SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110067. August 3, 1998]
MA. LINDA T. ALMENDRAS, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, URCICIO TAN PANG ENG and FABIANA YAP, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Private
respondents seek a reconsideration of the decision in this case remanding it to
the trial court so that private respondents may file a third-party complaint
against parties through whose property they claim a right of way in favor of
petitioner should pass since it would be the property least prejudiced by the
establishment of such easement.
First. Private respondents contend that
the Court should have dismissed the complaint in view of its finding that
petitioner “failed to prove that she has a right to the establishment of such
an easement through private respondents’ property.” The contention has no
merit.
While it is
undisputed that a right of way through private respondents’ property is the
shortest distance to the provincial road, there is no proof that making the
easement pass that way will cause the least damage as provided in Art. 650 of
the Civil Code. Hence, the Court said
in its decision:
Thus, it
has been held that “where the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However,
. . . if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement,
the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not
be the shortest. [2 Arturo M.
Tolentino, Civil Code 374 (1974)]”
[Quimen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112331, May 29, 1996]
In the case at bar, the trial court
ruled that the easement should be
constituted through the land of private respondents on the eastern side
because it would be the shortest way to the provincial road, being only 17.45
meters long, compared to 149.22 meters if the easement was constituted on the
Opone and Tudtud roads on the western and southern sides of petitioner’s land.
On the other hand, as already
pointed out, the Court of Appeals, in
pointing to the longer way, considered the fact that this was already existing
and does not preclude its use by other parties than the individual owners of
Lot 1-A to Lot 1-G and the owners of the land on which the connecting Tudtud
road is found.
. . . It is not possible to
determine whether the estates which would be least prejudiced by the easement
would be those of the owners of the Opone and Tudtud properties because they
have not been heard. Although evidence
concerning the condition of their estates has been presented by private
respondents, it is impossible to determine with certainty which estate would be
least prejudiced by the establishment of an easement for petitioner until these
parties have been heard. Any decision
holding them liable to bear the easement would not be binding on them since
they are not parties to this action.
This is the reason why the case has been ordered remanded for further
proceedings.
Second. Private respondents argue that to require them to file a
third-party complaint against the owners of the other neighboring estates would
be to force them to litigate and this would place on them the burden of proving
that the establishment of the right of way through the said properties would be
the least prejudicial route.
Since private
respondents claim that the point least prejudicial to the owners of servient
estates is through the properties of the Opones on the western side of
petitioner’s lot, they should really prove their allegation. For this purpose,
all property owners must be brought before the court.
Private
respondents contend that a third-party complaint is not the proper mode of
joining other property owners in the suit because those owners have no legal
tie with the owners of the estate sought to be burdened with the easement
(herein private respondents) so as to make them liable to the latter for
“contribution, indemnity, and subrogation,” as provided in Rule 6, §12 (now
§11) of the Rules of Court which states:
Sec. 12. Third party complaint. A third-party complaint is a claim that a
defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.
There is no
merit in this contention. A person who is not a party to an action may be
impleaded by the defendant either on the basis of liability to himself or on
the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff. It is liability to the defendant which may be in the form of
contribution, indemnity, or subrogation.
On the other hand, direct liability to the plaintiff may be in the form
of “any other relief in respect of plaintiff’s claim.”[1]
Third. What is really important to remember is that petitioner’s land is
surrounded on all four sides by the properties of other owners. She therefore has a right to demand a right of
way through any of the neighboring estates in order to have access to the provincial
road. In determining where the easement
should pass, the owners of all surrounding properties should be heard with
respect to two matters: (1) at which
point establishment of the easement would be least prejudicial to the owners of
the servient estates and (2) at which point the distance of the right of way to
the public highway would be shortest.
As already stated, if these two circumstances do not concur in the same
tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be taken.
Although we
believe private respondents can be made to substantiate their claim that the
easement in this case should be established through the Opone and Tudtud
properties, it would be in keeping with the rules on burden of proof if the
trial court simply issue an order impleading the aforesaid property owners and
requiring them to answer the complaint of petitioner and thereafter receive
their evidence. Pursuant to Rule 3, §11
“parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party
or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just.”
WHEREFORE, the
dispositive portion of the decision in this case is MODIFIED so as to make it
read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the
Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court are SET ASIDE, and this
case is REMANDED to the trial court with instructions forthwith to order the
owners of the Opone and Tudtud properties to be impleaded as defendants, and
thereafter hear their evidence and render judgment as may be warranted.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Melo, Puno and Martinez, JJ., concur.