FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109946.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MYLO O. QUINTO and JESUSA
CHRISTINE S. CHUPUICO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals holding that the mortgages in favor of the bank were void and ineffectual because when constituted the mortgagors, who were merely applicants for free patent of the property mortgaged, were not the owners thereof in fee simple and therefore could not validly encumber the same.[1]
On
On 2 November 1978 the Olidiana spouses filed with the Bureau of
Lands a Request for Amendment of
their Free Patent applications over several parcels of land including Lot No.
2029 (PIs-61). In this request they renounced, relinquished and waived all
their rights and interests over
On
Thereafter, for failure of
In view of the discovery, petitioner filed an action for Quieting of Title and Cancellation or
Annulment of Certificate of Title against respondents. After trial the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, rendered judgment
against petitioner.[6]
The court ruled that the contracts of mortgage entered into by petitioner and
the subsequent foreclosure of subject property could not have vested valid
title to petitioner bank because the mortgagors were not the owners in fee
simple of the property mortgaged. The court also found the mortgages over
The factual findings of the lower court disclose that when the Olidiana spouses mortgaged Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) to petitioner it was still the subject of a miscellaneous sales application by the spouses with the Bureau of Lands. Since there was no showing that the sales application was approved before the property was mortgaged, the trial court concluded that the Olidiana spouses were not yet its owners in fee simple when they mortgaged the property. The lower court also said that with the subsequent issuance of the Free Patent by the Bureau of Lands in the name of respondents Chupuico and Quinto, it could be gleaned that the property was indeed public land when mortgaged to petitioner. Therefore petitioner could not have acquired a valid title over the subject property by virtue of the foreclosure and subsequent sale at public auction.[7]
Resultantly, the trial court declared the following as null and void insofar as they related to Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) being a public land: the real estate mortgage dated 4 April 1978, the second mortgage dated 23 April 1979, the foreclosure sale on 14 April 1983, the certificate of sale registered with the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Sur on 1 September 1983, and the affidavit of consolidation of ownership registered with the Register of Deeds on 2 August 1985.
Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals which likewise ruled in favor of respondents, hence the instant petition.[8]
Petitioner now seeks to overturn the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding that Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) could not have been the subject of a valid mortgage and foreclosure proceeding because it was public land at the time of the mortgage, and that the act of Jesusa Christine S. Chupuico and Mylo 0. Quinto in securing the patents was not tainted with fraud. The crux of this appeal thus lies in the basic issue of whether the land in dispute could have been validly mortgaged while still the subject of a Free Patent Application with the government.[9]
We agree with the court a
quo. We hold that petitioner bank did not acquire valid title over the land
in dispute because it was public land when mortgaged to the bank. We cannot
accept petitioner’s contention that the lot in dispute was no longer public
land when mortgaged to it since the Olidrana spouses had been in open,
continuous, adverse and public possession thereof for more than thirty (30)
years.[10]
In Visayan Realty, Inc. v. Meer[11] we ruled that the approval of a sales
application merely authorized the applicant to take possession of the land so
that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law before a final
patent could be issued in his favor. Meanwhile the government still remained
the owner thereof, as in fact the application could still be canceled and the
land awarded to another applicant should it be shown that the legal requirements
had not been complied with. What divests the government of title to the land is
the issuance of the sales patent and its subsequent registration with the
Register of Deeds. It is the registration and issuance of the certificate of
title that segregate public lands from the mass of public domain and convert it
into private property.[12]
Since the disputed lot in the case before us was still the subject of a Free
Patent Application when mortgaged to petitioner and no patent was granted to
the Olidiana spouses,
With regard to the validity of the mortgage contracts entered into by the parties, Art. 2085, par. 2, of the New Civil Code specifically requires that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged. Thus, since the disputed property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses when they mortgaged it to petitioner the contracts of mortgage and all their subsequent legal consequences as regards Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) are null and void. In a much earlier case[13] we held that it was an essential requisite for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property mortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage was constituted before the issuance of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage in question must of necessity be void and ineffective. For, the law explicitly requires as imperative for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of what is mortgaged.
Finally, anent the contention of petitioner that respondents fraudulently obtained the property in litigation, we also find for the latter. As correctly found by the lower courts, no evidence existed to show that respondents had prior knowledge of the real estate mortgages executed by the Olidiana spouses in favor of petitioner. The act of respondents in securing the patents cannot therefore be categorized as having been tainted with fraud.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice
Consuelo Yfiares-Santiago, Concurred in by Justices Luis H. Javellana and
Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes.
[2] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] DeciSion penned by Judge Camilo E. Tamin,
RTC-Br. 23, Zamboanga del Sur.
[7]
[8]
[9] Petition, pp. 4-5.
[10]
[11] 96 Phil.
515(1955).
[12] Director of Lands v. De Luna, 110 Phil. 28(1960).
[13] Vda. de Bautista v. Marcos, No.