THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127596. September 24, 1998]
ARNOLD GINETE, FLOR GINETE, assisted by Jose Bontigao, and NORA GINETE, assisted by Ricardo Sabayle, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSEFINA RIBAYA-GINETE, VICTOR AND ALEX, both surnamed GINETE, EUDARLIO B. VALENCIA and MIRAFE BELLEN-VALENCIA, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition
for Review assailing four (4) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The June 16, 1995 Resolution[1] dismissed petitioners’ appeal for their failure to
file Appellants’ Brief despite the extension given. The December 8, 1995[2] Resolution ordered entry of judgment on the ground
that the June 16, 1995 Resolution had already become final and executory, there
being no Motion for Reconsideration filed contesting the dismissal of the
appeal. The January 26, 1996 Resolution[3] ordered the release of entry of judgment while the
December 18, 1996 Resolution[4] denied petitioners’ Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterated the order of release of entry of judgment.
The issue is basically one of
ownership and succession involving seven parcels of land with an area of 59
hectares, all located in Bulan, Sorsogon.
The resolution of said issue, however, hinges on the proper
determination of paternity and filiation of the contending parties.
Petitioners Arnold Ginete, Flor
Ginete assisted by Jose Bontigao, and Nora Ginete assisted by Ricardo Sabayle
were plaintiffs in a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and for Partition filed
against private respondents Josefina Ribaya-Ginete, Victor and Alex, both
surnamed Ginete, Eudarlio B. Valencia[5] and Mirafe Bellen-Valencia.[6]
There are two conflicting versions
as to the original ownership of said parcels of land. On the one hand, petitioners allege that the subject lots were
originally conjugal properties of the deceased spouses Mauricio Ginete and
Aniceta Ginga who had six children, one of whom was Onofre (or Odelon) Ginete,
now deceased. Petitioners claim to be
legitimate children of the late Onofre Ginete by his first wife, Beatriz
Tamboong.
According to petitioners, when
Mauricio Ginete died, his surviving heirs submitted a project of partition[7] wherein the subject lots were apportioned to Onofre
(Odelon) Ginete. During the lifetime of
Onofre and after the death of his first wife Beatriz Tamboong, petitioners
occupied some of the lots at the instance of the former.
On the other hand, private
respondents contend that the subject lots originally belonged solely to Aniceta
Ginga who subsequently sold two of the seven lots to private respondent
Josefina Ribaya-Ginete, the second wife of Onofre (Odelon). After Onofre’s (Odelon’s) death, Aniceta
sold another lot to Onofre’s (Odelon’s) acknowledged natural children. Then, Josefina Ribaya-Ginete redeemed three
lots from one Rufina Gacis and thereafter sold the same to private respondent
Mirafe Bellen Valencia, Aniceta’s daughter by her second husband and Odelon’s
half-sister. Said lots were
subsequently titled in the name of Mirafe Valencia married to Eudarlio
Valencia.
After hearing both sides, the
trial court, on June 29, 1992, ruled in favor of private respondents and
declared them owners of the entire 59 hectares of subject lots. Petitioners were ordered to pay private
respondents P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P15,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and necessary litigation expenses. In addition, petitioners were ordered to pay actual damages of P183,600.00
representing the value of the coconuts and/or proceeds of the fruits from the
parcels (or portions) they have been occupying since 1975 up to 1992,
specifically parcels 2, 3 (portion), 4, 5 and 6 plus P10,200.00 per
annum effective 1993 until they finally vacate and turn over the possession
thereof to private respondents and to the pay the costs.
Having received the above decision
on September 22, 1992, petitioners had until October 7, 1992 to file a notice
of appeal. Petitioners eventually filed
a notice of appeal on October 5, 1992.[8] Said notice was acted upon and given due course by
Presiding Judge Ireneo B. Escandor on October 8, 1992[9] in view of the retirement of Judge Alparce on June
30, 1992. However, Judge Escandor
inhibited himself and withdrew his October 8, 1992 order[10] giving due course to the appeal for an unspecified
reason. Instead, Judge Simon S. Encinas
acted upon and gave due course to the appeal on January 26, 1993.[11]
The Court of Appeals, however,
dismissed the appeal in a June 16, 1995 Resolution for failure of petitioners
to file appellants’ brief. Petitioners’
counsel received the resolution on July 3, 1995. As such, the last day for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration would have been on July 18, 1995. Corrollarily, said resolution would have attained finality on
July 19, 1995.
On August 1, 1995, petitioners
filed their Appellants’ Brief. A Motion
for Reconsideration dated July 18, 1995 was allegedly filed together with the
Appellants’ Brief but received by the Court of Appeals only on December 29,
1995. On December 8, 1995, the Court of
Appeals ordered entry of judgment and expunction of Appellants’ Brief after
verifying that no Motion for Reconsideration was filed with the Court of
Appeals. Nor was an appeal to the
Supreme Court filed.
Petitioners moved to reconsider
the December 8, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On January 26, 1996, the Court of Appeals
ordered the release of entry of judgment after a verification report dated
January 16, 1996 revealed that only the Appellants’ Brief was received on
August 31, 1995 but without the Motion for Reconsideration. On December 18, 1996, the Court of Appeals
denied petitioners’ motion for leave to file and admit incorporated omnibus
motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to release entry of
judgment.
Believing that they have a
meritorious case and claiming that they would be unjustly deprived of their
rightful share in the inheritance if their appeal is not reinstated in the
Court of Appeals, petitioners filed this instant petition for review on the
following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals abused its discretion in considering petitioners’ appeal abandoned and consequently dismissed for their failure to file their appellants’ brief, overlooking the fact that their failure to file the same was due to the gross negligence of their former counsel, whose negligence should not be binding on them.
2. The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of petitioners’ appeal was based on technicality thereby denying the rights of petitioners as plaintiffs-appellants to prosecute their case before said appellate court so that it can be decided on the merits and not on its technicality aspect.
3. The entry of judgment ordered by the Court of Appeals to be entered in this case was erroneous and premature considering that petitioners actually filed their motion for reconsideration of the June 16, 1995 order dismissing petitioners’ appeal.
4. The suspension of the rules in the instant case is warranted so that petitioners’ appeal with the appellate court could be reinstated and proceed in due course in order not to deprive the petitioners of their rightful shares of their inheritance which they were unlawfully deprived of by the private respondents.
Petitioners claim that their
counsel, who happened to be the third, declined to continue with the case for
fear of antagonizing the respondent-spouses who are judges. The same held true with their second
counsel and was the main reason for the refusal of other lawyers to accept
petitioners’ case. Hence, allegedly the
reason for their failure to file appellants’ brief within the reglementary
period.
The petition is impressed with
merit.
Private respondents lay stress on
the jurisprudentially-established rule that the timely perfection of an appeal
is not only mandatory but likewise jurisdictional. It is private respondents’ position that there are certain
procedural rules that must remain inviolable, like those setting the periods
for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review, for it is doctrinally
entrenched that the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to
avail of the right must comply with the statute or rules. The rules, particularly the requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law, must
be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment
of the court final and executory. As a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so
also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case.[12]
Private respondents’ argument is
misleading for the above-discussed statutory requirement is not applicable to
the instant case. Records show that the
notice of appeal was filed within the reglementary period.[13] As such, it was seasonably filed.
In Carco Motor Sales v. Court
of Appeals,[14] this Court held that:
“As held by the Court in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), ‘(T)he expiration of the time to file brief, unlike lateness in filing the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not a jurisdictional matter and may be waived by the parties. Even after the expiration of the time fixed for the filing of the brief, the reviewing court may grant an extension of time, at least where no motion to dismiss has been made. Late filing or service of briefs may be excused where no material injury has been suffered by the appellee by reason of the delay or where there is no contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced.” (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, a distinction should be made
between failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period and
failure to file brief within the period granted by the appellate court. The former would result in the failure of
the appellate court to obtain jurisdiction of the appealed decision resulting
in its becoming final and executory upon failure to move for
reconsideration. The latter would
simply result in the abandonment of the appeal which could lead to its
dismissal upon failure to move for its reconsideration. Consequently, the appealed decision would
become final and executory but prior thereto, the appellate court shall have
obtained jurisdiction of the appealed decision.
In the instant case, petitioners
simply failed to file the Appellants’ Brief within the extended period accorded
to them after the appellate court had obtained jurisdiction of the case.
Nevertheless, this Court will not
countenance the failure of petitioners’ counsel to observe the reglementary
period to file appellants’ brief.
Counsel are sworn to protect the interest of their clients and in the
process, should be knowledgeable about the rules of procedure to avoid
prejudicing the interests of their clients or worse, compromising the integrity
of the courts. Ignorance of the
procedural rules on their part is tantamount to inexcusable negligence.
The matter before this Court,
however, does not even call for counsel’s knowledge of procedural rules but
merely his managerial skill in keeping track of deadlines for filing necessary
pleadings, failing which, he can opt to withdraw from the case in order not to
prejudice further his client’s interest.
Failure of petitioners’ former
counsel to file the Appellants’ Brief within the reglementary period
constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In Perla Compania De
Seguros, Inc. v. Atty. Benedicto G. Saquilabon,[15] this Court held:
“An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People v. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of justice. (People v. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People v. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).” (Italics supplied)
While, certainly, an Appellants’
Brief was filed, it was admittedly filed beyond the reglementary period. Such lapse indubitably prejudiced the
interest of petitioners since it unduly delayed the resolution of this case on
the merits before the Court of Appeals.
As it is, it has taken more than twenty (20) years since the case was
first filed on July 19, 1978 and the merits of the appeal are yet to be
resolved before the Court of Appeals.
Considering that the bone of
contention consists of fifty-nine hectares of alleged inherited lands, it
cannot be presumed that petitioners were disinterested in pursuing the
case. They hired counsel precisely to
handle all the legal matters and to protect their interests. No duty was imposed upon them to remind
their counsel to file Appellants’ Brief.
Failure of petitioners’ former
counsel to file Appellants’ Brief clearly manifests his negligence which became
more pronounced when he was granted an extended period of time within which to
file the brief. Ordinarily, such
negligent act or omission on the part of counsel would, as a rule, have bound
his clients. Under the prevailing
circumstances and in the interest of justice and equity, this Court cannot
strictly apply the same rule in the case before it.
This Court may suspend its own
rules or exempt a particular case from its operation where the appellate court
failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing to appellant’s failure to
perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court suspend
its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already obtained
jurisdiction over the appealed case.
This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most mandatory
character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal has been invoked
and granted in a considerable number of cases.[16]
Thus, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[17] although the appeal was perfected six days after the
expiration of the reglementary period, this Court ordered the Court of Appeals
to entertain the same, as the Republic stood to lose close to 300 hectares of
land already titled in its name and used exclusively for educational purposes.
In the instant case, petitioners
stand to lose their alleged rightful share in the inheritance consisting of
fifty-nine hectares of land just because their former counsel failed to file
the Appellants’ Brief within the reglementary period.
To deprive petitioners of their
share in the inheritance due to the negligence of their counsel coupled with
their submissions of the trial court’s failure to appreciate and consider some of their evidence, documentary
at that, are sufficient demonstrations of the merits of their case.
While this Court would not readily
accept petitioners’ allegation that the trial court’s decision was drafted by
one of the private respondents who happened to be the Executive Judge
exercising supervisory functions over the branch where the instant case was
being heard, it cannot be overlooked that this particular situation may have
engendered some justifiable suspicion in the mind of petitioners. While such an allegation, coupled with the
allegation that another intervenor was also a judge,[18] as well as the belief that the reason they kept on
changing their lawyers was because their lawyers were intimidated by private
respondents who were judges, or that the lawyers themselves refused to accept
their case, are bereft of concrete proof, still they may not entirely be
without merit. In fact, the Appellants’
Brief, belatedly filed with the Court of Appeals, as well as the Motion for
Reconsideration, was signed by petitioners themselves claiming that the lawyer
who drafted the same refused to sign his name.
The above circumstances, taken
cumulatively, are sufficient demonstration of the merits of their case, hence
must be given due course if only to dispel from the minds of petitioners, as
well as the public, the image of partiality of
our courts, as well as to determine definitively the ownership over the
subject parcels of land.
Justice Teehankee, in his
concurring opinion in Republic v. Court of Appeals, stated, thus:
“The precedent of Paulino v.
Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257 [1977]) where the Court ordered the giving of
due course to an appeal notwithstanding that the same was admittedly filed two
days beyond the reglementary period and had been therefore rejected by the
appellate court is fully applicable to the case at bar. We cited therein inter alia the
demands of substantial justice and the presence of special circumstances for
giving due course to the appeal and reiterated that ‘(T)he underlying principle
in the administration of justice and application of the rules is substantial
justice and fair play. As restated
by the Court in Obut v. Court of Appeals (70 SCRA 546 [1976]), ‘(W)e cannot
look with favor on a course of action which would place the administration of
justice in a straight jacket for then the result would be a poor kind of
justice if there would be justice at all.
Verily, judicial orders, such as the one subject of this petition, are
issued to be obeyed, nonetheless a non-compliance is to be dealt with as the
circumstances attending the case may warrant.
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a
party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits
of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or
property on technicalities.”[19] (Italics supplied)
Let it be emphasized that the
rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this
principle. The power to suspend or even
disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which
this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now constrained
to do in instant case.[20]
Thus, this court is not averse to
suspending its own rules in the pursuit of the ends of justice. “x x x.
For when the operation of the Rules will lead to an injustice we have,
in justifiable instances, resorted to this extraordinary remedy to prevent
it. The rules have been drafted with
the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting justice. As a corrollary, if their application and
operation tend to subvert and defeat, instead of promote and enhance it, their
suspension is justified. In the words
of Justice Antonio P. Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada v. Sto.
Domingo, “(T)his Court, through the revered and eminent Mr. Justice Abad
Santos, found occasion in the case of C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, to lay
down for recognition in this jurisdiction, the sound rule in the administration
of justice holding that ‘it is always in the power of the court (Supreme Court)
to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require it . . .”[21]
The Rules of Court were conceived
and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not
to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be
mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts, in rendering
justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided
by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive
rights, and not the other way around.
As applied to instant case, in the language of Justice Makalintal,
technicalities “should give way to the realities of the situation.”[22]
Private respondents’ reliance on
technicalities should be placed in proper perspective lest it lead to a great
injustice and an abuse of the rules of procedure which are primarily
established to protect the rights of the parties. Technicality should not be relied upon to subject and defeat
substantive rights of the other party.
“Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration
from courts.”[23]
The emerging trend in the rulings
of this Court is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this
Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to
override substantial justice.[24]
This Court, likewise, has held
that “(W)here compelling circumstances are cited by the appellant that would
warrant an examination and review by the appellate court as the reviewer of the
findings of fact made by the trial court, ‘a liberal application of the rules
becomes imperative and conversely, an overstrict or rigid enforcement of the
reglementary period for the filing of briefs, extensions of which for
justifiable reasons are after all addressed to the sound discretion of the
court, is to be shunned and avoided lest a grave miscarriage of justice be
committed’.”[25]
Further, this Court has declared
that “the higher interests of justice and fairness justify the setting aside of
respondent court’s peremptory dismissal of petitioner’s appeal for failure to
file appellant’s brief within the original reglementary period due to a cause
not entirely attributable to its fault or negligence and that the exercise of
the Court’s “inherent right” to reinstate an appeal that was dismissed as the
result of fraud, mistake or unavoidable casualty is fully justified under the
circumstances of the case at bar.”[26]
In the case at bar, the lawyer’s
negligence without any participatory negligence on the part of petitioners is a
sufficient reason to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals. Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor
or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the
lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered
are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances,
(2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault
or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory,[27] (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
On the whole, the principal considerations in giving due course to
an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and mandatory rules are
substantial justice and equity considerations.
But the above-cited elements should likewise be considered for the
appeal to be reinstated and given due course.
Lest this Court be misinterpreted,
the statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration was filed
within the reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes
executory in due course is to be strictly enforced. This Court has held that the necessity for such a requirement is
considered an indispensable interdiction against needless delays and for the
orderly discharge of judicial business.[28] The essential rationale behind this statutory
requirement is expressed by this court in Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[29] thus:
“The necessity of giving finality to judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interest of society imposes it. The opposite view might make litigations more unendurable than the wrong (they are) intended to redress. It would create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the judgment or order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. When judgments of lower courts gain finality, they, too, become inviolable, impervious to modification. They may, then, no longer be reviewed, or in any way modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court. In other words, once a judgment becomes final, the only errors that may be corrected are those which are clerical.”
From the foregoing, it can be
inferred that the purposes for such a statutory requirement are two-fold:
first, to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally,
to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and; second, to put an end
to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely
why courts exist.
Obviously, the first purpose is in
line with the dictum that justice delayed is justice denied. But said dictum presupposes that the
court properly appreciates the facts and the applicable law to arrive at a
judicious decision. The end should
always be the meting out of justice.
As to the second purpose,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely.
The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
for an indefinite period of time. It
must be adjudicated properly and seasonably to better serve the ends of justice
and to place everything in proper perspective. In the process, the possibility
that errors may be committed in the rendition of a decision cannot be
discounted.
To be sure, this Court will not
disturb a final and executory judgment even at the risk that errors may have
been committed in its rendition as long as due process was observed. It has been held that as long as a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said
to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process.[30]
Due process means giving every
contending party the opportunity to be heard and the Court to consider every
piece of evidence presented in their favor.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioners were given
every opportunity to be heard. In fact,
this was never presented as an issue before the lower court. What was made an issue before the Court of
Appeals was the misappreciation of facts and misapplication of laws despite
clear and uncontroverted evidence. In effect,
petitioners claim that they would be deprived of their rightful shares of their
inheritance if their appeal is not reinstated and the findings of fact made by
the lower court are not reviewed.
In this Court’s perusal of the
records of the case, it appears that the lower court disregarded and
misappreciated certain documents presented by petitioners in proving filiation
as allowed by the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. Second, it seems to have misapplied the established presumptions
in cases of marriage and filiation.
Third, the forgery of the signature of the Notary Public in one of the
questioned Deeds of Sale appears to have been clearly established by
petitioners and unsatisfactorily and insufficiently rebutted by private
respondents.
In view of these circumstances,
this Court finds it imperative for the Court of Appeals to review the findings
of fact made by the trial court. For
while this Court may review factual findings of the lower court, it will not
preempt the Court of Appeals in reviewing the same and reappreciating the evidence
presented by petitioners to resolve factual questions.
Prior resolution of the aforecited
issues is necessary in order to determine the question of original ownership over the subject parcels
of land which in turn would resolve the question of succession. Said questions pertain to factual matters
that could best be resolved by the Court of Appeals which is mandated to
examine and review the findings of fact made by the lower court.
The demands of substantial justice
and fair play make it absolutely necessary for the courts to completely,
judiciously and satisfactorily resolve said questions of fact. Failure to give due course to the appeal and
to resolve those questions might give rise to the impression that the courts
may be fostering and promoting injustice if and when the appellants’ or
petitioners’ case turns out to be meritorious.
This Court cannot help but observe that the Court of Appeals itself is doubtful as to whether a motion for reconsideration of the June 16, 1995 resolution which dismissed petitioners' appeal was filed together with the Appellants’ Brief. While the Appellants’ Brief was indeed filed late, the Court of Appeals, in its December 8, 1995 resolution stated that the said brief was filed on August 1, 1995,[31] thirteen days after the supposed last day for filing a motion for reconsideration. However in its January 26, 1996 resolution, it stated that according to the Judicial Records Division Report, the Appellants’ Brief was received and dated August 31, 1995.[32]