THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 116516-20. September 7, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. NEMESIO FERRER y DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Nemesio Ferrer y de Guzman, a
60-year old farmer from Barangay Baybay, Aguilar, Pangasinan was charged by his
neighbor, 14-year old Irene Paral of five counts of rape. The first information[1] reads:
“That on or about the 25th day of September 1993 in the morning, in Barangay Baybay, Municipality of Aguilar, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Irene A. Paral against her will, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.”
The four other Informations[2] charged accused-appellant with rape allegedly
committed on October 2, 8, 16 and 22, 1993.
The cases were tried jointly.
On arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded “not guilty.” Whereupon, trial
on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented Dra. Wilma Flores Peralta, the Rural Health Officer of Aguilar,
Pangasinan, and the alleged victim, as witnesses. The defense on the other hand has accused-appellant and his
son-in-law Jorge Dian[3] as witnesses.
The prosecution established the
following facts:
Fourteen-year old Irene Paral and
accused-appellant were neighbors, the latter owning a farm located near the
house of the Parals in Barangay Baybay, Aguilar, Pangasinan. As part of her routine, Irene would go every
morning to a nearby creek, approximately 120 meters away from their house, to
wash clothes. In the afternoon, Irene
would again go near the creek to gather firewood.
On September 25, 1993 at 6:00
o’clock in the morning, Irene was washing clothes in the creek when suddenly,
accused-appellant approached her from behind, grabbed her hair, pointed a knife
at her neck and forcibly pulled her towards an area with tall grass, around ten
meters away from the creek. Thereafter,
accused-appellant pushed her to the ground and told her to keep quiet. Accused-appellant then started removing the
short pants of Irene but the latter resisted and kicked the accused. Accused-appellant retaliated by boxing the
thighs of his victim. The strength of
Irene proved no match to that of her ravisher.
Having subdued his prey, accused-appellant removed Irene’s underwear and
proceeded to remove his own.
Accused-appellant then went on top of Irene and had sexual intercourse
with her. Although in pain, Irene struggled and attempted to resist the
invasion of her womanhood by accused-appellant but to no avail for the latter
was pointing a knife at her all throughout her ordeal. Having momentarily satisfied his lust,
accused-appellant stood up and put on his pants. After warning Irene not to divulge the incident to anybody, else
her family would be in peril, accused-appellant left.
After the incident, Irene gathered
herself, returned to the creek and finished washing the clothes. She did not go back immediately to their
house as she was also afraid of the wrath of her mother if she does not finish
her chore.
Seven days after her first ordeal,
Irene was again subjected to another painful experience at the hands of
accused-appellant. On October 2, 1993,
Irene was again washing clothes in the creek when accused-appellant, propelled
by his lustful desires, surreptitiously approached Irene from behind, pointed a
knife at her neck and dragged her to a nearby cogonal area. Accused-appellant pushed her to the ground,
undressed her and succeeded in violating her again. As with the first time, accused-appellant was armed with a knife
and threatened to kill Irene and her family in case she should disclose the
incident to anybody. When Irene
struggled, accused-appellant boxed her thighs and pointed the knife at
her. The incident happened a third time
on October 8, 1993.
After sexually molesting Irene on
three separate occasions, accused-appellant’s lust apparently remained unsatisfied. In the afternoon of October 16, 1993, Irene was gathering
firewood when accused-appellant suddenly approached her and threatened her with
a knife. Accused-appellant went through
the motions of an accustomed ritual and succeeded in violating her again
followed by the threat to harm her and her family if she revealed the incident
to anybody.
On October 22, 1993 at 4:30 in the
afternoon, Irene was on her way to the creek when, without any warning,
accused-appellant dragged her to an area planted with cassava plants where he
prepared to mount her when suddenly one Arnel Abaday passed by. Frightened, accused-appellant threatened
Irene not to make any outcry and fled.
Since she could no longer bear the
abuses she had suffered at the hands of accused-appellant, Irene narrated her
harrowing experience to her mother and brother.
Dra. Wilma Flores Peralta, Rural
Health Officer of Aguilar, Pangasinan examined Irene and her findings, also
contained in a medical certificate,[4] revealed the following:
“1) Hymenal lacerations, old at 9:00, 1:00 and 5:00 o’clock positions; there are old lacerations in the hymen showing that there is stretching of the hymen or penetration like a penis of a man inserted in the vagina. The lacerations were probably caused in the months of September and October 1993;
2) Introitus admits one finger with ease as there was already previous insertion of a penis of a man inside the vagina;
3) Cervix soft which indicates that the patient is pregnant, because normally a non-pregnant woman’s cervix is firm;
4) Uterus enlarged, 2 fingerbreath above symphyses pubis which shows that patient is pregnant 2 to 3 months and the intercourse could have happened in october 1993. Per the medical record or the patient, the latter’s last menstrual period was September 25, 1993 and the expected date of delivery is July 1994. The date of the incident was recorded to determine the period of conception of the victim. the patient was only 14 years old at the time she examined her.”
Understandably, accused-appellant
came up with a different version. He
alleged that on September 24, 1993 he was sitting under the shade of a
camachile tree watching his carabao when Irene arrived and asked for
money. Since he had no money with him,
he promised to give Irene some amount the following day. When they met the next day, Irene asked him
to follow her to the creek where she would be washing clothes. When they were already near the creek,
accused-appellant tried to hand the
money to Irene but the latter insisted that she would only receive the
money in the area where there were tall cogon grasses, about ten meters away
from the creek.
Allegedly acting upon Irene’s
instructions, accused-appellant went to the grassy area where, upon arrival of
Irene, the latter undressed herself and offered herself to him. When he removed his brief and discovered
that his penis remained flaccid, Irene held it and rubbed it against her vagina
but when erection failed, Irene became angry, whereupon, he gave the money to
her and left. Subsequent events
allegedly happened in the same manner.
Jorge Dian, son-in-law of
accused-appellant, testified that he noticed that everytime his father-in-law
and complaining witness met, they would smile at each other and on one
occasion, he even saw his father-in-law give Irene some money.
On rebuttal, Irene testified that
on each occasion that accused-appellant raped her, the latter had an erection
and his penis penetrated her vagina.
She likewise denied asking money from accused-appellant as her parents
could afford to spend for her needs.
After trial on the merits, the
trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of four counts
of rape and one count of attempted rape.
The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing considerations, the court renders judgment against the accused Nemesio Ferrer as follows:
In Criminal Cases Nos. L-4962, 4963, 4964 and 4965, the court finds and holds the accused, Nemesio Ferrer, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape, charged in the Informations filed against him, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and conformable thereto, hereby sentences said accused, to suffer in each case the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and its accessory penalties provided by law and further to pay the costs of the proceedings.
In Criminal Case No. L-4966, the court likewise finds and holds the accused, Nemesio Ferrer, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Rape, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 335 in relation to Article 6 of the said code and conformable thereto, hereby sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correcional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum and to pay the cost of the proceedings.
The court further orders the accused to indemnify the offended party the sum of Three Hundred Thousand (P300,000.00) Pesos as moral damages in all the cases without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The court likewise orders the accused to acknowledge and support the child in the womb of the complainant, as his illegitimate child.
And applying the three-fold rule in favor of the accused, the total duration of the penalty to be served by him in all the cases shall not exceed forty (40) years. The preventive imprisonment served by him in relation to the cases shall be fully credited in his favor pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 6127.”
The said decision stated that “in
the ultimate and final analysis and evaluation of the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial, the court finds that the evidence adduced by the
prosecution is overwhelming against the sham and pretended innocence of the
accused and has established a moral certainty of the guilt of Nemesio Ferrer of
the offenses filed against him.”[5]
Accused-appellant is now before
this Court arguing for the reversal and setting aside of his conviction and
praying for his acquittal. In his
appeal, accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred:
1. In giving credit to the testimony of the victim which is incredible;
2. In not scrutinizing with extreme caution the testimony of the victim who really caused her pregnancy, whether a male member of her family or the accused himself;
3. In not acquitting the accused, this guilt having not been satisfactorily proven beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court, seeing through
accused-appellant’s fabricated yarn, is not persuaded. His conviction must stand. Accused-appellant attempted to cast doubt on
the testimony of Irene that he was armed with a knife when he intimidated and
raped her. If indeed there was a knife,
then the prosecution should have at least presented it during the trial.
This Court disagrees. During trial, what was presented and offered
by the prosecution was the testimonial evidence of Irene. It did not attempt to offer the knife since
in the first place, the knife was never in the possession of the prosecution
but with the accused-appellant.
Secondly, it is not necessary for the prosecution to corroborate Irene’s
testimony with a physical evidence, i.e., the knife. If found to be true and convincing, it suffices to convict
accused-appellant of the crimes charged.
The trial court, which is in the
best position to weigh all the pieces of evidence presented, accorded Irene’s
testimony sufficient weight to support accused-appellant’s conviction. The lower court ruled:
“The oral testimony of the offended
party supported by the fact that herein complainant is now five months pregnant
strongly proved the proposition that the accusations imputed against the
accused are credible and worthy of belief.
In responding to questions propounded to her, the offended party was
sincere and frank and at times shed tears from her eyes as she recalled and
narrated the harrowing and excruciating pains of the tragedy that befell upon
her, young as she is. There was no hesitancy
nor artificiality in her voice when she testified on salient aspects of the
incidents in question. It is admitted
that there are contradictions in her testimony but such inconsistencies in the
testimony of a witness, if only on minor details reinforce rather than weaken
her testimony.”[6]
Needless to say, it is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.[7]
On the other hand, the court a quo
totally disregarded accused-appellant’s testimony. It said:
“The court had also the occasion to
observe the accused when he took the witness stand. There was insincerity in his voice and could not immediately
answer the questions asked of him and instead of looking straightforward, he
oftentimes stooped as if he wanted to hide the shame and guilt of what he had
done to the offended party.”[8]
At this stage, suffice it to say
that the determination of a witness’ credibility is properly within the domain
of the trial court as it is in the best position to observe his demeanor and
bodily movements. Findings of fact, as
this Court has reiterated in a host of cases, are within the competence and
province of trial courts. Absent any
showing that they overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the result of
the case, this Court accords highest respect to their factual findings and to
their resolution of the issue of credibility.[9] In the instant case, the findings of fact of the
court below, must perforce stand.
Additionally, the defense failed
to ascribe any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution which could have
undermined the credibility of the complaining witness. Such failure only served to buttress the
credibility of the latter. It is
settled that where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper
motive why a prosecution witness would testify falsely against an accused or
falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.[10]
The defense insists that the
sexual congress was actually initiated by and with the consent of Irene and
that any resistance she put up was only a token one.
This Court is not convinced. As perceptively observed by the trial court,
there was a great disparity between the physical build of the parties. Irene was a young and frail 14-year old
while accused-appellant was a 60-year old with a much bigger and sturdier build. As aptly described by the trial court:
“With the physical condition of the
accused compared to the complainant, the court believes that any tenacious
resistance which Irene Paral will put up will be an exercise in futility.”[11]
The lack of physical injuries on
the part of complaining witness did not, in any way, negate the theory that
force was employed by accused-appellant in consummating the crimes. In rape cases, the degree of force and
resistance is relative, depending on the circumstances of each case and on the
physical capabilities of each party.
Besides, it is not exactly true that Irene did not suffer any physical
injuries. As borne out by the medical
records, Irene suffered hymenal lacerations.
In any case, the law does not
impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. Physical resistance need not be established
in rape when intimidation is exercised upon her and she submits herself against
her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for life and personal safety.[12]
Besides the absence of physical
injuries could be explained by the fact that 39 days after the last rape
incident had already lapsed when Irene underwent medical examination. Consequently, any discoloration or hematoma
in her thighs caused by the assault of accused-appellant may have already
disappeared.
Accused-appellant likewise
contends that it would be very improbable, if not possible, on his part to have
sexual intercourse with Irene considering that at his old age, he is no longer
capable of erection. This Court cannot
subscribe to this argument. The testimony to the effect that he is no longer
capable of erection is, at most, self-serving.
Accused-appellant insists on being 60 years of age but he failed to
submit any proof to substantiate his claim.
Age is not the criterion in determining sexual interest and
potency. Besides, erection is only
necessary for penetration. As this
Court has time and again ruled,
penetration is not an essential element of rape. Mere touching of the labia or pudendum by
male organ is enough to consummate the crime of rape.[13]
Prescinding therefrom,
accused-appellant’s contention of lack of penetration was satisfactorily
disproved by the medical findings which showed lacerations in the hymen of
Irene which could have only been caused by an introduction or penetration of a
blunt object, such as a male organ. The
penetration of accused-appellant’s penis into the vagina of Irene was
satisfactorily and conclusively proven by the pregnancy of the latter.
Finally, this Court dismisses with
alacrity the theory of the defense that each sexual congress of
accused-appellant with Irene was upon the enticement and solicitation of the
latter. At the time of the incidents,
Irene was an innocent, unsophisticated barrio lass of 14, while accused-appellant,
assuming that he is not lying about his age, was an elderly man of 60. It is most unseemly that such a young girl
would sell her young body for a paltry sum of P100, P60 or P10.
Under prevailing jurisprudence,
moral damages are imposable in rape cases involving young girls between
thirteen and nineteen years of age, taking into account the immeasurable havoc
wrought on their youthful feminine psyche.[14]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS that the
accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay: (1) P50,000.00 for each
count of rape, and (2) moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman),
Kapunan, and Purisima,
JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, p. 11.
[2] Rollo, pp. 7-10.
[3] Mentioned as “Jorhill Bayan” in the
Decision.
[4] Exhibit “A”, Records.
[5] Decision, Rollo, p. 34.
[6] Supra, p. 32.
[7] People v. Lusa, G.R. No. 122246,
March 27, 1998.
[8] See Note 5, pp. 32-33.
[9] People v. Penero, G.R. No. 116292,
July 31, 1997.
[10] People v. Abrecinoz, G.R. Nos.
122474-76, October 17, 1997.
[11] Supra, p. 32.
[12] See Note 8, supra.
[13] People v. Castromero, G.R. No.
118992, October 9, 1997.
[14] People v. Erese, G.R. No. 120579, November 5, 1997.