FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 108179.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO MALAZARTE alias Nolly, defendant-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Appellant Manolito Malazarte with Arnold Morales were charged
with the crime of murder in the following information filed with the
That on or about the 14th
day of April, 1991, at about 11:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate
intent, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and shot one Jimmy
Balansag[1] with handgun hitting the latter upon vital
parts of his body and inflicting upon him the following physical injuries:
HEMORRHAGE INTRABANIAL (sic), EXTENSIVE, SEVERE, SECONDARY TO GUNSHOT WOUND OF THE HEAD, LEFT SIDE
and as a consequence of said injuries Jimmy Balansag died few minutes later.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
A warrant for the arrest of the two accused was issued on
On May 6, 1991, counsel for accused Morales filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation and Reconsideration assailing the inclusion of the
said accused in the information despite the admission of Malazarte that he
alone planned and perpetrated the killing.
The motion also alleged that the supporting affidavits of the witnesses
were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy
between the two accused.[4]
The trial court granted the motion.[5]
In his reinvestigation report, Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo V.
Perez recommended the dismissal of the case as against accused Morales as
“there is no sufficient evidence to engender a well-founded belief that accused
Arnold Morales connived and conspired with Manolito Malazarte in the killing of
Jimmy Balansag.”[6]
The report was with the express approval of
City Prosecutor Jufelinito R. Pareja.[7]
On
During the hearing on
The facts as established by the record are as follows:
Aileen Balanzar[10]
was with her husband, victim Jimmy Balanzar, on the night of
The medico-legal report prepared by Dr. Tomas P. Refe showed that
23-year-old Jimmy Balanzar died of a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the left side of the occipital
region, proceeded forward and upward through the skin and soft tissues,
lacerated the brain and lodged underneath the fractured frontal bone.[11]
Dr. Refe testified that the assailant must have fired the gun
from behind the victim at a distance beyond 24 inches because there was no
evidence of near contact firing, like gun powder tattooing and burning. Based on the trajectory of the bullet and the
fact that the victim was standing, the assailant must have been standing also.[12]
Aileen Balanzar was presented by the defense as a hostile witness
to prove that she did not witness the actual shooting and that appellant “was
under the influence of liquor.”[13]
Aileen testified that as early as
Prior to the incident, Aileen did not know the names of the two
accused although appellant lived in their neighborhood. She came to know appellant’s name only after
the incident as he lived a bit far from their place. As to Arnold Morales, Aileen came to know his
name through a certain Atil who told her that, earlier that day, Morales was
looking for Arnel Balansag (sic), the brother of her husband.[15]
The defense also presented Antonio Cadungog, a Social Security
System pensioner who sold cigarettes to earn additional income. He claimed to be the friend of appellant’s
father and had known appellant since he was a child.[16]
On the night of
According to Cadungog, at about
On
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, this Court finds the accused Manolito
Malazarte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined and
penalized in accordance with Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes upon him the penalty by way of imprisonment, of reclusion perpetua,
to indemnify the surviving spouse and the heirs the amount of P50,000.00
and finally with costs against him.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and disregarding that of the defense. He asserts the trial court erred in convicting him of the crime of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant points out that Aileen Balanzar, in paragraph 3 of her affidavit, made a categorical declaration that she and her husband were sitting on the bench of the Sto. Niño team, but she did not declare that she saw him shoot her husband from behind.
He stresses that during Aileen’s testimony in court, she contradicted her affidavit by saying that while watching the basketball game, she was standing behind her husband with him on her left side and, for no apparent reason, appellant shot her husband.
He further claims that Aileen’s declaration in her affidavit that she was beside her husband when he was shot is more realistic and consistent with human experience because a wife always wants to be by her husband’s side. In such a position, appellant contends, it was impossible for her to identify the people standing or sitting behind her or notice what they were doing, without turning her head.
Appellant concludes that Aileen did not see the assailant fire
the shot which killed her husband.[19]
Appellant asserts that, on the contrary, the testimony of Antonio Cadungog is more credible as this does not suffer from any inconsistencies. Furthermore, Cadungog’s testimony that appellant was not the assailant is of the highest degree of sincerity and honesty as it was not motivated by any ill feeling towards the prosecution.
Appellant’s arguments hinge primarily on the issue of credibility of witnesses.
This Court has held in a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal, as the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having observed the deportment of the witnesses and their manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked, which, if considered, might have affected the outcome of the case.[20] We do not see any reason to depart from this well-entrenched rule.
There is actually no discrepancy between Aileen’s affidavit and her testimony in court. They can be reconciled. In paragraph 4 of her affidavit,[21] she said she saw two persons conspiring with each other, shoot her husband once, hitting him on the back of his head, although she did not mention who actually pulled the trigger. Perhaps, because of the existence of conspiracy between the two accused, she believed, it was not particularly important to point out who of them actually shot her husband. Assuming that there is such a discrepancy, the same does not destroy Aileen Balanzar’s credibility. This Court has consistently held that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the
statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness
stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are
generally incomplete. Affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because they
are oftentimes executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident
which has transpired. Further,
affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind
because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the
affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to them.[22]
As regards the circumstances of the crime, testimonial evidence carries more weight than affidavits.[23]
Furthermore, Aileen’s testimony in court is consistent with that of Dr. Tomas P. Refe, the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim.[24] Her testimony that as she was standing behind her husband, and that appellant, who was on her left side, shot her husband, dovetails with Dr. Refe’s finding that, based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant must have been behind the victim who must have been standing like the assailant.
Appellant’s allegation that it is unbelievable for him to have
committed the crime considering that, as Aileen herself admitted, no bad blood
existed between him and the victim, simply does not hold water. Lack of enmity or “bad blood” between the
culprit and the victim prior to the incident does not affect the credibility of
the prosecution evidence.[25]
Crimes have been attributed to persons who appear to have no reason for
committing them as long as they have been clearly identified as the offenders. Motive gains importance only when the
identity of the culprit is suspect. Such
is not the case here.[26]
On the other hand, it was not established that the sole
prosecution witness had a motive to testify against appellant. Absent evidence to show any reason or motive
why witnesses for the prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that their testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit.[27]
We agree with the trial court that the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any crime against a person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[28] As found by the trial court, appellant strategically positioned himself behind the victim and aimed the fatal shot at his head at the time when the victim’s attention was on the basketball game.[29] Such mode of attack deliberately resorted to by the appellant did not give the victim any opportunity to defend himself.
Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is
punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In the absence of any mitigating or generic
aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period[30]
or reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City finding appellant Manolito Malazarte guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the payment to the heirs of Jimmy Balanzar the indemnity of P50,000.00,
is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1]
Appears as Balazar in the records.
[2]
Original Record, p. 1.
[3]
Id.., at p. 11.
[4]
Id.., at 12.
[5]
Id., at 17.
[6]
Original Record, p. 19.
[7]
Id., at 20.
[8]
Id., at 23.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
She signed her name as Aileen Balanzar (not Balansag) in the sworn statement
found on page 3 of the Record.
[11]
Exhibit A.
[12]
TSN., August 7, 1991, pp. 2-4.
[13]
TSN., August 21, 1991, p. 1.
[14]
In her sworn statement, Aileen Balanzar heard one of them say, “Unsa ku-anon
na nato” while the other answered, “Onia na lang” (Record, p. 3).
[15]
TSN., August 21, 1991, pp. 4-10.
[16]
Appellant was 20 years old when the crime transpired. (Exhibit B.)
[17]
TSN, September 18, 1991, pp. 3-7.
[18]
Penned by Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas.
[19]
Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, p. 67.
[20]
People v. Cabiles, 248 SCRA 207 (1995); People v. Acuña, 248 SCRA 668 (1995).
[21]
See note 1 at p. 3.
[22]
People v. Manuel, 236 SCRA 545 (1994) citing People v. Sarellana,
233 SCRA 31 (1994) and People v. Ponferada, 220 SCRA 46 (1993).
[23]
People v. Matildo, 230 SCRA 635 (1994).
[24]
People v. Amaro, 235 SCRA 8 (1994).
[25] People v. Flores, 237 SCRA 653 (1994).
[26]
Thirty-nine (39) residents of Barangay Luz in Cebu City submitted a petition
endorsed by Barangay Captain Nemesio Pagador appealing for the reduction of
appellant’s liability from that of murder to homicide on the ground that
appellant is “not a brazen criminal but he was only able to do the killing
because of the brutal murder of his older brother and the constant provocation
of the victim who was the younger brother of the murderer of his older
brother.” (Rollo, p. 46) This
possible motive was not brought out at the trial but even if it was, still the
Court will arrive at the same conclusion as to the crime committed by appellant
considering the sufficiency of evidence therefor.
[27]
People v. Pacapac, 248 SCRA 77
(1995).
[28]
People v. 248 SCRA 609 (1995).
[29]
Decision, see note 1 at p. 62.
[30]
Art. 64(1), Revised Penal Code.