FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124043. October 14, 1998]

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Is the income derived from rentals of real property owned by the Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippines, Inc. (YMCA) – established as “a welfare, educational and charitable non-profit corporation” -- subject to income tax under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and the Constitution?

The Case

This is the main question raised before us in this petition for review on certiorari challenging two Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals[1] on September 28, 1995[2] and February 29, 1996[3] in CA-GR SP No. 32007. Both Resolutions affirmed the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) allowing the YMCA to claim tax exemption on the latter’s income from the lease of its real property.

The Facts

The Facts are undisputed.[4] Private Respondent YMCA is a non-stock, non-profit institution, which conducts various programs and activities that are beneficial to the public, especially the young people, pursuant to its religious, educational and charitable objectives.

In 1980, private respondent earned, among others, an income of P676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators, and P44,259.00 from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the commissioner of internal revenue (CIR) issued an assessment to private respondent, in the total amount of P415,615.01 including surcharge and interest, for deficiency income tax, deficiency expanded withholding taxes on rentals and professional fees and deficiency withholding tax on wages. Private respondent formally protested the assessment and, as a supplement to its basic protest, filed a letter dated October 8, 1985. In reply, the CIR denied the claims of YMCA.

Contesting the denial of its protest, the YMCA filed a petition for review at the Court if Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 14, 1989. In due course, the CTA issued this ruling in favor of the YMCA:

“xxx [T]he leasing of private respondent’s facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the [private respondents]. It appears from the testimonies of the witnesses for the [private respondent] particularly Mr. James C. Delote, former accountant of YMCA, that these facilities were leased to members and that they have to service the needs of its members and their guests. The Rentals were minimal as for example, the barbershop was only charged P300 per month. He also testified that there was actually no lot devoted for parking space but the parking was done at the sides of the building. The parking was primarily for members with stickers on the windshields of their cars and they charged P.50 for non-members. The rentals and parking fees were just enough to cover the costs of operation and maintenance only. The earning[s] from these rentals and parking charges including those from lodging and other charges for the use of the recreational facilities constitute [the] bulk of its income which [is] channeled to support its many activities and attainment of its objectives. As pointed out earlier, the membership dues are very insufficient to support its program. We find it reasonably necessary therefore for [private respondent] to make [the] most out [of] its existing facilities to earn some income. It would have been different if under the circumstances, [private respondent] will purchase a lot and convert it to a parking lot to cater to the needs of the general public for a fee, or construct a building and lease it out to the highest bidder or at the market rate for commercial purposes, or should it invest its funds in the buy and sell of properties, real or personal. Under these circumstances, we could conclude that the activities are already profit oriented, not incidental and reasonably necessary to the pursuit of the objectives of the association and therefore, will fall under the last paragraph of section 27 of the Tax Code and any income derived therefrom shall be taxable.

“Considering our findings that [private respondent] was not engaged in the business of operating or contracting [a] parking lot, we find no legal basis also for the imposition of [a] deficiency fixed tax and [a] contractor’s tax in the amount[s] of P353.15 and P3,129.73, respectively.

x x x x x x x x x

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the following assessments are hereby dismissed for lack of merit:

1980 Deficiency Fixed Tax – P353,15;

1980 Deficiency Contractor’s Tax – P3,129.23;

1980 Deficiency Income Tax – P372,578.20.

While the following assessments are hereby sustained:

1980 Deficiency Expanded Withholding Tax – P1,798.93;

1980 Deficiency Withholding Tax on Wages – P33,058.82

plus 10% surcharge and 20% interest per annum from July 2, 1984 until fully paid but not to exceed three (3) years pursuant to Section 51 (e)(2) & (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code effective as of 1984.”[5]

Dissatisfied with the CTA ruling, the CIR elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision of February 16, 1994, the CA[6] initially decided in favor of the CIR and disposed of the appeal in the following manner:

“Following the ruling in the afore-cited cases of Province of Abra vs. Hernando and Abra Valley College Inc. vs. Aquino, the ruling of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals that ‘the leasing of petitioner’s (herein respondent) facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of the parking lot are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the petitioners,' and the income derived therefrom are tax exempt, must be reversed.

“WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED in so far as it dismissed the assessment for:

1980 Deficiency Income Tax P 353.15

1980 Deficiency Contractor’s Tax P 3,129.23, &

1980 Deficiency Income Tax P372,578.20,

but the same is AFFIRMED in all other respect.”[7]

Aggrieved, the YMCA asked for reconsideration based on the following grounds:

I

“The findings of facts of the Public Respondent Court of Tax Appeals being supported by substantial evidence [are] final and conclusive.

II

“The conclusions of law of [p]ublic [r]espondent exempting [p]rivate [r]espondent from the income on rentals of small shops and parking fees [are] in accord with the applicable law and jurisprudence.”[8]

Finding merit in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the YMCA, the CA reversed itself and promulgated on September 28, 1995 its first assailed Resolution which, in part, reads:

“The Court cannot depart from the CTA’s findings of fact, as they are supported by evidence beyond what is considered as substantial.

x x x x x x x x x

“The second ground raised is that the respondent CTA did not err in saying that the rental from small shops and parking fees do not result in the loss of the exemption. Not even the petitioner would hazard the suggestion that YMCA is designed for profit. Consequently, the little income from small shops and parking fees help[s] to keep its head above the water, so to speak, and allow it to continue with its laudable work.

“The Court, therefore, finds the second ground of the motion to be meritorious and in accord with law and jurisprudence.

“WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is GRANTED; the respondent CTA’s decision is AFFIRMED in toto.”[9]

The internal revenue commissioner’s own Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Respondent Court in its second assailed Resolution of February 29, 1996. Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[10]

The Issues

Before us, petitioner imputes to the Court of Appeals the following errors:

I

“In holding that it had departed from the findings of fact of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals when it rendered its Decision dated February 16, 1994; and

II

“In affirming the conclusion of Respondent Court of Tax Appeals that the income of private respondent from rentals of small shops and parking fees [is] exempt from taxation.”[11]

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:

Factual Findings of the CTA

Private respondent contends that the February 16, 1994 CA Decision reversed the factual findings of the CTA. On the other hand, petitioner argues that the CA merely reversed the “ruling of the CTA that the leasing of private respondent’s facilities to small shop owners, to restaurant and canteen operators and the operation of parking lots are reasonably incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the objectives of the private respondent and that the income derived therefrom are tax exempt.”[12] Petitioner insists that what the appellate court reversed was the legal conclusion, not the factual finding, of the CTA.[13] The commissioner has a point.

Indeed, it is a basic rule in taxation that the factual findings of the CTA, when supported by substantial evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the said court committed gross error in the appreciation of facts.[14] In the present case, this Court finds that the February 16, 1994 Decision of the CA did not deviate from this rule. The latter merely applied the law to the facts as found by the CTA and ruled on the issue raised by the CIR: “Whether or not the collection or earnings of rental income from the lease of certain premises and income earned from parking fees shall fall under the last paragraph of Section 27 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended.”[15]

Clearly, the CA did not alter any fact or evidence. It merely resolved the aforementioned issue, as indeed it was expected to. That it did so in a manner different from that of the CTA did not necessarily imply a reversal of factual findings.

The distinction between a question of law and a question of fact is clear-cut. It has been held that “[t]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts.”[16] In the present case, the CA did not doubt, much less change, the facts narrated by the CTA. It merely applied the law to the facts. That its interpretation or conclusion is different from that of the CTA is not irregular or abnormal.

Second Issue:

Is the Rental Income of the YMCA Taxable?

We now come to the crucial issue: Is the rental income of the YMCA from its real estate subject to tax? At the outset, we set forth the relevant provision of the NIRC:

“SEC. 27. Exemptions from tax on corporations. -- The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such --

x x x x x x x x x

(g) Civic league or organization not organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare;

(h) Club organized and operated exclusively for pleasure, recreation, and other non-profitable purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or member;

x x x x x x x x x

Notwithstanding the provision in the preceding paragraphs, the income of whatever kind and character of the foregoing organization from any of their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject to the tax imposed under this Code. (as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1457)”

Petitioners argues that while the income received by the organizations enumerated in Section 27 (now Section 26) of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the payment of tax “in respect to income received by them as such,” the exemption does not apply to income derived “xxx from any if their properties, real or personal, or from any of their activities conducted for profit, regardless, of the disposition made of such income xxx.”

Petitioner adds that “rented income derived by a tax-exempt organization from the lease of its properties, real or personal, [is] not, therefore, exempt from income taxation, even if such income [is] exclusively used for the accomplishment of its objectives.”[17] We agree with the commissioner.

Because taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, the Court has always applied the doctrine of strict interpretation in construing tax exemptions.[18] Furthermore, a claim of statutory exemption from taxation should be manifest and unmistakable from the language of the law on which it is based. Thus, the claimed exemption “must expressly be granted in a statute stated in a language too clear to be mistaken.”[19]

In the instant case, the exemption claimed by the YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording of the last paragraph of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be subject to the imposed by the same Code. Because the last paragraph of said section unequivocally subjects to tax the rent income f the YMCA from its rental property,[20] the Court is duty-bound to abide strictly by its literal meaning and to refrain from resorting to any convoluted attempt at construction.

It is axiomatic that where the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, its express terms must be applied.[21] Parenthetically, a consideration of the question of construction must not even begin, particularly when such question is on whether to apply a strict construction or a literal one on statutes that grant tax exemptions to “religious, charitable and educational propert[ies] or institutions.”[22]

The last paragraph of Section 27, the YMCA argues, should be “subject to the qualification that the income from the properties must arise from activities ‘conducted for profit’ before it may be considered taxable.”[23] This argument is erroneous. As previously stated, a reading of said paragraph ineludibly shows that the income from any property of exempt organizations, as well as that arising from any activity it conducts for profit, is taxable. The phrase “any of their activities conducted for profit” does not qualify the word “properties.” This makes income from the property of the organization taxable, regardless of how that income is used -- whether for profit or for lofty non-profit purposes.

Verba legis non est recedendum. Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it allowed, on reconsideration, the tax exemption claimed by YMCA on income it derived from renting out its real property, on the solitary but unconvincing ground that the said income is not collected for profit but is merely incidental to its operation. The law does not make a distinction. The rental income is taxable regardless of whence such income is derived and how it used or disposed of. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

Constitutional Provisions

on Taxation

Invoking not only the NIRC but also the fundamental law, private respondent submits that Article VI, Section 28 of par. 3 of the 1987 Constitution,[24] exempts “charitable institutions” from the payment not only of property taxes but also of income tax from any source.[25] In support of its novel theory, it compares the use of the words “charitable institutions,” “actually” and “directly” in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, on the hand; and in Article VI Section 22, par. 3 of the 1935 Constitution, on the other hand.[26]

Private respondent enunciates three points. First, the present provision is divisible into two categories: (1) “[c]haritable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques and non-profit cemeteries,” the incomes of which are, from whatever source, all tax-exempt;[27] and (2) “[a]ll lands, buildings and improvements actually and directly used for religious, charitable or educational purposes,” which are exempt only from property taxes.[28] Second, Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[29] which limited the exemption only to the payment of property taxes, referred to the provision of the 1935 Constitution and not to its counterparts in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions.[30] Third, the phrase “actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes” refers not only to “all lands, buildings and improvements,” but also to the above-quoted first category which includes charitable institutions like the private respondent.[31]

The Court is not persuaded. The debates, interpellations and expressions of opinion of the framers of the Constitution reveal their intent which, in turn, may have guided the people in ratifying the Charter.[32] Such intent must be effectuated.

Accordingly, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., a former constitutional commissioner, who is now a member of this Court, stressed during the Concom debates that “xxx what is exempted is not the institution itself xxx; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes.”[33] Father Joaquin G. Bernas, an eminent authority on the Constitution and also a member of the Concom, adhered to the same view that the exemption created by said provision pertained only to property taxes.[34]

In his treatise on taxation, Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug concurs, stating that “[t]he tax exemption covers property taxes only."[35] Indeed, the income tax exemption claimed by private respondent finds no basis in Article VI, Section 28, par. 3 of the Constitution.

Private respondent also invokes Article XIV, Section 4, par. 3 of the Charter,[36] claiming that the YMCA “is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution whose revenues and assets are used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes so it is exempt from taxes on its properties and income.”[37] We reiterate that private respondent is exempt from the payment of property tax, but not income tax on the rentals from its property. The bare allegation alone that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution is insufficient to justify its exemption from the payment of income tax.

As previously discussed, laws allowing tax exemption are construed strictissimi juris. Hence, for the YMCA to be granted the exemption it claims under the aforecited provision, it must prove with substantial evidence that (1) it falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. However, the Court notes that not a scintilla of evidence was submitted by private respondent to prove that it met the said requisites.

Is the YMCA an educational institution within the purview of Article XIV, Section 4, par.3 of the Constitution? We rule that it is not. The term “educational institution” or “institution of learning” has acquired a well-known technical meaning, of which the members of the Constitutional Commission are deemed cognizant.[38] Under the Education Act of 1982, such term refers to schools.[39] The school system is synonymous with formal education,[40] which “refers to the hierarchically structured and chronological graded learnings organized and provided by the formal school system and for which certification is required in order for the learner to progress through the grades or move to the higher levels.”[41] The Court has examined the “Amended Articles of Incorporation”[42] and “By-Laws”[43] of the YMCA, but found nothing in them that even hints that it is a school or an educational institution.[44]

Furthermore, under the Education Act of 1982, even non-formal education is understood to be school-based and “private auspices such as foundations and civic-spirited organizations” are ruled out.[45] It is settled that the term “educational institution,” when used in laws granting tax exemptions, refers to a “ xxx school seminary, college or educational establishment xxx.”[46] Therefore, the private respondent cannot be deemed one of the educational institutions covered by the constitutional provision under consideration.

“xxx Words used in the Constitution are to be taken in their ordinary acceptation. While in its broadest and best sense education embraces all forms and phrases of instruction, improvement and development of mind and body, and as well of religious and moral sentiments, yet in the common understanding and application it means a place where systematic instruction in any or all of the useful branches of learning is given by methods common to schools and institutions of learning. That we conceive to be the true intent and scope of the term [educational institutions,] as used in the Constitution.”[47]

Moreover, without conceding that Private Respondent YMCA is an educational institution, the Court also notes that the former did not submit proof of the proportionate amount of the subject income that was actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. Article XIII, Section 5 of the YMCA by-laws, which formed part of the evidence submitted, is patently insufficient, since the same merely signified that “[t]he net income derived from the rentals of the commercial buildings shall be apportioned to the Federation and Member Associations as the National Board may decide.”[48] In sum, we find no basis for granting the YMCA exemption from income tax under the constitutional provision invoked

Cases Cited by Private

Respondent Inapplicable

The cases[49] relied on by private respondent do not support its cause. YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue[50] and Abra Valley College, Inc. v. Aquino[51] are not applicable, because the controversy in both cases involved exemption from the payment of property tax, not income tax. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, Inc. v. Pasay City[52] is not in point either, because it involves a claim for exemption from the payment of regulatory fees, specifically electrical inspection fees, imposed by an ordinance of Pasay City -- an issue not at all related to that involved in a claimed exemption from the payment if income taxes imposed on property leases. In Jesus Sacred Heart College v. Com. Of Internal Revenue,[53] the party therein, which claimed an exemption from the payment of income tax, was an educational institution which submitted substantial evidence that the income subject of the controversy had been devoted or used solely for educational purposes. On the other hand, the private respondent in the present case had not given any proof that it is an educational institution, or that of its rent income is actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.

Epilogue

In deliberating on this petition, the Court expresses its sympathy with private respondent. It appreciates the nobility its cause. However, the Court’s power and function are limited merely to applying the law fairly and objectively. It cannot change the law or bend it to suit its sympathies and appreciations. Otherwise, it would be overspilling its role and invading the realm of legislation.

We concede that private respondent deserves the help and the encouragement of the government. It needs laws that can facilitate, and not frustrate, its humanitarian tasks. But the Court regrets that, given its limited constitutional authority, it cannot rule on the wisdom or propriety of legislation. That prerogative belongs to the political departments of government. Indeed, some of the member of the Court may even believe in the wisdom and prudence of granting more tax exemptions to private respondent. But such belief, however well-meaning and sincere, cannot bestow upon the Court the power to change or amend the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated September 28, 1995 and February 29, 1996 are hereby dated February 16, 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16, 1995 is REINSTATED, insofar as it ruled that the income tax. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., see Dissenting Opinion.

---

[1] Special Former Fourth Division composed of J. Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr., presiding justice and ponente; and JJ., Fidel P. Purisima (now an associate justice of the Supreme Court) and Corona Ibay-Somera, concurring.

[2] Rollo, pp. 42-48.

[3] Ibid., pp. 50-51.

[4] See Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 1-10 and Memorandum of petitioner, pp. 3-10; rollo, pp. 149-158 and 192-199, respectively. See also Decision of the CTA, pp. 1-21; rollo, pp. 69-89.

[5] CTA Decision, pp. 16-18 and 2--21; rollo, pp. 84-86 and 88-89.

[6] Penned by J. Asaali S. Isnani and concurred in by JJ. Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr., chairman, and Corona Ibay-Somera of the Fourth Division.

[7] Rollo, pp. 39-40.

[8] CA Resolution, p. 2; rollo, p. 43.

[9] Ibid., pp. 2,, 6-7; rollo, pp. 43, 47-48.

[10] The case was submitted for resolution on April 27, 1998, upon receipt by this Court of private respondent’s Reply Memorandum.

[11] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 199-200.

[12] Ibid., p. 16; rollo, p. 205.

[13] Ibid., p. 17; rollo, p. 206.

[14] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mitsubishi Metal Corp., 181 SCRA 214, 220, January 22, 1990.

[15] Rollo, p. 36.

[16] Ramos et al. v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. et al., 19 SCRA 289, 292, February 9, 1967, per Bengzon, J.; citing II Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines, 255 and II Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 2784.

[17] Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 21-22; rollo, pp. 210-211.

[18] See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 605, 613, April 18, 1997.

[19] Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Court of Appeals, GR No. 117359, p. 15, July 23, 1998, per Panganiban, J.

[20] Justice Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Tax Law and Jurisprudence, p. 75, 4th revised ed. (1989); and De Leon, Hector S., The National Internal Revenue Code Annotated, p. 108, 5th ed. (1994), citing a BIR ruling dated May 6, 1975.

[21] See Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, 596, September 28, 1995.

[22] Cooley, Thomas M., The Law of Taxation, p. 1415, Vol. II, 4th ed. (1924).

[23] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 10. p. 234.

[24] “Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages of convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.” (Underlining copied from Reply Memorandum of Private Respondent, p. 7; rollo, p. 231)

[25] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 7; rollo, p. 231.

[26] “Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly , and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”

[27] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 231-232.

[28] Ibid., p. 8; rollo, p. 232.

[29] 14 SCRA 292, June 16, 1965.

[30] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 6-7; rollo, pp. 230-231.

[31] Ibid., p. 9; rollo, p. 233.

[32] Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284, 291-292, July 27, 1987.

[33] Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. Two, p. 90.

[34] Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 720, 1996 ed.; citing Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, p. 295.

[35] Vitug, supra, p. 16.

[36] “All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.”

[37] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, p. 20; rollo, p. 244.

[38] See Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phil 461, 468 (1947).

[39] Section 26, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

[40] Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

[41] Section 20, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232.

[42] Exhibit B, BIR Records, pp. 54-56.

[43] Exhibit C, BIR Records, pp. 27-53.

[44] This is in stark contrast to its predecessor, the YMCA of Manila. In YMCA of Manila v. Collector of Internal Revenue (33 Phil 217, 221 [1916]), cited by private respondent, it was noted that the said institution had an educational department that taught courses in various subjects such as law, commerce, social ethics, political economy and others.

[45] Dizon, Amado C., Education Act of 1982 Annotated, Expanded and Updated, p. 72 (1990).

[46] 84 CJS 566.

[47] Kesselring v. Bonnycastle Club, 186 SW2d 402, 404 (1945).

[48] “By-Laws of the YMCA,” p. 22; BIR Records, p. 31.

[49] Reply Memorandum of private respondent, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 238-240.

[50] Supra.

[51] 162 SCRA 106, June 15, 1988.

[52] 16 SCRA 226, February 28, 1966.

[53] 95 SCRA 16, May 24, 1954.