SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 114695.
July 23, 1998]
PREMIERE DEVELOPMENT BANK,
PROCOPIO C. REYES, PACITA M. ARAOS and RENATO DIONISIO, petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and TEODORA LABANDA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MARTINEZ, J.:
Is the filing of
an action for damages against one's employer tantamount to abandonment of job?
This is the main issue sought to be resolved in this petition for certiorari.
The factual
antecedents are as follows:
On August 8, 1985, Ramon T. Ocampo,
a depositor of petitioner bank, issued a check in the amount of P6,792.66
in favor of and for deposit to the account of Country Banker's Insurance
Corporation (CBISCO), also a depositor of petitioner bank. On the same day,
after the check and the deposit slip were presented to respondent Teodora
Labanda, who was employed as teller at petitioner's Taytay Branch, they were
turned over to the Branch cashier for verification of the fund balance and
signature of the drawer. There was a confirmation of the check and the same was
accepted by Labanda for deposit to the current account of CBISCO.
The check was posted by Manuel S.
Torio, the Taytay Branch bookkeeper.
But instead of posting it to CBISCO's account, the same was posted to
the account of Ocampo treating it as "On-Us Check," that is, drawn
against the Taytay Branch where the check was deposited.
On January 13, 1986, the wife of
Ocampo, together with the auditor from CBISCO, went to petitioner bank and
complained to petitioner Dr. Procopio C. Reyes[1] that her husband was being held accountable for the
amount. It was only then that petitioner bank discovered the misposting of the
check issued by Ocampo, resulting in the overstatement of his outstanding daily
balance by P6,792.66. The overstatement remained undetected until Ocampo
withdrew the money from the bank.
Due to this incident, petitioner
Pacita M. Araos[2] sent a demand letter to private respondent
requesting her to explain in writing the misposting and erroneous crediting of
the subject check in issue as well as the circumstances surrounding the
incident within three (3) days from receipt thereof, and in case she fails to
do so, necessary action shall be taken against her.[3]
Petitioner
Renato G. Dionisio,[4] upon instructions of petitioner
Reyes, sent the internal auditors of the bank to investigate and make a
detailed report about the incident. On January 22, 1986, the auditors came out
with a report finding private respondent Labanda and bookkeeper Torio primarily
liable for the incident, for the following reasons:
"a) Firstly, there was no end-of-the-day independent balancing of
cash and checks between Labanda and Torio, thus the former failed to notice the
over-stated cash and understated check reflected in the latter's blotter
posting tape;
b)
Manuel Torio did not affix his initial on Labanda's blotter to indicate
the balancing between them."[5]
These findings
prompted petitioner Dionisio to send a letter[6] to private respondent Labanda
requiring her to shoulder 20% of the amount lost via salary deduction.
Private respondent replied,[7] objecting to such move, reasoning
out that she is the breadwinner in the family. She further asked the bank to
furnish her a copy of the audit report and requested for a full-dress
investigation. For this reason, petitioners held in abeyance the salary
deductions.
On March 13,
1986, respondent Labanda was placed under preventive suspension pending
investigation of the incident. She was
requested to report on April 4, 1986 so that she can present her side of the
story. Labanda then wrote a letter[8] to petitioner Reyes requesting
information on the duration of her suspension and at the same time asking for
an expeditious investigation. In response thereto, she was informed that the
period of her suspension shall last until the investigation is completed and a
decision is made thereon.
On the date of
said inquiry, Labanda executed a statement.[9] However, she manifested before
Atty. Revelo during the inquiry that she will not sign any of the preliminary
statements she made unless the same is with the consent and advice of her
husband. She also told the inquiring officer that she could not inform
petitioners of the dates when she would be available for investigation.
On April 8,
1986, another letter was sent to respondent Labanda by petitioner Reyes
informing the former that her refusal to sign or authenticate preliminary
statements given on April 4, 1986 was a clear indication of her unwillingness
to cooperate or an effort to hide something or suppress the truth.[10]
The dates of the
hearing were rescheduled by petitioners several times. The first rescheduled
hearing was on April 14, 1986 where private respondent sent her lawyer bringing
with him a letter asking that she be given time to confer with her counsel for
which she was given until April 23.
Notices were sent to inform her of the rescheduled dates with warning
that failure to attend the same shall be taken as a tacit admission of her
liability and the case shall be resolved based on the evidence available. In
the meantime, Bookkeeper Torio admitted liability and was allowed to resign.
On April 7,
1986, petitioners received a letter from private respondent through her counsel[11] demanding payment of actual damages
in the amount of P50,000.00 for their alleged arbitrary, illegal and
oppressive acts.[12] Petitioners did not heed the
demand.
On May 23, 1986,
private respondent filed a complaint for damages before the court.[13] Petitioners’ subsequent motion to
dismiss was denied. When their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied,
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
which however dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the
complaint with the labor arbiter. The decision became final and executory on
July 30, 1987.
On April 4,
1988, eight months from the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision and two
years from the alleged termination of her employment, respondent Labanda filed
an illegal dismissal case[14] before the Labor Arbiter on the
ground that her dismissal was without lawful cause and without due process.
After trial, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the labor case ruling that:
"With the filing of the
complaint with the Regional Trial Court, complainant on her own, terminated her
employment with the Bank. She was not dismissed by her employer. She prayed for
actual and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs. In effect, she
abandoned her job when she filed a complaint for compensatory damages with the
regular court.
x x x x
x x x x x
"There is definitely no
dismissal, much less illegal dismissal committed by respondents in this case.
No denial of due process. Accordingly,
no damages could be awarded, nor any relief prayed for in the complaint.
"WHEREFORE, for utter lack of
merit, the complaint against herein respondents Premiere Development Bank and
the three individual bank officials is hereby dismissed.
"SO ORDERED." [15]
On appeal, the
NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter ruling that private
respondent’s indefinite preventive suspension amounted to constructive
dismissal. Citing the Implementing Rules,[16] the NLRC declared that:
"Based on the above-quoted
provisions of law, there was no adherence made by respondent as to confer both
validity and regularity in the exercise. The suspension in the first place was
misplaced and was not based on complainant's actual commission of culpability,
but apparently instituted to force complainant to submit to an inquiry which
appears not independent in character. The preventive nature of the suspension
appears not present in complainant's case as the proximate cause of the
misposting was the negligence of the Bookkeeper and not that of the
complainant. In the first place, all the required procedural acts and duties of
a Teller ought to be performed in the appreciation of the deposit in question
were properly served by the complainant. She has no more control in the
mechanical act of posting the transaction in the wrong current account letter,
and therefore, there is no valid reason to place her on preventive suspension,
the same being the principal duty of Bookkeeper Torio."
The dispositive
portion of the NLRC resolution reads:
"Accordingly, the decision
appealed from is hereby reversed and a new one is entered finding the
separation of the complainant Labanda illegal and unjust.
"Respondents Premiere
Development Bank and Procopio Reyes are hereby ordered to immediately reinstate
Labanda to her former position with backwages and other benefits for a period
not exceeding three (3) years without qualifications and deductions computed on
the amount of P87,750.00.
"SO ORDERED."[17]
When
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC, they filed the
instant petition for certiorari raising the following issues for
resolution:
I
Whether or not private respondent
Labanda was negligent for the misposting of the deposit of subject check.
II
Whether or not public respondent
NLRC gravely erred in ruling that said preventive suspension imposed by
petitioners for above-mentioned incident is illegal and violative of private
respondent Labanda's rights to due process.
III
Whether or not private respondent
Labanda abandoned her job with petitioner bank.[18]
In essence, the
above issues boil down to whether or not the filing of a complaint for damages
by respondent Labanda against the petitioners amounts to abandonment.
Corollarily, petitioners question the findings of the NLRC that there was
violation of due process and there was no legal cause in placing respondent
Labanda under preventive suspension.
In brief,
petitioners claim that there was no illegal dismissal because the severance of
employment was brought about by respondent Labanda’s own doing when she filed a
civil action for damages against them. They also contend that her preventive
suspension was justified because she was negligent in the performance of her
duty in complete disregard of the Bank's Manual Systems and Procedures which
brought about the loss to the bank and that she could not blame Bookkeeper Torio
for her fault. They further insist that her preventive suspension lasted beyond
the 30-day period prescribed by law because of her refusal to cooperate with
them in the investigation.
Private
respondent counters that she should not be blamed for the incident arguing that
her non-performance of the end-of-the-day balancing is justified. She presented
the affidavit of the former OIC-Manager of petitioner’s Taytay Branch.[19] The affidavit stated that the
procedure of "On-Us" checks and reconciliation of the end-of-the-day
balancing which differ substantially from the authorized procedure were being
implemented without petitioner bank's knowledge and approval. Petitioner bank,
however, said that the OIC-Manager was suspended because of some irregularities.
The petition is
without merit.
Private
respondent's preventive suspension is without valid cause since she was
outrightly suspended by petitioner. As of the date of her preventive suspension
on March 13, 1986 until the date when the last investigation was rescheduled on
April 23, 1986, more than 30 days had expired. The NLRC correctly observed that
the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period amounted to constructive
dismissal, thus:
"By placing her on indefinite
suspension, complainant was unduly deprived of her right to security in
employment which is her only means of livelihood. It is very evident that
complainant was already placed on constructive dismissal status as of March 13,
1986 when she was placed on preventive suspension indefinitely. The actuation
of respondents since no other sound interpretation but a predetermined effort
of dismissing complainant from the service in the guise of preventive
suspension."[20]
Furthermore, the
question of whether or not an employee has abandoned his/her work is a factual
issue.[21] It has been consistently held that
factual issues are not proper subjects of a petition for certiorari, as
the power of the Supreme Court to review labor cases is limited to questions
of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion.[22] Petitioners failed to show that the
findings of fact of the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence. Hence,
such findings must be accorded respect and finality on appeal.
We agree with
both the NLRC and the Solicitor General that respondent Labanda did not abandon
her job. To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1)
the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason, and (2) a clear intention to
sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.[23] Abandoning one's job means the
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment and
the burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on
the part of the employee to discontinue employment.[24] The law, however, does not
enumerate what specific overt acts can be considered as strong evidence of the
intention to sever the employee-employer relationship. An employee who merely took steps to protest
her indefinite suspension and to subsequently file an action for damages,
cannot be said to have abandoned her work nor is it indicative of an intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship.
Her failure to report for work was due to her indefinite suspension. Petitioner's allegation of abandonment is
further belied by the fact that private respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal. Abandonment of work
is inconsistent with the filing of said complaint.[25]
On procedural
considerations, respondent NLRC held that there was a violation by petitioner
bank of the due process requirements under the Labor Code when it held that we
also have not seen any effort of notifying complainant about her interest in
her job by sending letters at her home address.[26]
The twin
requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due
process which are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code in this wise:
SEC. 2. Notice of Dismissal. - Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker
shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s)
constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
x x x x
x x x x
x
"SEC. 5. Answer and Hearing. - The worker may answer
the allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a
reasonable period from receipt of such notice.
The employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
"SEC. 6. Decision to Dismiss. - The employer shall
immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
clearly the reasons therefor.
"SEC. 7. Right to contest dismissal. - Any decision
taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to
contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with
the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Commission.
Granting arguendo
that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied
that notice still has to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as
the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules explicitly
requires service thereof at the employee's last known address. While it is conceded that it is the
employer's prerogative to terminate the services of an employee, especially
when there is a just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be
taken lightly. The law does not
countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has
the effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in
favor of the employee.[27]
Petitioner's
allegation that private respondent is guilty of laches is likewise devoid of
merit. Laches is the failure for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which in exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned or has declined to assert it.[28] The question of laches is addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable remedy, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot work to defeat justice or to
perpetrate fraud and injustice.[29] A party cannot be held guilty of
laches when he has not incurred undue delay in the assertion of his rights.[30]
Under the law,[31] an illegal dismissal case is an
action predicated on the injury to the rights of the dismissed employee which
prescribes in four (4) years. On April 4, 1988 or eight months from the
finality of the Court of Appeals' decision and two years from the alleged
termination of employment by respondent Labanda, she filed her complaint with
the Labor Arbiter which is within the four-year reglementary period. She did
not sleep on her rights for an unreasonable length of time.
We note with
favor and give imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:
"The records of this case will
show that private respondent Labanda never intended to abandon her job. First,
after her indefinite suspension, she requested that the
"full-dressed" investigation be done at the quickest time possible,
and appealed to petitioner Reyes to consider that she was the breadwinner in
the family. Second, she actively fought for her right to security of tenure by
filing first with the Regional Trial Court an action for damages, and later
with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal.
Moreover, private respondent
Labanda's inability to report for work was not voluntary but was rather the
result of her indefinite suspension, which in reality was a constructive
dismissal.
It is noticeable that from March
13, 1986, the date when private respondent Labanda was placed on suspension,
petitioners, despite their warning that there would resolve the issue of the
misposted check even without private respondent Labanda's participation, never
decided who was responsible for the act. Indeed, if petitioners believed that
private respondent Labanda was really responsible, they would rule squarely on
the matter. But they never did, for reasons petitioners never stated. Moreover,
petitioners never took the initiative to notify private respondent Labanda
to report back to work or charge the latter with abandonment of work.
The foregoing considerations
indubitably show that private respondent Labanda did not abandon her job but
was illegally dismissed from employment without due process of law."[32]
We thus accord
respect and finality to the factual findings of respondent NLRC, supported as
it is by substantial evidence, that respondent Labanda did not abandon her
work. We ruled in Sampang v. Inciong[33] that in determining the penalty to
be imposed on an erring employee, due consideration must be given to the
employee's length of service and the number of violations he committed during
his employ.
In the case at
bench, considering that respondent Labanda has been in the service of
petitioner bank for the past 10 years and nowhere in the records does it appear
that she committed any previous infractions of company rules and regulations,
we find that the decision of respondent NLRC ordering her reinstatement with
three-year backwages is just and equitable.
Private respondent's dismissal
from work would be too severe a penalty under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, In view of the foregoing, the
instant petition is DISMISSED. The challenged January 10, 1994 Resolution of
the National Labor Relation Commission is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado,
(Chairman), Melo, Puno, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
[1]
Chairman and President of Petitioner Bank.
[2]
Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Gen. Administrative and
Personnel Division.
[3]
Dated January 14, 1986, Rollo, p. 61.
[4]
Executive Vice-President of petitioner Premier Development Bank.
[5]
Petition, Rollo, p. 17;
62; 65.
[6]
Dated March 10, 1986.
[7]
Dated March 11, 1986, addressed to petitioner Renato G. Dionisio,
Petition, Annex "G", Rollo, p. 67.
[8]
Dated March 16, 1986, Petition, Annex "G", Rollo, p.
68.
[9]
Taken by Atty. Isidro Revelo, Asst. VP and Head of the Legal and Collect
Division and witnessed by Petitioner Araos, dated April 4, 1986, Petition,
Annex "I", Rollo, p. 69.
[10]
Petition, Annex “J,” p.71.
[11]
Atty. Jose B. Ramos.
[12]
Petition, Annex "C", p. 63.
[13]
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136; See Petition, Annex
"B", Rollo, p. 35.
[14]
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, p. 33.
[15]
Labor Arbiter’s Decision, June 29, 1990, Petition, Annex “G,” Rollo,
p. 97.
[16] "SECTION 2. Notice of
Dismissal. Any employer who seeks
to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular
acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice
shall be served at the worker's last known address.
SECTION 4. Period
of Suspension. No preventive
suspension shall last longer than 30 days. The employer shall thereafter
reinstate the worker in his former or in substantially equivalent position or
the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period
of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. In such case, the worker shall not be bound
to reimburse the amount paid to him during the extension if the employer
decides, after completion of the hearing to dismiss the worker." (Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code).
[17]
NLRC Resolution penned by Hon. Commissioner Domingo H. Zapanta and
concurred in by Edna Bonto-Perez and Rogelio I. Rayala, dated January 10, 1994,
Rollo, p. 125.
[18]
Petition, Rollo, p. 21.
[19]
Onoridad E. Aquino.
[20]
NLRC Resolution, Rollo, p.125; 132.
[21]
General Textiles, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 102969, April 4, 1995,
243 SCRA 232, citing Palencia v. National Labor Relations Commission,
153 SCRA 247[1987].
[22]
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. vs. NLRC, 260
SCRA 758, August 22, 1996, citing Oscar Ledesma and Company vs. NLRC,
246 SCRA 2247, July 13, 1995; Loadstar
Shipping Co. vs. Gallo, 229 SCRA 654, February 4, 1994.
[23]
Artemio Labor, et al vs.
NLRC et. al, G.R. No. 110388, September 14, 1995, 248 SCRA 183.
[24]
Reno Foods, Inc. v. NLRC, 249 SCRA 379.
[25]
Santos & Judric Canning Corporation v. Inciong, G.R. No.
51494, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 887.
[26]
NLRC Resolution dated January 10, 1994, Rollo, pp. 125; 131.
[27]
De Ysasi III vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 104599, 231 SCRA 173, March 11,
1994.
[28]
Cormero vs. CA, 247 SCRA 291, August 14, 1995 citing Marcelino vs.
CA, 210 SCRA 444 (1992); Solomon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 185
SCRA 352(1990).
[29]
Jimenez vs. Fernandez, 184 SCRA 190, April 6, 1990; Palmera vs. Civil Service Commission,
235 SCRA 87, August 4, 1994.
[30]
Nemenzo vs. Sabillano, 25 SCRA 1; Fuentes vs. NLRC, 167 SCRA 767, November 24, 1988.
[31]
Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 1146.
[32]
Memorandum, Rollo, p. 430.
[33]
G.R. No. L-50992, June 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 561.