FIRST DIVISION
[G.R.
No. 123553. July 13, 1998]
NORA A. BITONG, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH
DIVISION), EUGENIA D. APOSTOL, JOSE A. APOSTOL, MR. & MS. PUBLISHING CO., LETTY J. MAGSANOC, AND ADORACION G.
NUYDA, respondents. NORA A. BITONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) and EDGARDO B. ESPIRITU, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
These twin cases originated from
a derivative suit[1] filed by petitioner Nora A. Bitong before the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC hereafter) allegedly for the benefit of
private respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc. (Mr. & Ms. hereafter), among others, to hold respondent spouses
Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol[2] liable for fraud, misrepresentation, disloyalty,
evident bad faith, conflict of interest and mismanagement in directing the
affairs of Mr. & Ms. to
the damage and prejudice of Mr. & Ms.
and its stockholders, including petitioner.
Alleging before the SEC that
she had been the Treasurer and a Member of the Board of Directors of Mr.
& Ms. from the time it was incorporated on 29
October 1976 to 11 April 1989, and was the registered owner of 1,000 shares of
stock out of the 4,088 total outstanding shares, petitioner complained of
irregularities committed from 1983 to 1987 by Eugenia D. Apostol, President and
Chairperson of the Board of Directors.
Petitioner claimed that except for the sale of the name Philippine
Inquirer to Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI hereafter) all
other transactions and agreements entered into by Mr. & Ms. with PDI were not supported by
any bond and/or stockholders’ resolution.
And, upon instructions of Eugenia D. Apostol, Mr. & Ms. made several cash advances to PDI on
various occasions amounting to P3.276 million.
On some of these borrowings PDI paid no interest whatsoever. Despite the fact that the advances made by Mr. & Ms. to PDI were booked as advances to an affiliate, there existed no board
or stockholders’ resolution, contract nor any other document which could
legally authorize the creation of and support to an affiliate.
Petitioner further alleged that
respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol were stockholders, directors and officers
in both Mr. & Ms.and PDI.
In fact on 2 May 1986 respondents Eugenia D. Apostol, Leticia J.
Magsanoc and Adoracion G. Nuyda subscribed to PDI shares of stock at P50,000.00 each or a total of P150,000.00. The stock subscriptions were paid for by Mr. & Ms. and initially treated as
receivables from officers and employees.
But, no payments were ever received from respondents, Magsanoc and
Nuyda.
The petition principally sought
to (a) enjoin respondents Eugenia D. Apostol and Jose A. Apostol from further
acting as president-director and director, respectively, of Mr. & Ms. and disbursing any money
or funds except for the payment of salaries and similar expenses in the ordinary course of business, and from
disposing of their Mr. & Ms.
shares; (b) enjoin respondents Apostol spouses, Magsanoc and Nuyda from
disposing of the PDI shares of stock
registered in their names; (c) compel respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol to
account for and reconvey all profits and benefits accruing to them as a result
of their improper and fraudulent acts; (d) compel respondents Magsanoc and
Nuyda to account for and reconvey to Mr.
& Ms. all shares of stock paid from cash advances from it and all
accessions or fruits thereof; (e) hold respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol
liable for damages suffered by Mr. &
Ms. and the other stockholders, including petitioner, by reason of their
improper and fraudulent acts; (f) appoint a management committee for Mr. & Ms. during the pendency of the
suit to prevent
further dissipation and loss of its assets and funds as well as
paralyzation of business operations; and, (g) direct the management committee
for Mr. & Ms. to file the
necessary action to enforce its rights against PDI and other third parties.
Private respondents Apostol
spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. &
Ms., on the other hand, refuted the allegations of petitioner by starting
with a narration of the beginnings of Mr.
& Ms. They recounted that on 9
March 1976 Ex Libris Publishing Co., Inc.
(Ex Libris hereafter) was
incorporated for the purpose of publishing a weekly magazine. Its original principal stockholders were
spouses Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (then Minister of National Defense) and
Cristina Ponce Enrile through Jaka
Investments Corporation (JAKA
hereafter), and respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol. When Ex Libris suffered
financial difficulties, JAKA and the
Apostols, together with new investors Luis Villafuerte and Ramon Siy,
restructured Ex Libris by organizing a
new corporation known as Mr. & Ms.
The original stockholders of Mr. & Ms., i.e., JAKA, Luis Villafuerte,
Ramon Siy, the Apostols and Ex Libris continued
to be virtually the same up to 1989.
Thereafter it was agreed among them that, they being close friends, Mr.
& Ms. would be operated as a
partnership or a close corporation; respondent Eugenia D. Apostol would manage
the affairs of Mr. & Ms.; and, no
shares of stock would be sold to third parties without first offering the
shares to the other stockholders so that transfers would be limited to and only
among the original stockholders.
Private respondents also asserted
that respondent Eugenia D. Apostol had been informing her business partners of
her actions as manager, and obtaining their advice and consent. Consequently the other stockholders
consented, either expressly or impliedly, to her management. They offered no objections. As a result, the business prospered. Thus, as shown in a statement prepared by
the accounting firm Punongbayan and Araullo, there were increases
from 1976 to 1988 in the total assets of Mr.
& Ms. from P457,569.00 to P10,143,046.00; in the total stockholders’
equity from P203,378.00 to P2,324,954.00; and, in the net sales, from P301,489.00
to P16,325,610.00. Likewise, cash
dividends were distributed and received by the stockholders.
Private respondents further
contended that petitioner, being merely a holder-in-trust of JAKA shares, only represented and
continued to represent JAKA in the
board. In the beginning, petitioner
cooperated with and assisted the management until mid-1986 when relations
between her and her principals on one hand, and respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
on the other, became strained due to political differences. Hence from mid-1986 to mid-1988 petitioner
refused to speak with respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, and in 1988 the former
became openly critical of the management of the latter. Nevertheless, respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
always made available to petitioner and her representatives all the books of
the corporation.
Private respondents averred that
all the PDI shares owned by
respondents Eugenia and Jose Apostol were acquired through their own private
funds and that the loan of P750,000.00 by PDI
from Mr. & Ms. had been fully
paid with 20% interest per annum. And,
it was PDI, not Mr. & Ms., which loaned off P250,000.00 each to respondents
Magsanoc and Nuyda. Private respondents
further argued that petitioner was not the true party to this case, the real
party being JAKA which continued to be the true stockholder
of Mr. & Ms.; hence,
petitioner did not have the personality to initiate and prosecute the
derivative suit which, consequently, must be dismissed.
On 6 December 1990, the SEC
Hearing Panel[3] issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
private respondents from disbursing any money except for the payment of
salaries and other similar expenses in the regular course of business. The Hearing Panel also enjoined respondent
Apostol spouses, Nuyda and Magsanoc from disposing of their PDI shares, and further ruled -
x x x respondents’ contention that
petitioner is not entitled to the provisional reliefs prayed for because she is
not the real party in interest x x x x is bereft of any merit. No less than respondents’ Amended Answer,
specifically paragraph V, No. 8 on Affirmative Allegations/Defenses states that
`The petitioner being herself a minor stockholder and holder-in-trust of JAKA shares represented and continues to
represent JAKA in the Board.’ This statement refers to petitioner sitting
in the board of directors of Mr. &
Ms. in two capacities, one as a minor stockholder and the other as the
holder in trust of the shares of JAKA
in Mr. & Ms. Such reference alluded to by the respondents
indicates an admission on respondents’ part of the petitioner’s legal
personality to file a derivative suit for the benefit of the respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc.
The
Hearing Panel however denied petitioner’s prayer for the constitution of a
management committee.
On 25 March 1991 private
respondents filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to Evidence alleging
that the issue of whether petitioner is the real party-in-interest had been
tried by express or implied consent of the parties through the admission of
documentary exhibits presented by private respondents proving that the real
party-in-interest was JAKA, not
petitioner Bitong. As such, No. 8, par.
V (Affirmative Allegations/Defenses), Answer to the Amended Petition,
was stipulated due to inadvertence
and excusable mistake and should
be amended. On 10 October 1991 the
Hearing Panel denied the motion for amendment.
Petitioner testified at the trial
that she became the registered and beneficial owner of 997 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the 4,088 total
outstanding shares after she acquired them from JAKA through a deed of sale executed on 25 July 1983 and recorded
in the Stock and Transfer Book of Mr.
& Ms. under Certificate of Shares of Stock No. 008. She pointed out that Senator Enrile decided
that JAKA should completely divest
itself of its holdings in Mr. & Ms.
and this resulted in the sale to her of JAKA’s
interest and holdings in that publishing firm.
Private respondents refuted the
statement of petitioner that she was a stockholder of Mr. & Ms. since 25 July 1983 as respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
signed Certificate of Stock No. 008 only on 17 March 1989, and not on 25 July
1983. Respondent Eugenia D. Apostol
explained that she stopped using her long signature (Eugenia D. Apostol) in
1987 and changed it to E.D. Apostol, the signature which appeared on the face
of Certificate of Stock No. 008 bearing the date 25 July 1983. And, since the Stock and Transfer Book which
petitioner presented in evidence was not registered with the SEC, the entries
therein including Certificate of Stock No. 008 were fraudulent. Respondent Eugenia D. Apostol claimed that
she had not seen the Stock and Transfer Book at any time until 21 March 1989
when it was delivered by petitioner herself to the office of Mr. & Ms., and that petitioner
repeatedly referred to Senator Enrile as "my principal" during the Mr. & Ms. board meeting of 22
September 1988, seven (7) times no less.
On 3 August 1993, after trial on
the merits, the SEC Hearing Panel dismissed the derivative suit filed by
petitioner and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction barring private
respondents from disposing of their PDI
shares and any of Mr. & Ms.
assets. The Hearing Panel ruled that
there was no serious mismanagement of Mr.
& Ms. which would warrant drastic corrective measures. It gave credence to the assertion of
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol that Mr.
& Ms. was operated like a close corporation where important matters
were discussed and approved through informal consultations at breakfast
conferences. The Hearing Panel also
concluded that while the evidence presented tended to show that the real
party-in-interest indeed was JAKA
and/or Senator Enrile, it viewed the real issue to be the alleged
mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest on the part of respondent Eugenia
D. Apostol, and allowed petitioner to prosecute the derivative suit if only to
resolve the real issues. Hence, for
this purpose, the Hearing Panel considered petitioner to be the real
party-in-interest.
On 19 August 1993 respondent
Apostol spouses sold the PDI shares
registered in the name of their holding company, JAED Management Corporation,
to Edgardo B. Espiritu. On 25 August
1993 petitioner Bitong appealed to the SEC
En Banc.
On 24 January 1994 the SEC En Banc[4] reversed the decision of the Hearing Panel and,
among others, ordered private respondents to account for, return and deliver to
Mr. & Ms. any and all funds and
assets that they disbursed from the coffers of the corporation including shares
of stock, profits, dividends and/or fruits that they might have received as a
result of their investment in PDI,
including those arising from the P150,000.00 advanced to respondents Eugenia D.
Apostol, Leticia J. Magsanoc and Adoracion G. Nuyda; account for and return any
profits and fruits of all amounts irregularly or unlawfully advanced to PDI and other third persons; and, cease
and desist from managing the affairs of Mr.
& Ms. for reasons of fraud, mismanagement, disloyalty and conflict of
interest.
The SEC En Banc also declared the 19 August 1993 sale of the PDI shares of JAED Management
Corporation to Edgardo B. Espiritu to be tainted with fraud, hence, null
and void, and considered Mr. & Ms.
as the true and lawful owner of all the PDI
shares acquired by respondents Eugenia D. Apostol, Magsanoc and Nuyda. It also declared all subsequent transferees
of such shares as trustees for the benefit of Mr. & Ms. and ordered them to forthwith deliver said shares to Mr. & Ms.
Consequently, respondent Apostol
spouses, Magsanoc, Nuyda, and Mr. &
Ms. filed a petition for review before respondent Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-GR No. SP 33291, while respondent Edgardo B. Espiritu filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition also before respondent Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-GR No. SP 33873. On 8
December 1994 the two (2) petitions were consolidated.
On 31 August 1995 respondent
appellate court rendered a decision reversing the SEC En Banc and held that from the evidence on record petitioner
was not the owner of any share of stock in Mr.
& Ms. and therefore not the real party-in-interest to prosecute the
complaint she had instituted against private respondents. Accordingly, petitioner alone and by
herself as an agent could not file a
derivative suit in behalf of her principal.
For not being the real party-in-interest, petitioner’s complaint did not
state a cause of action, a defense which was never waived; hence, her petition
should have been dismissed. Respondent
appellate court ruled that the assailed orders of the SEC were issued in excess
of jurisdiction, or want of it, and thus were null and void.[5] On 18 January 1996, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Before this Court, petitioner
submits that in paragraph 1 under the
caption "I. The Parties"
of her Amended Petition before the SEC, she stated that she was a
stockholder and director of Mr. & Ms. In par. 1 under the caption "II. The
Facts" she declared that she
"is the registered owner of 1,000 shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. out of the latter’s 4,088 total outstanding shares" and
that she was a member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and treasurer from its inception until 11 April 1989. Petitioner contends that private respondents
did not deny the above allegations in their answer and therefore they are
conclusively bound by this judicial admission.
Consequently, private respondents’ admission that petitioner has 1,000
shares of stock registered in her name
in the books of Mr. & Ms.
forecloses any question on her status and right to bring a derivative suit on
behalf of Mr. & Ms.
Not necessarily. A party whose pleading is admitted as an
admission against interest is entitled to overcome by evidence the apparent
inconsistency, and it is competent for the party against whom the pleading is
offered to show that the statements were inadvertently made or were made under
a mistake of fact. In addition, a party
against whom a single clause or paragraph of a pleading is offered may have the
right to introduce other paragraphs which tend to destroy the admission in the
paragraph offered by the adversary.[6]
The Amended Petition before
the SEC alleges -
I. THE PARTIES
1.
Petitioner is a stockholder and director of Mr. & Ms. x x x x
II. THE FACTS
1.
Petitioner is the registered owner of
1,000 shares of stock of Mr. &
Ms. out of the latter’s 4,088 total outstanding shares. Petitioner, at all times material to this
petition, is a member of the Board of Directors of Mr. & Ms. and from the inception of Mr. & Ms. until 11 April 1989 was its treasurer x x x x
On the other hand, the Amended
Answer to the Amended Petition states -
I. PARTIES
1.
Respondents admit the allegations contained in Caption I, pars. 1 to
4 of the Petition referring to the
personality, addresses and capacity of the parties to the petition except x x x
x but qualify said admission insofar as they are limited, qualified and/or
expanded by allegations in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses x x x x
II. THE FACTS
1.
Respondents admit paragraph 1 of the Petition, but qualify said
admission as to the beneficial ownership of the shares of stock registered in
the name of the petitioner, the truth being as stated in the Affirmative
Allegations/Defenses of this Answer x x x x
V.
AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS/DEFENSES
Respondents respectfully allege by
way of Affirmative Allegations/Defenses, that
x x x x
3.
Fortunately, respondent Apostol was able to convince Mr. Luis
Villafuerte to take interest in the business and he, together with the original
investors, restructured the Ex Libris Publishing
Company by organizing a new corporation
known as Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co.,
Inc.x x x x Mr. Luis Villafuerte
contributed his own P100,000.00. JAKA and respondent Jose Z. Apostol,
original investors of Ex Libris contributed
P100,000.00 each; Ex Libris Publishing Company was paid 800 shares for the name of Mr. & Ms. magazine and goodwill. Thus, the original stockholders of
respondent Mr. & Ms. were:
Cert./No./Date Name of Stockholder No. of Shares %
001-9-15-76 JAKA Investments
Corp. 1,000 21%
002-9-15-76 Luis Villafuerte 1,000 21%
003-9-15-76 Ramon L. Siy 1,000 21%
004-9-15-76 Jose Z. Apostol 1,000 21%
005-9-15-76 Ex Libris Publishing
Co. 800 16%
4,800 96%
4.
The above-named original stockholders of respondent Mr. & Ms. continue to be virtually the same stockholders up to
this date x x x x
8.
The petitioner being herself a minor stockholder and holder-in-trust of JAKA shares, represented and continues
to represent JAKA in the Board x x x
x
21. Petitioner Nora A. Bitong is not the true party to this case, the
true party being JAKA Investments
Corporation which continues to be the true stockholder of respondent Mr. & Ms. Publishing Co., Inc.,
consequently, she does not have the personality to initiate and prosecute this
derivative suit, and should therefore
be dismissed x x x x
The answer of private respondents
shows that there was no judicial admission that petitioner was a stockholder of
Mr. & Ms. to entitle her to file
a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. Where the statements of the private respondents were qualified
with phrases such as, "insofar as they are limited, qualified and/or
expanded by," "the truth being as stated in the Affirmative Allegations/Defenses
of this Answer" they cannot be considered definite and certain enough,
cannot be construed as judicial admissions.[7]
More so, the affirmative defenses
of private respondents directly refute the representation of petitioner that
she is a true and genuine stockholder of Mr.
& Ms. by stating unequivocally that petitioner is not the true party to
the case but JAKA which continues to
be the true stockholder of Mr. & Ms. In fact, one of the reliefs which private
respondents prayed for was the dismissal of
the petition on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal
interest to initiate and prosecute the same.
When taken in its totality, the Amended
Answer to the Amended Petition, or even the Answer to the Amended
Petition alone, clearly raises an issue as to the legal personality of
petitioner to file the complaint. Every
alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact which makes for the one
side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the
other side. The reason for this is,
where part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, the
court should weigh any other portion connected with the statement, which tends
to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest.
In other words, while the
admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined
from the whole statement and others intimately related or connected therewith
as an integrated unit. Although acts or
facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, however,
evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made
through palpable mistake.[8] The rule is always in favor of liberality in
construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted
to the judgment of the court.[9]
Petitioner also argues that
since private respondents failed to appeal the 6 December 1990 Order and the 3 August
1993 Decision of the SEC Hearing Panel declaring that she was the real
party-in-interest and had legal personality to sue, they are now estopped from
questioning her personality.
Not quite. The 6 December 1990 Order is clearly an
interlocutory order which cannot be considered as having finally resolved on
the merits the issue of legal capacity of petitioner. The SEC Hearing Panel discussed the issue of legal capacity
solely for the purpose of ruling on the application for writ of preliminary
injunction as an incident to the main issues raised in the complaint. Being a mere interlocutory order, it is not
appealable.
For, an interlocutory order
refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides
some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.[10] Thus, even though the 6 December 1990 Order was
adverse to private respondents, they had the legal right and option not to
elevate the same to the SEC En Banc but
rather to await the decision which resolves all the issues raised by the
parties and to appeal therefrom by assigning all errors that might have been
committed by the Hearing Panel.
On the other hand, the 3 August
1993 Decision of the Hearing Panel dismissing the derivative suit for failure
to prove the charges of mismanagement, fraud, disloyalty and conflict of
interest and dissolving the writ of
preliminary injunction, was favorable to private respondents. Hence, they were not expected to appeal
therefrom.
In fact, in the 3 August 1993
Decision, the Hearing Panel categorically stated that the evidence presented
showed that the real party-in-interest was not petitioner Bitong but JAKA and/or Senator Enrile. Petitioner was merely allowed to prosecute
her complaint so as not to sidetrack
"the real issue to be resolved (which) was the allegation of
mismanagement, fraud and conflict of interest allegedly committed by respondent
Eugenia D. Apostol." It was only
for this reason that petitioner was considered to be capacitated and competent
to file the petition.
Accordingly, with the dismissal
of the complaint of petitioner against private respondents, there was no
compelling reason for the latter to appeal to the SEC En Banc. It was in fact
petitioner’s turn as the aggrieved party to exercise her right to appeal from
the decision. It is worthy to note that
even during the appeal of petitioner before the SEC En Banc private respondents maintained their vigorous objection
to the appeal and reiterated petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to sue before
the SEC.
Petitioner then contends that she
was a holder of the proper certificates of shares of stock and that the
transfer was recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book of Mr. & Ms. She invokes
Sec. 63 of The Corporation Code which
provides that no transfer shall be valid except as between the parties until
the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation, and upon its
recording the corporation is bound by it and is estopped to deny the fact of
transfer of said shares. Petitioner
alleges that even in the absence of a stock certificate, a stockholder solely
on the strength of the recording in the stock and transfer book can exercise
all the rights as stockholder, including the right to file a derivative suit in
the name of the corporation. And, she
need not present a separate deed of sale or transfer in her favor to prove
ownership of stock.
Section 63 of The Corporation
Code expressly provides -
Sec. 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. - The capital stock of stock corporations shall
be divided into shares for which certificates signed by the president or vice
president, countersigned by the
secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal of the corporation
shall be issued in accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be
transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the
owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person legally authorized to make the
transfer. No transfer however shall be
valid except as between the parties until the transfer is recorded in the books
of the corporation showing the names of the parties to the transaction, the
date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the
number of shares transferred x x x x
This provision above quoted
envisions a formal certificate of stock which can be issued only upon
compliance with certain requisites. First,
the certificates must be signed by the president or vice-president,
countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed with the seal
of the corporation. A mere typewritten
statement advising a stockholder of the extent of his ownership in a
corporation without qualification and/or authentication cannot be considered as
a formal certificate of stock.[11] Second, delivery of the certificate is an
essential element of its issuance.
Hence, there is no issuance of a stock certificate where it is never
detached from the stock books although blanks therein are properly filled up if
the person whose name is inserted therein has no control over the books of the
company.[12] Third, the par value, as to par value shares,
or the full subscription as to no par value shares, must first be fully paid. Fourth, the original certificate must
be surrendered where the person requesting the issuance of a certificate is a
transferee from a stockholder.
The certificate of stock itself
once issued is a continuing affirmation or representation that the stock
described therein is valid and genuine and is at least prima facie evidence
that it was legally issued in the absence of evidence to the contrary. However, this presumption may be rebutted.[13] Similarly, books and records of a corporation which
include even the stock and transfer book are generally admissible in evidence
in favor of or against the corporation and its members to prove the corporate
acts, its financial status and other matters including one’s status as a
stockholder. They are ordinarily the
best evidence of corporate acts and proceedings.
However, the books and records of
a corporation are not conclusive even against the corporation but are prima
facie evidence only. Parol evidence
may be admitted to supply omissions in the records, explain ambiguities, or
show what transpired where no records
were kept, or in some cases where such records were contradicted.[14] The effect of entries in the books of the
corporation which purport to be regular records of the proceedings of its board
of directors or stockholders can be destroyed by testimony of a more conclusive
character than mere suspicion that there was an irregularity in the manner in
which the books were kept.[15]
The foregoing considerations are
founded on the basic principle that stock issued without authority and in
violation of law is void and confers no rights on the person to whom it is
issued and subjects him to no liabilities.[16] Where there is an inherent lack of power in the
corporation to issue the stock, neither the corporation nor the person to whom
the stock is issued is estopped to question its validity since an estoppel
cannot operate to create stock which under the law cannot have existence.[17]
As found by the Hearing Panel and
affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, there is overwhelming evidence that
despite what appears on the certificate of stock and stock and transfer book,
petitioner was not a bona fide stockholder of Mr. & Ms. before March
1989 or at the time the complained acts were committed to qualify her to
institute a stockholder’s derivative suit against private respondents. Aside from petitioner’s own admissions,
several corporate documents disclose that the true party-in-interest is not
petitioner but JAKA.
Thus, while petitioner asserts in
her petition that Certificate of Stock No. 008 dated 25 July 1983 was issued in
her name, private respondents argue that this certificate was signed by
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol as President only in 1989 and was fraudulently
antedated by petitioner who had possession of the Certificate Book and the
Stock and Transfer Book. Private
respondents stress that petitioner’s counsel entered into a stipulation on
record before the Hearing Panel that the certificate was indeed signed by
respondent Apostol only in 1989 and not in 1983.
In her reply, petitioner admits
that while respondent Eugenia D.
Apostol signed the Certificate of Stock No. 008 in petitioner’s name only in
1989, it was issued by the corporate secretary in 1983 and that the other
certificates covering shares in Mr. &
Ms. had not yet been signed by respondent Eugenia D. Apostol at the time of
the filing of the complaint with the SEC
although they were issued years before.
Based on the foregoing admission
of petitioner, there is no truth to the statement written in Certificate of
Stock No. 008 that the same was issued and signed on 25 July 1983 by its duly
authorized officers specifically the President and Corporate Secretary because
the actual date of signing thereof was 17 March 1989. Verily, a formal certificate of stock could not be considered
issued in contemplation of law unless signed by the president or vice-president
and countersigned by the secretary or assistant secretary.
In this case, contrary to
petitioner’s submission, the Certificate of Stock No. 008 was only legally
issued on 17 March 1989 when it was actually signed by the President of the
corporation, and not before that date.
While a certificate of stock is not necessary to make one a stockholder,
e.g., where he is an incorporator and listed as stockholder in the articles of
incorporation although no certificate of stock has yet been issued, it is
supposed to serve as paper representative of the stock itself and of the
owner’s interest therein. Hence, when
Certificate of Stock No. 008 was admittedly signed and issued only on 17 March
1989 and not on 25 July 1983, even as it indicates that petitioner owns 997
shares of stock of Mr. & Ms., the
certificate has no evidentiary value for the purpose of proving that petitioner
was a stockholder since 1983 up to 1989.
And even the factual antecedents
of the alleged ownership by petitioner in 1983 of shares of stock of Mr. & Ms. are indistinctive if not
enshrouded in inconsistencies. In her
testimony before the Hearing Panel, petitioner said that early in 1983, to
relieve Mr. & Ms. from political
pressure, Senator Enrile decided to divest the family holdings in Mr. & Ms. as he was then part of the
government and Mr. & Ms. was
evolving to be an opposition newspaper.
The JAKA shares numbering
1,000 covered by Certificate of Stock No. 001 were thus transferred to
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol in trust or in blank.[18]
Petitioner now claims that a few
days after JAKA’s shares were
transferred to respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, Senator Enrile sold to petitioner
997 shares of JAKA. For this purpose, a deed of sale was
executed and antedated to 10 May 1983.[19] This submission of petitioner is however
contradicted by the records which show that a deed of sale was executed by JAKA transferring 1,000 shares of Mr. & Ms. to respondent Apostol on
10 May 1983 and not to petitioner.[20]
Then Senator Enrile testified
that in May or June 1983 he was asked at a media interview if his family owned shares of stock in Mr. & Ms. Although he and his family
were stockholders at that time he denied it so as not to embarrass the
magazine. He called up petitioner
and instructed her to work out the
documentation of the transfer of shares from JAKA to respondent Apostol to be covered by a declaration of trust. His instruction was to transfer the shares
of JAKA in Mr. & Ms. and Ex Libris to
respondent Apostol as a nominal holder.
He then finally decided to transfer the shareholdings to petitioner.[21]
When asked if there was any
document or any written evidence of that divestment in favor of petitioner,
Senator Enrile answered that there was an endorsement of the shares of stock. He said that there was no other document
evidencing the assignment to petitioner because the stocks were personal
property that could be transferred even orally.[22] Contrary to Senator Enrile’s testimony, however,
petitioner maintains that Senator Enrile executed a deed of sale in her favor.
A careful perusal of the records
shows that neither the alleged endorsement of Certificate of Stock No. 001 in
the name of JAKA nor the alleged deed
of sale executed by Senator Enrile
directly in favor of petitioner
could have legally transferred or assigned on 25 July 1983 the shares of stock
in favor of petitioner because as of 10 May 1983 Certificate of Stock No. 001
in the name of JAKA was already
cancelled and a new one, Certificate of
Stock No. 007, issued in favor of respondent Apostol by virtue of a
Declaration of Trust and Deed of Sale.[23]
It should be emphasized that on
10 May 1983 JAKA executed a deed of
sale over 1,000 Mr. & Ms. shares
in favor of respondent Eugenio D. Apostol.
On the same day, respondent Apostol signed a declaration of trust
stating that she was the registered owner of 1,000 Mr. & Ms. shares covered by Certificate of Stock No. 007.
The declaration of trust further
showed that although respondent Apostol was the registered owner, she held the
shares of stock and dividends which might be paid in connection therewith
solely in trust for the benefit of JAKA,
her principal. It was also stated
therein that being a trustee, respondent Apostol agreed, on written request of
the principal, to assign and transfer the shares of stock and any and all such
distributions or dividends unto the principal or such other person as the
principal would nominate or appoint.
Petitioner was well aware of this
trust, being the person in charge of this documentation and being one of the
witnesses to the execution of this document.[24] Hence, the mere alleged endorsement of Certificate
of Stock No. 001 by Senator Enrile or
by a duly authorized officer of JAKA
to effect the transfer of shares of JAKA
to petitioner could not have been legally feasible because Certificate of Stock
No. 001 was already canceled by virtue of the deed of sale to respondent
Apostol.
And, there is nothing in the
records which shows that JAKA had revoked the trust it reposed on
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol. Neither
was there any evidence that the principal had requested her to assign and
transfer the shares of stock to petitioner.
If it was true that the shares of stock covered by Certificate of Stock
No. 007 had been transferred to petitioner, the person who could legally
endorse the certificate was private respondent Eugenia D. Apostol, she being
the registered owner and trustee of the shares of stock covered by Certificate
of Stock No. 007. It is a settled rule
that the trustee should endorse the stock certificate to validate the
cancellation of her share and to have the transfer recorded in the books of the
corporation.[25]
In fine, the records are unclear
on how petitioner allegedly acquired the shares of stock of JAKA.
Petitioner being the chief executive officer of JAKA and the sole person in charge of all business and financial
transactions and affairs of JAKA[26] was supposed to be in the best position to show
convincing evidence on the alleged transfer of shares to her, if indeed there
was a transfer. Considering that petitioner’s status is being questioned and
several factual circumstances have been presented by private respondents disproving petitioner’s claim, it was
incumbent upon her to submit rebuttal evidence on the manner by which she
allegedly became a stockholder. Her
failure to do so taken in the light of several
substantial inconsistencies in her evidence is fatal to her case.
The rule is that the endorsement
of the certificate of stock by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or any other person
legally authorized to make the transfer shall be sufficient to effect the
transfer of shares only if the same is coupled with delivery. The delivery of the stock certificate duly
endorsed by the owner is the operative act of transfer of shares from the
lawful owner to the new transferee.
Thus, for a valid transfer of
stocks, the requirements are as follows: (a) There must be delivery of the
stock certificate; (b) The certificate must be endorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact
or other persons legally authorized to make the transfer; and, (c) to be valid
against third parties, the transfer must be recorded in the books of the
corporation.[27] At most, in the instant case, petitioner has
satisfied only the third requirement.
Compliance with the first two requisites has not been clearly and
sufficiently shown.
Considering that the requirements
provided under Sec. 63 of The Corporation Code should be mandatorily
complied with, the rule on presumption of regularity cannot apply. The regularity and validity of the transfer
must be proved. As it is, even the
credibility of the stock and transfer book and the entries thereon relied upon
by petitioner to show compliance with
the third requisite to prove that she was a stockholder since 1983 is highly
doubtful.
The records show that the
original stock and transfer book and the stock certificate book of Mr. & Ms. were in the possession of
petitioner before their custody was transferred to the Corporate Secretary,
Atty. Augusto San Pedro.[28] On 25 May 1988, Assistant Corporate Secretary Renato
Jose Unson wrote Mr. & Ms. about
the lost stock and transfer book which was also noted by the corporation’s
external auditors, Punongbayan and Araullo, in their audit. Atty. Unson even informed respondent Eugenia
D. Apostol as President of Mr. & Ms.
that steps would be undertaken to prepare and register a new Stock and Transfer
Book with the SEC. Incidentally,
perhaps strangely, upon verification with the SEC, it was discovered
that the general file of the corporation with the SEC was missing. Hence, it was even possible that the original Stock and Transfer
Book might not have been registered at all.
On 20 October 1988 respondent
Eugenia D. Apostol wrote Atty. Augusto San Pedro noting the changes he had made
in the Stock and Transfer Book without prior notice to the corporate officers.[29] In the 27 October 1988 directors' meeting,
respondent Eugenia D. Apostol asked about the documentation to support the
changes in the Stock and Transfer Book with regard to the JAKA shares. Petitioner
answered that Atty. San Pedro made the changes upon her instructions
conformably with established practice.[30]
This simply shows that as of 1988
there still existed certain issues affecting the ownership of the JAKA shares, thus raising doubts whether
the alleged transactions recorded in the Stock and Transfer Book were proper,
regular and authorized. Then, as if to
magnify and compound the uncertainties in the ownership of the shares of stock
in question, when the corporate secretary resigned, the Stock and Transfer Book
was delivered not to the corporate office where the book should be kept but to
petitioner.[31]
That JAKA retained its ownership of its Mr. & Ms. shares was clearly shown by its receipt of the dividends
issued in December 1986.[32] This only means, very obviously, that Mr. & Ms. shares in question still
belonged to JAKA and not to petitioner. For, dividends are distributed to
stockholders pursuant to their right to share in corporate profits. When a dividend is declared, it belongs to
the person who is the substantial and beneficial owner of the stock at the time
regardless of when the distribution profit was earned.[33]
Finally, this Court takes notice
of the glaring and open admissions of petitioner made, not just seven (7) but
nine (9) times, during the 22 September 1988 meeting of the board of directors
that the Enriles were her principals or shareholders, as shown by the minutes
thereof which she duly signed[34] -
5.
Mrs. E. Apostol explained to the Directors that through her efforts, the
asset base of the Company has improved
and profits were realized. It is for
this reason that the Company has declared a 100% cash dividend in 1986. She said that it is up for the Board to
decide based on this performance whether she should continue to act as Board
Chairman or not. In this regard, Ms. N.A.
Bitong expressed her recollection of how Ex-Libris/Mr. & Ms. were organized and her participation for and on
behalf of her principals, as follows:
She recalled that her principals were invited by Mrs. E. Apostol to
invest in Ex-Libris and eventually Mr.
& Ms. The relationship between
her principals and Mrs. E. Apostol made it possible for the latter to have
access to several information concerning certain political events and issues. In many instances, her principals supplied
first hand and newsworthy information that made Mr. & Ms. a popular paper x x x x
6.
According to Ms. Bitong, her principals were instrumental in helping Mr. & Ms. survive during those years
that it was cash strapped x x x x Ms. N.A. Bitong pointed out that the
practice of using the former Minister’s influence and stature in the government
is one thing which her principals themselves are strongly against x x x
x
7.
x x x x At this point, Ms. N.
Bitong again expressed her recollection of the subject matter as follows:
(a) Mrs. E. Apostol, she remembers,
brought up the concept of a cooperative-ran newspaper company in one of her
breakfast session with her principals sometime during the end of 1985. Her principals when asked for
an opinion, said that they recognized the concept as something very noble and
visible x x x x Then Ms. Bitong asked a very specific
question - "When you conceptualized Ex-Libris and Mr. & Ms., did you not think of my shareholders the Ponce
Enriles as liabilities? How come
you associated yourself with them then and not now? What is the difference?"
Mrs. Apostol did not answer the question.
The admissions of a party against
his interest inscribed upon the record books of a corporation are competent and
persuasive evidence against him.[35] These admissions render nugatory any argument that
petitioner is a bona fide stockholder of Mr. & Ms. at any time before 1988 or at the time the acts
complained of were committed. There is
no doubt that petitioner was an employee of JAKA
as its managing officer, as testified to by Senator Enrile himself.[36] However, in the absence of a special authority from
the board of directors of JAKA to
institute a derivative suit for and in its behalf, petitioner is disqualified
by law to sue in her own name. The
power to sue and be sued in any court by a corporation even as a stockholder is
lodged in the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers and not in
the president or officer thereof.[37]
It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that where corporate directors are guilty of a breach of trust,
not of mere error of judgment or abuse of discretion, and intracorporate remedy
is futile or useless, a stockholder may institute a suit in behalf of himself
and other stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a
redress of the wrong inflicted directly upon the corporation and indirectly
upon the stockholders.[38] The stockholder’s right to institute a derivative
suit is not based on any express provision of The Corporation Code but
is impliedly recognized when the law makes corporate directors or officers
liable for damages suffered by the corporation and its stockholders for
violation of their fiduciary duties.
Hence, a stockholder may sue for
mismanagement, waste or dissipation of corporate assets because of a special
injury to him for which he is otherwise without redress.[39] In effect, the suit is an action for specific performance
of an obligation owed by the corporation to the stockholders to assist its
rights of action when the corporation has been put in default by the wrongful
refusal of the directors or management to make suitable measures for its
protection.[40]
The basis of a stockholder’s suit
is always one in equity. However, it
cannot prosper without first complying with the legal requisites for its
institution. The most important of
these is the bona fide ownership by a stockholder of a stock in his own
right at the time of the transaction complained of which invests him with
standing to institute a derivative action for the benefit of the corporation.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 31 August 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing
the complaint of petitioner Nora A. Bitong in CA-G.R. No. SP 33291, and
granting the petition for certiorari
and prohibition filed by respondent Edgardo B. Espiritu as well as annulling
the 5 November 1993, 24 January 1994 and 18 February 1994 Orders of the SEC En Banc in CA-G.R. No. SP 33873, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,
(Chairman), Vitug, and
Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J.,
no
part. Participated, as a
former practicing lawyer, in negotiations to buy subject shares.
[1] The derivative suit, docketed as SEC Case No. 03604,
was commenced on 5 July 1989 through a petition for injunction, accounting and
damages with prayer for the appointment of a management committee and for a
writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary retraining order.
[2] The name of respondent Jose Apostol has been
interchangeably designated in the records as "Jose A. Apostol" and as
"Jose Z. Apostol." For uniformity, "Jose A. Apostol" or
simply "Jose Apostol" is used in this Decision.
[3] The SEC Hearing Panel was composed of Hearing
Officers Josefina L. Pasay-Paz, Antonio M. Esteves and Manuel P. Perea.
[4] Associate Commissioners Rodolfo L. Samarista, Merle
O. Manuel, Fe Eloisa C. Gloria and Perfecto R. Yasay, Jr., concurred in the
Order, while Chairman Rosario N. Lopez did
not participate.
[5] CA Decision penned by Associate Justice Pedro A. Ramirez,
Chairman of the Eight Division (Division of Five), with Associate Justices
Jaime M. Lantin and Cancio C. Garcia concurring, and Associate Justices Lourdes
K. Tayao-Jaguros and Eugenio S. Labitoria dissenting.
[6] 29A AmJur
2d, p. 143.
[7] Almer v. Hobart Corp. (Mo App) 849 SW2d 135, CCH
Prod Liab Rep 13550 cited in 29A AmJur 2d, p. 137.
[8] Granada v. PNB, No. L-20745, 2 September 1966, 18
SCRA 1.
[9] Gaspar v. Dorado,
No. L-17884, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 331.
[10] Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 731.
[11] SEC Opinion, 20 October 1970 in Sehwani Investment
& Management Co., cited in Lopez, R., The Corporation Code of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 1994 Ed.
[12] Tuason v. La Previsora Filipina, 67 Phil. 36 [1938].
[13] Fletcher, William Meade, Encyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations, Vol. V, p. 5768.
[14] 18 AmJur 2d 706.
[15] Id., p. 707.
[16] See Note 13, p. 5765.
[17] Id., p.
5774.
[18] TSN, 24 August 1989, pp. 38-39; 6 April 1990, pp.
10-11.
[19] Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court,
p. 10; Rollo, p. 87.
[20] Exh. "21" for petitioner.
[21] TSN, 20 August 1990, pp. 5-18.
[22] Id., p.
40.
[23] Exhs. 21 and 21-A for Private Respondents.
[24] Rollo, p. 201.
[25] Lopez, Rosario, The Corporation Code of the
Philippines, vol. II, 1994 ed., p. 824.
[26] TSN, 20 August 1990, pp. 31-34.
[27] See Note 25, pp. 803-807.
[28] Exh. “35” for
private respondents.
[29] Exh. “30” for
private respondents.
[30] Exh. "31" for private respondents.
[31] Exh. "36" for private respondents.
[32] Exh. "26-B" for private respondents.
[33] Agbayani, Aguedo F., Commercial Laws of the
Philippines, Vol. III, 1988 Ed., p. 409.
[34] Exh. "F" for petitioner.
[35] See Note 25.
[36] See Note 26.
[37] See Note 33, citing RP v. Phil. Resources
Development Corp., G.R. No. 10141, 31 January 1958.
[38] Pascual v. Del Sanz Orozeo, 19 Phil. 82 {1911).
[39] See Note 11, p. 853, citing Mimnaugh v. Atlantic
City Electric Co., 7 NJ Super 310, Super 310, 70A (2d) 904.
[40] Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 728, 80 L Ed 1011, 56 Sup Ct 588.
[41] SMC, represented by Eduardo de los Angeles v. Kahn,
G.R. No. 85339, 11 August 1989, 176 SCRA 461.