EN BANC
[G.R. No. 120295.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755.
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon—
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation;
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid votes; or
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred"?
In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules
of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution
of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1
promulgated on
The Facts
On
"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and
declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of
Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes8.dated
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
RaulR.Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but
promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the
Comelec en bane directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of
proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the
province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at
On
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R.
Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene
and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G.
Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest
number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30,1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due implementation thereof."
On
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following propositions":15
"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor; and
Fourth - Correctly read
and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's
proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon."
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division,
promulgated on
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on
3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course
or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively
on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after
notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election." (Italics supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on
On
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction
in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from
assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered
within ( the period referred to in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days
before the elections"?
The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
"Sec. 39. Qualifications. — (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of
27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the
same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and
thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now,
he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and
a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now
boasts of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of
reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than
the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous
cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent Comelec, arguing the
validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of
said Decree at
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress — once created—to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues
that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was
"filed on
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States — a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace — and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 10465430 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not — and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995—the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) began—he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications — unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence — should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term — in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised
during the oral argument34 to the effect that the
citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for
that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39,
apart from requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another
item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under
the law35
a "voter" must be a citizen of the
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration—not the actual voting—is the core of this "qualification." In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern — and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized—and Lee has
not disputed — that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his
registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x
x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly
maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of
Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact,
his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic) his
eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all
the previous elections including on
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold
that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on
It is true that under the Civil Code of the
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these women—the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and curative."
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time
that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law
itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be
deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent
of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events — i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law came into being
— in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest
effect and expression, then there is all
the more reason to have the law apply
in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo on
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his American citizenship — was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee
was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within
relatively short spans of time after the same were filed.48 The fact that
such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to
repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the
government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of
wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in connection with or
as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the
instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people,
already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is
nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having
become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as
a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered
as having been repatriated—i.e., his Filipino citizenship restored — as of
It is not disputed that on
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated
"By the laws of the
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign
nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively
rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission
are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a
Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution53
of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and
executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order having
been issued by this Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee
"was proclaimed as the elected governor on
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution:55
"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided
that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of
the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final
judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence
it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."
The Third Issue: Comelec's
Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 — "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations —of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a
proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days
after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the final outcome of this case."
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor and not Lee—should be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."
Second. As we have
earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and
inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections,
he—not Lee —should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently
erroneous and should now be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.— A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions
are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First
Division) on
"SEC. 6. Effect of
Disqualification Case.— Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
(Italics supplied)
Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship maybe reacquired by xxx repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening repatriation has changed his political status — not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its own citizens — not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates" and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree — we must all follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of
philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to
elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or
its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in isolation or
in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to
err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little
understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice rejected candidate upon the
electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an
unacceptable assault upon this Court's conscience.
EPILOGUE
In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local
Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of
the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to
which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and
effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor
impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have
been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the
remedial or curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is
to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor,
during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S.
nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement
of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of governor, and
should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his
reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."67
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., J. dissenting opinion
Puno., J. concurring opinion
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Regalado, Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., pro hac vice.
Melo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J. and Mendoza, J., took no part.
1 Composed of Pres. Comm. Regalado E.
Maambong, ponente; Comm. Graduacion
A.R. Claravall, concurring, and Comm. Julio F. Desamito, dissenting.
2 In SPC No. 95-317, entitled Juan G. Frivaldo, petitioner, vs. Raul R.
Lee, respondent; Rollo, pp.
110-129.
3 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo,
Comms. Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, Manolo B. Gorospe
and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores. Chairman Pardo certified that "Commissioner
Julio F. Desamito was on official travel at the time of the deliberation and
resolution of this case. However, the Commission has reserved to Comm. Desamito
the right to submit a dissenting opinion." Rollo, pp. 159-171.
4 Rollo,
pp. 46-49.
5 Rollo,
pp. 50-55. The Second Division was composed of Pres. Comm. Remedies A.
Salazar-Fernando, ponente; Comm.
Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores, concurring, and Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe ("on
official business").
6 Frivaldo was naturalized as an American
citizen on
7 Signed by Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo and
the six incumbent commissioners, namely, Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A.
Salazar-Femando, Manolo B. Gorospe, Graduacion A. Reyes-Claravall, Julio F.
Desamito and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores; Rollo,
pp. 56-57.
8. Rollo,
p. 60.
9 Rollo,
pp. 61-67.
10 Rollo,
pp. 86-87. The Comelec considered the votes cast for Frivaldo as
"stray votes," and thus Lee was held as having garnered the
"highest number of votes."
11 Rollo,
pp. 88-97. This is the forerunner of the present case.
12 211 SCRA 297 (
13 Rollo,
pp. 110-128.
14 Rollo,
pp. 159-170.
15 Rollo,
pp. 16-17; petition, pp. 14-15.
16 Rollo,
pp. 10-15. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 5.
17 Rollo,
pp. 16-17. This is the same resolution referred to in footnote no. 7.
18 Rollo,
pp. 18-21. This is signed also by the Chairman and the six other Comelec
Commissioners
19 Republic Act No. 7160.
20 See footnote no. 6, supra.
21 In debunking Frivaldo's claim of
citizenship, this Court in G.R. No. 87193, supra,
p. 254, observed that "(i)f he (Frivaldo) really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, petitioner should
have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under C.A. No. 63 as
amended by C.A. No. 473 and P.D. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation."
22 Supra,
p. 794.
23 Petition, p. 27; Rollo, p. 29.
24 The full text of said memorandum reads as
follows:
"MEMORANDUM
TO
: The Solicitor General
The
Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs
The
Director-General
National
Intelligence Coordinating Agency
The previous administration's practice of
granting citizenship by Presidential Decree or any other executive issuance,
and the derivative administrative authority thereof, poses a serious and
contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of
prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first
Congress under the 1987 Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, you as Chairman
and members of the Special Committee on Naturalization, are hereby directed to
cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your
functional area of responsibility, as defined in Letter of Instructions No. 270
dated April 11, 1975, as amended, Presidential Decree No. 836 dated December 3,
1975, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1379 dated May 17, 1978, relative
to the grant of citizenship under the said laws, and any other related laws,
orders, issuances and rules and regulations.
(Sgd.) Corazon C. Aquino
25 Art. 7, Civil Code of the
26 Cf.
Ty, et al. vs. Trampe, et al, G.R. No. 117577 (
27 Petition, p. 28; Rollo p. 30.
28 The aforesaid Manifestation reads as
follows:
"MANIFESTATION
The Solicitor General,
as Chairman of the Special Committee on Naturalization, hereby manifests that
the following persons have been repatriated by virtue of Presidential Decree
No. 725, since June 8, 1995:
1. Juan Gallanosa
Frivaldo R-000900
2. Manuel Reyes
Sanchez 901
3. Ma. Nelly
Dessalla Ty 902
4. Terry Herrera
and
Antonio Ching 903
5. Roberto Salas
Benedicto 904
6.
7. Samuel M. Buyco
906
8. Joselito
Holganza Ruiz 907
9. Samuel
Villanueva 908
10. Juan Leonardo
Collas, Jr. 909
11. Felicilda Otilla
Sacnanas-Chua 910”
29 The
text of P.D. 725 is reproduced below:
"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725
PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO WOMEN
WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF NATURAL
BORN FILIPINOS.
WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who
had lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens;
WHEREAS, while the new Constitution allows a
Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship unless
by her act or omission, she is deemed under the law to have renounced her
Philippine citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does not apply
to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect;
WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
amended) allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their citizenship
by reason of their marriage to aliens only after the death of their husbands or
the termination of their marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos
who have lost their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship;
Now, THEREFORE, I,
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order that: (1) Filipino
women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and (2)
natural born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instructions No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation
shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration.
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby
authorized to promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the appropriate
forms and the required fees for the effective implementation of this Decree.
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
Done in the City of
30 See
footnote no. 6, supra
31 Cf.
Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec, 211 SCRA 297 (
32 "The term of office of all local
elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code shall be three
(3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided
for by law, x x x." Sec. 43, Local Government Code.
33 96 Phil. 447,453 (1955).
34 The
following are excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the oral
argument held on
"JUSTICE
PANGANIBAN: Mr. Counsel, it is your position then that the candidate should be
a citizen at the time of proclamation?
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
Yes, Your Honor, it is required that he must be a citizen at the time of
proclamation and not only that, at the time that he assumes the office he must
have the continuing qualification as a citizen.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Should that not be reckoned from the time of filing of certificate of candidacy
or at least the day of the election?
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
Yes, Your Honor, there are positions taken that it should be reckoned from the
date of certificate of candidacy as in the case of qualification for Batasang
Pambansa before under B.P. 53 — it says that for purposes of residence it must
be reckoned x x x from the time of the filing of the certificate, for purposes
of age, from the time of the date of the election. But when we go over all the
provisions of law under current laws, Your Honor, there is no qualification
requirement insofar as citizenship is concern(ed) as to when, as to when you
should be a citizen of the Philippines and we say that if there is no provision
under any existing law which requires that you have to be a citizen of the
Philippines on the date of the filing or on the date of election then it has to
be equitably interpreted to mean that if you are already qualified at the time
that the office is supposed to be assumed then you should be allowed to assume
the office.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Is it not also true that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate should
also be a registered voter and to be a registered voter one must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
Yes, Your Honor, in fact, Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of
Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he voted again in 1995. In
fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned but the Court dismissed (sic)
his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in
all the previous elections including on
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
But the fact that he voted does not make him a citizen. The fact is, he was
declared not a citizen by this Court twice.
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
That is true, Your Honor, we admit that he has been twice declared not citizen
and we admit the ruling of the Supreme Court is correct but the fact is, Your
Honor, the matter of his eligibility to vote as being a registered voter was
likewise questioned before the judiciary. There was a ruling by the Municipal
Court, there was a ruling by the Regional Trial Court and he was sustained as a
valid voter, so he voted.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I raised this question in connection with your contention that citizenship
should be determined as of the time of proclamation and not as of the time of
the election or at the time'of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
That is true, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
And is it your contention that under the law, particularly the Local Autonomy
Code, the law does not specify when citizenship should be possessed by the
candidate, is that not correct?
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
That is right, Your Honor, there is no express provision.
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
I am also asking you that under the Local Autonomy Code the candidate for
governor or for other local positions should be a voter and to be a voter one
must be a citizen?
ATTY. BRILLANTES:
That is right, Your Honor, but the fact of voting is not an issue here because
he was allowed to vote and . he did in fact vote and in fact, he was a
registered voter." (TSN, March 19. 1996.)
35 Section 117, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
otherwise known as "The Omnibus Election Code of the
36 Comment, p. 11; Rollo, p. 259.
37 See footnote no. 33.
38 Section 253 reads as follows:
"Section 253. Petition for quo warranto.— Any voter
contesting the election of any member of the Congress, regional, provincial, or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the
Any voter
contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyally to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a
sworn petition for quo warranto with
the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court,
respectively, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 189, par. 2, 1978 EC)."
39 Art. 4, New Civil Code. See also Gallardo vs. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500 (May
25,1988), and Nilo vs. Court of Appeals, 128
SCRA 519 (April 2,1984).
40 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
"Exceptions to
Rule. — Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1)
when the law itself so expressly provides, (2) in case of remedial statutes,
(3) in case of curative statutes, (4) in case of laws interpreting others, and
(5) in case of laws creating new rights."
41 id., p.
25.
42 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed.,
pp. 270-271.
43 73 Am Jur 2d, sec. 354, p. 489, cited in Castro vs. Sagales, 94 Phil. 208,210
(1953).
44 Memorandum, p. 9.
45 73
Am Jur 2d, Sec. 351, p. 488.
46 73 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 354, p. 490; italics
supplied.
47 Art. 10, Civil Code of the
48 Based on the "Corrected
Compliance" dated
49 "SEC. 40. Disqualifications.— The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) Those with dual
citizenship";
50 P.
11; Rollo, p. 259.
51
Resolution, p. 12; Rollo, p.
121.
52 Cf.
Navarro vs. Commission on Elections,
228 SCRA 596 (
53 The dispositive portion of said Resolution
reads:
"WHEREFORE,
this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is
DISQUALIFIED to run for the office of Provincial Governor of Sorsogon on the
ground that he is not a citizen of the
54 Petition, p. 19; Rollo, p. 21.
55 Resolution promulgated on
56 42 SCRA 561, 565 (
57
Art. IX, Sec. 2.
58 SPC No. 95-317 is entitled "Annulment
of Proclamation" and contains the following prayer:
"WHEREFORE, it
is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that after due notice
and hearing an Oder (sic) /Resolution/ Decision be issued as follows:
a)
Annulling/setting aside the
b) Ordering the
proclamation of the petitioner as duly elected governor of Sorsogon;
xxx xxx xxx
59 229 SCRA 666, 674 (
60 211 SCRA 297, 309 (
61 G.R. No. 120265,
62 Supra,
at p. 312.
63 See footnotes 2 and 3.
64 174 SCRA 245, 254 (
65 Salonga and
66 In Espinosa
vs. Aquino, (Electoral Case No. 9, Senate Electoral Tribunal [SET]), the
election of the late Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. was upheld, despite his not
being of the required age on the day of the election, although he celebrated
his thirty-fifth birthday before his proclamation. Much later, in 1990, this
Court held in Aznar vs. Comelec (185
SCRA 703, May 25, 1990) that even if Emilio "Lito" Osmena held an Alien
Certificate of Registration as an American citizen, he was still not
disqualified from occupying the local elective post of governor, since such
certificate did not preclude his being "still
a Filipino." The holding in Aquino
was subsequently nullified by the adoption of the 1987 Constitution (Art.
VI, Sec. 3), which specified that the age qualification must be possessed on
the day of the elections, and not on the day of the proclamation of the winners
by the board of canvassers. On the other hand, Sec. 40 of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991 ) which took effect on January 1, 1992 ,
provides that those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any
elective local position, and effectively overturns the ruling in Aznar. But the point is that to the
extent possible, and unless there exist provisions to the contrary, the laws
have always been interpreted to give fullest effect to the political will.
67 Benito
vs. Commission on Elections, 235 SCRA 436, 442 (
68
This antagonism was clearly present in the two earlier cases involving
Frivaldo. See footnote no. 6.