FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117266.  March 13, 1997]

IN THE MATTER OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST VENTURA O. DUCAT, ET AL. PAPA SECURITIES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J.:

PAPA SECURITIES CORPORATION filed on 30 September 1983 an action for a sum of money against Ventura O. Ducat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati[1] in connection with an obligation which arose on 25 August 1983.

On 30 June 1987 the trial court rendered  judgment finding  respondent Ventura O. Ducat liable to petitioner Papa Securities Corporation  in the principal amount of P3,159,253.37 with interest at  14% per  annum  from  25 August 1983  until full payment,  service  fee of  1/2% of the debt balance computed monthly, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation in an amount equivalent to 25% of the amount due plus costs of suit.

On 12 February 1991 the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.  On 20 November  1991 this Court also affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and on 22 January 1992 denied the motion for its reconsideration.

On  18  June 1992 a writ of execution  was  issued by the trial court by virtue of which respondent Ducat's shares of stock with petitioner  and a lot located at Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, were sold  in an  execution  sale.  The proceeds of the sale being insufficient to  satisfy the judgment  debt his residential house and lot located at  Wack   Wack Subdivision, Mandaluyong, were further sold in a public sale on 7 September 1992.  In that sale petitioner was the highest bidder.  On 9  September 1992 a certificate of sale covering the aforementioned property was issued by  the Sheriff and the sale was accordingly annotated on the certificate of title.

Respondent Ducat having failed to redeem the Wack Wack property within the one (1) year redemption period, a final deed of sale was executed by the  Sheriff on 10 September 1993  and a writ of possession  with notice to vacate was issued by the trial court.

On 14 September 1993 respondent Ducat filed an Urgent  Omnibus Motion seeking to annul the  execution sale  conducted on 7 September 1992, to set aside the order of 10 September 1993, and to hold in abeyance the implementation of the writ of possession and notice to vacate on the grounds  that:  (a) the  levy  and  sale  of  the  Wack  Wack property already  exceeded  the amount  of the judgment debt; (b) the Sheriff's  Return dated 15 July 1992 regarding the sale of the shares  of stock rendered the writ of execution dated 18 June 1992 functus officio   such that no further sale on execution could have been made by authority thereof; and, (c) petitioner failed to observe the procedure laid down by law  for the sale of properties exempt from execution such as the Wack Wack property which has been constituted as his family home.

Resolving the claims of Ducat, the trial court held:  (1) the auction sale of 7 September 1992 was conducted in full compliance  with  the requirements  of  the  law;  besides,  as  early  as  26 October 1992 Ducat already acknowledged  the validity of the proceedings in his letter to the Makati Stock Exchange;  (2) there could never as  yet be an excessive execution of judgment in the absence of entry of satisfaction of judgment contemplated by Sec. 46  in relation  to Sec. 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of  Court; and,  (3) the family home of Ducat was  not exempt  from execution.  Thus on 3 November 1993 the Urgent Omnibus Motion was denied,[2] and on 31 January 1994 the Court of Appeals sustained the denial of the motion.[3]

The decision of the Court of Appeals was elevated to this Court but on 23 May 1994, for non-compliance with Circulars 1-88 and 19-91, the Motion for Extension of Time to file petition was denied,[4] and the petition itself was likewise denied not only because it  was  filed  out  of time but also for failure to show  any reversible error committed by  the appellate court.  Respondent Ducat moved to file the petition anew but was similarly denied on 11 July 1994 because no compelling reason  was adduced to warrant  the  relief sought.[5] Thereafter petitioner filed before the trial court a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of possession.

On 16 August 1994 respondent Ducat moved  for reconsideration  of  the denial of his motion by  this Court.

On 18 August 1994 or during  the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion respondent Ducat thru a new and collaborating counsel, respondent Atty. Elgar Cruz of the  Teng Mariano and Cruz Law Offices, filed an urgent motion to declare  failure  of  auction sale  of  the  Wack  Wack property  before the trial court.  He argued that  based on  the  decision dated 30  June  1987 and   the corresponding  writ  of  execution  his  obligation  to petitioner  has amounted to P13,789,964.73.  After  the sale  of his shares of stock and the Ayala Alabang lot there  was left only a balance of P5,429,964.73 whereas  the Wack Wack property was sold for P13,294,264.31 thereby leaving an excess over the judgment in the  amount  of P7,864,299.58.   Atty. Cruz invoked Sec. 23, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court which provides that if the amount of the bid exceeds the amount stated in the judgment, the judgment creditor who at the same time is the purchaser at  the execution sale must pay the excess.

The records do  not show that petitioner paid the excess.  He  further invoked Art.  1352  of the  Civil  Code  which provides  that a contract of purchase  and sale is  null and void and produces no effect whatsoever where the purchase price which appears therein as paid was  never in  fact paid  by  the purchaser to the vendor;[6] needless to say, the auction sale of the Wack Wack property  did not produce any effect.

On  7  September 1994 this Court denied reconsideration of the 11 July 1994 ruling.

On  14 September 1994 respondent Ducat again thru respondent  Atty. Cruz filed before the trial court  a position paper  in support of the 18 August 1994 motion.

On  26  September 1994 another urgent motion was filed but  this  time for protective orders: (a) requiring the Sheriff to render a complete  and final report and accounting; (b) requiring petitioner to pay the excess of bid over the judgment debt; (c) declaring void the certificate of sale of the Wack Wack  property based on the same arguments raised in the 18 August 1994  motion;  and, (d)  holding  in  abeyance the resolution of the motion for an alias  writ of possession.

The filing of these motions prompted  petitioner to file a petition with this Court on 12 October 1994 to cite in contempt of court respondents Ventura O. Ducat and Teng Mariano and Cruz Law Offices alleging that respondents Ducat and his present counsel have deliberately, maliciously  and in utter and palpable bad faith delayed and continue to delay the satisfaction  of a final  judgment  in  its favor, and that respondent Ducat cannot keep on re-filing motions and attempting to re-open finally settled issues  through  the  expediency  of hiring a new counsel.  On the other hand, the present counsel is duty-bound to be  aware  of the status of the case and cannot take refuge in the claim that he was newly hired.

Incidentally, on 14 October 1994 the trial court denied the  motion  to declare the  7 September  1992 auction sale void inasmuch as the Court of Appeals and this Court had categorically and finally declared  the sale valid.   The  motion  for  the  issuance  of  a protective order  to  declare  the certificate of  sale  void  was likewise denied since the issuance of said  certificate was an act related to the auction sale that  has  been declared valid with finality.  On 17 October 1994 the trial court issued an order stating that the alias writ of  possession/authority to  break open would issue simultaneously as soon as it was informed by the parties of the action taken by them in the matter of the excess judgment.

Respondents  contend that they have not  committed any  act to  delay the proceedings before the trial court.  In fact, their acts have been guided by and  premised on  the decision  of the Court of  Appeals  dated  31 January  1994, as affirmed by this Court  in  G.R.  No. 115585, which held that the computation of the judgment debt vis-a-vis the amounts obtained under execution was premature.  They filed the two (2) urgent motions before the trial court precisely because it was the  opportune time to compute those amounts.  They counter the  present  motion   by moving   that   petitioner   instead   be declared  in indirect contempt of court based on the following:  (a) abuse of the processes of the   courts,   particularly  the  process   of   execution,  and  (b) improper conduct directly tending to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of justice.

We grant the motion of petitioner as we find respondent Ventura O. Ducat and his counsel Atty. Elgar Cruz guilty of indirect contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71, of the Rules of Court.  By filing the 18 August 1994 motion respondents committed the acts mentioned in letters (c) and (d) of Sec. 3:

(c)   Any  abuse  of  or  any   unlawful interference with the process or  proceedings of  a court not constituting direct  contempt under section 1 of this rule;[7]

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,  obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice x  x x x

The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior and offensive personalities.[8]

A comparison of the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed on 14 September 1993[9] with the urgent motion to  declare  failure  of  auction sale of the Wack Wack property filed on 18  August 1994[10] discloses that the latter motion merely echoed  the  allegations  found  in  the former motion.   Furthermore,  both motions prayed for the same relief, namely, the annulment of the auction sale conducted  on  7  September 1992.    In effect, respondents asked the  trial court in the  18  August 1994  motion to resolve an  issue which has been settled by the same court as early as  3 November  1993, affirmed by the Court of Appeals on  31 January 1994, and by this Court on 11 July 1994.  Equally disdainful is  the  fact  that  the  motion  for reconsideration of the 11 July 1994 ruling was  still pending before this Court when respondents filed the 18 August 1994  motion.  The foregoing actuation  demonstrates defiance of the authority and dignity of this Court and disrespect of the  administration  of justice.[11]

The explanation proffered by respondents in filing the 18 August 1994 and 26 September 1994 motions, i.e., that it is the opportune time to determine whether there  was  an  excess over the judgment  debt, is an attempt to mask  their  underlying  intention.  As distinctly  set forth in the prayer of the 18 August 1994 motion and in the position paper which they  filed as proof and in support of the motion, the relief that they were asking was the annulment of the 7 September 1992 auction sale.

Respondents  are  therefore  guilty  of  indirect contempt of this Court.  Punishment shall be meted on a corrective principle[12] in  order  to     vindicate    the   authority   and   dignity   of   this   Court   and   the administration of justice.   Under Sec. 6, Rule 71, of the Rules of Court, if the contempt was committed against a superior  court or judge, the accused may be fined  not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or  imprisoned for not  more  than six (6) months,  or  both.  Conformably thereto,  we  impose  upon   respondent   Ventura  O.  Ducat   a   fine  of    Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00).   As regards respondent Atty. Elgar Cruz,   being not just a member of the legal profession but an officer of the court as well,[13] we impose upon him a higher fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00).

Respondents' motion to declare petitioner instead guilty of  indirect contempt of  court deserves no consideration because the  bases  relied upon  are utterly unfounded.

WHEREFORE, respondents VENTURA  O. DUCAT and ATTY. ELGAR CRUZ  of Teng Mariano and Cruz Law Offices are declared GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and fined Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), respectively, with a STERN WARNING  that a repetition of the same or similar  acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.  The imposed fines should be paid to this Court within ten (10) days from notice.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and entered in the records of respondent Atty. Elgar Cruz.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.



[1] Raffled to Br. 57 then presided over by Judge Francisco  X.  Velez.

[2] RTC Order denying the Urgent Omnibus Motion was issued by Judge Arsenio J. Magpale; Rollo, p.  36.

[3] CA Decision sustaining the denial of the Motion was penned by Mme. Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros with Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Jesus M. Elbinias concurring,  Rollo, p. 88.

[4] G.R. No. 114871, Third Division.

[5] G.R. No. 115585, Second Division.

[6] The exact provision reads:  Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect whatsoever.  The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

[7] Sec. 1.  Direct contempt punished summarily. - A person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court or judge as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court or judge, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so, may be summarily adjudged in contempt by such court or judge x x x x

[8] Cf. De Guia v. Guerrero, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1099, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 625.

[9] Rollo, pp. 15-31.

[10] Id., pp. 113-121.

[11] Alcuaz v. PSBA, G.R. No. 76353, 2 May 1988, 161 SCRA 7.

[12] Contado v. Tan, No. L-49299, 15 April 1988, 160 SCRA 404.

[13] Alvarez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59621, 23 February 1988, 158 SCRA 57.