EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148.
July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant,
vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint
dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under
scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this
complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court.
in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six
months suspension without pay,[2] while in
Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court
on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records
reveal the following facts:
From the Report
and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart
Roman Catholic Church in Quezon City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of
their eleven children were born. In
1962 respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos
City), where his last three children were born and where he practiced his
profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January 30,
1976.
In August, 1976,
shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977
Elena gave birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
In view of this
cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for immorality.
After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period
of six months without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]
Despite this
penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to
another charge of immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming
an officer of the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court
ordered his dismissal and separation from the service.[6]
But his
dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena, which
resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella
Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely
abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later
moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along
Elena and their two children. And
on March 5, 1992, respondent contracted
marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge
Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal.
This was done while the respondent’s marriage to complainant subsists,
as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in
the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement
from the government service in 1990.
However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the
misery they allegedly suffered because of their father’s acts, including
deception and intrigues against them.
Thus, despite having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed
in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present petition for disbarment
under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children
from the despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty.
Ma. Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with
Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.
After conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended that respondent be disbarred, and
his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that, notwithstanding
sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report
Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against
him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the
Court, as when he said:
“I have been ordered suspended by
Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the
same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Peña, now my wife.
Being ordered separated in later administrative case constitute double
jeopardy. If now disbarred for
marrying Ms. Elena Peña will constitute triple jeopardy. If that’s the law so be it.”[8]
Based on said
report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed
on May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioner’s recommendation, as
follows:
“RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios
Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as
it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation therein to be
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and that his name be
stricken off the roll of attorneys.”
We find the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by
the Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by
said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We are in agreement that
respondent’s actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is
the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to
maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity.[9] There is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code
of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.*
As this Court
often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as
well as morality including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the
scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct –
both public and private – fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and,
after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it
should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a
fact that aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a
judge’s actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a
judge is the visible representation of the law, more importantly, of
justice. Ordinary citizens consider him
as a source of strength that fortifies their will to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a
judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his
actuations, lest it be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely,
respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct entirely as to
lose its moral imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who
is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an
attorney-at-law is also invested with public trust. Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the court,
lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is
administered with dignity and civility.
A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the
community where he resides. He must
maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to
stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities
of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to
strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and
thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration
of justice.
On these
considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting
in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]
The power to
disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the Court of and member of the bar.[18] For
disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full
opportunity to vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to
assure the general public that those who are tasked with the duty of
administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in
whom the Courts and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of
Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a
complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar by his
wife. She was able to prove that he had
abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous relations with a
married but separated woman. Respondent
was not able to overcome the evidence presented by his wife that he was guilty
of grossly immoral conduct. In another
case,[20] a lawyer
was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another
woman who had borne him a child. The
Court held that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality
expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present
case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this
Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than
lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the
Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent
far from contrite; on the contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even
arrogance; in the face of charges against him.
The IBP Board of Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited
the privileges extended to a member of the legal profession, resolved the
matter against him. For indeed,
evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against him and could not be
explained away. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as well as
abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his
disregard of family obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer’s
oath. Such gross misbehavior over a
long period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent’s character, his
moral indifference to scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not
but put the legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.
IN VIEW
THEREOF, respondent
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Martinez, and Quisumbing,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, no part due to
personal relationships.
Purisima, J., no part.
[1] Rollo, pp. 2-8.
[2] Records, p.2; Rollo, p.3.
[3] Dy Teban Hardware & Auto Supply Co. v. Tapucar,
102 SCRA 493 (1981).
[4] Ibid., p.510.
[5] Administrative Matter No. 1740 (Tranquilino Calo, Jr.
v. Judge Lauro Tapucar) April 11, 1980.
[6] Supra 3 at
p.510.
[7] Report of Commissioner Fernandez, Commission on Bar
Discipline, IBP, p.4.
[8] Records of the Case-IBP, Vol. II, p.101, par. 3(b)
(emphasis supplied).
* b) If the
Board, by the vote of a majority of its local membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the
Supreme Court for final action.”
[9] Rayos-Omboc v. Atty. Rayos, Adm. Case No.
2884, January 28, 1998; Leda v. Tabang, 206 SCRA 395 (1992); People v.
Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 (1990); Melendrez v. Decena, 176 SCRA 662 (1989).
[10] Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed. (1989), p.22.
* Emphasis supplied.
[11] Ernesto Pineda, Legal & Judicial Ethics, 1994
ed., p.336, citing Luque v. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165; Otero v. Esguerra, 57 SCRA
57; Jugueta v. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27.
[12] Ruben Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 4th ed. (1989), p.454.
[13] Ibid., p.465.
[14] Rule 1.01
- A judge should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.
Rule 2.01
- A judge should so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (Italics
ours)
[15] Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,
247 SCRA 503 (1995).
[16] Nadayag v. Grageda, 237 SCRA 202 (1994); Marcelo v.
Javier, Sr., 214 SCRA 1 (1992).
[17] Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court.
[18] Siervo v. Infante, 73 SCRA 35; Andres v. Cabrera, 127
SCRA 802.
[19] Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., 128 SCRA 485, 487.
[20] Toledo v. Toledo, 117 Phil. 768.