FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108733.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENANTE
PAREL y TEJAMO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case hinges on the issue of whether the circumstantial
evidence now on record constitutes an unbroken chain sufficient to convict the
accused Renante Parel y Tejamo of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila found him guilty, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
the victim Leticia Perez P50,000.00 for her death and P70,412.00
for actual damages, and to pay the costs.
Leticia Perez was residing in a three-storey building at
The other employees of Le Mars were Jean Santollo and a certain Luz who
worked as countergirls, Mary Yurag as cashier, Steve as cook, Erwin as kitchen
helper, and Samuel Terrado, Jun Recente, Rocky Solis and Lito Perenia. Estrellita San Luis, a half-sister of
Leticia, was supervisor. Estrellita was
also the common-law wife of accused-appellant.
Renante used to work at Le Mars as a kitchen helper until 1991
when he transferred to other restaurants as temporary cook, although he would
always hang around Le Mars where he would substitute the regular cook
whenever the latter was not available on Sundays. He would also fetch Estrellita regularly from
the restaurant after work.[2]
On
Michael arrived at about P4,000.00 in the
cash register. Leticia told Michael to
put the amount in her bag. Michael noted
that aside from the P4,000.00 he placed inside his mother's bag there
were smaller denominations worth P2,000.00. Then he left.
Meantime, Leticia told Jean Santollo to take care of answering the telephone calls as she was going up to her
bedroom to rest, taking her bag with her.
Mary Yurag took over as cashier up to
At
At about this time Marita Banaban arrived from Bicol and went
straight to her sister's bedroom on the third floor. The two sisters talked for about twenty
minutes after which Marita left.[6]
At three-forty-five that afternoon, while on duty as a
countergirl, Jean caught sight of the accused in front of the restaurant. She asked him where he was going. He replied that he was seeing his employer
for some money. At four-thirty, Mary
went to the bedroom of Leticia and turned over P828.00 to her. When Mary went down to the second floor, she
saw Renante and Samuel trading jokes. As
she fixed herself, Renante kidded her that she should go home as she was
already married. Mary left.[7]
At
At four-forty-five Jean received a telephone call for
Estrellita. Jean told the caller that
Estrellita was not there, only appellant.
Jean looked for Renante but did not find him, so she informed the caller
that he must have already left.
Appellant then appeared near the kitchen and asked her if Estrellita
called. Then he went to the comfort room
near the stairs and was not seen by Jean anymore after that.[8]
At eight that evening Michael arrived. He went briefly to his bedroom on the third
floor and came down again to supervise the closing of the restaurant. Then he went up to his mother to tell her
that dinner was ready. At that time there
were still employees in the restaurant.
Michael knocked at his mother's door.
There was no answer. He tried to
open her room but the door would not budge.
He repeatedly turned the knob until it finally opened. The room was in darkness. Then Michael saw his mother sprawled on the
floor just below the bed. He lifted her
to her bed. Her body was stiff and her
neck bore a linear abrasion on the anterior aspect.[9]
Meanwhile, at around
Dr. Marcial Cenido of the Medico-Legal Office of the Western
Police District who autopsied the body of Leticia Perez found the cause of
death as asphyxia consistent with strangulation.[10]
On P6,005.00
as he needed the money for his trip with
Estrellita to P3,000.00, the amount left of the P6,000.00
she supposedly received from Renante on
Appellant Renante vehemently denied the charge. He invoked alibi instead. He testified that his family was from
In December 1991 he and Estrellita decided to spend a vacation in
Renante further claimed that on P1,200.00
on that occasion. Estrellita went home
and took her lunch with Renante who by then had already finished washing
clothes. Estrellita went to Divisoria
again while appellant returned to Le Mars to wait for Danilo. Renante arrived at two o'clock in the
afternoon, then went to the second floor to talk with Jean, Samuel and
Luz. He told them that he was going to
wait for Estrellita and Danilo.
At three o'clock he went to the ground floor and saw Mary Yurag who was on duty as cashier. He also saw Marita on the ground floor and spoke to her. He would go in and out of the eatery while waiting for his brother.
At four o'clock that afternoon, Danilo finally arrived on board a
Nissan Patrol jeep accompanied by the driver and another passenger. Danilo handed to Renante an envelop
containing P6,000.00 and explained to him that P3,000.00 was for
him while the balance was for their mother.
Renante then told Richard Depante, an employee at Le Mars who saw
Danilo arrive, that he (Renante) was already leaving. He also requested Richard to inform Leticia
that he and Estrellita would be leaving for their vacation.
According to Renante he left the restaurant and reached home at
around five o'clock in the afternoon. He
told Estrellita that his brother Danilo gave him P6,000.00, P3,000.00
of which was for their mother. They then
went to Carriedo, Quiapo, where they bought two pairs of shoes for Renante for
the total price of P2,500.00. At
eight o'clock in the evening, Marita arrived in their house and they talked
about the planned trip to Bacolod City but not
about the money.
At nine o'clock that evening, Jun, Edwin, Alex, all employees of Le Mars, arrived at the house of Renante and broke the news of Leticia's death to them. Renante, Estrellita and Marita all rushed to Le Mars. Renante and Estrellita went directly to the third floor. Estrellita saw the drawer of Leticia's cabinet already on the floor together with loose changes scattered all over. Leticia's bag was on top of her dresser. According to appellant, at that time Jean, Lito, Jun, Mary, Richard, Erwin, Alex, Ricky and Marita, all employees of the restaurant, were already being investigated by the police but not Renante and Estrellita. Lito was handcuffed after the police investigators found some dollars in his bag.
The following day, 5 March 1992, Renante went to Le Mars and accompanied Michael in buying clothes for his mother and other things. In the afternoon of the same day policemen arrived and invited appellant to Police Station No. 5 for questioning. They theorized that he killed Leticia. From then on he was placed under detention.
On 6 March 1992 Renante was asked by the police if he had any
money. He replied that he was given P6,000.00
by his brother Danilo and that money was already with his wife Estrellita. Sgt. dela Rosa who was grilling Renante
called up Amante Amante to get the money from Estrellita. Estrellita was then asked by her brothers and
sisters to explain where Renante got the P6,000.00. She told them that according to appellant the
money came from his brother Danilo. Even
so, Estrellita was advised by her family to turn over the money to the police. Subsequently, together with Michael and her
family, Estrellita went to the police station where Michael entrusted the money
to Sgt. Salvador Fradejas.
Renante also testified
that Sgt. Alfredo dela Rosa ordered him to sign his name on a piece of paper
and to have his fingers printed on two blank sheets of paper. When he refused, Sgt. dela Rosa hit him on
his side with the butt of a gun and boxed him.
The following day, 7 March 1992, Sgt. dela Rosa directed him to sign the
Booking Sheet and Arrest Report and when he refused he was again
maltreated. Appellant claimed that it
was only that day that Estrellita was allowed to see him in his detention
cell. She told Renante that she gave the
remaining P3,000.00 to the police operatives. Renante chided Estrellita and asked her why
she gave the money when it actually belonged to them. Estrellita told him that she planned to see
his brother Danilo in Batangas to verify if the money had really come from him. She eventually received confirmation from
Danilo, but this notwithstanding, she was advised by her family to leave the
matter to the court.
In this appeal Renante strongly argues that the lower court erred in convicting him solely on the basis of the testimony of Jean Santollo that he was present at the Le Mars Food House on 4 March 1992, and of Marita Banaban that he told her that the money given by the deceased to him and Estrellita for their vacation was "barya lang." He claims that during the entire period that Jean saw him on the second floor of the restaurant until she left him, he was with Luz and Samuel repacking noodles. Hence they could have easily seen him going up the stairs to the third floor and acting strangely or suspiciously. The failure of the prosecution to satisfactorily explain its inability to call Luz and Samuel to the witness stand necessarily creates the presumption that their testimonies if presented would not be favorable to the prosecution.
Appellant likewise asserts that the statement of Jean that it took her some time to look for him when he had a telephone call and then he suddenly appeared in the kitchen was the only basis for the court a quo to conclude, rather precipitately, that he must have gone up to the bedroom of Leticia, divested her of cash and in the process strangled her, after which he hurried down to the ground floor and into the kitchen. He maintains that the conclusion is unfounded. Even as Jean had spoken with him personally and thus could have observed his agitated state, i.e., he appeared exhausted or was perspiring profusely, she nonetheless testified that there was no indication of any abnormal behavior resulting from his alleged unusual exertion of energy in going up to the third floor, strangling the victim, robbing her and rushing back to the ground floor. Finally, he contends that the evidence of the prosecution does not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he robbed and killed Leticia.[12]
Indeed the guilt of the accused has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, hence, he must be acquitted.
The alleged extrajudicial admission of appellant that he was the
one who robbed and killed the deceased cannot be used as evidence against
him. The trial court correctly held this
confession to be inadmissible in evidence for being constitutionally infirmed. The prosecution failed to demonstrate that
appellant while under custodial investigation was duly informed of his
constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent or that he waived said
rights, if indeed he did so, in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. According to the prosecution,
on 5 March 1992, while Sgt. Fradejas was investigating appellant, Estrellita
arrived with a lawyer for appellant.
Forthwith, Sgt. Fradejas stopped the questioning but appellant remained
in detention. The following day, 6 March
1992, Sgt. Margallo and SPO1 Buluran of the WPD Homicide Section resumed the
investigation and in the course thereof appellant orally admitted that he
strangled Leticia to death after divesting her of cash amounting to P6,005.00.[13]
Under Sec. 12, par. 1, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, any
person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. The right to be informed
carries with it the correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to
explain, and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject
understanding what is being conveyed.
Since what is sought to be attained is comprehension, the degree of explanation
required will vary and depend on the education, intelligence and other relevant
and personal circumstances of the person being investigated. In further ensuring the right to counsel, it
is not enough that the subject be informed of that right; he should also be
asked whether he wants to avail himself of the same and should be told that he
can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one will be
provided him at his request. If he
decides not to retain a counsel of his choice or avail himself of one to be
provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such
waiver, to be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of
counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer.[14]
Even assuming that in the instant case the extrajudicial confession made by appellant spoke the truth and was not extracted through violence or intimidation, still the failure of the police investigators to inform appellant of his right to remain silent, coupled with the denial of his right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal assistance when he waived his constitutional rights, rendered the confession inadmissible under Sec. 12, par. 3, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution.
To sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide, which is primarily an offense against property, it is essential that
the robbery itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of the homicide alone is not sufficient
to support a conviction for the crime of homicide with robbery.[15] The taking with intent to gain of personal
property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation of
person or using force upon things are the essential elements of robbery. There is robbery with homicide when by reason
or on the occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.[16]
In the instant case, two things must be borne in mind: first, there was no eyewitness either
to the robbery or to the homicide; and second, none of the things
allegedly stolen was ever recovered. If
there was any proof to support the charge, the same was entirely
circumstantial in character. The
circumstances which were made the basis for appellant's conviction
were: (1) the admission of appellant
that he and his live-in partner Estrellita were leaving for Bacolod City for
their vacation; (2) the testimony of the doctor who examined the cadaver of the
victim that the latter died by strangulation at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of 4 March 1992; (3) the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the admission of appellant that he was
present at the restaurant at four o'clock that afternoon of 4 March 1992; (4)
the testimony of prosecution witness Mary Yurag that after she turned over the
earnings for that day to the deceased inside her bedroom on the third floor,
she went down to the second floor and found appellant there at about four
o'clock in the afternoon talking to Samuel Terrado, an employee of the
restaurant; (5) the testimony of Jean Santollo that at about four-thirty in the
afternoon of the same day she saw appellant inside the restaurant standing by
the stairway but fifteen minutes later, just when he was needed on the phone,
he was nowhere to be seen although thereafter he abruptly appeared in the
kitchen; (6) the testimony of Michael Perez, son of the deceased, that while
inside the restaurant he placed P4,000.00 in 100-peso bills in his
mother's bag and that he saw, aside from the P4,000.00, smaller
denominations of about P2,000.00; (7) the testimonies of police
investigators that they saw the lifeless body of Leticia on the bed and that her bag was lying
on top of her dresser about a meter from the bed already open and, without any
money or jewelry but only a woman's
personal things; (8) the admission of appellant and his common-law wife
Estrellita who testified in his behalf that he received P6,000.00 from
his brother Danilo who came over to Le Mars, and that half of the amount
was for him while the other half was for their mother in Bacolod City.
As there were no eyewitnesses to the alleged robbery, and
although the evidence already showed that at the time of the killing the money
in the bag of the deceased was missing, it cannot be presumed that there was
robbery.[17] It is essential to prove intent to rob. This necessarily includes evidence to the
effect that the accused carried away the effects or personalty of the
deceased. In the instant case, there is
absence of positive proof that appellant intended to rob the deceased or that
he was the one who carried away the money belonging to the victim. His mere presence at the locus criminis is not sufficient to implicate him.[18]
The admission of appellant that he had in his possession P6,000.00
allegedly given to him by his brother cannot lend support to the prosecution's
theory that he robbed the deceased.
While the evidence of the defense that the P6,000.00 really
belonged to the accused is rather weak, the burden of proof still rests on the
prosecution to establish that the P3,000.00 turned over to the police by
his live-in partner was part of the loot.
It is essential in robbery that the personalty taken from the accused
does not belong to him but to complainant or another.[19] In failing to discharge such burden of
proof, the court cannot rely on mere presumptions and conjectures to convict
the accused.
Similarly, the circumstances presented by the prosecution are
inadequate to demonstrate clearly and persuasively that it was appellant who killed Leticia. The proferred justification for the killing
is an affirmative allegation that must be proved with certainty by sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing evidence.[20] The mere presence of appellant on the second
floor does not even indicate that he went up to the third floor with the
intention to rob the deceased and that by reason of the robbery he strangled
her to death. It should be emphasized
that in all the instances when the prosecution witnesses saw appellant on the
second floor he was always in the company of one or two employees of the
restaurant. None of these witnesses
testified that they actually saw appellant going up to the third floor just
before Leticia was slain. In fact, his
presence in the eatery was a usual and ordinary occurrence since his live-in
partner was employed there and was also a half-sister of the deceased. Moreover, even if he had already resigned
from Le Mars, he would work there on Sundays whenever the regular cook
was absent. Indeed, there is paucity of
evidence indicating that other than appellant, no other person had or could
have had access to Leticia's bedroom on
the third floor where the money was kept.
The prosecution has not completely discounted the possibility that there
could have been other intruders. In the
final analysis, the circumstances demonstrated by the prosecution have
engendered doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of Renante Parel.
It is a fundamental evidentiary rule in criminal law that the
prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the
accused. Ei incumbit probatio non qui
negat. He who asserts - not he who
denies - must prove. As oft-repeated,
the conviction of the accused must rest
not on the weakness of his defense but on the strength of the prosecution. Hence, circumstantial evidence which has not
been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the
basis of conviction.[21]
Circumstantial evidence must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent. Furthermore, to sustain a conviction upon
circumstantial evidence alone, the circumstances proved should form an unbroken
chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion proving that the accused is
the author of the crime, to the exclusion of all others.[22] These requirements are not met in the
instant case. This Court finds that
although the evidence for the defense is dismally weak, the evidence for the
prosecution is no better. It is not
strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.[23] This doubt, combined with the constitutional
presumption of innocence which can only be overthrown by the strength of the
prosecution's own evidence, leads us quite irretrievably to a judgment of
acquittal for appellant.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the conviction by the court a quo of accused-appellant RENANTE PAREL y TEJAMO is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ACQUITTING him of the crime charged. He is ordered immediately released from custody unless detained for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Records, pp. 132-133.
[2] Id., p. 132.
[3] Id., p.133.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Id.,
pp.133-134.
[6] Id., p.
134.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Id.,
p.135.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Id., pp.
136-137.
[11] TSN, 15 June 1992, pp. 16-18.
[12] Appellant's Brief, Rollo, pp. 87-110.
[13] Decision penned by Judge Romeo J.
Callejo, RTC-Br. 49, Manila (now Associate Justice, Court of Appeals).
[14] People v. Agustin, G.R. No. 110290, 25 January 1995, 240
SCRA 541.
[15] See People v. Pagal,
No. L-32040, 25 October 1977, 79 SCRA 570.
[16] People v. Barlis, G.R. No. 101003, 24 March 1994, 231 SCRA
426; People v. Pacala, No. L-26647, 15 August 1974, 58 SCRA 370.
[17] People v. Ambahang, 108
Phil. 325 (1960).
[18] Rollo, p.
93.
[19] Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, p.95; see
People v. Pacala, Note 15.
[20] People v. Osigan,
G.R. No. 102980, 28 June 1993, 223 SCRA 742.
[21] People v. Ilaoa, G.R. No. 94308, 16 June 1994, 233 SCRA
231.
[22] People v. Genobia,
G.R. No. 110058, 3 August 1994, 234 SCRA 699.
[23] People v. Salangga, G.R. No. 100910, 25 July 1994, 234
SCRA 407.