parcels of land in Negros
Oriental sold at public auction in 1986 despite the expiration of the period
for their redemption on 27 October 1989; that such refusal was a clear
manifestation of bias in favor of respondent's deceased brother-in-law Julio P.
Garcia and his wife Josefa who were the judgment debtors in Civil Case No. 5221; and, that respondent still refused to execute the Final Deed of
Sale despite the final and executory decision dated 26 June 1996 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP-34649,[2] an appeal interposed by complainant and his sister
Rosario R. Habaña from Civil Case No. 10109 for mandamus, the dispositive
portion of which pertinently reads -
x x x x the judgment of respondent court dated May 4, 1994, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering ATTY. THELMA A. GARCIA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental, to execute the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale of the subject parcels of land in favor of the petitioners within thirty (30) days after the finality of this decision in order to avoid any further delay in the enforcement, execution and satisfaction of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5221, which, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in G. R. No. 53429, has become final and executory on August 23, 1985 (underscoring supplied).[3]
As gleaned from the decision of the
Court of Appeals, this administrative complaint traces its roots to Civil Case
No. 5221, an action for possession, ejectment, receivership and damages filed
by complainant's parents Proceso and Rosario Remollo against respondent's
brother-in-law Julio Garcia and his wife Josefa.
On 28 March 1974 judgment was
rendered in favor of complainant's parents declaring respondent's
brother-in-law and his wife to be possessors and planters in bad faith. The decision became final and executory on
23 August 1985 after it was affirmed by this Court on 13 June 1980.[4]
To satisfy the money judgment,
forty-three (43) parcels of land belonging to the Garcia spouses were sold at
public auction for P229,487.10. The highest bidders were the heirs of the
deceased Remollo spouses who were the judgment creditors, namely: Maria Azucena, Rosario, Proceso Jr.,
Rufinita and herein complainant Edgar, all surnamed Remollo. A Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was issued
on 12 February 1986 by then Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff,
Atty. Benjamin V. Diputado, and registered with the Register of Deeds on 27
October 1988. However, despite the
expiration of the twelve-month period for redemption on 27 October 1989,
respondent Atty. Garcia, who was then already the Clerk of Court and Ex Officio
Provincial Sheriff, refused to execute a
Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale allegedly because the heirs of the judgment
debtors, who happened to be her nephews and nieces, were making partial payments
of the judgment obligation by paying the Remollo account with the Philippine
National Bank. This prompted Rosario,
Maria Azucena and Edgar Remollo, three (3) of the judgment creditors' heirs, to execute an Affidavit of
Consolidation in lieu of the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale.
On the other hand, respondent
executed a Certificate of Redemption dated 11 June 1990 which the heirs of the judgment debtors presented
for registration with the Register of Deeds on 20 December 1991. When their
Affidavit of Consolidation was denied registration on the ground that such a document was proper
only in foreclosures of mortgage, siblings Edgar and Rosario Remollo instituted
Civil Case No. 10109 for mandamus as well as an administrative case with this
Court[5] to compel respondent to execute the Sheriff's Final
Deed of Sale. On 14 September 1992 the
administrative case docketed as A.M. No. P-92-722 was provisionally dismissed
to await the outcome of the petition for mandamus. However when respondent allegedly still refused to execute the
Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale despite the Court of Appeals' directive for her to
do so in CA-G.R. SP-34649, the appealed mandamus case, complainant Edgar P.
Remollo refiled this administrative complaint against respondent.
In her Comment filed on 24
October 1997 respondent alleged that she already complied with the decision of the Court of Appeals
when she executed and signed on 5 March 1997 the subject Sheriff's Final Deed
of Sale in favor of Rosario, Edgar, Maria Azucena, Rufinita, Proceso Jr. and
Arthur, all surnamed Remollo, in their capacity as heirs of the judgment creditors in Civil Case No.
5221; and, that complainant was
informed through his counsel of the execution of the Deed of Sale by means of
a letter dated 17 March 1997 of
the Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Br. 38,
Dumaguete City. Respondent contended
that she did not execute the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale when the period for redemption first expired
on 27 October 1989 because of on-going negotiations between complainant's other
siblings, namely, Maria Azucena,
Proceso Jr., Rufinita and Arthur, on one hand, and the heirs of the judgment
debtors on the other, for the
redemption of the parcels of land.
In his Reply to
respondent's Comment complainant countered that the agreement for the
redemption of the parcels of land after
the expiration of the one-year period for redemption on 27 October 1989 was not
sanctioned by him nor by his sister Rosario, hence, it was still ministerial
for respondent to execute the Deed of Sale.
In addition, complainant averred that the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale
executed on 5 March 1997 did not comply with the Court of Appeals' decision for
respondent "to execute the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale x x x in favor of the petitioners x x x"
as it was executed in favor of all the Remollo siblings instead of only in his
name and that of his sister Rosario
being the only petitioners in Civil Case No. 10109 for mandamus. Furthermore, it contained a rider not
ordered by the Court of Appeals, thus -
HOWEVER, MRS. AZUCENA R. VDA. DE QUANZON, ARTHUR REMOLLO, PROCESO REMOLLO, JR., and RUFINITA R. ESPINA, abandon, quit and waive all their rights, shares, interests and participation of (sic) the above-described parcels of land together with the improvements existing thereon in favor of defendant-judgment debtors JULIO GARCIA, ET AL., in a document entitled AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER duly notarized by Notary Public ROTHELIO LUMJOD x x x attached and form an integral part hereof.
Complainant
asked that respondent be meted the maximum penalty under the law for
continually and unjustifiably denying them the fruit of their legal victory for nearly a decade despite court orders for
her to do so.
On 24 November 1997 we referred
this case to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
In its report dated 4 March 1998 the OCA recommended the imposition of a
P5,000.00-fine upon respondent after finding her to be remiss in the performance of her ministerial
functions.
We agree with the OCA that
respondent is administratively liable for her failure to execute the Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale. However we are
unable to agree with the recommended penalty.
From the records it is clear that respondent was not simply
remiss or neglectful of her duties as Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff. On the contrary, and in fact, she intentionally refused to execute a Sheriff's
Final Deed of Sale despite the clear mandate in Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court,[6] as well as Chapter VIII, Sec. D, par. (2) (u), of the
Manual for Clerks of Court that the sheriff shall execute the corresponding
deed of conveyance in favor of the
purchaser upon the expiration of the twelve-month period given the judgment
debtor within which to redeem properties sold at public auction.
Respondent attempted to justify
her inaction with the claim that the heirs of the judgment debtors - who are
her nephews and nieces - were allegedly negotiating with the heirs of the
judgment creditors-purchasers for the redemption of the properties beyond the twelve-month period. However, respondent was well aware that only
some of the judgment creditors, namely, Maria Azucena, Proceso Jr. and Arthur,
were in such an agreement with the heirs of the judgment debtors, and that at
least two (2) of the judgment creditors-purchasers, namely, herein complainant
and his sister Rosario Habaña, were opposed to giving the heirs of the judgment
debtors an extension of the redemption period as in fact they had been
demanding that respondent execute the Final Deed of Sale.
It is well-settled that a
sheriff's functions are purely ministerial, not discretionary.[7] The Manual for Clerks of Court categorically
states that -
Sheriffs are ministerial officers. They are agents of the law and not agents of the parties, neither of the creditor nor of the purchaser at a sale conducted by him. It follows, therefore, that the sheriff can make no compromise in an execution sale x x x x It is not his duty to decide on the truth or sufficiency of the processes committed to him for service (underscoring ours).
As a
ministerial officer, a sheriff ought to know that it is his duty, in the
absence of instructions, to faithfully perform what is incumbent upon him. Moreover, he is under obligation to conduct
himself, at all times, with propriety; but most of all, be above suspicion[8] for the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of
its personnel.[9]
In this case, respondent not only
refused to perform a specific duty imposed upon her, but favored the heirs of
the judgment debtors (her nephews and nieces) further by executing a
Certificate of Redemption on 11 June 1990 some eight (8) months after the
period for redemption had already expired knowing fully well that it is
ministerial for a sheriff to execute a certificate of redemption only when the
tender payment in the correct amount is made within the period for the purpose,[10] i.e., twelve (12) months[11] from the date of registration of a certificate of
sale. Worse, respondent falsely stated
in the Certificate of Redemption that she was reconveying the subject parcels
of land to the heirs of the judgment debtors "with authority of the
plaintiff judgment creditor(s)" when complainant Edgar Remollo and his
sister Rosario Habaña, two (2) of the heirs of the judgment creditors, never
gave her such authority, and were in fact demanding the execution of a final
deed of sale in their favor.
Even after the Certificate of
Redemption was properly denied registration by the Register of Deeds[12] for the very reason that it was "dated and
presented for registration long after and beyond the period for redemption
declared in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale,"[13] respondent still refused to execute the proper deed
and allowed herself to become the respondent in a petition for mandamus (Civil
Case No. 10109) which herein complainant and his sister Rosario Habaña were
constrained to file against her. In
fact, it was only on 5 March 1997 that she executed a Sheriff's Final Deed of
Sale despite the fact that the directive of the Court of Appeals dated 26 June
1996 in CA-G.R. SP-34649, the appealed mandamus case, was for her to "execute
the Sheriff's Final Deed of Sale x x x within thirty (30) days after the finality
of this decision in order to avoid any further delay in the enforcement,
execution and satisfaction of the
judgment in Civil Case No. 5221, which x x x became final and executory on
August 23, 1985." The decision
attained finality on 18 July 1996.[14]
In Padilla v. Arabia[15]we dismissed a deputy sheriff for serious misconduct
and dereliction of duty when he failed
to enforce writs of execution and instead granted the judgment debtor a
grace period within which to settle his obligation. In the case of respondent, her liability is compounded by the
fact that she used her official position for personal and selfish ends, i.e.,
favoring party-litigants who are her kin.
Under the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees,[16] public officials and employees are mandated to always
uphold public interest over and above personal interests in consonance with the
time-honored principle of a public office being a public trust.[17] Specifically, they are prohibited from dispensing or
extending undue favors on account of their office to their relatives whether by
consanguinity or affinity except with respect to appointments of such relatives
to strictly confidential positions or as coterminous members of their personal
staff.[18] By her actuations
respondent has not only caused
anguish and damage to the complainant for the unwarranted delay in the
execution of the Sheriff's Final Deed
of Sale, but more importantly, she has placed the court where she works in a
bad light and has undermined the faith of a party-litigant and of the public in
general in that court's administration of justice,[19] hence warranting the administrative penalty herein imposed.
However, before this Court could
dispose of this case, respondent compulsorily retired on 28 October 1997, which effectively precluded it from
actually imposing the proper penalty which respondent otherwise deserves. But, we are not prevented from ordering that
her retirement benefits, which the Court earlier ordered withheld, be forfeited
in part for her malfeasance and
misfeasance in office. In fact, this is
not the first time that respondent has taken advantage of her official position
to favor party-litigants closely related to her. In Ponce de Leon v. Atty. Thelma A. Garcia,[20] the Court reprimanded respondent for her unauthorized
act of transferring motu proprio Civil Case No. 9803 on ground of
improper venue to the RTC, Bais City, instead of merely including it in the
raffle of cases, to favor the defendants therein among whom were her husband
Tomas A. Garcia and brother-in-law Jose A. Garcia. Thus, we said therein -
There is nothing wrong with respondent’s act of protecting the interest of her husband in the co-ownership. After all, her husband’s income therefrom is conjugal in character and would benefit their family. However, her over-zealousness had transcended the bounds of propriety. For her actuations, respondent should be reprimanded.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Thelma A. Garcia, former Clerk
of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of Negros Oriental, is found
GUILTY of gross misconduct in refusing to execute a Sheriff’s Final Deed of
Sale over certain parcels of land as directed in a final judgment of the trial
court, affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 53429, which affirmance had in turn
become final and executory, thus using her official position to favor
party-litigants who are her close relatives.
Consequently, this Court imposes upon respondent a fine of P30,000.00 to be deducted from
her retirement benefits earlier ordered
withheld pending termination of the instant case. After the deduction is made, let the rest of the retirement
benefits of respondent be released to her.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide
Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez,
Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1] This complaint was
originally filed by Edgar P. Remollo on 5 March 1992, docketed as A.M. No.
P-92-722, but was provisionally dismissed by the Court on 14 September 1992 to
await the outcome of Civil Case No. 10109, an action for mandamus filed on 11
December 1991 by the same complainant Edgar P. Remollo and his sister Rosario
R. Habaña with the RTC of Dumaguete City, to compel respondent Atty. Thelma A.
Garcia to execute the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale.
[2] Rosario Remollo Habaña and
Edgar Remollo v. Clerk of Court and Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Negros Oriental.
[3] Decision penned by Justice Artemon
D. Luna, concurred in by Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Portia Aliño
Hormachuelos, prom. 26 June 1996; Rollo,
pp. 108-122.
[4] Julio A. Garcia and Josefa
Villegas v. Court of Appeals, Proceso Remollo and Rosario P. Remollo, G.
R. No. 53429.
[5] See Note 1.
[6] Now Sec. 33, Rule 39, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.
[7] Evangelista v.
Penserga, A.M. No. P-92-766, 27 March 1995, 242 SCRA 702.
[8] De Labaco v. Parale,
A. M. No. P-66-A, 14 December 1981, 110 SCRA 25.
[9] Dicdican v. Fernan
Jr., A. M. No. P-96-1231, 12 February 1997, 268 SCRA 69.
[10] Morales v. CFI of
Cavite, Br. V, No. L-47125, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 373.
[11] Now one (1) year under Sec.
33, Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[12] Affirmed by the Land
Registration Authority on 23 March 1994 in Consulta No. 1986.
[13] Rollo, p. 25.
[14] Order issued on 11 March
1998 in Civil Case No. 10109 by Judge Alfonso P. Briones, RTC-Br. 38, Negros
Oriental.
[15] A.M. No. 93-774, 8 March
1995, 242 SCRA 227.
[16] RA No. 6713, "An Act Establishing a Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, to Uphold the
Time-Honored Principle of Public Office Being a Public Trust, Granting
Incentives and Rewards for Exemplary Service, Enumerating Prohibited Acts and
Transactions and Providing Penalties for Violations thereof and for Other
Purposes.
[17] Sec. 4 par. (A), subpar.
(a), RA No. 6713.
[18] Sec. 4, par (A), subpar.
(c), id.
[19] Recto v. Racelis,
A.M. No. P-182, 30 April 1996, 70 SCRA 438.
[20] Second Division Resolution
dated 27 January 1992, A.M. No.
P-91-544.