THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129413.
July 27, 1998]
ROLIA VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division), ATLAS
LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC., ALEJANDRO A. MARAMAG, TERESA ALVINA and FELIX DE
JESUS, respondents.
D E
C I S I O N
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner Rolia
Villanueva assails the resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated January 17, 1997[1] declaring her validly dismissed
from her employment as well as its accompanying resolution dated February 7,
1997 denying her motion for reconsideration.[2]
In 1970,
petitioner was hired as clerk by the private respondent Atlas Lithographic
Services. Subsequently, on September 1,
1978, she was promoted to her present position as Accounting Manager.
On July 10,
1995, petitioner received a show cause letter[3] from the private respondent asking
her to submit her written explanation regarding a letter complaint filed by a
certain Adelina Oguis.[4] In her complaint, Oguis alleged
that petitioner would demand two thousand pesos for every work order she would
obtain from private respondent for her.
Private respondent viewed this act by the petitioner as an act of
dishonesty prejudicial to its interest.
In denying any
wrong-doing, petitioner sent a letter claiming that the money she received from
Oguis was in consideration of past favors or services she rendered to the
latter. In other words, the money was
given on a purely voluntary basis as an expression of gratitude.[5] Apparently, private respondent was
not impressed with petitioner’s written explanation, hence, on July 14, 1995 an
investigation was conducted wherein petitioner, Oguis and a representative of
the private respondent were present.[6]
However, despite
the investigation private respondent did not find any merit in petitioner’s
contention, resulting in the termination of the latter’s employment effective
August 2, 1995.[7]
Petitioner then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages before the arbitration
branch of the NLRC. After due
proceedings, Labor Arbiter Potenciano S. Canizares, Jr. on May 13, 1996 ruled
in favor of the petitioner holding that her dismissal was illegal for failure
by the private respondent to prove its allegation, viz.:[8]
“Here the respondents failed to
prove that Oguis expression of gratitude to the complainant, for the aforecited
help extended to Oguis so ruined the company that it had to protect its
interest by dismissing the complainant.
There was no evidence of damage in any form or manner presented by the
respondents.
x x x x
x x x x x
WHEREFORE, the respondents are
hereby ordered to reinstate the complainant with full backwages from the time
her salaries were withheld from her until her actual reinstatement.”
Unfazed by the
setback, private respondent appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the
NLRC. To the dismay of the petitioner,
the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter[9] and declared that she was validly
dismissed from her employment taking into account the following points:
“Admittedly, complainant, an
accounting manager, was a managerial employee who should have the complete
trust and confidence of respondent. Complainant’s
admitted acceptance of certain amounts from respondent’s contractor Ms. Oguis
for alleged services rendered was improper and anomalous.
x x x x
x x x x x
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision
of May 13, 1996 is hereby VACATED and a new one is adjudged DISMISSING instant
complaint for lack of merit.”
Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but was unsuccessful.[10]
Hence this
petition for review on certiorari wherein the sole issue to be resolved is
whether the petitioner was validly dismissed by the private respondent.
To begin with,
there is no denying that loss of trust and confidence is a valid ground for
termination of employment.[11] Thus, the basic requisite for
dismissal on the ground of loss of confidence is that the employee concerned
holds a position of trust and confidence[12] or is routinely charged with the
care and custody of the employer’s money or property.[13] Moreover, the breach must be
related to the performance of the employee’s function.[14] Also, it must be shown that the
employee is a managerial employee, since the term “trust and confidence” is
restricted to said class of employees.[15] In reviewing this petition, we have
fully taken into account the foregoing considerations.
There is no
dispute that petitioner was a managerial employee; as such any transgression on
her part gives the employer a wider latitude of discretion in terminating her
services.[16] Likewise, it is without doubt that
petitioner accepted money on at least four different instances from Oguis, one
of private respondent’s contractors.
However, she attempts to legitimize the propriety of her acceptance by
claiming that the money was given to her as an expression of gratitude by
Oguis.
Be that as it
may, we cannot condone petitioner’s conduct.
Her dismissal must be upheld.
Petitioner, as
account manager, had the duty to deal
with all of the private respondents’ contractors. Consequently, the
marketability, goodwill and sustainability of private respondent’s service or
products would greatly depend on the objectiveness and unbiased demeanor of the
petitioner. Any deviation from these
standards would inevitably affect the private respondent’s business and
reputation among its other contractors.
As aptly
observed by the Solicitor General:
“Natural human desire to continue
such an advantageous arrangement could not, but have undermined petitioner’s
ability to make recommendations and decisions concerning said account on the
sole basis of what should have been good for the company. And, having shown such weakness in one
account, petitioner was obviously not invulnerable to similar temptations
regarding other accounts. In other
words, private respondents could no longer safely assume that petitioner was
looking after the company’s welfare only whenever she would recommend a particular
account for payment, or a particular contract for approval, or whenever she
would act in any other way on any other matter concerning a company account or
contract.”[17]
It must be
emphasized that private respondent’s reliance on petitioner’s evaluation and
assessment concerning its respective contractors was based primarily on trust
and confidence. Thus, when petitioner
accepted considerable amounts of money from one of the private respondent’s
contractors, the trust and confidence reposed on her have been seriously
shaken.
In fine, whether
petitioner demanded the money from Oguis or it was voluntarily given is
immaterial. The fact that she accepted
money from one of the private respondent’s contractors has cast doubt on her
integrity. After all, we cannot
discount the possibility that as a quid pro quo to her acceptance, some
future favors might be asked by Oguis, which may somehow be detrimental to
private respondent’s business interests.
The fact that private respondent did not suffer losses from the
dishonesty of the petitioner because of
their timely discovery does not excuse the latter from any culpability. Indeed, the law, in protecting the rights of
workers, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer.[18] In this regard, a company has the right to dismiss its
employees as a measure of self-protection.[19]
Petitioner
likewise contends that assuming she was at fault, being a first-time offender
and considering her twenty-five (25) years of employment with the private
respondent, the penalty of dismissal is too harsh.[20] In support of her contention,
petitioner cites the following cases, to wit:
PAL v. PALEA,[21] Gelmart Industries Phil. v. NLRC,[22] Mary Johnston v. NLRC,[23] Manila Electric Company v. NLRC,[24] and Dolores v. NLRC.[25]
We are not
unmindful of the foregoing doctrine, but after a careful scrutiny of the above
cases, we are not convinced of its application to the instant petition.
First, in all of the cases cited, it
should be borne in mind that the employees involved were all rank-and-file or
ordinary workers. However, as earlier
pointed out, petitioner was not included in such category but was the account
manager of private respondent, clearly, a managerial position. Metro Drug Corporation v. NLRC,[26] states:
“Managerial personnel and other
employees occupying positions of trust and confidence are entitled to security
of tenure, fair standards of employment, and the protection of labor laws. However, the rules on termination of
employment, penalties for infractions, and resort to concerted action are not
necessarily the same as those for ordinary employees.”
Moreover, it
pointed out the differences in the imposition of sanctions concerning erring
employees, thus:
“When an employee accepts a
promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust and
confidence, she gives up some of the rigid guaranties available to ordinary
workers. Infractions which if committed
by others would be overlooked or condoned or penalties mitigated may be visited
with more severe disciplinary action. A
company’s resort to acts of self-defense would be more easily justified.”
In addition, in
the above-cited cases, the employees’ transgressions could not be considered as
inimical to the interest of their respective employers. In fact, in the PAL case, it only
involved a theft of a lead pipe while the Gelmart case was concerned
with the pilfering of one (1) used oil plastic container. The Mary Johnston case relates to a
heated argument between two co-employees.
The Dolores case pertains to an employee who failed to obtain
prior leave before pursuing her studies abroad. While the MERALCO case involved an employee facilitating
an illegal installation of power line, which is clearly prejudicial to the
economic activity of his employer (MERALCO), there was a finding that these
losses were not due to the fault of the employee but to the Power Sales
Division of MERALCO.[27]
Finally, there
is another aspect which strongly militates against petitioner’s plea. Certainly, this was not the petitioner’s
first infraction. She admitted that she
received money from Oguis on four (4) different occasions, a fact shown in the
cash deposit slips.[28] To our mind, each incident
constitutes a separate offense. The
fact that this was the first time that her misdeeds were discovered does not
diminish her accountability in whatever way.
In the final
analysis, petitioner, as a managerial employee, is expected to conduct her
duties above reproach and to avoid, not only impropriety, but likewise, the
appearance of impropriety.
Unfortunately, her propensity of accepting money from Oguis, one of her
employer’s contractors, has severely compromised her impartiality. Her excuse that the money was given
voluntarily in recognition of past favors does not convince. In fact, it is deplorable to note that she
did not have the courage to say “no” when these amounts were first offered to
her, considering that it was coming from one of her employer’s business
contractors. Ordinary reason and
prudence should have prompted the petitioner to desist from accepting the
money, however, well-meaning the offer.
Oguis, being one of her employer’s contractors and her being the account
manager of the latter should have cautioned petitioner to act in a more
circumspect manner.
In sum, we hold
that the dismissal of the petitioner as account manager was for a just and
valid cause and that private respondent faithfully observed procedural due
process in effecting her dismissal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned resolution dated January 17, 1997 and its accompanying resolution
dated February 7, 1997 of the National Labor Relations Commission are
accordingly AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J.,
(Chairman), Kapunan, and
Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 40-47.
[2] Ibid., p. 49.
[3] Id., pp. 55-56.
[4] Id., p. 136.
[5] Id., pp. 57-58.
[6] Id., pp. 60-69.
[7] Id., pp. 70-71.
[8] Id., pp. 50-54.
[9] Id., pp. 40-47.
[10] Id., p. 49.
[11] Madlos v. NLRC, 254 SCRA 248 (1996); Zamboanga City Electric
Cooperative v. Buat, 243 SCRA 47 (1997).
[12] NASUREFCO v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122277, February 24,
1998.
[13] Mabeza v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 670 (1997).
[14] Quezon Electric Cooperative v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 94
(1989).
[15] De la Cruz v. NLRC, 268 SCRA 458 (1997).
[16] San Antonio v. NLRC, 250 SCRA 359 (1995).
[17] Solicitor General’s Comment, Rollo, p. 195.
[18] Atlas Fertilizer Corp. v. NLRC, 271 SCRA 549 (1997).
[19] MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664
(1996).
[20] Rollo, pp. 233-234.
[21] 57 SCRA 489 (1974).
[22] 176 SCRA 295 (1989).
[23] 163 SCRA 110 (1988).
[24] 175 SCRA 277 (1989).
[25] 205 SCRA 348 (1992).
[26] 143 SCRA 132 (1986).
[27] Manila Electric Company v. NLRC, 175 SCRA 277 (1989),
at p. 282.
[28] Rollo, pp. 138-139.